JUDGMENT 1. - This revision petition is preferred by Ramsingh petitioner against the order dated February 7, 1980 of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sirohi framing the charge against him under section 302/109, I.P.C. 2. The facts relevant for the disposal of this revision are these. On 23-8-78 in the evening at about 7 p.m., Narayani d/o Khubsingh was grazing her cattle in the field. Sohansingh came there and some altercation took place, then Drulatsingh gave a lathi blow on the head of Sohansingh who fell down on the ground. Another accused Roopsingh was then coming on the cycle. He stopped the cycle and caused various injuries with a knife to Sohan-Singh Daulatsingh also gave a few lathi blows to Sohansingh, who ultimately succumbed to his injuries. Hue and cry was raised by Narayani which attracted Madhosingh and others. Madhosingh removed Sohansingh to Mandola Hospital, but it appears that Sohansingh by then had succumbed to his injuries. Thereafter, Madhosingh went to police station, Rani, and lodged the report. It further appears that at the hospital Prithvisingh informed Madho Singh that on 22-8-78, while passing by the but-stand, he heard Ramsingh talking to Roopsingh and Ramsing said:- " lksguflag ekLVj vius dks ednesa ckth esa tks thrus ugha nsrk gS] bldks tku ls [kRe djks& ihNs tks dqN gksxk esa ns[k ywaxkA " Police examined Prithvisingh during the investigation. He stated that on 22-8-78, in evening at about 6 or 6.30 p.m., he was returning from his field, when he reached near the bus-stand he saw Roopsingh and his brother Daula Singh and Ramsingh, Ramsingh said that Sohansingh Master did not permit them to have an upper hand in litigation and, therefore, he should be killed. He will see to the consequences. The police, however, did not place any reliance on the statement of Prithvisingh recorded during the investigation and gave a final report against Ramsingh The learned Additional Sessions Judge was of the opinion that Ramsingh should also be tried for abatement of the murder and secured his presence. At the stage of charge, lengthy arguments were advanced on behalf of Ramsingh that no case was made out against him. Learned Additional Sessions Judge by a detailed order disagreed with the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner and by its impugned order dated February 7, 1980 framed the charge under section 302 read with 109, I.P.C. against the petitioner. Learned Additional Sessions Judge by a detailed order disagreed with the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner and by its impugned order dated February 7, 1980 framed the charge under section 302 read with 109, I.P.C. against the petitioner. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of revision. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor for the State and the learned counsel for the complainant and perused the record of the case carefully. 4. It may be at the out set stated that the case against the petitioner hinges solely on the statement of Prithvisingh given during the course of investigation. It was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the statement of Prithvisingh is inherently probable and no court will convict Ramsingh on this statement. In other words, there is no material or evidence upon which a charge can be framed against the petitioner. 5. On the other hand, it was argued by the learned Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel for the complainant that at the stage of framing the charge, the learned Additional Sessions Judge was not required to weigh the evidence and was precluded from considering the necessities of the case. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, therefore, rightly did not weigh the statement of Prithvisingh at the stage of framing the charge. The statement of Prithvisingh was enough to raise a great suspicion against Ramsingh for his complicity in the crime. Various authorities were brought to my notice by both the sides about the scope of section 227, Cr P.C. In my opinion, as all the authorities lay down the same principles, I will for the sake of brevity refer to only two of them State of Bihar v. Rameshsingh (A.I.R 1977 S.C. 2018) . "Reading Section 227 and 226 together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be,it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under sec. 227 of sec. 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, can not take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under sec. 227 or sec. 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under sec. 228 and not under sec. 227". 227 or sec. 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under sec. 228 and not under sec. 227". (2) Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal and another (A.I.R, 1979 S.C. 366) - "The words not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post-office to frame the charge at behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the acts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really his function after the trial starts. At the stage of Section 227 the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. 6. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, the following principles emerge : (1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. (2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused". 7. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused". 7. I propose to examine the statement of Prithvisingh in the light or principle enunciated in the aforesaid authorities. After a careful perusal of the statement of Prithvisingh, I am, of the view that intrinsic worth of the statement of Prithvi Singh is almost zero and no court can possibly believe it because- (1) Prithvisingh came to know of the conspiracy on the evening of 22-8-78 yet he did not take any prompt action and did not inform of the conspiracy to the deceased or any of his relatives. (2) No doubt, Prithvisingh states that at the hospital after the incident, he informed Madhosingh of the conspiracy and this fact is also mentioned in the F.I.R. However, there is no material on the record of the case with the help of which the statement of Prithvisingh can be checked. It may be that after the incident, Prithvisingh took an opportunity to falsely implicate Ramsingh. (3) Prithvisingh on his own showing is a chance witness and according to him, it was a sheer accident that he over-heard the conversation. Such a statement can be made by any witness at any time and no court will believe such a chance witness in the total absence of any other evidence to corroborate it. (4) It is extremely unlikely and impossible that Ramsingh and the other two accused conspired about the murder of Sohan Singh Master while they were sitting at the bus-stand on a chabutra, which was admittedly an open place. 8. For all these reasons, in my opinion, the statement of Ramsingh is almost worthless and no court can even possibly place any reliance upon it. In this view of the matter in my opinion, the learned Additional Sessions Judge was in error in framing a charge under section 302/109, I.P.C. against Ramsingh on the strength of the solitary statement of Prithvisingh not corroborated by any other fact or circumstance. I, therefore, accept the revision petition and quash the charge framed against Ramsingh for the offence under section 302/109, I.P.C. and discharge him.Revision accepted. *******