JUDGMENT S. D. Agarwal, J. - This is a defendants second appeal arising out of a suit filed by the plaintiff respondent for ejectment of the defendant appellant from the premises in suit on the ground of default in the payment of rent after the receipt of the notice dated 26th Aught, 1970. The relevant facts for the purposes of this appeal are that the appellant is a tenant of the premises in dispute at the rate of Rs. 10/ per mensem. On 26th August, 1970, a composite notice of demand and termination of tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of property Act was sent to the appellant which was alleged to have been refused by the appellant on 2nd September, 1970. It has been further alleged that the rent due was from 1st April, 1970 up to 31st August, :1970. L e. for more than four months. The allegation, therefore, was that in spite of service of a notice of demand the appellant did not pay rent and as such he was a defaulter within the meaning of Section 3 (1) (a) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. The appellant contested the suit on the ground that he was not a defaulter. He alleged that he had offered the rent but was refused by the respondent and that he deposited the rent under Section 7-C of the Act. He further alleged that the notice to quit was invalid and that in fact the notice of demand was not served upon him as alleged by the plaintiff respondent. 2. Two issues were framed by the trial court, one whether the notice was served on the appellant and as such whether the appellant was a defaulter within the meaning of Section 3 (1) (a) of the Act, and the second whether the defendant appellants tenancy was legally determined. The trial court held both these issues against the applicant and, therefore, decreed the suit for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent. Against the said judgment the appellant filed an appeal which was also dismissed by the lower appellate court on 29th August, 1972. The judgment dated 29th August, 1972 has been impugned in the present second appeal. 3. The trial court held both these issues against the applicant and, therefore, decreed the suit for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent. Against the said judgment the appellant filed an appeal which was also dismissed by the lower appellate court on 29th August, 1972. The judgment dated 29th August, 1972 has been impugned in the present second appeal. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the composite notice of demand and termination of tenancy dated 26th August, 1970, which is alleged to have been served on the appellant by refusal on 2nd September, 1970, is not a valid service of notice in the eye of law and as such the appellant cannot be held to be a defaulter. 4. In the instant case admittedly the notice was sent on 26th August, 1970. The notice was alleged to have been served by refusal on 2nd September, 1970. In the statement of the appellant it was categorically stated by him that no notice was received by him and neither did he refuse to accept any notice as shown in the endorsement of the post office. In the cross-examination it was, however, admitted that he has no enmity with the postman and it has been further admitted that the address given in the notice was the address on which he normally received his letters. The plaintiff-respondent, however, had also given evidence in the case. He has admitted the fact that he did not go along with the postman to serve the notice of the appellant. The postman has not been examined. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant has to be examined in the light of these admitted facts. 5. In support of his submissions learned counsel has cited two decisions of this Court. The first decision is Amamath v. Smt. Champa Devi, 1978 All LR 90, The second decision cited by him is Ram Nekshatra v. Girdhar Das Kashya, 1979 (U.P.) RCC 5. 5. In support of his submissions learned counsel has cited two decisions of this Court. The first decision is Amamath v. Smt. Champa Devi, 1978 All LR 90, The second decision cited by him is Ram Nekshatra v. Girdhar Das Kashya, 1979 (U.P.) RCC 5. In both the above cases it has been laid down that it is well settled that when a registered notice is sent to a tenant at his correct address a presumption about its service even though the registered envelop is returned back with an endorsement of refusal arises but in case the tenant states on oath in evidence that he did not receive the notice or he did not refuse to accept the notice then the said presumption is rebutted and thereafter it is the burden of the landlord to establish that the notice was served upon the tenant by refusal. In the instant case it is clear that the tenant had categorically stated in his statement on oath that he did not refuse to accept the notice. In cross-examination only two aspects were brought' out, namely, that the address which was given in the notice was correct and that there was no enmity with him and the postman concerned. In the circumstances it is clear that in the evidence before the court the appellant had clearly rebutted the presumption which arises in the instant case, and, therefore, it was the duty of the plaintiff to have established by cogent evidence the fact that the appellant had refused to accept the notice. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent has, however, vehemently urged that both the cases mentioned above do not apply to the facts of the instant case as in the instant case the courts below have disbelieved the evidence of the appellant. It is further urged by him that one of the main circumstances on which the evidence of the appellant has been disbelieved is that he had stated that in the end of August 1970 ho had gone to the landlord to give rent and the landlord had told him that he had sent a notice, and, therefore, it is urged that the appellant had full know- ledge about the notice. I have examined the judgment of the trial court as well as of the appellate court. I have examined the judgment of the trial court as well as of the appellate court. Neither the trial court nor the lower appellate court have disbelieved the entire evidence of the appellant. Both the courts below have not considered the evidence in the light of the law laid down in the two cases mentioned above. Both the trial court and the lower appellate court have decided the case on the ground that since the notice had been served by refusal there arises a presumption of service of notice on the appellant. In this view of the matter I do not find any force in this submission of the learned counsel for the respondent. 7. It is no doubt true that from the evidence of the appellant it does come out that the appellant had the knowledge of the fact that a notice had been sent to him. This by itself does not disentitle the appellant from urging that he did not receive the notice of demand. 'The receipt of the notice of demand is a crucial event by virtue of which a heavy burden is cast upon the tenant to send the arrears of rent within one month of the receipt of the notice of demand. Mere knowledge of the notice is not enough to entitle a landlord to evict the1, tenant on the ground of default. Section 3 of U. P. Act No. 111 of 1947 clearly lays down that it is only after one month of the receipt of the notice of demand that the tenant is liable for ejectment if he does not send the arrears of rent. Therefore, the service of the notice of demand is essential for treating the tenant as a defaulter for non payment of arrears of rent. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent has further urged that since in the courts below the only argument raised was that no presumption arises therefore the appellant cannot be permitted to urge this point before this Court. This argument is devoid of any substance. In the trial court a specific issue was framed as to whether the notice was served or not. It is the duty of the court to determine the issue on the facts of the case. It is not for a party to suggest a rule of law to the Court. This argument is devoid of any substance. In the trial court a specific issue was framed as to whether the notice was served or not. It is the duty of the court to determine the issue on the facts of the case. It is not for a party to suggest a rule of law to the Court. In Somnath Singh v. Ambika Prasad, AIR 1950 All 121 , a Division Bench of this Court held as follows: "It was pleaded on behalf of the plaintiffs that there was no plea of estoppel by the defendants. I find that all necessary facts were pleaded by the defendants. When they were proved what remained was only to draw the legal inference from them that the plaintiffs were estopped. It was for the court to draw it, though of course the defendants could have suggested it to the Court. A party cannot be penalised for not suggesting through its pleadings a rule of the Court, a party is not bound to plead the law". The above principle fully applies to the facts of the instant case. 9. In view of the above I am of the opinion that the respondent-landlord has failed to prove that the notice was served on the tenant. 10. In the result I allow the appeal, modify the decree of the Courts below and dismiss the suit for the ejectment of the appellant from the premises in dispute. The rest of the decree is. however, maintained. In the circumstances of the case I direct the parties to bear their own costs.