Judgment :- 1. The petitioner was an employee of the respondent-Devaswom Board. On 7 61972 he was kept under suspension pending enquiry into certain charges. An enquiry was conducted. The enquiry officer submitted his report to the disciplinary authority. The petitioner objected to the manner in which the enquiry was conducted He complained that he was not given a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses. His objection was accepted by the Board. The Board therefore ordered a fresh enquiry against the petitioner by order dated 6-1-1975. By this time three years had elapsed from the date on which the petitioner was suspended. In the mean lime the petitioner had reached the age of superannuation and retired from service of the Board on 131974. Thus on the date on which the Board ordered a fresh enquiry, the petitioner was not a servant of the Board. However, a fresh enquiry was held. The enquiry officer submitted his report on 5-11-1977 finding the petitioner guilty of most of the charges. By Ext.P3, the Board rejected the petitioner's objections as regards the merits of the report. The petitioner was asked by Ext.P2 dated 31-3-1978 to show cause why the punishment of dismissal should not be imposed upon him. The petitioner filed his objections. By Ext.P3 dated 19-5 1978 the Board imposed upon the petitioner the punishment of compulsory retirement effective from 7 61972 which was the date on which he was suspended from service. Thus the punishment was imposed upon a person who had long ceased to be a servant of the Board. 2. There was no master and servant relationship at the time of Ext. P3. The Board had no power to impose a punishment upon a person who was not one of its employees. (See State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram, AIR. 1970 SC. 214; Xavier v. Kerala State Electricity Board, 1979 KLT. 80 (F.B.)). 3. The respondent's counsel, however, submits that, although Ext. P3 was made long past the retirement of the petitioner, no objection had been raised by the petitioner on that count. The petitioner did not object to the jurisdiction of the Board when he submitted his objections as regards the merits of the first enquiry. His only objection then was that rules of natural justice had been violated. That objection was accepted and a fresh enquiry was ordered on 6-1-1975. The petitioner did not object to the jurisdiction of the Board when he submitted his objections as regards the merits of the first enquiry. His only objection then was that rules of natural justice had been violated. That objection was accepted and a fresh enquiry was ordered on 6-1-1975. At that time the petitioner was out of service. He could have objected to a fresh enquiry. He did not. Even in answer to the show-cause notice Ext P2 dated 31-3-1978, the petitioner did not raise any objection to jurisdiction on the ground that he was longer an employee of the Board. Counsel therefore submits that, in the light of the principles stated by this Court in Trivandrum Co-operative District Wholesale Society v. Dy. Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Trivandrum (1975 KLT. 589), the objection to jurisdiction cannot be raised at this late hour by recourse to proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution. 4. This Court stated in 1975 KLT 589 that lack of jurisdiction must be pleaded at the earliest opportunity. He who did not object to the jurisdiction of a Tribunal or an authority invested with judicial or quasi-judicial power to adjudicate upon questions cannot be heard to contend upon the completion of the adjudication that such Tribunal or authority acted without jurisdiction. That principle is applicable to Tribunals or authorities invested under a statute with judicial or quasi-judicial power. Such body manifestly bears the insignia of power to adjudicate. Objection to exercise of power by such body must be raised by a proper plea at the very first instance. He who sits on the fence, hoping for a favourable decision, cannot be heard to object on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, if the decision finally goes against him. That is a principle of law which must be confined to Tribunals or authorities invested with statutory power of adjudication. An employer has authority to proceed against his employee by way of disciplinary action. But he can do so only so long as the contractual relationship of master and servant lasts. Once an employee has ceased to be his servant, and he has thus lost all control over him, in the absence of any statute conferring upon him any special power, he has no authority to proceed by a domestic enquiry against his former servant when the contractual relationship between the two no longer existed. Once an employee has ceased to be his servant, and he has thus lost all control over him, in the absence of any statute conferring upon him any special power, he has no authority to proceed by a domestic enquiry against his former servant when the contractual relationship between the two no longer existed. In such a case lack of objection does not confer upon him any power which he otherwise lacks Power to punish cannot be derived by acquiescence, or even by submission, when there is no contractual or statutory relationship. That is a principle of law which has to be borne in mind in understanding a different principle stated by this Court in 1975 KLT. 589. Ext. P3 is invalid. It is so declared, The O. P is allowed. No costs. Allowed.