Judgment Hari Lal Agrawal, J. 1. This application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India arises out of a proceeding initiated by the peti tioners under Sec.16 (3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the act ). 2. The right of pre-emption was claimed by the petitioners over an area of 9 decimals of plot No.277, Khata No.54, situated in village Rerama, police Station Daltonganj, in the district of Palamau. The said plot was sold by respondent No.2 to respondent No.1 on the basis of a saledeed executed on 3-4-1973 which was registered on 11-5-1973. Respondent no. I however, transferred the said land to Ragani Devi and Ramdheyan Singh separately by two registered sale-deeds on 12-6-1973. It was there after that on 28-6-1973 the petitioners made an application for pre-emption on the ground of their being co-sharers as well as adjoining raiyats of the plot in question, a fact which is not disputed. 3. The purchaser (respondent No.1) resisted the claim of the peti tioners for pre-emption, inter alia, on the ground that in view of the trans fer of the plot in question by him under the two registered sale deeds dated 12-6-1973 that is, before the application for pre-emption was filed by the petitioners, the pre-emption application was not maintainable against him. 4. The Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Sadar Daltonganj, and the additional Collector, Daltonganj, by orders contained in Annexures 1 and 2 allowed the claim of pre-emption of the petitioners on a finding that the transactions of sale by respondent No.1 in favour of his two transferees were sham and had been made with an intention to defeat the provisions of the Act. Respondent No. i then filed a revision before the Board of revenue. It appears that the revision was filed before the Board of Reve nue after some delay; i. e. beyond the period of limitation. The petitioners did not appear before the Board of Revenue and by order dated 21-3-1978 (Annexure 3), the Board allowed the revision ex-parte and rejected the application for pre-emption filed by the petitioners. The petitioners have, accordingly, moved this Court. 5. The petitioners did not appear before the Board of Revenue and by order dated 21-3-1978 (Annexure 3), the Board allowed the revision ex-parte and rejected the application for pre-emption filed by the petitioners. The petitioners have, accordingly, moved this Court. 5. It was argued by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners that the notice of the revision application issued by the Board of Revenue was not properly served upon the petitioners and further that there was no express order passed by the Board of Revenue condoning the delay in filing the revision application, specially when at the time of admission, it was specifically mentioned that this matter will be considered later on. Be that as it may, I allowed the learned counsel for the petitioners a full dress hearing. His argument was that the board of Revenue was not right in dismissing the claim of the petitioners for pre-emption in a casual manner without meeting the reasonings of the Revenue authorities who held that the transfers made by the purchaser (respondent no.1) were sham. He also referred to the decision of this Court in smt. Sudama Devi and others v. Rajendra Singh and others (AIR 1973 Patna 199 ). In my view this decision hardly lends any support to the case of the petitioners, inasmuch as it was clearly laid down in that case that when a sale-deed is executed prior to filing of an application for pre-emption under section 16 (3) of the Act, merely because it was registered subsequent to the filing of the application, it cannot be said to have been hit by the doctrine of lie penderes. Learned counsel, however, placed reliance upon the observations made in paragraph 15 of the report where it was observed that the question of the second transaction being of benami nature can be decided only in presence of the subsequent transferee as in his absence it was not binding on him. In that view of the matter, this court had remanded the case and sent back the matter to the first Revenue authority to go into the question afresh after impleading the subsequent transferee. Learned counsel argued that such an opportunity should be given to the petitioners as well. This Court in several decisions has made observations to the above effect and, therefore, a pre-emptor is now supposed to know the correct legal position. Learned counsel argued that such an opportunity should be given to the petitioners as well. This Court in several decisions has made observations to the above effect and, therefore, a pre-emptor is now supposed to know the correct legal position. On the facts of the present case, when respondent No.1 in his show cause specifically alleged of his parting with the title in the plot in question, it was high time for the petitioners to make an application before the L. R. D. G. himself for impleading the said transferees. No such step having been taken at any stage, granting the prayer of the peti tioners would, in my view, amount to giving premium to their negligence and would cause unnecessary harassment to a defaulting pre-emptor, the right of pre-emption being a feeble right. I, therefore reject this conten tion of the learned counsel for the petitioners, and in view of the fact that respondent No.1 had already parted with the title to the plot in question the pre-emption application filed by the petitioners against him was obviously not maintainable and it has been rightly rejected. 6. The application being devoid of any merit is, therefore, dismissed but in the circumstances of the case, I would make no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.