N. H. BHATT, S. L. TALATI, J. ( 1 ) * * * * ( 2 ) MR. R. N. Shah the learned advocate for the appellant M. G. Patel and Co. however had two fold submissions to be made in this connection. He firstly stated that sec. 167 of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act would not be attracted at all because the claim for money was not touching the business of the society. The business of the society as could be gathered from the Certificate of Registration ex. 107 was to construct buildings on Co-operative basis to purchase lands to sell lands to hire lands to develop lands and to prosecute other objects which would ultimately ameliorate the physical education and cultural well being of its members. The purchase of land is one of the main objects of the society. Any cause of action that has got a direct bearing with the purchase of land has to be said as touching the business of the society. the word `touching from its common sense connotation is suggestive of concerning. The plaintiffs claim for the unpaid amount of consideration is directly rooted in the defendant societys purchase of land. The question of payment of consideration arose because the society was out to purchase the land in prosecution of its objects. So the question of consideration its payment or non payment is invariably associated with the purchase of land by this defendant society. In our view therefore it is too spacious a plea to be urged that the present subject matter of the suit is not touching the business of the society. It vitally concerns itself with the business of the society as we are almost compelled to hold despite our dislike for the rejection of an otherwise tenable claim only on a technical plea. ( 3 ) MR. Shah however in this connection invited our attention to certain authorities which we are required to deal with at this stage. The authorities referred to are A. I. R. 1969 S. C. 1320 A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 1893 A. I. R. 1967 Bombay 21 and this High Courts judgment reported in 20 G. L. R. 71 (STATE V. AGA MOHMAD ). In our opinion they are not germane to the case on hand and so we do not propose to burden this judgment by referring to those authorities. In our opinion they are not germane to the case on hand and so we do not propose to burden this judgment by referring to those authorities. We however would like to say that one judgment of the Orissa High Court reported at A. I. R. 1975 ORISSA PAGE 137 (RANGALAL RAMESHWAR LAL and ORS. V. UTKAL RASTRABHASA PRACHAR CO-OP. PRESS and PUBLISHERS SOCIETY LTD. and ORS) clearly helps Mr. Shah and the plaintiff of the civil suit no. 33/63 M. G. Patel and Co. It is the judgment of a Single Judge of that court. The respondent cooperative society was running a press on co-operative basis and had purchased certain papers the essential material for carrying out the purpose of the society. A suit was filed by the plaintiffs there against the society for the balance of the purchase price. There is the Orissa Co operative Societies Act 1962 having sec. 127 which we would like to reproduce here. Said sec. 127 reads as follows:-"127. No suit shall be instituted against a society or any of its officers in respect of any act touching the constitutions management or the business of the society until the expiration of two months after notice in writing has been delivered to the Registrar or left at his office stating the cause of action the name description and place of residence of the plaintiff and the relief which he claims and the paint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left. " in that case the learned Judge held that the suit was not one in respect of an act touching the business of the society within the meaning of the section. Said sec. 127 quoted above is almost identical with sec. 167 of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act. We however feel constrained to record our respectful disagreement with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge of the Orissa High Court. We have already stated above that the word touching is synonymous with concerning an whatever is directly concerned with the business of the society is the cause of action touching the business of the society. Payment of money by the society is pursuant to its fulfilment of its object. Non payment is the other side of that coin and will be equally associated with or touching the business of the society. Payment of money by the society is pursuant to its fulfilment of its object. Non payment is the other side of that coin and will be equally associated with or touching the business of the society. We therefore hold that the present suit is the suit touching the business of the society and so a notice under sec. 161 of the Act was compulsory and after service of the notice waiting for the period of full two months was the mandate of the legislature which the plaintiff unfortunately failed to comply with due to hurry of one day. ( 4 ) THE next submission of Mr. Shah however in this connection was that on the earlier occasion before the very Registrar a fullfledged plaint ex. 75 dated 31-5-67 was there and so he was apprised of a dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant society. According to Mr. Shah the purpose of sec. 167 of the Act is to apprise the Registrar of the pendency of such a dispute so that he may exercise his supervisory jurisdiction and bring an end to the threatened action. According to Mr. Shah the plaint ex. 75 therefore should be interpreted to be a notice under sec. 167 of the Act. It is difficult for us to agree. When the plaint Ex. 75 was presented to the Registrar it would not be evident to his mind that his supervisory jurisdiction is invoked. It would not put him to notice that it is one of his public duties to see that an impending civil litigation is averted. The only attention which would be focussed at him on receipt of ex. 75 is to decide whether there is a dispute or not and moment he finds that the dispute is not within his cognizance he would take his hands off the matter. The paramount idea underlying the provisions of sec 167 of the Act is to pointedly bring to the notice of the Registrar a public functionary that he is under a legal duty to see that a litigation between a co-operative society on one hand and a private party on the other hand is averted as far as possible by exercise of his supervisory powers. Unless his pointed attention is drawn to this duty of his by means of a notice which would clearly purport to be one under sec. Unless his pointed attention is drawn to this duty of his by means of a notice which would clearly purport to be one under sec. 167 of the Act though it may not specifically bear that label he will not be prompted or inspired to invoke his supervisory jurisdiction and intervene to arrest the future filing of the litigation. It is possible that a party who unsuccessfully presents a dispute to the Registrar under sec. 96 of the Act may not be prompted to pursue the matter in the civil court for a variety of possible reasons like limitation. Despite our sympathies for the plaintiff which we have already vindicated above we feel that the plaint Ex. 75 cannot be interpreted as a notice under sec. 167 of the Act. ( 5 ) THE outcome of this finding would be that the plaint filed by M. G. Patel and Co. registered as the special civil suit no. 33/68 would be required to be rejected as per Order 7 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. Therefore the First Appeal no. 332 of 1974 will be required to be technically allowed and instead of dismissal of that suit an order rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code will be required to be passed. What practical utility of this rejection of the plaint will be is a matter of concern to the plaintiff and it is not for us to advise this plaintiff in this regard. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 6 ) MR. Oza had then urged that both the suits were barred by limitation and sec. 14 of the Indian Limitation Act did not intervene to sure their being dismissed as time barred. Mr. Oza urged that the Registrar acting under sec. 96 of the Co-operative Societies Act is not a court and therefore the time spent by these plaintiffs in prosecuting their remedy before the Registrar cannot be excluded by recourse to sec. 14 of the Indian Limitation Act. We do not agree. Mr. Oza urged that the Registrar acting under sec. 96 of the Co-operative Societies Act is not a court and therefore the time spent by these plaintiffs in prosecuting their remedy before the Registrar cannot be excluded by recourse to sec. 14 of the Indian Limitation Act. We do not agree. What sec. 14 requires is that the plaintiff must be prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision against the defendant. The proceedings prosecuted by the plaintiff before the Registrars Nominee was a civil proceeding. They do not say that the civil proceedings must have been prosecuted in a court as such. All that sec. 14 says is that a civil proceeding whether it is prosecuted in the original forum or in appellate or revisional forum is a proceeding the time taken to prosecute which will be excluded from computing the period of limitation We agree with the reasoning of the learned trial Judge on this score and adopt the same. Appeal allowed. .