ORDER Sohani, J. 1. On a motion made by the petitioners with the consent of the learned Advocate General, a notice was issued to the respondents to show cause why action be not taken against them under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, hereinafter called the Act, for having published on 20th March 1980 an editorial in Nai Dunia, a Hindi daily printed and published at Indore. Respondent No.1 is the editor of Nai Dunia and respondent No.2 is the printer and publisher of tile newspaper. Respondent No.1 is the editor of Nai Dunia and respondent No.2 is the printer and publisher of tile newspaper. The editorial was a follows :- ^^Xokfy;j ds U;k;eafnj es dqN yksxks us dkuwu dks gkFk es fy;k vkSj og Lfkkuh; Lrj dh ?kVuk lkjs ns’k es xwat jgh gSA vius vkidks dkuwu dk j[kokyk crkus okys nks lewg ,d nwljs dks [kyuk;d crk jgs gS vkSj U;k;O;oLFkk ds izfr vkLFkk j[kus okys yksx pfdr gS fd vc D;k gksxk\ iqfyl vkSj odhy la?k”kZ dh eqnkz es t:j gS ysfdu lkEiznkf;d fdLe dh rh[kkiu fLFkfr es ugh gS vksj u ,d nwljs dh Bhd dj nsus dk ladYi nksuks us dj fy;k gSA nksuks gh i{k vius vkidks jktk gfjpUnz ds FkksMk Hkh utnhd ugh ikrs vkSj vrar% nksuks dh viuh&viuh xyfr;ks dks ,glkl djds pqids ls ,d gks tkuk gSaA U;k; ds fy, U;k;O;oLFkk dh lykerh dh fprak T;knk yksxks dks ugh gS blfy, lc dqN cgqr tYn gh lkekU; gks tk,xkA Xokfy;j dh ?kVuk us dqN vge eqnnks dks mtkxj fd;k gSA izns’k es fdrus U;k;ky; ,sls gS] tks lpeqp U;k; eafnj dks xfjek ls eafaMr yxrs gS\ vU; dpgfj;ks dh rjg vnkyrks es Hkh fdlh Hkh txg dksbZ Hkh igqap tkrk gSA tt vksj odhy xys es gkFk Mkydj ?kwers gSA iqfyl okyk dne&dne ij mudh lsok es gkftj utj vkrk gSaA jkr es os lkFk es cSBdj e|iku Hkh dj ldrs gS vkSj U;k;k/kh’k iqfyl vkSj odhyks ds gkFk ds f[kykSus Hkh cu tkrs gSA dbZ odhy ,sls gh iqfyl dfeZ;ks vkSj U;k;dfeZ;ks dks ilna djrs gS tks muds /kU/kks dks pedkus es ennxkj cu ldsA iztkr=a es izpkj dk Hkqykok ns dj pyk, x, tu vkanksyuks dh gekjs ;gk dksbZ deh ugh gS vkSj us ,sls Lfkkuks dh deh gS tks f’kdk;rks ds vk/kkj ij lp >wB dk rgdhdkr fd, cxSj gksrs gSA tc jktuSfrd vkSj lkeus [kMs gks rks lgdkjh vf/kdkjh Hkfo”; ds [krjks ls cpus ds fy, vius v/khuLFk dh bZekunkjh ij vklkuh ls ‘kadk dj ysrs gS cgqr t:jh gS fd vnkyr ds vgkrs es dk;ns dkuwu vkSj izfdz;k dk iwjk&iwjk ikyu gksA bUnkSj es gk;dksVZ tt ij Hkjh vnkyr es pkdw Qsdus dh ?kVuk gks pqdh gSA Xokfy;j es rks vfr gks xbZ gS bUlkQa ds efnaj es lc dqN dgUsk dh NwV rks gh ldrh gS ysfdu pkgs tks djus dh NwV ugh gksuk pkfg,A gj,d dh lqj{kk dk iwjk izcU/k gksuk pkfg, vkSj ‘kkar ,oe~ la;e dk okrkoj.k gksuk pkfg,A xfjek ds fxjrs Lrj ds rjQ vc Hkh /;ku ugh fn;k x;k rks U;k;O;oLFkk fdl va/kh xr es tk fxjsxh] dguk eqf’dy gSA The petitioners submit that the following passage in the aforesaid editorial scandalises the Courts and Judges in general and has brought in disrepute the administration of justice in the State :- izns’k es fdrus U;k;ky; ,sls gS tks lpeqp U;k;eafnj dh xfjek ls eafMr yxrs gS\ vU; dpgfj;ks dh rjg vnkyrks es Hkh fdlh Hkh txg dksbZ Hkh igWqp tkrk gSA tt vksj odhy gkFk es gkFk Mkydj ?kwers gS iqfylokyk dne&dne ij mudh lsok es gkftj utj vkrk gSA jkr es os lkFk cSBdj e|iku Hkh dj ldrs gS vkSj dqN U;k;k/kh’k iqfyl vkSj odhyks ds gkFk ds f[kykSus Hkh cu tkrs gSA^^ 2. In reply, the respondents denied that they were guilty of any contempt of Court. It was averred that the editorial was a comment inspired by events which took place within the precincts of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Gwalior on 20th March 1980. It was submitted that the tone and tenor of the editorial should be judged in the context of what had happened in Gwalior on that date. It was further contended that the editor was in fact reacting in anger against the contempt in which the police and the lawyers in Gwalior were holding all norms of law and order, thus bringing down the prestige of the judiciary within its own campus. It was further stated that what had happened at Gwalior was merely the wild symptom of a malaise which had been growing for a long time as was evident from the fact that another symptom of the same malaise was witnessed in the Allababad High Court in May-1980. It was submitted that these symptoms, appearing with disturbing frequency, needed honest diagnosis. It was further stated that the respondents were coming across with increasing alarm instances in the last few years where not only the police officers and lawyers left much to be desired in their conduct, but even the Judges had committed acts of commission and omission which should not have been done. The respondent therefore, submitted that the impugned editorial read as a whole was a passionate plea for bringing back into Court - rooms the proper etiquettes, respect for procedure and lost dignities, that it called for steps to prevent vandalism directed against the Judges and the Judiciary, and that the editorial sub-served the cause of justice rather than hind red its course. It was further stated that the institutional behaviour was often shaped by social expectations, that the comments made in the editorial was entirely general and that they only referred to the pollution that had marred the stream of justice. The allegation of malice made by the petitioners was denied. 3. It was further stated that the institutional behaviour was often shaped by social expectations, that the comments made in the editorial was entirely general and that they only referred to the pollution that had marred the stream of justice. The allegation of malice made by the petitioners was denied. 3. At the time of hearing, learned Advocate General, who had earlier given his consent to the petitioners for making a motion under section 15 of the Act, stated that he had not thoroughly studied the matter at the time of giving the consent and on a further consideration of the matter, he had come to the conclusion that no contempt was committed by the petitioners. It is regretted that at the time of according consent, the learned Advocate General should not have thoroughly examined the matter before giving his consent. We should have thought that in discharging duties entrusted to an Advocate General under the provisions of section 15 of the Act, there was no scope for a cavalier approach. 4. Shri Sanyal, learned counsel for the petitioners, contended that the editorial was directed at lowering the dignity of the Courts and had the effect of interfering with the administration of justice. On behalf of the Bar, Shri Ramesh Garg supported the petition and contended that this was a fit case for taking action against the respondents. 5. The respondents appeared in person Respondent No.1 stated before us that he had no intention of interfering with the administration of justice, that the editorial was meant to be a dialogue between the press and the judiciary and that he had nothing further to add to the submissions already made by the respondents in their reply. 6. Before we proceed to examine the question as to whether any action should be taken against the respondents under the provisions of the Act, it would be useful to bear in mind the following observations by Lord Danning in Reg. v. Commr. of Police of the Metropolis [(1968) 2QBD 150)- "Let me say at once that we will never use this jurisdiction as a means to uphold our own dignity. That must rest on surer foundations. Nor will we use it suppress these who speak against us. We do not fear criticism, nor do we resent it. For there is something far more important at stake. That must rest on surer foundations. Nor will we use it suppress these who speak against us. We do not fear criticism, nor do we resent it. For there is something far more important at stake. It is not less than freedom of speech itself." As observed by Seervai at page 1708 in Volume-III of 'Constitutional Law in India', the position in India must be even stronger than it is in England, because of freedom of speech, which includes the freedom of press, is a fundamental right although subject, inter alia, to reasonable restrictions imposed by the law governing contempt of Court and that the current tendency has not been to restrict freedom of speech by resorting to the power to commit for contempt of Court. 7. In this connection, it would also be instructive to refer to the following guidelines, while taking action under the provisions of the Act, as observed by Krishna Iyer, J. in Re. S. Mulgaonkar ( AIR 1978 SC 727 )- (i) There should be a wise economy of use by the Court of this branch of its jurisdiction. (ii) An effort should be made to harmonies the constitutional values of free criticism, the fourth estate included, and the need for a fearless curial process and its presiding functionary, the Judge. A happy balance has to be struck, the benefit of the doubt being given generously against the Judge, slurring over marginal deviations but severely proving the supremacy of the law over pugnacious, vicious unrepentant and malignant contemners. (iii) The fourth estate which is an indispensable intermediary between the State and the people and necessary instrumentality in strengthening the forces of democracy should be given free play within responsible limits even when the focus of its critical attention is the Court. (iv) The Judges should not be hyper-sensitive even where distortions and criticisms overstep the limits. (v) After evaluating totality of factors, if the Court considers the attack on the Judge or Judges scurrilous, offensive, intimidatory or malicious beyond condonable limits, there should be no hesitation in taking action against the contemnor." It is in the light of the aforesaid principles that we have to decide whether the offending passage in the editorial calls for any action against the respondents. 8. 8. Now, it was not disputed before us that the editorial was written in the background of an unfortunate incident that took place in the precincts of the High Court Bench at Gwalior on 20th March 1980 involving confrontation between the lawyers and the police. The State Government have already appointed a Commission to enquire into that incident and we, therefore, refrain from expressing any opinion in that behalf. That such an incident should have taken place is undoubtedly a matter of grave concern to everyone for whom democracy is a deep-rooted commitment. The incident thus undoubtedly provided an occasion for reflection on the state of Judiciary in this State. The learned editor was, however, not content with merely pointing out the falling standards and the desirability of Judges keeping themselves aloof from the police and lawyers appearing before them so as to avoid any cause for misapprehension in the mind of the public about their competency to administer justice. The learned editor, however, went further and posed the question as to how many Courts in this State could, in the prevailing state of affairs, qualify to be designated as temples of justice. To a layman, the implication in the question is obvious that the fall in the standards of judiciary and the profession of lawyears is so rampant that there is hardly a Court in this State which can truly be called a place where justice is administered. That is why the learned editor observed that unholy alliance between the Judges, lawyers and the police was a familiar sight in the Courts. Such wholesale denunciation of Judiciary in this State is bound to cause pain to a large body of judicial officers, especially the members of the subordinate judiciary who have to shoulder the main burden of the administration of justice at district and Tehsil levels and who, we are aware are discharging their duties honestly, faithfully and to the best of their abilities. The offending passage in the article has the effect of lowering the reputation of the judiciary in this State generally. The offending passage in the article has the effect of lowering the reputation of the judiciary in this State generally. We are however conscious that action for contempt is taken primarily not for the protection of the Judges personally but for the protection of the public whose interests would be very much affected if by the act or conduct of any party, the authority of the Court is lowered and the sense of confidence, which people have in the administration of justice by it, is weakened. 9. Learned editor appearing before us submitted that there was no intention on his part to interfere with the administration of justice and that the reference to the undesirable association between the Judges, lawyers and the police referred to in the editorial was only to emphasize the fact that the Judges, by virtue of their office, have to keep themselves aloof from the police and the lawyers appearing before them. The object, no doubt, is laudable. It cannot be disputed that a Judge, by virtue of his office, has to so conduct himself that there should be no cause even for suspicion that he is biased in favour of the police or a particular lawyer. But the matter in which the learned editor has tried to focus the attention of the readers on this aspect is such as to cause apprehension. In the minds of common man that in this State there is hardly any Court where he can hope to get justice in the prevailing state of affairs. 10. At the time of arguments, learned editor informed us that he had not written that article as an individual citizen, because in that capacity he had made a complaint to the Chief Justice against certain Judicial Officer but had not heard anything further in the matter. It was contended that the editorial was a dialogue between an institution and an institution, between the Press and the Judiciary. We regret to note this misconception in the mind of the learned editor about the role of judiciary in this country. We cannot enter into any dialogue with the press. We cannot hold a press conference and try to defend ourselves. We regret to note this misconception in the mind of the learned editor about the role of judiciary in this country. We cannot enter into any dialogue with the press. We cannot hold a press conference and try to defend ourselves. In this connection, we cannot be better than quote the observation of Lord Denning in [(1988) 2 QB 136]- "It is the right of every man, in Parliament or out of it, in the Press or over the broad-cast, to make fair comment, even out-spoken comment, on matters of public interest. Those who comment can deal faithfully with all that is done in a Court of justice. They can say that we are mistaken, and our decisions erroneous, whether they are subject to appeal or not. All we would ask in that those who criticise us will remember that, from the nature of our office, we cannot reply to their criticisms. We cannot enter into public controversy. Still less into political controversy." We cannot, therefore, enter in the arena. We can only decide causes that come before us and the society expects us to decide those causes in conformity with the law prevailing in the country, fearlessly, without any bias and without any expectation of favour from anyone including the State. For properly discharging these duties, fair comment on judicial actions is not only justifiable but beneficial. We are, however, afraid that the offending passage in the article is likely to be construed as such an indictment of the judiciary in this State as is likely to shake the confidence of the public into the administration of justice in this State. 11. The question still remains whether any action need be taken against the respondents. We cannot be unmindful of the background in which the offending article was written. We cannot be unmindful of the fact that in our country all institutions, including the press and the Judiciary, are on trial. We must uphold the right of freedom of speech guaranteed by our Constitution to the utmost. The right of freedom of speech would lose its content if every deviation in an honest exercise of that right is to be visited with penal consequences. We are satisfied that the respondents acted honestly, without any malice and with an earnest desire to strengthen the fiber of the judicial system. The right of freedom of speech would lose its content if every deviation in an honest exercise of that right is to be visited with penal consequences. We are satisfied that the respondents acted honestly, without any malice and with an earnest desire to strengthen the fiber of the judicial system. Therefore, having given our anxious consideration to every pros and eons of the matter and after evaluating the totality of the factors, we have come to the conclusion that the offending article cannot be held to be a scurrilous or malicious attack against the judiciary as to warrant any action against the respondents for contempt. It our opinion, therefore, no action need be taken against the respondents under the provisions of the Act. The rule is, therefore, discharged. Parties shall bear their own costs.