Sushila Debi Fomra v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL — 1980 DIGILAW 185 (CAL)

JUDGMENT (1.) IN this appeal, the appellant Sushila Devi has challenged the propriety of the judgment of C. K. Banerji J. By the said judgment, the learned Judge discharged the Rule Nisi issued on- the application of the appellant under Article 226 of the Constitution. (2.) THE respondent no. 5, Mannulal Fomra, is the owner of premises nos. 83 and 84, Acharya Jagadish Chandra Bose Road, Calcutta, comprising both land and buildings. The appellant is a tenant of a portion of the said premises and one madanlal Fomra is a tenant of the remaining portion of the said premises. It is alleged that the appellant carries on her business under the name and style of "phumbhra Agencies Road Transport Company'" in the said two premises. The respondent no. 2, the First Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta, served an order dated April 23, 1976 under section 3 (1) of the West Bengal Land Requisition and Acquisition Act, 1948 (Act II of 1948), hereinafter referred to as the Act. Requisitioning the whole of the said premises no. 83 and part of the premises no. 84, Acharya Jagadish Chandra Bose Road, Calcutta for the establishment of a sub-depot of the Calcutta State Transport Corporation. The measurement and description of the requisitioned land have been given in the Schedule to the impugned order. The Schedule is as follows : schedule description of the land land measuring more or less 3b-10k-8ch-5 Sq. ft. equivalent to 1. 2645 acres or 0. 5117 hectare comprising premises nos. 83 and 84 (portion), Acharya Jagadish Chandra Bose Road in Ward no. 56 of the Calcutta Municipality in the city of Calcutta and bounded on the northby premises no. 84 (Por.) and 85, Acharya Jagadish Ch: Bose Road and 76, Durga Charan Doctor Road. Eastby premises no. 84 (remaining portion), 82, 81/2b, and 8c, Acharya Jagadish Ch. Bose Road. South by premises no. 84, 81/2b, and 8c, Acharya Jagadish Ch. Bose Road. Westby premises no. 68/1, 53/1 53b, C, D, A, Durga Charan Doctor Road. The appellant being aggrieved by the said order of requisition moved this Court against the same and obtained a Rule Nisi out of which this appeal arises. Bose Road. South by premises no. 84, 81/2b, and 8c, Acharya Jagadish Ch. Bose Road. Westby premises no. 68/1, 53/1 53b, C, D, A, Durga Charan Doctor Road. The appellant being aggrieved by the said order of requisition moved this Court against the same and obtained a Rule Nisi out of which this appeal arises. At the hearing of the Rule, the appellant challenged the legality of the order of requisition on three grounds: (1) the impugned order was bad for its vagueness, (2) the Act did not authorize the requisition or acquisition of land for the purposes of any juristic person like the State Transport Corporation, and (3) it was made in violation of the principles of natural justice. The learned. Judge overruled all the three contentions of the appellant and discharged the Rule. Hence this appeal. (3.) THE same contentions as made before the learned Judge have been repeated before us on behalf of the appellant. Mr. R. C. Deb, Darned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, submits that the order of requisition is vague and it should be quashed on that ground. Our attention has been drawn to the Schedule of the requisition order which has been set out earlier. Under that Schedule, the area of land that has been requisitioned is stated to be 3b-10k-8ch-5 Sq. ft. which is equivalent to 70 cottah 8 chataks 5 sq. ft. In paragraph 23 of the writ petition, it has been alleged that the vacant land of the said two premises measures 80 cottah 2 chataks more or' less. It is contended that the impugned order not having specified by demarcation the area of 70 cottah 8 chataks 5 sq. ft. of land sought to be requisitioned out of the total vacant land of 80 cottah 2 chataks, it is vague and can not be given effect to. Even assuming that the premises comprise a total area of 80 cottah 2 chataks of vacant land, it is difficult for us to accept the contention of the of the appellant that the area of land which has been requisitioned has not been clearly specified by demarcation in the impugned order, for the contention completely overlooks the fact that the Schedule of the impugned order contains the boundary of the land sought to be requisitioned. In the writ petition, the appellant has not challenged the correctness of the boundary of the requisitioned land. Indeed there is no mention in the writ petition about the boundary given in the impugned order. There can be no doubt when the land has been described by boundary it can be easily identified. (4.) LET us now consider the correctness of the statement of the appellant that the premises nos. 83 and 84, Acharya Jagadish Chandra Bose Road contains a total area of 80 cottah 2 chataks of vacant land. In paragraph 1 of the writ petition, it has been alleged that the total area of the said two premises measures 93 cottah 2 chataks 18 sq. ft, but in the letter dated June 3/4, 1976 written on behalf of the appellant to the Secretary, Ministry of Land and Land Revenue, Government of West Bengal, demanding justice it is stated that the said two premises an area of 4 big has 10 cottah 6 chataks which is equivalent to 90 cottah 6 chataks. In paragraph 22 of the writ petition, the area covered by the buildings and structures has been stated to be 13 cottah 18 sq. ft. If this area is subtracted from the total area of the premises, the area of the vacant land will be obtained. But the appellant has given two different total areas of the said two premises. If we proceed on the basis that the total area of the two premises is 90 cottah 6 chataks, then the area-of the vacant land comes to 77 cottah 6 chataks 18 sq, ft., So it is difficult for us to accept the statement of the appellant in paragraph 23 of writ petition that the area of the vacant land is 80 cottah 2 chataks. In paragraph 3 (h) of the affidavit-in opposition sworn by the respondent no. 4, the General Manager of the Calcutta State Transport Corporation, it is stated that' the vacant land of the said two premises measures about 3 big has 16 cottah 30 chataks 5 sq. ft. having a frontage of 30 ft. and in paragraph 3 (j) it is stated that possession of the said 3 big has 16 cottah 8 chataks 5 sq. ft. ft. having a frontage of 30 ft. and in paragraph 3 (j) it is stated that possession of the said 3 big has 16 cottah 8 chataks 5 sq. ft. of vacant land was taken by the First Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta on April 26, 1676 at 2 P. M. In the said paragraph, the boundary of the said quantity of land has been given. The boundary is identical with the boundary that has been given in the Schedule to the impugned order. The possession certificate which is Annexure "a" to the affidavit-in opposition of the respondent no 4 shows that possession was taken of 3 big has 16 -cottah 8 chataks 5 sq. ft. of land. Mr. Nara Narayan Gooptu, learned Senior Government' Pleader, submits that the requisition was made of the vacant land measuring 3 big has 16 cottah 9 chataks 5 sq. ft. land appertaining to the said two premises and not 3 big has ' 10 cottah 8 chataks 5 sq. ft. The original requisition order has been placed before us and it shows that the area of the land which has been requisitioned is 3 big has 16 cottah (not 10 cottah) 8 chataks 5 sq. ft. He submits that in the copy of the order that has been served upon the appellant a mistake has been committed in mentioning the area of the requisitioned land, as 3 big has 10 cottah, 8 chataks 5 sq. ft. But the equivalent area of the requisitioned land as mentioned in acres or hectares is quite correct. It is not disputed before us on behalf of the appellant that 1.2645 acres or 0.5117 hectares as mentioned in the Schedule to the impugned order is equivalent to 3 big has 16 cottah 8 chataks 5 sq. ft. of land, that is, 76 cottah 8 chataks 5 sq. ft. It is not disputed before us on behalf of the appellant that 1.2645 acres or 0.5117 hectares as mentioned in the Schedule to the impugned order is equivalent to 3 big has 16 cottah 8 chataks 5 sq. ft. of land, that is, 76 cottah 8 chataks 5 sq. ft. It has been already stated that the area of vacant land as stated by the appellant in paragraph 23 of the writ petition cannot be accepted, for there is a discrepancy about the total area of the said two premises as given in paragraph 1 of the writ petition and in the said letter demanding justice, in our view, we do not find any reason why we should not accept the case of the respondent that the total area of the vacant land is 76 cottah and odd and the same is covered by the impugned order. In any event, there is no substance in the contention that the area of the land sought to be requisitioned has not been demarcated in the impugned order and, as such, the impugned order is vague and cannot be given effect to. Such a contention is not available to the appellant in the face of the boundary of the requisitioned land as given in the Schedule to the impugned order. The learned Judge, in our opinion, was perfectly justified in overruling the contention of the appellant that the impugned order was vague. (5.) NEXT it is contended that the Act does not permit the requisition or acquisition of land for the purposes of a Corporation or a company. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed on behalf of the appellant on my judgment in Sandhya Mukhati and Ors.-v- Additional District Magistrate, 24 Parganas and Ors., 1977 (2) C. L. J. 375. In that case, land was requisitioned for the purposes of the members of a Co-operative Society, Madhyamgram Pathiparsastha Babasayi Samity. It was observed by me as fallows : "the purposes which are mentioned in section 3 (1) of the Act are undoubtedly public purposes. The Act does not make any provision for requisition or acquisition of lands for the benefit or any individual, society or company, like they Land Acquisition Act which provides for acquisition of land for a company. It was observed by me as fallows : "the purposes which are mentioned in section 3 (1) of the Act are undoubtedly public purposes. The Act does not make any provision for requisition or acquisition of lands for the benefit or any individual, society or company, like they Land Acquisition Act which provides for acquisition of land for a company. In the absence of any specific provision in that regard any requisition or acquisition of land for the purpose of an individual or a society or a company. Will not be a public purpose or a purpose for the Community. If the disputed land is requisitioned, the same has to be distributed among the members of the respondent Samity. . . :. . . . . . . . . . . " I do not think that the said observation supports the contention of the appellant. In Sandhya Mukhati case (supra) the requisition was made for the purposes of the Samity so that after the requisition of the land, it would be distributed among the members of the Samity; the purpose for which the requisition was sought to be made was not a public purpose. In the instant case, however, although the requisition has been made for the purposes of the State Transport Corporation, such purposes are the purposes of the State itself, The learned Judge has also rejected this contention and, we think, rightly. He has inter alia relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Bombay -v- R. S. Valji, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 294. In that case, a part of a building was requisitioned for providing accommodation to an 'official of the State Road Transport Corporation under the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948. In that case, it has been observed by the Supreme Court that providing living accommodation for its employees is a statutory activity of the Corporation and it is essential for it to provide for such accommodation in order to ensure an efficient working of the Road Transport system and it must, therefore, be held that the impugned order was validly passed under the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948. In-our opinion, the same principle should apply to the instant case. It is the duty of the State to make suitable arrangement for road transport and for that purpose the State Transport Corporation has been created. In-our opinion, the same principle should apply to the instant case. It is the duty of the State to make suitable arrangement for road transport and for that purpose the State Transport Corporation has been created. Any requirement of the Corporation is the requirement of the State. In these circumstances, it is difficult to accept the contention of the appellant that the purpose for which the requisition has been made is not the purpose of the State Government and, as such, the order of requisition should be quashed on that ground. We hold that land can be requisitioned or acquired for the purposes of the State Transport Corporation under the provisions of the Act. The contention of the appellant is, accordingly, overruled. (6.) THE last point that has been strongly urged by Mr. Deb is that the Land Acquisition collector not having given the appellant an opportunity of being heard before the impugned order of requisition was issued by him, it is illegal and invalid. It is contended by him that the observance of the rules of natural justice is implicit in the provisions of the Act. In other words, it is obligatory upon the respondents to observe the rules of natural justice, that is, by giving a hearing to the person who will be affected by the order of requisition before such an order is made. It is also submitted by him that the provisions of the Act also give a clear indication that the rules of natural justice should be followed. In support of this contention Mr. Deb has placed strong reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Madan Gopal Agarwal -v- District Magistrate, Allahabad, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2656. in that case, the house of the appellant was requisitioned by the District magistrate under section 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947. In support of this contention Mr. Deb has placed strong reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Madan Gopal Agarwal -v- District Magistrate, Allahabad, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2656. in that case, the house of the appellant was requisitioned by the District magistrate under section 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947. Section 3 of the U. P. Act provides as follows : "if in the opinion of the District Magistrate it is necessary to requisition any accommodation for any public purpose, he may, by order in writing requisition such accommodation and may direct that the possession thereof shall be delivered to him within such period as may be specified in the order, provided that the period so specified shall not be less than fifteen days from the date of the service of the order; provided also that no building or part of a building exclusively used for religious worship shall be requisitioned under this section. Provided further that no accommodation which is in the actual occupation of any person shall be requisitioned unless the District Magistrate is further of the opinion that suitable accommodation exists for his needs or has been provided to him. " It has been observed by the Supreme Court that although the said Act does not contain an express provision for notice and, hearing before the making of the requisitioning order such a provision should be read there by necessary implication. The requisitioning of the property deprives the owner of the property of the right to hold and enjoy the property as he likes. It is difficult to assume that the legislature would have intended to deprive him of his cherished right without notice and hearing. Thereafter, the Court points out that there are objective factors which should be enquired into before any order is made. With regard to the first proviso to section 3 of the U. P. Act, it has been observed that the proviso strongly suggests the implication of notice and hearing in the main part of section 3. Further, it is pointed out that the second proviso also requires that the owner of the property should be heard before it is requisitioned. Section 3 (1) of the Act with which we are concerned also contains a proviso which is somewhat similar to the first proviso in the U. P. Act. Mr. Further, it is pointed out that the second proviso also requires that the owner of the property should be heard before it is requisitioned. Section 3 (1) of the Act with which we are concerned also contains a proviso which is somewhat similar to the first proviso in the U. P. Act. Mr. Deb has strongly relied on the observation of the Supreme Court that has been made on the first proviso to section 3 of the U. P. Act, namely, that it strongly suggests the implication of notice and hearing. It is contended by him that in view of, the said decision of the Supreme Court, it should be held that it is implicit that before the making of an order of requisition the person affected should be given-a notice and hearing. There can be no doubt that although the U. P. Act does not contain an express provision for notice and hearing, such a provision is implicit in the said Act as has been held by the Supreme Court in Madan Gopal's case (supra).,in the U.P. Act, the second proviso enjoins that no accommodation which is in actual occupation of any person shall be requisitioned unless the District Magistrate is further of the opinion that the suitable alternative accommodation exists for his needs or has been provided to him. This cannot be done without hearing the person who is in actual accommodation and in case he has no suit; able alternative accommodation, his property cannot be requisitioned without providing him such accommodation. It is true that the Supreme Court has also observed that the first proviso suggests the implication of giving, notice and hearing, but in our opinion, the judgment of the Supreme Court should be read as a whole, It is not known what the decision of the Supreme Court would have been if there had been no such provision like the second proviso to section 3 of the U. P: Act. In the U. P. Act, the indication of the legislature is very clear. It is not the intention of the legislature to-deprive a person of his accommodation without providing a suitable alternative accommodation to him if he has no such accommodation. As has been stated already, this cannot be done without giving the person concerned a hearing. In the U. P. Act, the indication of the legislature is very clear. It is not the intention of the legislature to-deprive a person of his accommodation without providing a suitable alternative accommodation to him if he has no such accommodation. As has been stated already, this cannot be done without giving the person concerned a hearing. It has to be ascertained from him whether he has, an alternative accommodation and in case he has not, he has to be provided with such accommodation. The existence of the second proviso in the U. P. Act. and the absence of such a proviso in the Act with which we are concerned have made a good deal of difference. In this connection, we may refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Daud Ahmad -v- The District Magistrate, Allahabad A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 896. This case also relates to the' requisition of an accommodation under section 3 of the U. P. Act. In this case, the Supreme Court has, on a consideration of only the second proviso to section 3 of the U. P. Act observed, that the person affected should be given a notice and hearing before any Older of, requisition is made. Further, it has been observed : "it is the nature of the power and the circumstances and conditions under which it is exercised that will occasion the invocation of the principle of natural justice. Deprivation of property affects rights of a person. If under the Requisition Act, the petitioner was to be deprived of the occupation of the premises the District Magistrate had to hold an enquiry in order to arrive at an opinion that there existed alternative accommodation for the petitioner or the District Magistrate was to provide alternative accommodation. " So in our opinion, it is apparent that in view of the second proviso to the U. P. Act, the Supreme Court held that the principle of natural justice should be followed before any order of requisition is made. (7.) WE may now refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in S. M. Nandy -v-The State of West Bengal A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 961, which has been strongly relied on by Mr. Gupta learned Counsel for the respondents. This is a case of requisition under the Act with which we are concerned. (7.) WE may now refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in S. M. Nandy -v-The State of West Bengal A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 961, which has been strongly relied on by Mr. Gupta learned Counsel for the respondents. This is a case of requisition under the Act with which we are concerned. The appellants in that case challenged the constitutional validity of the Act on three grounds: (1) there is no provision for a notice to the owner or the occupier of the property before an order of requisition is passed, (2) there is no provision for an appeal against an order of requisition and (3) a civil suit is barred under section 11 of the Act. On the first ground of attack to the constitutional validity of the Act, namely, absence of a provision for a notice to the owner or the occupier of the property before the making of an order of requisition, the Supreme Court observed as follows : "it is true that there is no express provision to make a representation against an order of requisition, but there is no bar to a representation being made after an order is served under Section 3 (2) of the Act. We have no doubt that if the representation raises a point which overrides the public purpose it would be favorably considered by the State Government or other Government authorities as the case may be. " This case, in our opinion, is an authority for the view that the Act does not contemplate giving of a notice and hearing to the person affected before the making of an order of requisition. Such a provision is not implicit in the Act, The only remedy that is available to the aggrieved person is that he will be at liberty to make a representation to the authority concerned after an order of requisition is served under section 3 (2) of the Act. It is, however, contended by Mr. Deb that in S. M. Nandy's case (supra), the Supreme Court has made the said observation in repealing the contention that the Act is constitutionally invalid, as it has not made any provision for notice to the owner before the making of a requisition order. The Supreme Court has not considered whether the provision for notice and hearing is implicit in the Act or not. . The Supreme Court has not considered whether the provision for notice and hearing is implicit in the Act or not. . We are unable to accept this contention. If by necessary implication, the Act provided for notice and hearing before the order of requisition was made, in that case, the Supreme Court would have repelled the contention of the invalidity of the Act for the absence of an express provision in this regard on the ground that by necessary implication such a provision was contemplated, but that was not the finding of the Supreme Court. In these circumstances, in our view, the said observation, in S. M. Nandy's case (supra) impliedly overrules the contention that by necessary implication the Act contemplates the giving of notice and hearing to the person affected before the making of an order of requisition. (8.) SO far as this Court is concerned, it has been consistently held on the authority of the decision in S. M. Nandy's case (supra) that the Act does not contemplate by necessary implication the giving of a notice and hearing to the aggrieved party before any order of requisition is made Basumati Bag v. Collector, Howrah 78 C.W.N. 29 ; Narendra Nath Tripathi -v-State of West Bengal, 78 C.W.N. 397 ; Mihir Kumar Sarkar -v- State of West Bengal A.I.R. 1972 Cal-8=75 CWN 851 ; saktipada Mondal -v- Collector, Hooghly AIR 1976 Cat. 282. In discharging the rule, the learned Judge has also placed reliance on the above decisions of this Court. Narendra Nath Tripathy's case referred to above is a Bench decision of this Court consisting of A. C. Gupta and S. K. Dutta JJ. In that case, the appellants whose land was requisitioned under the Act moved a writ petition before this Court and obtained a Rule Nisi. One of the points that was urged on behalf of the appellants was that the rules of natural justice required that the owners of the land should Be given an opportunity to show cause against the order of requisition. That contention was overruled by the learned single Judge and on appeal, the Division Bench upheld the order of the learned Judge. In discharging the Rule. That contention was overruled by the learned single Judge and on appeal, the Division Bench upheld the order of the learned Judge. In discharging the Rule. S.K. Dutta J held on the authority of the decision of the Supreme Court in S. M. Nandy's case (supra) that the application of the principles of natural justice was excluded by necessary implication, A. C. Gupta J could not subscribe to that view. It was, however, observed by Gupta J : "in any case, if it was open to the appellants to make a representation after they were served with notice under section 3 (2) of the Act they have not done so They cannot therefore make a grievance now that they had no opportunity to show cause against the order of requisition. " So it follows from the observation of Gupta J that the principles of natural justice will be sufficiently complied with if the authority concerned considers any representation made by the aggrieved person after he has been served with an order of requisition. As the appellants did not make any representation after they were served with the order of requisition, Gupta J. concurred with the view of S.K. Dutta J that the appeal should be dismissed. This case is, therefore, of no help to the appellant. (9.) IT has, however, been urged by Mr. Deb that the field of operation of the principle of natural justice has been extended to a large extent. He submits that it is now established law that the principle of natural justice, that is to say, opportunity to give a hearing must be observed before taking any action prejudicial to any person. He has placed strong reliance on the observation of the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi -v- Union of India A. I. R. 1978 S. C. 597, that the law must therefore, now be taken to be well settled that even in an administrative proceeding, which involves civil consequences, the doctrine of natural justice must be held to be applicable. Relying on this observation, it is contended on behalf of the appellant that before making an order of requisition which invariably affects the owner or occupier of land with civil consequences, such owner or occupier should be given an opportunity of being heard. Relying on this observation, it is contended on behalf of the appellant that before making an order of requisition which invariably affects the owner or occupier of land with civil consequences, such owner or occupier should be given an opportunity of being heard. In Maneka Gandhi's case (supra), the Supreme Court has relied on the observation made by it in an earlier decision in Suresh Koshy George -v- University of Kerala, A. I. R. 1669 S. C. 198. It has been observed that the rules of natural justice are not embodied a rules. What - particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of the case. So in view of the said observation it cannot, in our opinion, be claimed that an order of requisition cannot be made before giving the aggrieved person an opportunity of being heard. In this connection, we may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in S. M. Nandy's case (Supra) where, it appears, the consideration of a representation that may be made subsequent to the service of an order of requisition under section 3 (2) of the Act has been considered to be sufficient compliance with the rules of natural justice: It has been stated already that Gupta J also seemed to take the same view in Narendra Nath Tripathy's case (supra). (10.) NEXT it is contended by Mr. Deb that unless a statute expressly excludes the application of the principle of natural justice,, it must always be followed. He submits that nothing short of an express legislation can exclude the principle of natural justice. According to him it can not be excluded by necessary implication. (10.) NEXT it is contended by Mr. Deb that unless a statute expressly excludes the application of the principle of natural justice,, it must always be followed. He submits that nothing short of an express legislation can exclude the principle of natural justice. According to him it can not be excluded by necessary implication. He, however, admits that it is not clear whether the principle of natural justice can be excluded by necessary implication or not, He submits that in any event, if the principle can be excluded by necessary implication, such implication should not be easily read; the court should be disinclined to read it. It can be only read, if at all, in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Gill -v-the Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi, A.I.R. 1978 S. C. 851. In that case, Krishna Iyer J observed : "indeed, natural justice is a pervasive facet of secular law where a spiritual touch enlivens legislation, administration and adjudication, to make fairness a creed of life. It has many colors and shades, many forms and shapes and, save where valid law excludes, it applies when people are affected by acts of authority. It is the bone of healthy government, recognized from earliest times and not a mystic testament of judge-made law. " Much emphasis has been given by Mr. Deb in his argument on the expression in the above observation "where valid law excludes". It is argued that unless the principles of natural justice are expressly excluded by valid law, it has got to be observed. It is true that in Mohinder Singh's case (supra) the Supreme Court has greatly emphasized the need for observance of the principles of natural justice in all actions. But it is difficult to accept the contention of the appellant that the exclusion must be by an express legislation and not by implication. In paragraph 76 of the judgment in Mohinder Singh's case (supra) Krishna Iyer J observed: "We have been told that wherever the Parliament has intended a hearing it has said so in the Act and the rules and inferentially where it has not, specific Ted it is otiose. There is no such sequester the silence of a statute has no exclusionary effect except where it flows from necessary implication. There is no such sequester the silence of a statute has no exclusionary effect except where it flows from necessary implication. " This observation, in our opinion, supports the view we have taken, namely, that the principle of natural justice can be excluded by a statute by necessary implication. In this connection, we may refer to two other decisions of the Supreme Court, which have been relied on by Mr. Deb in support of his contention that the principle of natural justice can only be excluded by express legislation. In Gullappalli Nageswararao -v- State of Andhra Pradesh A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 1376, there is an observation that unless the legislature clearly and expressly ordained to the contrary the principles of natural justice cannot be violated. In Commissioner of Income-Tax, Calcutta –v- B. N. Bhattacharjee, A.I.R. 1979 S. C. 1725, Krishna Iyer J has observed that even apart from any specific provision, it is legal fair play not to hurt any party without hearing him unless the Act expressly excludes it. We have already set out the observation of Krishna Iyer J in Mohindra Singh's case (supra) which supports the view that the principles of natural justice can be excluded by necessary implication. In our opinion, exclusion by express provision and exclusion by necessary implication have the same effect. Where it is apparent on the face of the provision of a statute that the legislature has intended to exclude the principles of natural justice, such intention cannot be ignored. It is true that in Nageswararao's case (supra) and in B.N. Bhattacharjee's case (supra), the Supreme Court has observed about the express exclusion of the principle of natural justice by a statute, but in our opinion, it does not follow from such observation that where a statute excludes the principles of natural justice by necessary implication, still it has to be complied with. In our view, whether the principle of natural justice is to be complied with or not by giving a hearing to the aggrieved party will depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case and the provisions of the statute concerned. I may now refer to an unreported decision of My Lord the Chief Justice in Matter No. 840 of 1973 (Abrasives and Castings Ltd.-v- Union of India) disposed of on January 22, 1975. I may now refer to an unreported decision of My Lord the Chief Justice in Matter No. 840 of 1973 (Abrasives and Castings Ltd.-v- Union of India) disposed of on January 22, 1975. In that case, the validity of an order made by the Central Government under section 18aa of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 was challenged in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The principal point that was argued in the case was that in making an order under section 18aa (1) (b) of the Act, the Central Government did not comply with the principle, of natural justice. My Lord the Chief Justice observed that the provision of section 18aa (1) empowering the Central Government to pass an order without any prior investigation did not indicate or suggest that in making an order, under that section, principles of natural justice were not required, to be observed. It is thus apparent that My Lord took the view that the principle of natural justice were not excluded by necessary implication by the provision of section 18aa (1). (11.) WE may now deal with the contention of the appellant that even assuming that the principle of natural justice can be excluded by necessary implication, such implication should not be easily read and it can be only read, if at all, in very exceptional circumstances where, compulsive necessity so demands. In support of this contention, learned Council for the appellant has relied on the observation in Maneka Gandhi's case (supra). It has been observed in that case that except in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands, the principle of natural justice must not be jettisoned, At the same time, it has been observed that since the right to prior notice and opportunity of hearing arises only by implication from the duty to act fairly it may equally be excluded where, having regard to the nature of the action to the taken, its object and purpose and the scheme of the relevant statutory provision, fairness in action does not demand its implication and even warrants its exclusion. In our opinion, nobody should be hurt by any action of an authority without giving him a notice and a hearing, but this is subject to the rule of legislative intent. In our opinion, nobody should be hurt by any action of an authority without giving him a notice and a hearing, but this is subject to the rule of legislative intent. If the legislature either expressly or by necessary implication excludes notice and hearing, the action cannot be declared illegal or invalid because of the non-compliance of the rules of natural justice. (12.) IN the instant case, the appellant has not made any representation to the Land Acquisition Collector who made the impugned order of requisition. Instead, the appellant preferred to move this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution complaining about the violation of the rules of natural justice. The grievance of the appellant is that although some other more suitable land was available to the Government for the purpose of a sub-depot of the State Transport Corporation, yet the disputed land was requisitioned. In our opinion, the question whether a particular plot of land will be suitable or not should be left to the Government as observed by the Supreme Court in S. M. Nandy's case (supra). The decision of the Supreme Court in S. M. Nandy's case (supra) is directly on the Act with which we are concerned and, we think, we are bound by that decision. No other point has been urged in this appeal. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed, but in, view of the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order for costs. Appeal dismissed No costs.