JUDGMENT Mookerjee, J. The plaintiff, are the appellants in this appeal. They brought a suit in the City Civil Court. Calcutta against the Corporation of Calcutta, the Commissioner of the Corporation of Calculta and two other officers of the Corporation of Calcutta, inter alia, for a declaration that the notice under S. 414(1) of the Calcutta Municipal Act and the order of the defendant No. 4 pursuant thereto were had in law, invalid, ultra vires and they had no authority to demolish the shed at the back of the premises No.5. Haralal Das Lane. The plaintiff also prayed for permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from demolishing the shed in suit. 2. The defendants the Commissioner, Corporation of Calcutta by filing the written statement contested the said suit In their said written statements, the defendants did not make any averments; that the suit was liable to be dismissed in limini on the ground that the Commissioner, Corporation of Calcutta had not been impleaded by the name of the then incumbent of the said office. But the learned Judge, Eighth Bench, City Civil Court, Calcutta has however dismissed the suit brought by the plaintiff appellants, inter alia, on the ground that the plaintiffs not having impleaded the Commissioner by name 'the suit must fail. At the same time the learned Judge of the Court below found in favour of the plaintiffs that the impugned C.I. shed was constructed more then 12 twelve years before April 6, 1959 and, therefore, no action could be taken under S. 414 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951. 3. The learned Judge of the trial court founded his judgement primarily on the decision in P. B. Shah & Co. & Ors. v. Chief Executive Officer, Corporation of Calcutta & Ors, 65 CWN 1128. but the said decision of Bachawat and Chatterjee, JJ in P. B. Shah's case (supra), ought to be read in the light of the later decision of P. N. Mookerjee and A. C. Sen, JJ. in M/s. Metro General Traders v. The Commissioner Corporation of Calcutta, AIR 1965 Cal. 442 . 4. P. N. Mookerjee and A. C. Sell, JJ. in M/s. Metro General Traders' case 'supra), had inter alia, observed that they were not inclined to agree with the decisions of Bachawat and Chatterjee, JJ. in M/s. Metro General Traders v. The Commissioner Corporation of Calcutta, AIR 1965 Cal. 442 . 4. P. N. Mookerjee and A. C. Sell, JJ. in M/s. Metro General Traders' case 'supra), had inter alia, observed that they were not inclined to agree with the decisions of Bachawat and Chatterjee, JJ. in P. B. Shah's case (supra) and of G. K. Mitra, J. in Central Glass Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner, Corporation of Calcutta ILR 1957(1) Cat. 432. According to the said later Division Bench decision even where the statute does not expressly make a particular title holder a Corporation Sole, there may be the necessary intendment in the particular statute to lead to the same effect and, suits in this country at least, in the mofussil have freely brought against the Collector without naming any individual person or the particular occupant of the post at the time. The learned Judges in M/s. Metro General Trader's case (supra), further observed that any other view is bound to lead to serious complications and difficulties. It has to be remembered that the idea of the Corporation Sole is a flexible one, introduced as a fiction by the English law, and it does not always require a supporting statute, although, usually, this characteristic is emphasised by the particular statute in question. We respectfully agree with the above observations of the Division Bench decision in M/s. Metro General Traders' case (supra). 5. There is another aspect of the matter. Assuming the plaintiff by not stating in the plaint the name of the person who held the post of commissioner, Corporation of Calcutta, the defendant No.2. had omitted to give tile full particulars required under clause (c) of Rule 1, Order 7 or the Code of Civil Procedure, the suit cannot be straightway dismissed. The object of the said provision is to ensure that full and complete particulars of the parties should be stated in the plaint so as to identify the parties intended to be sued and also rule out all uncertainty or doubt. In case an objection is raised that the plaint does not captain the full particulars of the name, description or place of residence of the defendant, or defendants, there could be no legal impediment in the way of the plaintiff applying for amendment or the plaint to meet the said objections about mis-description or incomplete description of a defendant or defendants. In this connection, Mr. Mitra has rightly relied upon the decision of the Supreme court in Purushttam Umedhhai & Co. v M/s. Manilal & Sons AIR 1961 SC 325 . Incidentally, the Supreme Court in Purushttam Umedhhai & Co's case (supra) had approved and affirmed the judgment of Dasgupta, CJ and Bachawat, J. In M/s. Manilal & Sons v. Purushttam Umedhhai & Co. reported in AIR 1960 Cal. 15 . In the said case a partnership firm carrying on business outside India and who were not permitted by the Civil Procedure Code to bring a suit in the . firm name instituted as plaintiff, in the High Court at Calcutta The learned trial judge refused the subsequent prayer for amendment of the plaint by way of sticking out the name of the firm and substituting the names of the individual partners as plaintiffs. The appeal court consisting of Dasgupta, CJ, and Bachawat, J. reversed the decision of the trial court and allowed the said amendment of the plaint. The Supreme Court affirmed the said decision of the appeal court. It was, inter alia, held that such an amendment of the plaint by way of substituting the names of the individual partners should be allowed because the same only cured the mis-description of the plaintiff. When the court records the names of the individual partners who had been mis-described the Court in effect finds that the persons who had been previously mis-described were already on record. If the court allow, the amendment of the plaint by introducing the legitimate name of that person, the Court is not adding a new party for the purpose of invoking S. 22 of the Limitation Act (1908) nor is it taking away from the defendant any defence accrued by lapse of time (vide the judgment of Bachawat, J. in AIR 1960 Cal 15 ). 6. The above principles may be invoked in a case where a defendant is described in the plaint only by his official designation. We are inclined to hold that such an omission to state in the cause title of the plaint the name of the office is at best a mis-description or incomplete description of the said defendant. 6. The above principles may be invoked in a case where a defendant is described in the plaint only by his official designation. We are inclined to hold that such an omission to state in the cause title of the plaint the name of the office is at best a mis-description or incomplete description of the said defendant. If no objection at the preliminary stage of the suit is raised by the defendants and the court proceeds to determine the case on merits, the court cannot refuse to grant relief in the suit solely on the ground that the full name and description of a particular defendant was not stated in the plaint. In case, at the initial stage immediately after entering appearance, the defendant/defendants raise objection about the description of the defendant/defendants, the plaintiff would get an opportunity to apply for the amendment of the plaint to meet such an objection and to correct the mis-description or misnomer of the defendant/defendants. But when without raising such an objection the defendant who is not correctly and fully described in the plaint, contests the suit on merits case, the Court may hold that the defendant had waived his objection as to his mis-description or misnomer in the plaint. 7. We are of the view that the facts of the present case are neatly similar to those of M/s. Metro General Traders’ case (supra). In the instant case also, Mr. P. C. Majumdar, the then Commissioner, had himself verified the written statement including the additional written statement filed in the case. We have already pointed out that no objection was taken in their Written Statement by the defendants that the frame of the suit was bad because of the fact that the Commissioner, had not been sued by name. If such a technical objection had been taken, there would have been no difficulty in the way of the plaintiff praying for amendment of the plaint for so as to rectify the mis-description of the defendant No.2 the Commissioner Corporation of Calcutta. In this connection we respectfully adopt and follow the view of P. N. Mukherjee and A. C. Sen JJ in M/s Metro General Traders' case (supra) at page 443, paragraph 4 of the report. 8. We also agree with the pronouncement made by the Division Bench in the case of M/s. Metro General Traders’ case (supra). In this connection we respectfully adopt and follow the view of P. N. Mukherjee and A. C. Sen JJ in M/s Metro General Traders' case (supra) at page 443, paragraph 4 of the report. 8. We also agree with the pronouncement made by the Division Bench in the case of M/s. Metro General Traders’ case (supra). in paragraph 6 of the judgment, regarding the effect of impleading a statutory authority like the Commissioner of Calcutta Corporation by office only and not by name also. In the facts of this case, however, for the foregoing reason, it is not necessary to remand the matter to enable the plaintiffs to apply for amendment of the plaint so as to remove the irregularity as raised in the objection regarding the description of the defendant No.2. who had full opportunity to contest the suit. The defendants did not suffer any prejudice by reason of the defendant No.2 having been described only his by official designation and the judgment of the case was not affected by the said defect in the plaint. In the instant case', the learned trial judge found that the C.I shed in question had been in existence fur more than 12 years before the issue of the notice under S. 44(1) of the Calcutta Municipal Act 1951. The learned Advocate for the defendant-respondents has not challenged the correctness of the said finding. In the above view, the impugned action taken under S. 414(1) of the Calcutta Municipal Act was clearly without Jurisdiction and the defendant respondents should be restrained from giving any effect or further effect to the same. 9. Before we conclude the judgment, we also point out that we arc not inclined to concur with the view of the trial judge that in the instant suit the Corporation of Calcutta and the other officers of the said body were not necessary parries. In fact it was the defendant No.4 who had attempted to give effect 10 the said impugned order of demolition and at least the defendant No. 4 as also the defendant No. 1, Corporation of Calcutta, were necessary parties. 10. We accordingly, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court brought by the plaintiffs. In the circumstances of the case, both parties will bear their respective costs both in the trial court and in this Court. Sharma J: I agree. Appeal allowed.