ORDER A. N. Varma, J. -By means of this petition, the validity of an order passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Dehradun dated 4-8-78 is assailed. 2. These are the relevant facts. One Prabha Ram was the original tenant of shop No. 39/40, Paltan Bazar, Dehradun-On 2-4-1976, he moved an application to admit Devender Singh (through whom this petition has been filed) as a partner for doing business in electronic goods with the petitioner. This application was moved in pursuance of the provisions contained under proviso (a) to Rule 10 (6) of the Rules framed under the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972-hereinafter referred to as the Act). This sub-rule empowers the District Magistrate to allot a non-residential building to a partnership firm if he comes to the conclusion that the partnership is a bona fide transaction and not a mere cover for subletting. This application was accompanied by affidavits of Prabha Ram and Devender Singh aforesaid as well as a no objection certificate from the landlord, namely, Jang Bahadur. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer caused an enquiry to be made in pursuance of this application and, thereafter, by an order dated 7-5-1976 directed that the order of allotment be made as prayed for. In pursuance of the said order, an order of allotment was passed in favour of partnership consisting of Prabha Ram and Devender Singh. Subsequently, on 31-5-1976, the respondent No. 3 Ramesh Kumar Kohli filed an application before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to the effect that the aforesaid order of allotment had been obtained by suppression of material facts as well as by misrepresentation of facts. 3. This application was contested by Prabha Ram and Devender Singh. The landlord Jang Bahadur also filed an objection reiterating that the partnership was a genuine transaction, and that in any case, he had recognised Devender Singh and Prabha Ram as his tenants prior to coming into force of U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976, as a result of which, the 'tenants who were in occupation of an accommodation with the consent of the landlord prior to the coming into force of the said U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976 (prior 5-7-1976) are entitled to continue to be in occupation, even though there may be no order of allotment in their favour. 4. Upon the said application of Ramesh Kumar Kohli, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed an order dated 6-4-77 setting aside the order of allotment which had been passed in favour of the partnership, declaring at the same time a vacancy under S. 12 of the Act as well as inviting applications for allotment. Against the aforesaid order dated 6-4-1977, Messrs Bombay T.V. Centre (the name and style under which the said partnership was to function), Devender Singh and Prabha Ram filed a Revision. In this Revision, the parties entered into a compromise on 1-6-77, whereby they agreed that Messrs Bombay T.V. Centre be deemed to be authorised occupants, and that the adjudication and declaration of vacancy be set aside. This application was duly verified by all the parties to the Revision as well as counsel for the parties before the learned Additional District Judge, the learned Additional District Judge recorded the compromise and passed an order dated 1-6-1977 allowing the Revision and directing the shop to be allotted in favour of Devender Singh and Prabha Ram carrying on business under the name and style of "Messrs Bombay T.V. Centre." By the same order, the declaration of vacancy was set aside. Against this order, the Respondents Nos. 3, 4 and 5 filed a review application which has been allowed by the learned District Judge by the order dated 4-8-78 against which this petition is directed. The learned District Judge reviewed the order passed by his predecessor, set aside the order dated 1-6-1977 and dismissed the Revision filed by the petitioner as not maintainable. It is against this order that the petition is directed. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted the following points for my consideration :- 1. The order passed by the learned District Judge dated 12-8-1978 is patently without jurisdiction inasmuch as the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 does not contain any provision for review of an order passed by a District Judge under Section 18 of the said Act; 2. Even if it be assumed that the Court did have power to recall an order passed earlier on grounds which are recognised as permissible for recalling orders passed by a court or authority such as fraud or misrepresentation, ignorance of real facts or inadvertence and the like, "in the present case, no such error could be found in the order dated 1-6-1977. Consequently, the order passed by the learned District Judge recalling the order dated 1-6-1977 is on the face of it without jurisdiction. 3. The order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 6-4-1977 recalling the order of allotment dated 7-5-76 is manifestly unsustainable in law. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that the order passed by the learned District Judge dated 1-6-77 was without jurisdiction and patently illegal. It was, therefore, rightly recalled by the learned District Judge. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the view that the impugned order dated 4-8-78 is patently without jurisdiction and illegal, and is, therefore, liable to be set aside. 8. Points Nos. 1 and 2 being interconnected are being taken up together. It was not disputed by the learned counsel for the respondents that there is no specific power for review under the statute. The learned District Judge, therefore, could not review the order passed by his predecessor on merits. However, it was contended by counsel for the respondents that in view of the provisions of Section 34 (8) and Rule 22 (f) of the Rules framed under the Act, the learned District Judge certainly had power to recall the order dated 1-6-1977 for the ends of justice and to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. 9. In order to appreciate the controversy, it would be useful to reproduce briefly the precise grounds upon which the learned District Judge has recalled the order passed by his predecessor. These are : 1. The Revision filed by the petitioner against the order dated 6-4-1977 was not maintainable; 2. The compromise on the basis of which the order dated 1-6-1977 was passed did not bear the signature of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, who had been arrayed as an opposite party in the Revision; 3. The learned District Judge did not give any finding on the question whether the order of allotment passed, in favour of petitioner on 7-5-76 had been obtained by fraud and misrepresentation of facts; 4. The learned District Judge had no power to pass an order of allotment in a .Revision under Section 18 of tire Act. 10. The first question which, therefore, arises for consideration is whether a Revision lay against the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 6-4-77. The learned District Judge had no power to pass an order of allotment in a .Revision under Section 18 of tire Act. 10. The first question which, therefore, arises for consideration is whether a Revision lay against the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 6-4-77. By the order dated 6-4-1977 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had expressly set aside the order of allotment dated 7-5-1976, which had been passed in favour of the petitioner. Under Section 18 of the aforesaid Act, a Revision is provided against an order passed under Section 16 of the Act. The learned District Judge has observed that inasmuch as the order of allotment dated 7-5-1976 had been set aside by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on the ground of "fraud and misrepresentation", the order dated 6-4-1977 must be deemed to have been passed under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and not under Section 16. The view of the learned District Judge is obviously wrong. "Fraud" or "Misrepresentation" might have been the grounds upon which the order of allotment was set aside, but [there could be little doubt that the order cancelling the order of allotment was and could be only under Section 16 of the Act which is the only provision under which an allotment order is passed. The cancellation of the order of allotment must, therefore, also be deemed to be an order under Section 16. Section 18 of the said Act does not limit entertainment of Revision against orders of any particular type passed under Section 16 of the Act. All orders passed under Section 16 are amenable to be revised under Section 18. The learned District Judge, therefore, fell into a manifest error of law in holding that no revision lay. In fact counsel for the respondents made hardly any attempt to contend that the order dated 6-4-77 was not an order under Section 16 of the Act. The first ground upon which the Seamed District Judge reviewed the order dated 1-6-1977, therefore, fails. 11. In fact counsel for the respondents made hardly any attempt to contend that the order dated 6-4-77 was not an order under Section 16 of the Act. The first ground upon which the Seamed District Judge reviewed the order dated 1-6-1977, therefore, fails. 11. As regards the second ground, namely, the fact that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had not joined in the compromise though he was made a party in the Revision is completely devoid of any substance, it is difficult to under stand how the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was either a necessary or even a proper party to the compromise. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer. His non-participation i the compromise therefore, was of no consequence. 12. As regards the third point, namely, absence of a finding in the order of the learned District Judge dated 1-6-1977 on the question whether the order of allotment dated 7-5-76 had been obtained by fraud or misrepresentation, in my view, firstly, such a ground could not be the basis for recalling the order dated 1-6-1977, inasmuch as this ground is clearly one pertaining to the merits of the order passed on 1-6-1977, and, therefore, could not be a ground for review in the absence of any statutory provision for review, and, secondly, even on facts, I am of the opinion that the learned District Judge was not required to give any specific finding on that question, for the complaint of "fraud" and "misrepresentation" had been made only by Ramesh Kumar Kohli, at whose instance alone was the order dated 6-4-1977 passed. When, therefore, Ramesh Kumar Kohli himself entered into a compromise and appeared before the learned District Judge and requested him to pass an order in terms of the compromise, the learned District Judge could not be blamed for not giving a finding on the question of alleged "fraud and misrepresentation". Ramesh Kumar Kohli had signed the compromise and verified, it before the learned District Judge. All the interested parties had appeared before the learned District Judge including the landlord and had prayed that the possession of the partnership over the shop in dispute be regularised under Section 14 of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 as amended by U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976. All the interested parties had appeared before the learned District Judge including the landlord and had prayed that the possession of the partnership over the shop in dispute be regularised under Section 14 of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 as amended by U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976. Under these circumstances, the learned District Judge was not required to give any finding on the question of alleged fraud or misrepresentation. The learned District Judge, therefore, erred in law in recalling the order dated 1-6-1977 on this ground. 13. Coming to the last ground upon which the learned District Judge has chosen to recall the order dated 1-6-1977, it may be recalled that the order dated 1-6-1977 was passed on the basis of a compromise. The order passed by the learned District Judge is in substance one merely recognising the fact that the partnership had been admitted as a tenant by the landlord and it was in occupation of the shop with the consent of the landlord prior to the relevant date, that is, 5-7-1976. Under these circumstances and particularly in view of the fact that a similar order of allotment had already been passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 7-5-1976, which was, in the opinion of the learned District Judge wrongly set aside by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 6-4-1977, it cannot be said that the learned District Judge committed any such error which may justify review of his order. The learned District Judge has fallen into a manifest error of law in reviewing the order even on this ground. 14. It would thus appear that none of the grounds on which the learned District Judge has recalled the order passed by is predecessor was sustainable in law or could afford any justification or ground for reviewing the order dated 1-6-1977. The impugned order is, therefore, entirely without any jurisdiction and illegal. 15. 14. It would thus appear that none of the grounds on which the learned District Judge has recalled the order passed by is predecessor was sustainable in law or could afford any justification or ground for reviewing the order dated 1-6-1977. The impugned order is, therefore, entirely without any jurisdiction and illegal. 15. Coming to the third point, I do agree with counsel for the petitioner that though the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has used the expression "fraud or misrepresentation on the Court," a scrutiny of the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 6-4-1977 clearly suggests that the order dated 7-5-1977 could not be said to have been obtained by any fraud or misrepresentation." The Rent Control and Eviction Officer has observed that if the order had not been passed on 7-5-1977 but a little later, some more facts could have come to light about the transaction of partnership. The facts which are, however, referred to in order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer do not seem to suggest that any "fraud" was played on the Court or Authority as such. The entire fraud which is alleged is that previously the date fixed was "13-5-1976," which was on the request of the petitioner, advanced to "7-5-76" on the ground that there was a risk of the petitioners losing the agency which had been given to them by the Television Electronics (Private) Limited, New Delhi. In the application, the petitioner had asserted that if they did not start functioning before 15-5-76, there was a possibility of the petitioner losing the agency. In the letter which was produced, it was stated that there was a threat that if the petitioner was unable to complete the arrangement in time, Messrs T.V. Electronics (Private) Ltd. might be forced to make an alternative arrangement. I do I not consider these circumstances as affording any basis for a finding that there was a "misrepresentation." The basic assertion was the same, namely, that the petitioners were under pressure from Messrs T.V. Electronics (Private) Limited to open the shop immediately failing which there was a risk of their losing the agency. The finding of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, therefore, that there was any "fraud or misrepresentation" in obtaining the order dated 7-5-76, is obviously wrong and unsustainable. The finding of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, therefore, that there was any "fraud or misrepresentation" in obtaining the order dated 7-5-76, is obviously wrong and unsustainable. The order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 6-4-1977 is on the face of it illegal. I am also inclined to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the view expressed by the learned District Judge in the order dated 1-6-1977 that even if the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was inclined to hold that the order dated 7*5-1977 was] wrongly obtained on the ground that there was no genuine partnership, he: should only have dismissed the petitioners application under Rule 10 (6) proviso (a) to the Rules. He had no jurisdiction to declare vacancy straightway. The third submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner also succeeds and is accepted. 16. For the reasons stated above, this petition succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Dehradun dated 4-8-1978 is quashed. The petitioner is entitled to his costs from the respondents Nos. 3, 4 and 5.