Judgment Tulpule J.-One Gaurishankar Shrivastava, who retired as a Director of the Veterinary Department in the former Central Provinces, possessed property house No. 750 in Khare Town, Dharampeth, Nagpur. The house consisted of the main building bearing Nos. 750/1 to 3 and the garage and out-houses in the said plot bearing No. 750/4 to 8. Gaurishankar had purchased a plot upon which he constructed this main building, out houses and the garage. The sale-deed was dated 23rd April 1938 by which he purchased this plot admeasuring 120 x 150 feet, nearly 20,000 sq. feet. 2. Gaurishankar had a brother by name Dayashankar. Family of Gaurishankar and Dayashankar appeared to be not in comfortable circumstances and had very little immovable property of their own. It was only after Gaurishankar entered Civil Service and rose to the post of a Director that he acquired the property in suit. Dayashankar apparently was maintained by Gaurishankar and did not do anything. He had 3 sons Lalitmohan, Rammohan and Shyammohan, who were looked upon almost as his sons by Gaurishankar. 3. Gaurishankar died on 28th October 1957 leaving behind his widow Rajrani and his nephews as aforesaid. Prior to his death, Gaurishankar, according to the plaintiffs, had left a will dated 3rd January 1949. Gauri-shankar also subsequently made a codicil by which certain provisions of the will were amended and altered. That was on 19th November 1952. According to the plaintiffs, by this will the property was devised by Gaurishankar between his 3 nephews and his wife Rajrani. The property, which was, how-ever, given to Rajrani, his wife, was not given to her absolutely, but as a limited estate and during her lifetime. It also provided that she could, if she wanted, sell this property to her nephews, who were the other legatees under the will and to none other. By the codicil made on the 19th November 1952 these provisions in the will were changed. Shyammohan, one of the nephews, apparently incurred displeasure of Gaurishankar and was disinherited. Similarly the right given to Rajrani to sell the property given to her, if so desired, in favour of her nephews, was also taken away. In other words, by the codicil her right in the property was limited to her lifetime only. 4. It appears that Lalitmohan and Rammohan as well as Shyam-mohan shifted from Nagpur. Similarly the right given to Rajrani to sell the property given to her, if so desired, in favour of her nephews, was also taken away. In other words, by the codicil her right in the property was limited to her lifetime only. 4. It appears that Lalitmohan and Rammohan as well as Shyam-mohan shifted from Nagpur. All the brothers seem to have migrated to Jabalpur, presumably on the re-organisation of the States and this area having merged in Bombay State. Lalitmohan and Rammohan died respectively on 12–12–1961 and 12–12–1964 leaving behind them their sons and widows. Admittedly, though Lalitmohan and Rammohan shifted to Jabalpur their sons continued to remain at Nagpur taking their education living with their grandmother Rajrani. 5. The present suit was commenced by the widow of Lalitmohan and the sons of Lalitmohan and Rammohan against 3 persons - defendants Nos. 1 to 3-who claimed to have purchased this property by two sale-deeds dated 20th December 1968 from Rajrani, and Maltirai the widow of Ram-mohan, and tenants-defendants in the properties. The suit was for a declaration that the sale-deeds dated 20th December 1968 were void and that the plaintiffs were entitled to enjoy and remain in possession of the property and to restrain defendants Nos. 1 to 3 by permanent injunction from interfering with their claim to possession and ownership. 6. The plaintiffs alleged that by reason of the will and testament of Gaurishankar dated 3–1-1949 as modified by the codicil dated 19–11–1952, Rajrani had no transferable or disposable interest in the property, and that she had only a limited interest to a part of the property in which she had a right to live and enjoy during her lifetime. Rest of the properties were given to Lalitmohan and Rammohan. Lalitmohan and Rammohan and there-after the sons and the family were living together along with Rajrani in the said house and enjoying the property. So far as Rajrani and others were concerned, they were living in the portion of the main building while the garage and other out-houses were let out to the tenants. While this was the position and Rajrani had no power or right to dispose of the property, on 20th December 1968 by two sale-deeds she is purported to have sold the smaller portion of this house bearing house No. 750/4 to 8 to defendants Nos. While this was the position and Rajrani had no power or right to dispose of the property, on 20th December 1968 by two sale-deeds she is purported to have sold the smaller portion of this house bearing house No. 750/4 to 8 to defendants Nos. 2 and 3 and the bigger portion to defendant No. 1. The sale-deed of the smaller portion was brought about by defendant No. 1 Ishwar and one Raghunath Sarda. That these persons had become persons of confidence of Maltirai, defendant No. 4 and Rajrani. That Rajrani did not execute a sale-deed as such, but that her signatures were obtained on blank papers by these persons representing to her that the signatures were required in connection with the application for mutation of the smaller portion of the house. Signatures of Malti were also obtained on the representation that those signatures were necessary in order to show that Rajrani had signed in her presence. Those signatures so obtained were then made use of for scribing a document of sale of the smaller portion thereon. No consideration for any of these deeds was received by anybody, either Rajrani or Malti. 7. As regards the main building, namely, house No. 750/1 to 3, it is their further contention that Rajrani did not execute any document, that she did not appear before the Sub-registrar and both her signatures as well as the alleged thumb impressions said to have been made before the Sub-registrar are not her signatures or her thumb impressions. According to them, they are forgeries and the document was brought into existence by defendant No. 1 and /or Raghunath Sarda. It was. also their case that the document was brought into existence by using their influence over the widows and by reason of misrepresentation and fraud which was practiced by them upon Rajrani and Maltirai. 8. The principal contention of the plaintiffs, however, is that Rajranibeing incompetent to transfer the property, she could not transfer any title in the property, nor hand over possession. The plaintiffs who are the heirs or legatees of Lalitmohan and Rammohan are entitled to this property and are in possession and since defendants Nos. 1 to 3 claimed that they have purchased these properties from Rajrani, they were required to file this suit. Hence they prayed for a declaration and injunction in terms of the prayers. The plaintiffs who are the heirs or legatees of Lalitmohan and Rammohan are entitled to this property and are in possession and since defendants Nos. 1 to 3 claimed that they have purchased these properties from Rajrani, they were required to file this suit. Hence they prayed for a declaration and injunction in terms of the prayers. Rajrani died on 8th June 1969 and within a year from the death of Rajrani, namely, on 3rd September 1970, the present suit came to be filed. 9. Defendants Nos. 1 to 3 filed a common written-statement. According to them, they were not aware of Raghunath Sarda being the person of confidence of Rajrani or Maltirai. According to them, on 20th December 1968 two sale-deeds were executed in their favour properly, legally and validly by Rajrani. They denied the existence of the will or that the will was properly, legally and validly made for want of knowledge. They also denied the alleged dispositions in the will. According to them, the property did not belong to Gaurishankar exclusively and in any event after the death of Gaurishankar belonged exclusively to his widow, and only heir Rajrani, and to none others. 10. The documents, according to them, were not brought about either by undue influence, misrepresentation or fraud. That Rajrani herself presented the documents before the Sub-Registrar and signed them in the presence of the Sub-Registrar. That thereafter the defendants have started recovering rent from the tenants who were in possession of the property. 11. It is also the case of the defendants that Rajrani was an ostensible owner of the property. That they took all precautions and care and acted in good faith, paying valuable consideration to Rajrani of the properties in suit. They purchased the properties, therefore, from a person who held out to be the owner of the property. Since they had purchased this property for a valuable consideration from the ostensible owner, the plaintiffs cannot now turn round and say that they are the owners. They also claimed protection under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. They, therefore, prayed that the suit ought to be dismissed. 12. Defendant No. 4 filed her separate written-statement by which in substance she admitted the claim of the plaintiffs. As regards the will, how-ever, she stated that she had no personal knowledge and, therefore, the plaintiffs be required to prove that. They, therefore, prayed that the suit ought to be dismissed. 12. Defendant No. 4 filed her separate written-statement by which in substance she admitted the claim of the plaintiffs. As regards the will, how-ever, she stated that she had no personal knowledge and, therefore, the plaintiffs be required to prove that. So far as Raghunath Sarda was concerned, according to her, Rajrani was persuaded by this Raghunath Sarda to execute a sale-deed of the smaller portion of the house covered by the garage and out-houses in favour of defendants Nos. 2 and 3 for a sum of Rs. 20,000. That she being an obedient daughter-in-law of Rajrani had to attest the sale-deed in obedience to what she was directed. She stated that she does not know whether any consideration was received. According to her, she has now realised that Sarda has taken undue advantage of their acquaintance and by means of coercion and misrepresentation had obtained a sale-deed in favour of defendants Nos. 2 and 3 of the smaller portion of the house. This Sarda, according to her, had “created great impression on her and managed to seek her favour under misrepresentation and got several signatures of hers on the blank papers telling her that this defendant both that they were for the alleged sale of the out house strip bearing No. 750/4 to 8 only and for the attornment of the tenants living therein etc.” According to her, said blank papers and the signatures made by her and Rajrani now appear to have been utilised for purposes of making out a sale-deed in favour of defendant No. 1. That Rajrani did not execute any such sale-deed nor was she present in the office of the Sub-Registrar. That was, according to Maltirai, an impersonation by somebody. The written-statement filed on behalf of other defendants-tenants is not very material for the purposes of this suit. 13. The learned trial Judge framed a number of issues and in particular whether the will dated 3rd January 1949 was the last will of Gauri-shankar. He held that the will was legally and validity made and was the last will of Gaurishankar. The consequence of this finding naturally resulted in holding that no title was transferred or bestowed by reason of the sale-deed in favour of defendants Nos. 1 to 3. He held that the will was legally and validity made and was the last will of Gaurishankar. The consequence of this finding naturally resulted in holding that no title was transferred or bestowed by reason of the sale-deed in favour of defendants Nos. 1 to 3. He, however, also held with regard to the sale-deed in favour of defendant No. 1 dated 25th December 1968 that it was not executed by Rajrani. In regard to both these sale-deeds he was of the view that they were obtained by fraud and were avoidable. As the plaintiff's right to succeed to the property and right to be in possession of the property was held by him flowing from the will, he decreed the plain-tiffs' suit and also held that the suit for declaration without asking for possession was maintainable. In the result, he decreed the plaintiffs' suit. 14. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree defendant No. 1 alone has preferred this appeal. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 have not preferred any appeal and seemed to be satisfied with the decree which has been passed against them. Consequently the area of controversy in the present appeal relates only to the sale-deed in favour of original defendant No. 1 Ishwar Korga Pujari, hereinafter referred to as Ishwar, and the transaction evidenced by Ex. 128 dated 20th December 1968. 15. Mr. Bhangde who appeared for Ishwar raised before us four principal contentions. His first contention was that the alleged will of Gaurishankar, dated 3–1-1949 and the codicil effected on 19–11–1952 are not alleged to be the last will and testament of deceased Gaurishankar. In the absence of any pleading and in the absence of any evidence that the said will was the last will of Gaurishankar, he contended that it cannot be held, as was held by the learned trial Judge, that that was the last will. He contended that unless the will was shown to be the last will, the succession would be in accordance with the law of inheritance and not in accordance with the testament. Therefore, if the property belonged to Gaurishankar, on his death it would go to his heir, namely, widow Rajrani. If his widow Rajrani was the sole heir and successor to the property, under the law of inheritance, which was applicable, then he claimed that if appellant Ishwar succeeds in proving that the sale-deed Ex. Therefore, if the property belonged to Gaurishankar, on his death it would go to his heir, namely, widow Rajrani. If his widow Rajrani was the sole heir and successor to the property, under the law of inheritance, which was applicable, then he claimed that if appellant Ishwar succeeds in proving that the sale-deed Ex. 128 was executed by Rajrani, the suit must be dismissed. 16. Second contention of Mr. Bhangde was that the suit was bad for multifariousness. According to him, though such a contention was raised in the written statement, no issue was framed by the learned trial Judge. Merely because no issue was framed if the contention was raised, he submitted, the matter had to be decided. According to him in the present case, since the suit was bad for misjoinder of parties and causes of action grave prejudice has been caused to appellant Ishwar. 17. The third submission which Mr. Bhangde urged before us was that it was wrongly held that the document Ex. 128 was not executed by Rajrani. He pointed out that no evidence has been led as to the circumstances in which, and the possibility in which Raghunath Sarda could have acquired such blank signed documents. The evidence adduced by the plaintiffs did not go to establish that Raghunath Sarda could have obtained blank documents and signatures from the two ladies and had a position of confidence so far as they were concerned. Since that was not established, the very basis of the plaintiffs' claim that blank signatures were obtained and those blank signatures on a piece of paper were converted and used for the purpose of bringing into existence a sale deed must itself fail. 18. Mr. Bhangde's secondary contention in this context was that the signature of Rajrani as an executant upon the document Ex. 128 has been admitted. It does not matter, even if the signature of presentation before the Sub-Registrar and the signature in token of receipt of consideration are not proved to be that of Rajrani. It was Mr. Bhangde's contention that these signatures were also of Rajrani as was proved by Ishwar's own evidence and that of an Expert examined by him. He also relied in this connection on the evidence of witness Shyammohan examined by the plaintiffs. In the circumstances of the pleadings and the evidence, it was Mr. It was Mr. Bhangde's contention that these signatures were also of Rajrani as was proved by Ishwar's own evidence and that of an Expert examined by him. He also relied in this connection on the evidence of witness Shyammohan examined by the plaintiffs. In the circumstances of the pleadings and the evidence, it was Mr. Bhangde's contention that the execution of the document Ex. 128 must be held to have, been proved and ought to have been so held. As a subsidiary contention of that contention and as a part of the conduct of Rajrani and of Ishwar defendant No. 1 appellant, it was urged that the suit ought to have been filed for possession. That Ishwar Korga had been recovering rent from his tenants in the main building. That he did so for about a year and it was only after the suit notice was given to him that the tenants had stopped paying rent to him. If Ishwar was, therefore, in possession, merely because the plaintiffs were in possession of a part of the property, which also was not in their possession but was in possession of Rajrani, the plaintiffs could not bring a suit merely for a declaration and injunction. 19. Mr. Bhangde then contended that Rajrani had been allowed to deal with the property as if she was the full owner. That no action seems to have been taken pursuant to the will dated 3–1-1949 and the codicil of the 19th November 1952, either by the executor named under the will or by the legatees. The entire rent of the properties was admittedly received by Rajrani who managed the property as if it belonged to her. If Lalitmohan and Rammohan and the present plaintiffs lived in the property and yet allow-ed the property to be managed and looked after as if it belonged to Rajrani, then section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act came to the assistance of Ishwar-appellant. According to Mr. Bhangde, all those reasonable enquiries which were necessary and under the circumstances warranted were made by him. Ishwar acted in good faith and paid valuable consideration of Rs. 40,000. Rs. 25,000 out of that consideration were paid before the Sub-Registrar and admittedly received by the executant of the document Ex. 128. Therefore, even if the will is held to be proved as the last will and testament of Gaurishankar, still according to Mr. Ishwar acted in good faith and paid valuable consideration of Rs. 40,000. Rs. 25,000 out of that consideration were paid before the Sub-Registrar and admittedly received by the executant of the document Ex. 128. Therefore, even if the will is held to be proved as the last will and testament of Gaurishankar, still according to Mr. Bhangde, section 41 provided an adequate shield to the appellant to resist the plaintiffs' claim. 20. Lastly it was Mr. Bhangde's contention that under the will a part of the property was admittedly given to Rajrani, though by way of a limited estate. Rajrani being the wife and widow of Gaurishankar, he contended, had a right to be maintained by Gaurishankar, and out of his property. She had a right which existed even before the will came into existence and the will started speaking. If in token of that right or in satisfaction of that right, property was given to Rajrani, may be as a limited owner, by reason of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, which applies to such dispositions made even after the coming into force of the Act, would enlarge the estate which was conferred upon Rajrani into a full estate. He contended, therefore, that the combined effect of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act and the provisions of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act resulted in enlarging the estate of Rajrani into a full proprietary interest. Defendant No. 1 Ishwar who had purchased that interest from Rajrani was entitled to remain in possession at least of that portion of the property which had been bequeathed, under the will to Rajrani. 20. A. Mr. Bhangde who argued this appeal with fairness and ability, however, conceded that if it is found that the document Ex.128 was not “executed by Rajrani then all these questions which have been raised by him would recede into insignificance and in the back ground. He, however, seriously contended that a grave prejudice has been caused to Ishwar in the present case, which was bad for multifariousness, being allowed to proceed to trail without deciding that question. He pointed out that though a joint written-statement was filed by defendants 1 to 3, defendant No. 2 only entered into the witness-box. Defendant No. 2 appears to have colluded, subsequent to the filing of the written-statement with the plaintiffs and gave evidence, Mr. He pointed out that though a joint written-statement was filed by defendants 1 to 3, defendant No. 2 only entered into the witness-box. Defendant No. 2 appears to have colluded, subsequent to the filing of the written-statement with the plaintiffs and gave evidence, Mr. Bhangde says, against defendant No. 1 Ishwar and in favour of the plaintiffs. This has directly affected and prejudiced the case of defendant No. 1 Ishwar. These are according to Mr. Bhangde really two suits in respect of which the defendants did not have a unity of interest. The causes of action against the two sets of defendants were also dissimilar. All the defendants did not have interest in all the causes of action and there-fore, they could not be joined in a single suit. Mr. Bhangde contended that these are in effect two suits combined into one. He also pointed out that the plaintiffs have not in the alternative based their case as being heirs of deceased Rajrani or deceased Gaurishankar after the death of Rajrani. No such alternative claim is put forward on behalf of the plaintiffs and therefore, according to him, these two suits could not be brought together so as to cause prejudice in the defence to defendant Ishwar. 20-B. We would in the first instance take up the question as to whether the suit was bad for multifariousness. We have already pointed out that the claim made by the plaintiffs in this case is based upon the will dated 3–1-1949 left by deceased Gaurishankar. Therefore, it is quite clear that the only title which the plaintiffs are claiming is on the strength of the will. It is also plain from the recitals in the plaint that the plaintiffs' claim that they are in actual physical possession of a portion of the property, which is not in dispute The rest of the property is in the possession of the tenants. The evidence which has been adduced in this case goes to show that the plaintiffs must be held to be also in possession constructively through their tenants. The question which is necessary to be considered at this stage is whether such a suit for injunction and declaration filed on the basis that the plaintiffs are in possession of the property and are, therefore, entitled to an injunction against persons who are not entitled to possession is in any way bad for multi-fariousness. The question which is necessary to be considered at this stage is whether such a suit for injunction and declaration filed on the basis that the plaintiffs are in possession of the property and are, therefore, entitled to an injunction against persons who are not entitled to possession is in any way bad for multi-fariousness. 20-C. Mr. Bhangde contended that under Order 2, rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, referred to hereinafter as the Code, a joinder of causes of action is permitted only as contemplated in that rule. Order 2, rule 3 of the Code permits a plaintiff to unite in a single suit several causes of action against the same defendant or defendants jointly. It also permits plaintiffs jointly interested in the causes of action to join in a single suit, except as is otherwise provided. The causes of action, according to Mr.Bhangde against the two sets of defendants were separate and independent and the plaintiffs cannot be said to be jointly interested in the different causes of action. 21. We do not think that this contention is sound. If we refer to Order 1, rule 1 and Order 2, rule 3, which permit joinder of defendants and joinder of causes of action it will be seen that more than one plaintiff may join in a suit where the right to relief in them arises “out of the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions”. Now the said right to relief need not arise jointly and it may arise jointly or severally or also in the alternative in such persons. This is, however, followed by a proviso and a condition, namely, that “if such persons were to bring separate suits in respect of the right to relief arising out of the same act or series of acts or transactions, any common question of law or fact would have arisen” In other words, more than one plaintiffs can unite in a suit and file a single suit, though they may not be entitled to that relief jointly and may be entitled to it either severally or alternatively, if the right to relief arises out of the same act or series of acts and any common question of law or fact arises in such a suit. This clearly applies to the plaintiffs and does not speak of defendants. This clearly applies to the plaintiffs and does not speak of defendants. However, rule 3 of Order 1 speaks of defendants and says that more than one defendants may be joined in a single suit where against them “a right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions” is alleged to exist. That may not arise against them jointly and may arise severally and may also arise in the alternative. This again is qualified by the same provision as is to be found in the case of the plaintiffs, namely, that if separate suits have been brought, a common question of law or fact would have arisen in such suits 22. Order 1, rule 1 and Order 1, rule 3 of the Code are thus complementary to each other. Whereas rule 1 provides for the joinder of the plaintiffs, rule 3 provides for the joinder of defendants. What is common to both is that the right to relief against the persons who are sued must arise out of the same act or series of acts. It is not necessary that either the plaintiffs or the defendants must be jointly interested in all the causes of action or rights to relief, they may be interested jointly and may also be interested severally or alternatively. This, however, has a qualification and the qualification is that a common question of law or fact must arise, and the test is that such a common question of law or fact would have arisen if all these persons had filed separate suits against all these persons against whom right to relief is claimed. In other words, it is patent that several persons may join in an action provided their claim or right is based upon the same act or series of acts against a defendant or defendants against whom the relief is claimed and provided if they had brought separate suits against the several defendants by the several plaintiffs a common question of law or fact would have arisen”. The test, therefore, clearly seems to be that the right to relief and the persons against whom the right to relief is claimed must arise out of the same act or series of acts and the adjudication of that act or acts must involve a common question of law or fact. The test, therefore, clearly seems to be that the right to relief and the persons against whom the right to relief is claimed must arise out of the same act or series of acts and the adjudication of that act or acts must involve a common question of law or fact. Applying these tests it is quite clear that the basis of the claim made by the plaintiffs, supposing they were to file two separate suits against defendant No. 1 and defendants Nos. 2 and 3, would have been the same. That basis is their right to the property on the basis of the will left by Gaurishankar. It was certainly, therefore a common question and if we may so say common question of law or fact would have arisen. It is not merely that, but that the question of possession which was being disturbed, which it was alleged was being disturbed by the defendants, also raised a common question of law as well as of fact. The right to an injunction is again based upon existing possession, and if what was necessary to be proved by the plaintiffs and if the right to relief against defendants Nos. 1 to 3 for an injunction arose for the plaintiffs by virtue of the fact that they were entitled to possession and were in possession, once again a common question of law and fact would have arisen in two separate suits had they been filed by the plaintiffs. 23. Mr. Bhangde contended that defendant No. 1 was not interested in any way in the transaction resulting in sale-deed in favour of defendants Nos. 2 and 3. Similarly defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were also not interested in the sale-deed executed in favour of defendant No. 1. All the diverse questions in regard to fraud, misrepresentation and influence or confidence against Raghunath Sarda arose in different circumstances or would have arisen in different circumstances in respect of sale-deed of defendants Nos. 2 and 3 and in respect of defendant No. 1. According to Mr. Bhangde, though such questions may be similar, they were not common questions which would arise in such a suit. He urged that in that event it would be improper and not conducive to justice and fair trial to try such suits together. 2 and 3 and in respect of defendant No. 1. According to Mr. Bhangde, though such questions may be similar, they were not common questions which would arise in such a suit. He urged that in that event it would be improper and not conducive to justice and fair trial to try such suits together. He seems to suggest that it is not enough that one single question may arise in common in such suits but all the questions which arise in both the suits must be common. 24. We do not think that that contention is sound or warranted on the basis of the words used in Order 1, rule 1, or Order 1, rule 3 of the Code. The words used arc singular and not plural. Besides the emphasis is supplied by the addition of the noun “any”. It is, therefore, clearly not necessary that more than one common question of law or fact must arise or all questions arising in the two suits either of law or fact must be common in both the suits when only one suit can be filed by more than one plaintiffs against more than one defendants provided of course the right to relief arises from the same act or series of acts. 25. Besides no suit can be dismissed on the ground that it is bad for multifariousness. We do not think that the defendant No. 1 in this case felt that there was any prejudice likely to be caused to him. If there was any prejudice likely to be caused, then we feel that at the earliest opportunity defendant No. 1 would have sought an issue and decision on the matter. No such issue has been framed and we think that defendant No. 1 did not press, though he had raised that contention before the trial Judge, his contention of multifariousness, as he did not think that there was any prejudice going to be caused to him. We feel and we think that defendant No. I must have rightly felt, that the principal question in the case was in regard to the claim or right of the plaintiffs to the property and the second question was whether that right could be defeated by the execution of the sale deed in his favour as claimed by them by Rajrani. These two questions are really “ the basic questions in this suit and they could have been common to both the suits; we do not think, therefore, that there is any substance in the contention that the suit was bad for multifariousness or that defendant No. 1 was in any way prejudiced in the conduct of the trial of the suit by reason of defendants Nos. 2 and 3 being joined in the very suit. 26. Mr. Bhangde fairly conceded before us that so far as the formal execution, proof, legality and validity of the will dated 3rd January 1949 and the codicil dated 19th November 1952 Exs. 79 and 79-A are concerned, he was not in a position to assail that evidence. We think that the concession is rightly made and the evidence given by the two attesting witnesses, namely, Shri P. V. Lele (P. W. 1) and Shri V. G. Ayachit (P. W. 2) respectively to prove the will as well as the codicil clearly satisfies the test of section 68 of the Evidence Act. Exs. 79 and 79A, therefore, must be held to have been legally and validly executed. [ After considering the oral evidence on the question whether Exhibits 79 and 79A were proved to be the last will and testament of the deceased in paras. 27 to 80 the Judgment proceeds : ] 81. We may now refer to some of the cases to which reference was made by Mr. Bhangde relating to the execution of a document. In Sarkar's Evidence Act, page 639, the meaning and the proof of the word “execution” has been set out. It says “Executed” means completed. 'Execution' is the last act or series of acts which completes it. Execution consists in signing a document written out and read over and understood and does not consist of merely signing a name upon a blank sheet of paper. To be executed, a document must be in existence; where there is no document in existence, there can be no execution” 82. It seems to us plain that a person cannot be said to execute a document where he does not do so with the intention of making it. This may appear to be simple, but it is clearly, in our opinion, full of meaning and import. It seems to us plain that a person cannot be said to execute a document where he does not do so with the intention of making it. This may appear to be simple, but it is clearly, in our opinion, full of meaning and import. The word “execution” in a sense means the making of a document, and a person can be said to have made or authorised a document where with the intention and knowledge of bringing into existence a particular kind of document he prepares or gets prepared, such a document and signs it in token of his having accepted that document, with a desire to bring it into existence. Mere signing of a document without the intention of bringing that document into existence, meaning thereby giving effect to it would not properly speaking attract the expression “execution”. A person may, for instance, prepare and sign a document and put it away without any intention of bringing it into existence at that time. The intention to bring it into existence may be contingent, may also be dependent and may never be acted upon. Where a document is delivered to a person intended to be delivered to, or with a view that it should be acted upon, it could be said that the document has not been brought into existence. The execution, therefore, would mean a conscious making out of a kind of document intend-ed to be made out, acknowledging it that it is so made out by affixing his signature or thumb mark to that document in token of having accepted it, and when it is delivered or communicated, or any act is done in that behalf with a view to bring it into existence. The intention must be to bring it into effect. It is when all these transactions and acts are intended and also completed, that a document in a proper sense can be said to have been executed. 83. Mr. Bhangde first relied upon a decision in (Gopal Das v. Sri Thakurji)1 and the observation therein that “the evidence of due registration is itself some evidence of execution”. In that case certain documents had been admitted in evidence and an endorsement appeared thereon as admitted against the plaintiffs. 83. Mr. Bhangde first relied upon a decision in (Gopal Das v. Sri Thakurji)1 and the observation therein that “the evidence of due registration is itself some evidence of execution”. In that case certain documents had been admitted in evidence and an endorsement appeared thereon as admitted against the plaintiffs. No objection seems to have been raised when the document was admitted in evidence and so exhibited, to its admission or exhibiting on the ground that the document was not proved. The plaintiffs against whom this document was admitted made a grievance thereof and raised that ground for the first time in the Court of Appeal. It was found that at the appropriate time no objection was raised to the admitting and exhibiting the document and making the endorsement. The question there was whether Parshottam Das had made a certain statement. In the circum-stances the only question which was raised was whether the person who had appeared before the Registrar was Parshottam Das or an impostor. It is in this context that the Privy Council observed that “registration is itself some evidence of execution”. This observation made by the Privy Council was later explained in Ramkrishna v. Mohammad Kasam2 to which we will make a reference later. 84. Mr. Bhangde heavily relied upon Dalchand v. Hasanbi3. In that case it was observed that “the initial burden of proving execution of a document when it is denied is upon the person alleging execution. But if nothing else is known, then the mere fact that a document is admitted to bear a certain signature and that it comes from proper custody ought to be enough to raise an inference that it was signed with the intention of execution.” Mr. Bhangde submitted that it was admitted in this case that the signature on the document was of Rajrani. The document is produced by him and, therefore, execution should be held, since nothing else is shown or alleged as proved. In that case there were two documents, proof of which was in question, one of 2nd October 1912 and second of 31st August 1920 of which copies were produced. The execution of these documents was called in question much later. It is in these circumstances that the case came to be decided. In that case there were two documents, proof of which was in question, one of 2nd October 1912 and second of 31st August 1920 of which copies were produced. The execution of these documents was called in question much later. It is in these circumstances that the case came to be decided. We may, however, refer to an observation of the Bench that “We have no quarrel with the general proposition that proof of signature is not necessarily proof of execution and that an admission that a document bears a man's signature is not necessarily an admission of execution. The circum-stances of the case may negative such an inference”. We think that the proposition which has been made out in that case is that an admission of signature on a document without anything more would lead to an inference that the document was executed, as persons do not put their signatures to' documents without knowing and reading their contents. Circumstances, however, may arise which would negative a prima facie inference so arising. We think that there exist a host of circumstances in this case to negative, assuming a prima facie inference were to arise in this case. 85. In (Alapati Sivaramakrishnayya v. Alapati Kasiwiswanadham)4 the question was of the proof of a letter. There was no question of any formal proof and it was held proof of a man's signature under it a prima facie proof that the contents of the letter are attributable to his authorship. If a person denies that he has written a letter which bears his signature, then surely he must prove what he alleges i. e. the letter was got up on a blank piece of paper containing his signature. This case followed Dalchand v. Hasanbi (cit. supra) to which we have already made a reference and the judgment in that case is based upon the Nagpur decision. We may refer to some of the observations in this case, which point out, the distinction between the case of a letter and a deed as in this case. This case followed Dalchand v. Hasanbi (cit. supra) to which we have already made a reference and the judgment in that case is based upon the Nagpur decision. We may refer to some of the observations in this case, which point out, the distinction between the case of a letter and a deed as in this case. “It is necessary to point out that the word 'execution' is hardly apt when used in regard to the drafting of a letter and is only appropriate in regard to a deed or instrument, as in such cases, certain formalities are insisted upon by law and they are to be followed by the executant in order to make the document effective in law”. It is true that a sale-deed is not one such category of document which requires to be proved by examining an attesting witness, but nevertheless a sale-deed is much more formal document and a solemn document than a mere letter. 86. Mr. Bhangde fairly pointed out to us that the observations of the Privy Council in Gopal Das v. Shri Thakurji (cit. supra) have been explained in Ramkrishna v. Mohammad Kasam. In that case the question was whether a certain wakf deed was executed. The execution of the wakf deed was denied. Reliance was placed in this connection on the evidence of one Kazi Rahimuddin said to have been present at the time of the deed. The High Court disagreed with that view. It is in this context that the Privy Council decision in Gopal Das v. Sri Thakurji was relied upon. By relying upon the provisions of section 60 of the Registration Act and the Privy Council decision in the Court below, it was considered that “that was somewhat evidence of execution”. The Bench then proceeded to consider various decisions in that behalf and pointed out that it has been held as far back as in Maruti v. Dattu5 that from the endorsement made by the registering officer that a certain person admitted the execution, it may be presumed that the person who admitted execution was the person who signed the deed but that does not of itself prove who signed the deed. Reference was then made to (Thama v. Govind)6 which observed that the “endorsements may show that the person purporting to sign admitted his signature before the Registrar. In the absence of any further evidence... . Reference was then made to (Thama v. Govind)6 which observed that the “endorsements may show that the person purporting to sign admitted his signature before the Registrar. In the absence of any further evidence... . of the necessary link in the chain that the person who admitted execution before the Registrar was the person who could give title to the plaintiff”, the alleged admission would not pass any title. The Bench then took a review of all the cases and pointed out that “a certificate of registration given under section 60 of the Registration Act is not sufficient to prove due execution of a document and when the execution of a document is denied proof as required by section 67 of the Evidence Act must be furnished.” The Privy Council decision was observed to be as “not laying down that proof as contemplated by section 67 of the Evidence Act can be dispensed with in the case of a registered document.” 87. It will thus be seen that the correct view to take in regard to an execution of a document which is denied and the signature thereto only is admitted, is if there is nothing else and no other circumstances are pleaded, then the question as to upon whom the burden of proof is of the execution of the document will depend upon the circumstances of that case. Where, however, only the signature is admitted and the execution is denied and the other facts pleaded and circumstances shown to be existing, it is the person who alleges that the document was executed has to prove that it was so executed in the sense that the executant intended to make and bring into existence the document which it purports to be. 88. Mr. Bhangde fairly drew our attention in this context to the judgment reported in (Dattatraya v. Rangnath)7 to which we now refer. A contention was advanced before the Court by counsel for the appellant in that case that “when the execution of a document is denied, the party seeking to prove that document must not only prove that the alleged executant has signed that deed, but he must also prove that the executant had signed the same with the knowledge of its contents.” The Supreme Court observed “What facts and circumstances have to be established to prove the execution of a document depend on the pleas put forward. If the only plea taken is that the executant has not signed the document and that the document is a forgery, party seeking to prove the execution of a document need not adduce evidence to show that the party who signed the document knew the contents of the document”. It was pointed out that firstly a person does not put a signature to a document without knowing its contents, but where it is so pleaded, then in certain circumstances it will be necessary for the party seeking to prove the document to place material before the Court to satisfy it that the party signing the document had knowledge of it. We think that in the present circumstances the plaintiffs clearly pleaded that Rajrani did not sign the document knowing its contents or intending to execute a sale-deed, knowing that she was so executing a sale-deed. We think in the present case it was not sufficient for defendant No. -1 to merely prove the signature on Ex. 128 at page 9 to be that of Rajrani. 89. In view of what we have discussed above and in view of the various circumstances set out and the evidence, we are inclined to hold that the document in this case Ex. 128 was not executed by Rajrani. We are satisfied that the evidence is clear that Rajrani on 20th December 1968 had gone to the Sub-Registrar's office and only one document Ex. 95 was register-ed that day as executed by her. 90. Mr. Bhangde then contended that defendant No. 1 is protected by reason of provisions of section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. He submitted that the evidence disclosed that it was Rajrani alone who was recovering rents of the property. Ex. 131 showed that Municipal Corpora-tion tax bill was issued in the name of Rajrani alone, though there are other bills standing in the names of others. The entire income of the property was being taken by Rajrani. There was no evidence, according to him, of either Lalitmohan or Rammohan having asserted their title to the property at any time prior to their death. Maltirai who lived along with Rajrani must have been doing so after her husband's death. She also did not assert any act of ownership or interest in the property. Mr. There was no evidence, according to him, of either Lalitmohan or Rammohan having asserted their title to the property at any time prior to their death. Maltirai who lived along with Rajrani must have been doing so after her husband's death. She also did not assert any act of ownership or interest in the property. Mr. Bhangde made this submission in the alternative in case his contention that the will was not the last will was not accepted. We have already held that the will and codicil in this case Exs. 79 and 79-A are the last will and testament of Gaurishankar. 91. For section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act the consent of the real owners need not be express. Where such person constitutes another as an ostensible owner of such property, it is then that the real owners are not allowed to turn round and claim the property, provided the other requirements of section 41 are satisfied. Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act enacts a special branch of estoppels arising against real owners permitting a person to put forth himself as the owner of the property. The principle, however, is not unqualified, and it requires that the transferee must take reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor has power to transfer and acts good faith “Good faith” is defined in section 52 of the Indian Penal rode Though the definition is in the negative term “good faith” presupposes due care and attention. Absence of due care and attention is want of good faith The transferee must also take reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor has power to make the transfer. If these two requirements are not satisfied, then there is no question of any estoppel arising against the real owners and the benefit cannot be given to the transferee. 92. We are unable to accept, on the evidence which has been adduced in this case that Ishwar the transferee had either acted in good faith or had taken reasonable care to ascertain whether Rajrani, had the power to alienate. We have already pointed out that the evidence produced by defendant Ishwar himself the form of Exs. 130 to 135 showed that apart from Rajrani the name of other persons appear in the Municipal records. We have already pointed out that the evidence produced by defendant Ishwar himself the form of Exs. 130 to 135 showed that apart from Rajrani the name of other persons appear in the Municipal records. In the enquiry, Ishwar says, he made at the Sub-Registrar's office no other name except that of Gaurishankar was found by him. A reasonable care would pre-suppose investigation in the title and investigation of the nature and circumstances of the claim of persons whose names appear in the other record, namely, the Corporation record. There is not even a public notice issued. Ishwar is completely silent as to the investigation of the title deeds and admits that he made no enquiry excepting at the two offices. It is clear to us that the appearance of the three names Lalitmohan, Rammohan and Shyammohan in the Corporation records put Ishwar on enquiry and must have put him on enquiry as to their interest in the property He states that during the course of his talks with Rajrani, Maltirai was present with Rajrani. He also admitted to have seen the young boys namely, son Lalitmohan and yet he does not make any enquiry either of Rajrani or of Maltirai, as to how Rajrani was the owner and as to how she got the property solely to herself. An absence of any enquiry whatsoever cannot be described as taking all reasonable care. The words used in the section are “taking reasonable care to ascertain” the transferor's power to make the transfer. The word “care” is stronger than the word “enquiry” The burden therefore, required to be discharged by the transferee under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act is a heavier burden than in the case of a mere enquiry or a reasonable enquiry. 93. In our opinion, Ishwar did not act in good faith and with due care and attention. Not only that, we have already made a reference to the circumstance that Ishwar was getting a very cheap bargain and that would normally require him to take all such care and attention as a normal prudent man would be expected to take. Rajrani was a fairly old woman. In her last days of life she is said to have been ailing also and used to be in bed. She died won after the sale-deed on 8th June 1969. Rajrani was a fairly old woman. In her last days of life she is said to have been ailing also and used to be in bed. She died won after the sale-deed on 8th June 1969. If no enquiry was made and if Ishwar does not say that he made enquiry as to whether there were any sons of Rajrani and Gaurishankar or other persons as heirs, we do not see how Ishwar can be said to have acted in good faith. 94. He has similarly made no enquiry with the tenants. It is only after about 5–6 months that he says that he went to the tenants and demanded rent from them as also the arrears for six months. He claims that the rent was paid to him by the tenants for about 11 months and he passed receipts to them. Neither has he produced any counterfoils of such receipts, nor did he call upon the tenants to produce the receipts which he had passed in their favour. We are unable to think that he either claimed any rent from them or attempted to recover that rent or received any rent. He has been questioned as regards certain signed documents and thumb impressions of Rajrani and Malti obtained on blank papers having been used for purposes of communication to the tenants and Corporation even after Rajrani's death. A number of such documents were produced by the plaintiffs at Exh. 156 to 161. They cast a considerable amount of suspicion over the entire transaction. Mr. Bhangde, however, contended and rightly that the learned trial Judge was in error in allowing these documents at the fag end of the trial and exhibiting them. Though it does appear that some of these documents were produced along with the plaint, no effort has been made to prove the original. The documents produced are either certified copies or photo copies of the original which were in the possession of Nagpur Municipal Corpora-tion. We think that these documents must be left out of consideration. We will not, therefore, consider that part of the evidence of Ishwar relating to these documents. Nevertheless his evidence clearly goes to show a conduct of a person who did not bona fide and in a genuine transaction purchase such a valuable property. The defence, therefore, raised under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act must fail. 95. We will not, therefore, consider that part of the evidence of Ishwar relating to these documents. Nevertheless his evidence clearly goes to show a conduct of a person who did not bona fide and in a genuine transaction purchase such a valuable property. The defence, therefore, raised under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act must fail. 95. That takes us to the last contention which was raised by Mr. Bhangde. Mr. Bhangde sought to raise this new ground by way of an amendment to his appeal memo. It was urged that no such ground was taken in the written statement and should not be allowed. Mr. Bhangde sought to raise a legal contention by the amendment and that was, that even if the will and testament Exh. 79 and Exh. 79-A were held proved, the estate which was conferred by the will upon Rajrani was a limited estate. That estate, he submitted, automatically bloomed into a full title by reason of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. It was Mr. Bhangde's submission that Gaurishankar's widow Rajrani had a pre-existing right to be maintained. That during the life-time of Gaurishankar the right was a personal right against her husband. If that right he submitted got translated into a bequest of immovable property during the life-time of a wife that was in recognition of that pre-existing right and a provision was made for her maintenance by conferring upon her immovable property in which the husband purported to create a life estate. Mr. Bhangde submitted that no new facts were necessary to be proved or established. On the facts held proved and emerging on the evidence, he was entitled to submit a legal contention that it was sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act which applied and enlarged Rajrani's estate in the property. Even if, therefore, defendant No. 1 fails on other aspects, he submitted that if the execution of the deed is held to have been made by Rajrani, then to the extent the property was give a to Rajrani, Ishwar's claim to the property should be upheld. 96. Since the question raised by Mr. Bhangde is pure question of law, we have allowed him to raise it fey an amendment. We do not think, how-ever, that sub-section (1) of section 14 of Hindu Succession Act has any application in the present case. 96. Since the question raised by Mr. Bhangde is pure question of law, we have allowed him to raise it fey an amendment. We do not think, how-ever, that sub-section (1) of section 14 of Hindu Succession Act has any application in the present case. Reliance was placed in this behalf on the provisions of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, section. 18 of the Hindu. Adoptions and Maintenance Act as also sections 21 and 28 of the same Act Mr. Bhangde also drew our attention to section 39 of the Transfer at* Property Act. He also relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in (Vaddebovina Tulasama v. Seslva Reddi)8 and (Bai Vajia v. Thakorbhaii Ghelabhai)9. 97. Now it may be mentioned that the Hindu Succession, Act came-into force on the 18th June 1956 and the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act came into force on 22nd December 1956. Those two Acts and other connected Acts, such as Hindu Marriage Act and Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act which came into force in that year were parts of intended reforms in the Hindu Law which compendiously were sought to be brought under the Hindu Code. Where these enactments made provisions, then the contrary provisions in the Shastric Hindu Law, which till then governed Hindus, so far as their personal law was concerned, would abrogate and yield to the enacted provisions. The wife's right to maintenance was also-recognised under the ordinary Hindu Law. Section 18(1) of the Hindis Adoptions and Maintenance Act entacts that a Hindu wife is “entitled to be maintained by her husband during her lifetime.” Mr. Bhangde's contention, therefore, was that the right to be maintained was during the lifetime of the wife, and, therefore, could be enforced even after the lifetime of the husband. If no arrangement had been made and the husband leaves any property, then it is that property which can be proceeded against. It then becomes the subject of realisation of that right. 98. The wife is also included in the dependents mentioned in section 21 of the said Act. Reliance was then placed upon section 28 which says that “where a dependant has a right to receive maintenance out of an estate, and such estate or any part thereof is transferred, the right to receive maintenance may be enforced against the transferee, if the transferee has notice of the right. Reliance was then placed upon section 28 which says that “where a dependant has a right to receive maintenance out of an estate, and such estate or any part thereof is transferred, the right to receive maintenance may be enforced against the transferee, if the transferee has notice of the right. or if the transfer is gratuitous......” The widow's right to maintenance, therefore, according to him, being a dependant, could be enforced against the legatees. So far as the property given to her was concerned, that stood on a different footing, 99. We may notice section 27 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act and section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act. Under section 27 the right of maintenance is a personal right. Section 18 also does not say that the right is other than personal. It becomes a charge or an interest in the properly and the property gets encumbered only where “it is “created by the will of the deceased by a decree of court, by agreement between the dependants and the owner of the estate or portion, or otherwise.” Similar to section 28 is the provision in section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act and considerations which apply to cases under section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act would equally apply to cases under section 28 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act. The real question, however, is whether section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act has application to such a case. 100. We are in the present case concerned with a post Hindu Succession Act death of a Hindu male. All these enactments, as pointed out were placed on the Statute book in the year 1956. A female and a widow of a deceased male under the Succession Act is recognised as an heir and immediately takes an interest in the property upon intestacy under section 8. A widow is an heir in Class 1. If there in any property left by a Hindu dying intestate, then the widow can claim that property as an heir; But it would be difficult to think that she would be able to enforce her claim to be maintained from out of the other property of the deceased going to other heirs on the ground that the property which came to her by way of in-heritance was not enough. The right to maintenance being a personal right, with the disappearance of the person such a right would be gone. Both section 28 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act and section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act speak of the right to receive maintenance “out of an estate, and such estate or any part thereof is transferred.” Therefore, ¦we think that in order to attract, either section 28 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act or section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act, the right must be with reference to any property and in the property. 101. Mr. Bhangde contended that it is really not a right in the property, but it is a right against the property. We are unable to agree. The words used in the section, as we have pointed out, refer to the existence of the right to maintenance, either out of the property or out of the profits of the property. It is, therefore, a right or interest in the property. It would be against that property only if the property is liable to be taken for realisation of that right under a decree. What appears under section 28 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act and section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act is a right which travels with the property and is attached to it. That is why it can be enforced against a gratuitous transferee and also against a transferee with notice. Even such a right cannot be enforced against a transferee without notice. 102. It is, therefore, unnecessary to go into this controversy as we do not think that section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act has any application to this situation. Reliance was placed upon the words in sub-section (1) of section 14 relating to property “whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act.” It was, therefore, urged that Rajrani may have acquired this property after the Hindu Succession Act came into force. She was, however, possessed of that property and, therefore, if the possession and acquisition of that property was in recognition and in furtherance of a pre-existing right of maintenance, then the limited estate purported to be conferred bloomed into a full estate. Mr. Bhangde drew our attention in this connection to the recitals in Ext. She was, however, possessed of that property and, therefore, if the possession and acquisition of that property was in recognition and in furtherance of a pre-existing right of maintenance, then the limited estate purported to be conferred bloomed into a full estate. Mr. Bhangde drew our attention in this connection to the recitals in Ext. 79 that Gaurishankar was aware that he had a responsibility and liability for maintenance towards his wife. In para 3 of the will it is stated that only person for whom I should provide and who is my sole heir is my wife Rambai G. Rajrani. Therefore, making provision for Rajrani and others the testator made a bequest which he did. The provisions of one-fourth share in the house in favour of Rajrani was, therefore, by way of a provisions for her maintenance. Mr. Bhangde, therefore, submitted that Rajrani acquired this property and was possessed of it after the coming into force of the Act. By the very force of the Act, he submitted, as interpreted by the Supreme' Court in Vaddebovina Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi (cit-supra) that estate became a full estate. He quoted copiously from the observations of the Supreme Court in that judgment to which we shall presently come. 103. We think, however, Mr. Bhangde is not right both on the basis of the observations of the Supreme Court in Tulasamma's case (cit. supra)r and the scheme and the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act. We may firstly refer to the Explanation attached to section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, which says what is meant by the word “property”. The property which section 14 (1) speaks of is the property possessed by a female, Hindu which is to bloom into a full ownership. Now if we read the Explanation it will be clear that it takes in its ambit all kinds of properties acquired and obtained in whatever manner, movable and immovable “immediately before the commencement of this Act”. The Explanation, therefore, in our opinion, applies and refers to such property under sec-tion 14 (1), as possessed and held by a Hindu female immediately before the commencement of the Act. 104. The word “possess” has now been held to mean not only she property which was in actual physical possession, but also such property to which a female has a right. 104. The word “possess” has now been held to mean not only she property which was in actual physical possession, but also such property to which a female has a right. She must have, therefore, a right to possess such a property. It is on the basis of this interpretation that Mr. Bhangde sought to urge that the property includes not only the property which is in actual physical possession, but the property to which a female had a right. He urged section 14 did not apply merely to cases of such properties coming into existence immediately before the commencement of the Act. Even after the commencement of the Act where a Hindu female had a pre-existing right in respect of or against any property, even if the property is so acquired by her after the commencement of the Act, if it comes to her as a limited owner, she would become a full owner. Mr. Bhangde claimed, therefore, that where a Hindu male dies leaving behind him a will and confers any property upon his widow as a limited owner, section 14 (1) would be attracted to such a case. 105. We think that if this interpretation were to be accepted, then the implication underlying the provisions in section 8 and section 30 of that Act would be wiped away. Section 8 speaks of succession to a Hindu dying intestate. In the case of testate succession, the provisions of Indian Succession Act apply as is laid down in section 30 of that Act. If therefore, a Hindu is capable of effecting a will and thereby altering the mode of succession as laid down by the law of whatever property of which he can make a will and dispose it of, so far as a widow was concerned, such a provision would be of no avail. Mr. Bhangde pointed out that former sub-section (2) of section 30 has now been repealed and the provisions in that behalf are carried to section 29 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act. Mr. Bhangde pointed out that former sub-section (2) of section 30 has now been repealed and the provisions in that behalf are carried to section 29 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act. Former sub-section (2) of section 30 laid down that: “For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that nothing contain-ed in sub-section (1) shall affect the right to maintenance of any heir specified in the Schedule by reason only of the fact that under a will or other testamentary disposition made by the deceased the heir has been deprived of a share in the property to which he or she would have been entitled under this Act if the deceased had died intestate.” It was urged that even under the former sub-section (2) of section 30 where the widow was deprived of her share in the property, which she would have got if the Hindu died intestate, her right of maintenance would not have been affected. 106. We do not see how that would make any difference in the position which was available when Gaurishankar died. Sub-section (2) of sec-tion 30 was not then available. Section 29 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act would not also be attracted, as we think that a provision had been made for the widow in the will itself for her maintenance. The will recites that whatever cash and ornaments were possessed by the deceased upto the date of the will, he had “already distributed them between his wife and 3 nephews”. He stated “they are in possession of all my movables as I have distributed and they shall continue to own and possess them as their own property”. If any cash or ornaments the deceased was to remain in possession of and own during his lifetime were also provided under the will to pass to his sole heir Rajrani. It is true that the extent of the cash and ornaments on the date of the will and on the death of Gaurishankar or on the day he effected the will, that is, 3rd January 1949, has not come on record. But in view of these provisions it will not be possible for us to say that no provision was made for his wife by Gaurishankar. Besides for purposes of maintenance she had been given a portion of the house, though only during her life-time. 107. Mr. But in view of these provisions it will not be possible for us to say that no provision was made for his wife by Gaurishankar. Besides for purposes of maintenance she had been given a portion of the house, though only during her life-time. 107. Mr. Madkholkar for the respondents Nos. 2, 3, 5 and 6 submitted that section 14 of the Succession Act in its nature and terms applies and affects situations in repect of properties to which Hindu female has either a right or was possessed of at the time of the coming into force of the Act. His contention was that the property which the Hindu female possessed either actually and physically or to which she had a right as contemplated in section 14, must be antecedent to the coming into force of the Act. Where property of the nature as described in the Act is received by a Hindu female after the coming into force of the Act, but not in fulfillment or pursuant to her right existing prior to 18th June 1956 when the Act came into force, to such a property, the Act does not apply. In the present case, he urged that widow Rajrani received this property for the first time after the coming into force of the Act. It was not given pursuant to any pre-existing right in the property, but for the first time by a will and as a gift. He pointed out that under the Hindu Succession Act if Gaurishankar had died intestate, deceased Rajrani was entitled to claim the property as an heir. By the will the course of succession in law has been changed by the deceased and a different device has been adopted. The law contemplates property being devised by a will in the manner done by Gaurishankar. As long as Gaurishankar was able to maintain, and was maintaining Rajrani during his lifetime, she has no right against the property. That right, according to him, would not spring into existence even in the case of intestacy. It would be available only in case the property of the deceased has gone to a legatee or gratuitous transferee or a transferee with notice of a right to receive maintenance out of that estate. That right, according to him, would not spring into existence even in the case of intestacy. It would be available only in case the property of the deceased has gone to a legatee or gratuitous transferee or a transferee with notice of a right to receive maintenance out of that estate. He referred to section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act which he says would be set at naught, if the interpretation sought to be placed by Mr. Bhangde is accepted. 108. Both Mr. Madkholkar and Mr. Bhangde relied upon portions of observations in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Tulasamma's case (cit. supra). Sub-section (2) of section 14, it is now settled, is in the nature of a proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14. Therefore, it has been cons-trued in such a manner to confine it to a case where the property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing right under a gift, will, instrument, decree or order. 109. In (Badri Prasad v. Smt. Kanso Devi)10 the Supreme Court had also held that the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 14 came into opera-tion where acquisition is for the first time without there being any pre-existing right. Mr. Bhangde relied upon the conclusion of the Supreme Court that a Hindu Widow's right to maintenance is a pre-existing right. Therefore, according to him, when deceased Gaurishankar made a provision for her and gave to her one-fourth of the property, he gave it to her pursuant to, or in satisfaction of her pre-existing right to be maintained out of the property. While Mr. Bhangde relied upon the observations of Mr. Justice Bhagwati in Tulasamma's case (cit. supra) to the effect that “the right of the widow to be maintained is of course not a jus in rem, since it docs not give her any interest in the joint family property but it is certainly jus ad rem, i. e. a right against the joint family property. Therefore, when specific property is allotted to the widow in lieu of her claim for maintenance, the allotment would be in satisfaction of her jus ad rem, namely, the right to be maintain-ed out of the joint family property. It would not be a grant for the first time without any pre-existing right in the widow.” 110. Mr. Therefore, when specific property is allotted to the widow in lieu of her claim for maintenance, the allotment would be in satisfaction of her jus ad rem, namely, the right to be maintain-ed out of the joint family property. It would not be a grant for the first time without any pre-existing right in the widow.” 110. Mr. Bhangde also drew our attention to the second and fourth propositions deduced from the analysis of Hindu Law by Mr. Justice Fazal All in para 27 of his judgment. These propositions clearly say that a right of maintenance though “may not be a right to a property”, it is certainly a right “against the property” and the husband has a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if the family has a property, a female has a legal right to be maintained from it. Where such a right is translated into a charge or agreement by which it attaches to any property, it does not thereby confer a new title upon the female, but merely “evidences or conforms the pre-existing right.” That sub-section (2) of section 14 should be construed in such a manner as to impinge as little on the benevolent and enlarging the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 14. The situations in section 14, sub-section (2) are such by which a new title is given to the female for the first time and has no application when the instrument merely seeks to confer, endorse, declare or recognise a pre-existing right. These 3 conclusions which are relevant for the purposes of this controversy alone need be considered. 111. If we apply the above tests and particularly the material test, namely, whether in the present case giving of a part of the property as a limited owner to Rajrani by Gaurishankar was in recognition or fulfillment and pursuant to a pre-existing right existing before 18th June 1956 in her, then it seems to us that the answer must be in the negative. It is material to attract sub-section (1) of section 14, in our opinion, that the right must exist in the female prior to 18th June 1956. It is only in cases the acquisition by her of the property is in satisfaction, exercise or pursuant of that right that the property is acquired by her whether before or after the Act came into force, that it becomes enlarged. It is only in cases the acquisition by her of the property is in satisfaction, exercise or pursuant of that right that the property is acquired by her whether before or after the Act came into force, that it becomes enlarged. The will speaks from the time of the death of the testator. The right in this case of Rajrani to maintenance by Gaurishankar was only a personal right upto the date of his death on 28th October 1957. It had not crystallised or got itself attached to the property. If it were to be held that the giving of a portion of the property to her with a restriction and only during her lifetime was in recognition of such a right and, therefore, a pre-existing right, then it would come in conflict with section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act which permits testamentary succession for Hindu female. The principle, we think, cannot be interpreted so widely, as Mr. Bhangde wants us to do, so as to produce a conflict between sub-section (1) of section 14 and section 30, in cases arising after the Hindu Succession Act came into force, and the disposition is made by a Hindu husband by means of a will of his property giving therein to his wife a limited estate. After 18th June 1956 we think the law on the point is clear. The position of the Hindu woman of tutelage or subordination in the Hindu joint family has ceased. Her rights to equality and economic independence hampered by the rules of succession which prevailed formerly have been removed. In her husband's property on the death of her husband who dies intestate, she has a right to a share by way of inheritance. If he dies leaving a will, then we do not think that the section should be so interpreted as to convert an estate which the husband did not want to be converted. If during the life-time of Gaurishankar the property could have been sold by him to a stranger for valuable consideration, merely because he had a wife, the notice of whose existence the transferee had, the transferee would not have been required to maintain her from out of the property purchased by him. To hold so would place that right of maintenance on a parity with a covenant running with the land. To hold so would place that right of maintenance on a parity with a covenant running with the land. The husband's property in such a situation, it would have to be held, would continue to be burdened with an obligation to maintain the wife and even the dependents, where no provision for them is made and the husband or father, as the case may be, wills it away or sells it. In the case of a will the provisions of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act provide for the property being reached. But if in other cases it cannot be reached, even with the knowledge of the existence of a wife or other dependents, we do not see how there would be a difference if the disposition is made by a will. Where no provision is made for the maintenance of the widow, persons who receive the property under a will may carry the burden of maintenance. But merely because by way of a provision for maintenance a property is given to a widow during her lifetime, it is difficult to think that the Legislature or the decision in Tulasamma's case (cit. supra) intended that even in such cases the property so given to the widow would bloom into a full estate. A provision by way of annuity would take away the claim of being maintained out of the property by a female Hindu. In such a case even if the property is bequeathed under the will, the legatees would not be liable for the claim of maintenance from out of the property by the widow. Merely because the same result is achieved by giving a portion or parcel of the property during the lifetime, even assuming for purposes of maintenance, we do not see how the intention of the testator to create such a right, and he is permitted in law to do so, can be defeated by recourse to provisions of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. 112. We think that the proper construction of the application for the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act is to find out whether the property is given to her prior to the coming into force of the Succession Act, and a right in the widow or female had sprung into existence prior to that date against that property. Where such is the case and property is received subsequently satisfaction of that right or against that right, then sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act would come into operation. In other cases subsequent to 18th June 1956, sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act must have application. 113. Since the appeal fails and has to be dismised, we see no reason to depart from the normal rule of costs which follow event. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.