Judgment :- ISMAIL, C. J. 1. This is an appeal against the judgment and decree of N. S. Ramaswami, J. dt. 2nd April, 1975 rendered in App. No. 29 of 1971. The first defendant in O. S. No. 29 of 1969 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Mayuram, is the appellant herein. The suit properties admittedly belonged to one Subramanla Iyer. Defendants 1 to 3 in the suit and one Krishnamurthy Iyer were the four sons of the said Subramania Iyer. At the time of the suit Krtshnamurthi Iyer was not alive and defendants 4 and 5 were his sons. The suit properties had been usufructuarily mortgaged by ail the members of the family to one Appaswami Iyer, as early as on 25th May, 1923. Subsequent to that mortgage the members of the family effected a partition of the remaining family properties under Ex. B 2, dt. 29th May 1933. Under the partition the suit properties, which had been usufructuarily mortgaged in favour of Appasami Iyer, were reserved to be partitioned at a later date. In 1945, under the original of Ex. Al. dt 28th May, 1945, defendants 2 and 3 and Krishnamurthi Iyer, the father of defendants 4 and 5 purported to effect a partition of the suit properties into four shares, allotting one share each to the four sons. They proceeded on the footing that their father, Subramania Iyer, who was then alive had no further interest in the properties in pursuance of certain recitals in the earlier document. Further the first defendant was not a party to this partition. The second defendant had executed a sale deed, as per Ex. A2, dt. 17th December, 1962, in favour of the first plaintiff conveying the share which he purported to get under Ex. A 1. The third defendant was adjudged insolvent and in the sale held by the Official Receiver 1/4th share of the third defendant which he got under Ex. A.1 was purchased by the first plaintiff. 2. Meanwhile, the second and third defendants paid their share of the mortage amount due to Appasami Iyer, and the first defendant, namely, the appellant herein, instituted a suit for redemption of the usufructuary mortgage. That suit was instituted not only on his own behalf, but also on behalf of his brothers. That suit was decreed and he took possession of the suit properties in December, 1953. That suit was instituted not only on his own behalf, but also on behalf of his brothers. That suit was decreed and he took possession of the suit properties in December, 1953. Only in January, 1957, he purported to usufructuarily mortgage the entire properties to a third party under the original of Ex. B10. It was in that set up that the first plaintiff filed the present suit claiming that he was entitled to the 1/4th share of the second defendant and of the third defendant which he had acquired under Ex. A2 and Ex. A3 respectively, and for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession. Alternatively he prayed that the suit properties might be divided into two shares and one such share separated and allotted to him. 3. The appellant herein was the only defendant who contested the suit. He put forward three contentions by way of defence to the suit. The first contention was that his brothers had relinquished their interest in the suit properties in his favour and that therefore they could not pass any title to the first plaintiff under Ex. A2. and A3. The second was that he had prescribed title to the suit properties by advene adverse possession. The third contention was that the first plaintiff, having taken a lease of the entire suit property from the first defendant at one stage, was estopped from disputing the first defendants title to any part of the suit properties. The trial Court negatived all these three contentions and decreed the suit of the plaintiffs. The appeal preferred by the first defendant to this Court was dismissed by N. S. Ramaswaml, J. Hence, the present Letters Patent appeal. 4. As far as the three contentions put forward by the appellant are concerned, we have no doubt whatever taht there are no merits in the same. xxxxx [The discussion on contentions 1 and 2 relate to facts and is omitted—Ed] 5. That leaves out the question of estoppel. It is true that on 7th March, 1962, the first plaintiff had taken on lease the entire property from the appellant herein. But, that was at a time when the first plaintiff had not purchased the shares of the second and third defendants. As we pointed out already, he purchased the share of the second defendant under Ex. It is true that on 7th March, 1962, the first plaintiff had taken on lease the entire property from the appellant herein. But, that was at a time when the first plaintiff had not purchased the shares of the second and third defendants. As we pointed out already, he purchased the share of the second defendant under Ex. A2, dated 17th December, 1962, and the share of the third defendant from the Official Receiver under Ex. A3, dated 23rd September, 1953. These purchases of the shares of the second defendant and the third defendant were subsequent to the first plaintiff taking on lease the entire property from the appellant herein. To such a situation the principle of estoppel provided under S. 116 of the Evidence Act cannot apply. A Bench decision of this Court in Md. Hussain Sahib v. Abdul Gaffoor , 1 is directly in point. In fact, the facts of that case are also similar to the facts of the present case. That decision clearly lays down that the doctrine of estoppel, which operates between landlord and tenant has no application to the same parties, even while the tenancy exists, when the question of the title arises between them, not in the relationship of landlord and tenant, but of vendor and purchaser. In this case, the first plaintiff subsequent to his taking on lease the entire property from the appellant, has purchased the shares of the second and third defendants in the entire pro-parties, and therefore with reference to those shares he could certainly agitate his title as against the appellant herein, and the estoppel provided for under S. 116 of the Evidence Act is only to prevent a lessee from questioning the title of the lessor at the time of the lease. The Bench decision referred to above is clearly against the claim of the appellant in this case. 6. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.