JUDGMENT - R.L. AGGARWAL, J.:---In this writ petition, the petitioner employee Murlidar Babulal Shah, who was in the service of the 1st respondent Massrs. Eagle Vacuum Bottle Manufacturing Co. Pvt. Ltd., challenges the validity of the Award made by the 2nd respondent 5th Labour Court, Bombay whereby the 2nd respondent rejected the reference that the petitioner who had been dismissed from service with effect from 2nd May, 1972 should be reinstated with full back wages and also be given proper compensation for the entire period during which he had been kept out of employment. Shir Shetye, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, challenges the impugned Award on the grounds that the approach of the Labour Court is perverse and the decision is based on presumption arrived at on the basis of speculation and that the finding of the Court relating to the abandonment of service is also perverse. 2. The few which need be mentioned are that the petitioner was in the service of the 1st respondent from 29th September, 1969 upto 1st May, 1972. The nature of the duties of the petitioner related to preparation of accounts. According to the petitioner, the 1st respondent issued a letter on 10th April, 1972 alleging that his accounts work was in arrears, on account of which the 1st respondent has to pay penalty for late submission of Sales Tax Returns. The petitioners submitted his explanation by his letter dated 12th April, 1972. On 14th April, 1972, the 1st respondent issued another letter stating that his explanation was not satisfactory. On 28th April, 1972, the 1st respondent issued another letter directing him to complete the alleged arrears of work by 29th April ,1972, to which the petitioner explained his inability to complete the work by 29th April, 1972 but assured that the would do his best to complete whatever work was possible for him to do. According to the petitioner, the 1st respondent was ostinate and insisted on a writing from the petitioner that he would complete the work, to which the petitioner did not agree, and thereupon the petitioner was informed that his services were dispensed with and he should not report for work on and from 2nd May, 1972. According to the petitioner, the 1st respondent was ostinate and insisted on a writing from the petitioner that he would complete the work, to which the petitioner did not agree, and thereupon the petitioner was informed that his services were dispensed with and he should not report for work on and from 2nd May, 1972. The petitioner, in the circumstances, lodged a complaint with the Government Labour Officer and, according to the petitioner, during the discussions before the Government Labour Officer, it was agreed that the petitioner would be allowed to join duty on 13th May, 1972. It is also the case of the petitioner that he reported for work on 13th May, 1972 and signed the attendance register and he remained on the premises of the 1st respondent for about two hours when he was asked to give in writing an apology for lodging the complaint before the Government Labour Officer. The petitioner refused to give such a writing and thereupon the 1st respondent asked him to leave the premises. This incident was reported by the petitioner on 15th May, 1972 to the Government Labour Officer who advised the petitioner to raise an industrial dispute. Ultimately, the matter was admitted in conciliation. On a failure report, the Deputy Commissioner of Labour referred the dispute for adjudication to the Labour Court. 3. On these bare facts, normally there should not have been any controversy. But the picture presented by the 1st respondent is different. The 1st respondent filed an affidavit of Venkatnarayan Devidas Bhat, an Accountant, who has stated on oath that he is conversant with the facts of the case and is able to depose to the same. His version of the historical facts is that apart from the letter dated 10th April, 1972, a copy whereof is annexed to the affidavit, there were other instances of incomplete work left by the petitioner. The petitioner, according to the deponent, was in the habit of sleeping over the work and as the duly written and completed accounts were required by the auditors of the Company, it was again impressed upon the petitioner by the Companys Memos dated 14th April, 1972 and 28th April, 1972 that the petitioner should complete the work in arrears. The petitioner, according to the deponent, was in the habit of sleeping over the work and as the duly written and completed accounts were required by the auditors of the Company, it was again impressed upon the petitioner by the Companys Memos dated 14th April, 1972 and 28th April, 1972 that the petitioner should complete the work in arrears. The petitioner did not give any reply to the latter dated 28th April, 1972 and hence a report was called for about the petitioners work from the Financial Manager which the latter did by his report dated 1st May, 1972 and pursuant to this, the petitioner was again given time upto 8th May, 1972. It is further stated that at that crucial time, the 1st respondent was very much interested in seeing that the petitioner completed the work badly required by the auditors and not that the petitioner be removed to allow the work to remain incomplete. As the work entrusted to the petitioner could have been completed by 8th May, 1972, time was granted to him upto 8th May, 1972. The deponent also denies that the 1st respondent wanted from the petitioner any writing as alleged and/ or that the petitioner refuse to give the same or that he was informed that his service were dispensed with or that he should not report for work on and from 2nd May, 1972. As regards the agreement or the discussion before the Government Labour Officer on 3rd May, 1972, the version of the 1st respondent is that what was agreed before the Government Labour Office was that the petitioner was free to join duties but no back wages for the period of absence would be given. The petitioner, however, did not come for work until 13th May, 1972 when he was permitted to join duties. The petitioner after signing the muster-roll and remaining therefore, some time again slipped away on 13th May, 1972 and did not work for the day nor reported for duties thereafter at any time. 4. The letter dated 10th April, 1972, Ex. 1 to the said affidavit, states that on or about 1st January, 1972 the petitioner was directed to complete the work in the Cash Book of the Company which had remained in arrears from November 1971 and to reconcile the Bank Statement since September 1971 and bring the work upto date as quickly as possible. 1 to the said affidavit, states that on or about 1st January, 1972 the petitioner was directed to complete the work in the Cash Book of the Company which had remained in arrears from November 1971 and to reconcile the Bank Statement since September 1971 and bring the work upto date as quickly as possible. It further states that the Finance Manager had personally warned the petitioner and the petitioner had given an assurance in writing that he would complete the work by 15th February, 1972. By 15th February, 1972 the petitioner had completed some work as stated in the said letter, but the letter indicates that the petitioner had failed to complete the work and that he was given time upto 4th March, 1972. The petitioner was, in the circumstances, asked to explain as to why his services should not be terminated immediately. 5. This short resume of the affidavit in reply indicates that the petitioner has not been frank and candid in setting forth his case in the petition when moving this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. There is no denial to these statements, nor any reason was given as to why the petitioner could not file any affidavit in rejoinder. Let it may be said that the affidavit in reply was made only on 4th August, 1980, a copy of which was furnished to the petition on 6th August, 1980. It is also to be borne in mind that the petitioner is a Commerce Graduate and was working in the Accounts Department. Therefore, he is a responsible person both by virtue of his education and the nature of work undertaken by him. In his background, it cannot be said that the petitioner is an illiterate workman who could have suffered from the intelligence of giving proper and adequate instructions to his learned Advocate in drafting the petition. From what is revealed from the affidavit in reply and the exhibits annexed hereto, it is reasonable to say that the petitioner has suppressed facts as well as documents while giving history of the matter having a bearing on the petition. If these facts and documents have been disclosed in the petition, it is not improbable that the petition might not have been admitted and rule issued as these are telling facts and documents having a vital bearing on the issues agitated in the petition. If these facts and documents have been disclosed in the petition, it is not improbable that the petition might not have been admitted and rule issued as these are telling facts and documents having a vital bearing on the issues agitated in the petition. However, on this ground, I do not propose to dismiss the petition as the matter has been argued on merits. 6. On merits, Shri Shetye has taken me through the Award and the reasoning given by the Labour Court in considering the four points raised by it for its determination. One of the questions which fell for its consideration was whether the workman had no intention of performing his duty as he voluntarily abondoned his services with effect from 2nd May, 1972. This issue, I notice, has been fairly well considered both on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence. I also find that proper and adequate inferences have been drawn from the material on record. I am not impressed by Shri Shetyes contention that the findings of the Labour Court are based on speculation. 7. With regard to the letter dated 10th April, 1972, Exh. 1 to the affidavit in reply, the Labour Court has made a proper analysis of its contents as reflected in paragraph 11 of the Award. It seems that relying upon the background of the case and the difficulty for the petitioner in clearing off the arrears in spite of the repeated warnings and instructions given to him, it was possible, according to the Labour Court, that the petitioner left the office on 1st May, 1972 with the idea that thereby he would not be held responsible for the arrears. Such a possibility cannot be said to be ill-founded on the facts and circumstances of the case, nor the inference could be said to be perverse, as sought to be made out on behalf of the petitioner. The Labour Court has also taken into consideration the fact that the 1st respondent Company was not interested in terminating the services of the petitioner on 1st May, 1972. The petitioner was an experienced accountant having served for the Company since September 1969. He was thus possibly an asset for the Company and the Company could not have afforded to lose him. Furthermore, the only allegation against the petitioner was his failure to complete the work in time. The petitioner was an experienced accountant having served for the Company since September 1969. He was thus possibly an asset for the Company and the Company could not have afforded to lose him. Furthermore, the only allegation against the petitioner was his failure to complete the work in time. It is also to be remembered that the Company had to pay penalty for filling Sales Tax Returns late in the previous year. This fact has rightly been not taken into consideration by the Labour Court as it was a thing of the past. The Court has rightly focussed its mind to the circumstances immediately prior to 1st May, 1972. 8. Another factor to be remembered is that the evidence of the Companys Joint Managing Director A.H. Shivji shows that them petitioner was given 8 days further time on 1st May, 1972 to clear off the arrears. This vital circumstance has been accepted by the Labour Court and I see no reason as to why the Court should not have accepted it in the light of the discussion through which I have been taken on behalf of the petitioner. This oral testimony of the Joint Managing Director seems to be supported by the report, Ex. 11, of one Pirani. The report seems to be dated May, 1972 and to that extent it becomes a contemporaneous record of the happenings of 1st and 2nd May, 1972 and from the angle of the Law of Evidence, this document has considerable weight and credibility. 9. Another factor which seems to have guided the Labour Court is the absence of any evidence of handing over the charge of the petitioners table on 1st May, 1972 and this aspect of the matter if discussed in paragraph 14 of the Award. The Labour Court has also fairly assessed the evidence of the petitioner and his witness Natha. The witness seems to have been disbelieved. One of the reasons for disbelieving him was that he had been retrenched from service of the Company. But that is not the only reason on which his evidence has been discarded. That was only one circumstance to show that he could have possible harboured some bad feeling for the 1st respondent. Had that been the sole reason for rejecting his evidence, there would have been considerable force in Shri Shetyes contention. But that is not the only reason on which his evidence has been discarded. That was only one circumstance to show that he could have possible harboured some bad feeling for the 1st respondent. Had that been the sole reason for rejecting his evidence, there would have been considerable force in Shri Shetyes contention. But I find that his evidence has been discussed with considerable concern as required of a Court and if the Court discharged its duty properly in assessing the evidence, it is not the function of the High Court in acting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to have a review of the same as an Appellate Court. 10. Shri Shetye placed reliance on two decisions of the Supreme Court. The first decision is (Buckingham Carnatic Co. v. Venkatiah)1, A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 1272, wherein it is observed at page 1275:--- "It is true that under common law an inference that an employee has abandoned or relinquished service is not easily drawn unless from the length of absence and from other surrounding circumstances an inference to that effect can be legitimately drawn and it can be assumed that the employee intended to abondon service. Abondonment or relinquishment of service is always a question of intention, and normally such an intention cannot be attributed to an employee without adequate evidence in that behalf." 11. The other decision is (M/s. Jeewanlal (1929) Ltd. v. Its Workmen)2, A.I.R. 1961 Supreme Court 1567. In that case, the expression "continuous service" fell for consideration in a gratuity scheme in an award, on voluntary retirement or resignation of an employee after 15 years continous service. In this connection, it is observed in paragraph 6 at page 1569 that" if an employee continues to be absent from duty without obtaining leave and in an unauthorised manner for such a long period of time that an inference may reasonably be drawn from such absence that by his absence he has abondoned service, then such long unauthorised absence may legitimately be held to held to cause a break in the continuity of service." 12. Relying upon these decisions, Shri Shetye contended that the finding of abondonment of service is perverse because in the present case, the length of time during which the events took place, viz., the letter dated 10th April, 1972 asking for an explanation, the complaint lodged with the Government Labour Officer on 2nd May, 1972, and the fact that the petitioner reported for duty on 13th May, 1972, indicate that no interference of abandonment could have been drawn by the Labour Court as between April and May, 1972 there was no long passage of absence from duty. There could have been no question of absence from duty when the petitioner lodged a complaint. The short period and the fact that during the same period a complaint had been lodged cannot be reconciled while considering the question of abandonment of service. In my opinion, this contention is misconcieved on the facts and circumstances of the present case. It is not necessary that in every case the only test available is the length of time as urged by Shri Shetye. In the present case, the Labour Court has drawn proper inferences from the oral and documentary evidence as pointed out earlier. The impugned Award, therefore, does not suffer from any error which requires to be corrected in the exercise of my extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 13. In the result, the petition is dismissed. The rule is discharged with costs in favour of the 1st respondent. Petition dismissed. -----