HARUGERI URBAN COOP. BANK v. STATE OF KARNATAKA — 1980 DIGILAW 192 (KAR)

P. P. BOPANNA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners herein are all co-operative societies (in short, 'the societies') registered under the Karnataka co-operative Societies Act, 1959 (in short, the C. S. Act ). They have challenged the awards orders of the various Labour Courts and Industrial tribunals in the State in reference made by the State Government under s. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short, 'the I. D. Act'), holding that even after S. 70 (2) (d) was incorporated in the C. S. Act by the Karnataka co-operative Societies (Amendment) act, 1976 (Karnataka Act No. 19 of 1976) with effect from 20-1-1976, the labour Court or Industrial Tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicate the reference made, by the State Government on applications of workmen under S. 33c (2) of the I. D. Act. ( 2 ) THESE petitions were heard on 13-2-80 and other subsequent dates and at the request of the learned Advocate general, they were posted on 2-1-1980 since a submission was made in the course of the arguments that the state Government was contemplating of bringing the necessary bill for amending S. 70 (2) (d) of the C. S. Act. On that date, it was represented by the learned Advocate General that it would not be necessary for this court to adjudicate on the validity of the aforesaid section in view of the proposed bill which might, become law by the end of May last. Accordingly, these cases were adjourned to 6-6-80 for further hearing, and finally to 17-7-80 at the request of the Government advocate. On that date, the learned Government Advocate, appearing for the learned Advocate General, submitted that he was not in a position to say categorically whether any proposal or resolution was pending in the Assembly for amending the aforesaid section. But the learned counsel for the workmen in these petitions have brought to my notice that a large number of cases are pending in various labour Courts all over the State in view of the stay order issued by this court in these petitions and any delay in the disposal of these petitions would seriously affect the prospects of workmen' and would cause serious disharmony in the industrial relations between the societies and their workmen. I am in agreement with this contention of the learned, counsel for the workmen, and hence I am of the view that no purpose would be served by giving further time to the Government in the absence of any definite commitment from their counsel as to what exactly the Government propose to do to remove the hardship that is caused to the workmen. ( 3 ) IN these petitions, the common question of law that arises for consideration is whether S. 70 (2) (d) of the cs. Act would take away the jurisdiction of the adjudicating Authorities constituted by the State Government under S. 7 to 7b of the I. D. Act to adjudicate the disputes of the employees of the societies covered by that sub-section referred to them by the State Government on the applications of those employees under S. 33c (2) of the I. D. Act. ( 4 ) IN WP Nos. 4594 of 1976 and 4724 to 4727 of 1980, the petitioners haye challenged the maintainability of the applications under S. 33c (2) of the i. D. Act in view of S. 7 (2) (d) of the c. S. Act. In WP Nos. 2756, 2932 and 7046 of 1976, 3203 of 1978, 7650 of of 1979 and 3197 of 1980, the petitioners have challenged the preliminary order of the Labour Court or Industrial tribunal holding that it has jurisdiction to adjudicate the disputes referred to it notwithstanding S. 70 (2) (d) of the c. S. Act. In WP Nos. 5942 of 1977 and 7975 of 1978, the petitioners have challenged the awards passed by the labour Court and Industrial Tribunal on the merits of the dispute as also on the question of jurisdiction. ( 5 ) THE leading arguments for the petitioners were advanced by the learned counsel, Messrs B. Gopaliah and B. T. Parthasarathy, and the other counsel have merely adopted their arguments. ( 6 ) THERE is no dispute that the i. D. Act is applicable to the co-opertive societies which carry on, any industry within the meaning of S. 2 (j) of that Act. ( 6 ) THERE is no dispute that the i. D. Act is applicable to the co-opertive societies which carry on, any industry within the meaning of S. 2 (j) of that Act. However, under S. 70 (1) (c) of the C. S. Act, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time, being in force, any dispute between a society and an employee or a deceased employee of that society should be referred to the Registrar for decision and no court has jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceeding in respect of such dispute. S. 70 (2) (d) of the C. S. Act, which was inserted by Karnataka Act No. 19 of 19'76 with effect from 20-1-76, provides. "70. Disputes which may be referred to Registrar for decision: (2) For the purposes of sub-sec. (1) the following shall be deemed to be disputes touching the constitution, management or the business of a co-operative society, namely- (d) any dispute between a co-operative society, and its employees or past employees or heirs or legal representatives of a deceased employee, including a dispute regarding the terms of employment, working conditions and disciplinary action taken by a co-operative society;"this Court lias consistently taken the view that S. 70 (2) (d) of the C. S. Act is only prospective in its operation and does not affect the references made to the adjudicating authorities constituted under the I. D. Act prior to introduction of the said provision. But the point for consideration is whether the references made after 20-1-1976 on applications filed under s. 33c (2) of the I. D. Act after 20-1-76, are without jurisdiction in view of the aforesaid amendment by Act 19 of 1976. ( 7 ) MR. Gopaliah maintained that: (I) the C. S. Act is a special Act which governs all employees of societies, whether they are workmen or not within the meaning of S. 2 (s) of the I. D. Act and, therefore, the provisions of Section 70 of the c. S. Act should prevail over the provisions of the I. D. Act; (II) S. 70 (2) (d) of the C. S. Act does not amount to fresh legislation but what has been provided for under S. 70 (1) (c) is made clear in S. 70 (2) (d) of that Act so as to include even collective disputes between societies and their employees; (III) Ss. 70 (1) (c) and 70 (2) (d) of the C. S. Act are special provisions to protect the co-operative Societies and they could stand by themselves without offending clauses (1) and (2) of article 254 of the Constitution; Entry 22 in List III (Concurrent Last) of the constitution, which provides for legislation by both the Central and the state Government on "trade unions; industrial and labour disputes", must be understood in its pith and substance and thus understood, any reference after the amendment of S. 70 of the c. S. Act must be only to an arbitrator empowered under that Act and could not be under the provisions of the i. D. Act; (IV) the word 'court' has to be understood sd any judicial or quasi-judicial authority and though S. 118 of the c. S. Act purports to take away the jurisdiction of only the civil or revenue courts in the context of S. 118 (1) (c) the words 'civil court' must be understood as a labour court constituted under S. 7 of the I. D. Act. (V) assuming S. 118 of the C. S. Act does not take away the jurisdiction of the adjudicating authorities under the I. D Act, in view of the amendment to S. 70 of the C. S. Act, S. 118 of that Act has become redundant and hence no inference against the petitioners could be drawn from the language of S. 118 of the CS ACT. ( 8 ) MR. B. T. Parthasarthy, who was permitted to intervene in these petitions, supplemented the arguments of Mr. Gopaliah. He submitted; (1) the amended provision was only a declaratory or curatory law to resolve the conflict among the various High courts on the interpretation of the word 'dispute in the C. S. Act and such provision has both prospective as well as restrospective effect. He relied on the decisions in Kunnimelliahalli dodda Pramanada Prathami Pattin vyavasaya Sahakari Sangh Ltd. v. Shivappa Guddappa Surad (1), GIP railway Employees Co-operative Bank ltd. v. Bhikhaji Merwanji Karanjia (2) and Surathkal Co-op. Town Bank ltd v. E. Padmanabhayya (3) to press his point that there was an apparent conflict as to the scope of S. 70 (1) (c) of the C. S. Act and, therefore, the legislature stepped in and removed the conflicit by incorporating S. 70 (2) (d) in that Act. (2) He also, while supporting Mr. Town Bank ltd v. E. Padmanabhayya (3) to press his point that there was an apparent conflict as to the scope of S. 70 (1) (c) of the C. S. Act and, therefore, the legislature stepped in and removed the conflicit by incorporating S. 70 (2) (d) in that Act. (2) He also, while supporting Mr. Gopaliah's contention that the C. S. Act is a special Act, made a distinction between employees of a Socitey and the workmen under the I. D. Act. Under the I. D. Act according to him, relief was limited to a class of persons who were workmen within the meaning of S. 2 (s) of that act, whereas, under the C. S. Act, all employees of societies could raise a dispute covered by S. 70 (2) (d) of that Act. His further case was that whereas under the I. D. Act, the workmen could get the benefit of the adjudication only if a reference, is made by the State Government to the adjudicating authority under that Act any employee whose dispute is covered by the aforesaid amendment to the c. S. Act could directly approach the registrar or any person authorised to adjudicate the dispute and that is an indication that the society employees are a special class of employees and they have a, special remedy for the redressal of their grievance and hence the C. S. Act is a special Act in relation to the I. D. Act. Elaborating this argument, he submitted tha,t the co-operative movement in this country requires special protection for its healthy development and for ensuring a certain amount of discipline to render service that is expected of it to its various members who belong to a special class of persons who believe in the co-operative movement and that is why S. 70 (2) (d) should be interpreted as to exclude the operation of the I. D. Act to employees of the cooperative societies and that the C. S. Act, whose main object is to promote thrift and selfhelp etc, among its members, is a special Act designed and conceived for the betterment of the co-operative movement and incidentally renders speedy relief to the employees of societies in obtaining redressal of their disputes touching their conditions of service with their respective employers. He also relied on Entry 22 in the Concurrent List and maintained that if it is held that the i. D. Act is applicable to disputes covered by Act 19 of 1976, the growth of co-operative movement would be curbed and the said amendment Act does not amount to colourable legislation and does not offend the provisions of Art. 254 of the Constitution. He relied on the decision of the Supreme court in U. P. State Electricity Board v. Hari Shanker Jain (4) which was also strongly relied upon by the counsel for the respondents. Applying the principles la;d down in the said case, Mr. Parthasarthy maintained that the C. S. Act is a special Act and therefore, the general principle that the general Act must give way to the special Act, must be applied to the facts of these cases. ( 9 ) MR. V. Krishna Murthy, learned senior Advocate, and Mr. M. C. Narasimhan, learned counsel for some of the respondents, maintained: (1) The C. S. Act is not a special act in relation to the I. D. Act and S. 70 (2) (d) of the C. S. Act is a deeming provision which raises a legal fiction that the disputes covered by that amended provision shall be deemed to be touching the constitution, management and the business of co-operative societies and that provision which creates a legal fiction amounts to colourable exercise of the legislative powers by the State Government and, therefore, ultra vires since it cannot be brought under Entry 32 of List-II (State List) of the Constitution which refers to co-operative societies. (2) The topic of legislation in S. 70 (2) (d) of the C. S. Act is itiem 22 in List III but the Legislature has usurped its powers under Entry 32 of list II and passed the amendment Act which is hit by Art. 254 (1) of the constitution, and it is also nol sayed under Art. 254 (2) of the Constitution since the assent of the President has not been obtained before bringing the amendment. (3) The Amendment Act (No. 19 of 1976) not having made any distinction between an employee of a society who is covered by the I. D. Act and an employee who is not covered by that Act, the rights of the workman covered by the i. D. Act which is a Central Act, have been taken away by a State enactment, in violation of Article 254 of the constitution. (4) It is doubtful whether the registrar or other authorities appointed under the C. S. Act which could adjudicale a dispute covered by S. 70 (2) (d) of the Act, could grant all the reliefs that an industrial court could grant under I. D. Act, and the period of limitation fixed under the c. S. Act is also an encroachment on the right of the workman to obtain reliefs both in regard to his termination, dismissaj or discharge of his service and in regard to any monetary benefit due to him from the society by an application under S. 33c (2) of the I. D. Act which are not controlled by provisions prescribing a period of limitation. (5) The dispute covered by S. 70 (2) (d) of the C. S. Act does no take in its fold thirteen matters covered by the second and the Third Schedules to the I. D. Act and in the absence of any provision for election of remedies by the workmen, as provided for in the karnataka Shops and Establishments act, 1948, the provisions of S. 70 (2) (d) of the C. S. Act are a serious encroaenment on the right of the employees of co-operative specieties who could properly come within the meaning of S. 2 (s) of the I. D. Act. 4 ( 10 ) MR. KRISHNA Murthy also relied on, the decision, of the Supreme Court in hari Shankar's case (4) and submitted that there cannot be any dispute that the I. D. Act is a special Act in relation to employees of co-operative societies. 4 ( 10 ) MR. KRISHNA Murthy also relied on, the decision, of the Supreme Court in hari Shankar's case (4) and submitted that there cannot be any dispute that the I. D. Act is a special Act in relation to employees of co-operative societies. The C. S. Act is an Act which covers the co-operative institutions as a where, their incorporation, objects, functioning, bye-laws for their internal management, control by the Government in appropriate cases and various other matters and that is a general law and the I. D. Act which is also applicable to the employees of societies who are workmen within the meaning of S. 2 (s) of the i. D. Act, is a special law sinee it: is specifically enacted for resolving the collective as well as individual disputes between the employer and his workmen. ( 11 ) HE invited my attention to certain features of the I. D. Act providing for conciliation under S. 12 of that Act, reference of disputes by the Government under S. 10 of the Act and the effect of an award or a settlement under S. 13 (1) or 18 (3) of the Act and contended that these provisions have a special significance in industrial adjudication and workmen employed by a society engaged in any industry who are covered by the I D. Act could not be deprived of the benefit of these special provisions of the amended C. S. Act. ( 12 ) LASTLY, he maintained tha,t under s. 25j of the I. D. Act, the provisions of Chapter VA of that Act relating to lay-off and retrenchment shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law including the standing orders made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act. 1946. The proviso to S. 25j (1) of the I. D. Act saves the operation of S. 25j (1 ). It provides that if under any other Act or rules, orders or notifications issued thereunder or any standing orders or under any award, contract of service or otherwise, a workman is entitled to benefits in respect of any matter which are more favourable to him than those to which he would be entitled under this Act, the workman shall continue to be entitled to the more favourable benefits in respect of that matter, notwithstanding that he receives the benefits in respect of other matters under that Act. S. 25j (2) of the I. D. Act provides that the rights and liabilities of employers and workmen in so far as they relate to lay off and retrenchment, will have to be determined in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VA of that Act. In view of these provisions, Mr. Krishna murthy maintained that the absence, of any rules or orders or notifications etc. under the C. S. Act providing for better benefits to a workman than those he could have obtained under the I. D. Act, S. 25j (1) covers all employees of co-operative societies who we workmen and S. 25j (2), with regard to lay-off and retrenchment, totally exclides the operation of the provisions of S. 70 (2) (d) of the C. S. Act. Hence, in the absence of any provision expressly excluding the operation of the I. D. Act in the C. S. Act, it cannot be held that S. 70 (2) (d) has taken away the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to decide all disputes between societies and their workmen. ( 13 ) MEETING the contention of Mr. Partha sarthy that S. 70 (2) (d) of the c. S. Act is a declaratory law, he contended that such argument could be founded only on the language of the statute and the bill introducing the amendment Act does not say that S. 70 (2) (d) was incorporated to overcome the conflict in law in the cages relied upon by Mr. Parthasarathy. He also relied on the decision of the Supreme cqurt in Deccan Merchants Co-operative bank Ltd. v. M/s Dalichand Jugraj Jain (5) where Sikri, J. , as he then was, repelled the contention of the appellant-co-operative bank that S. 91 of the maharashtra Co-operative Societies act, 1961, did not affect the provisions of s. 28 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. ( 14 ) ON these contentions, the first point that requires my consideration is whether the C. S. Act is a special Act in relation to the I. D. Act. If it is a special act, subject to Art. 254 of the Constitution, the C. S. Act should prevail over the provisions of the I. D. Act. ( 14 ) ON these contentions, the first point that requires my consideration is whether the C. S. Act is a special Act in relation to the I. D. Act. If it is a special act, subject to Art. 254 of the Constitution, the C. S. Act should prevail over the provisions of the I. D. Act. ( 15 ) IN Harishanker's case (4) the supreme Court had to resolve the conflict between the standing orders under the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946, and the regulations made under the Electricity (Supply) act, 1948. After examining the provisions of the Standing Orders Act with special reference to the mandate of the constitution in Arts. 42 and 43, and to the Directive Principles of State Policy, the Court observed:"the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act is thus seen to be an Act specially designed to define the terms of employment of workmen in industrial establishments, to give the workmen a collective voice in defining the terms of employment and to subject the terms of employment to the scrutiny of quasi judicial authorities by the application of the test of fairness and reasonableness. It is an act giving recognition and form to hard-won and precious rights of work-men. We have no hesitation in saying that it is a special Act expressly and exclusively dealing with the schedule-enumerated conditions of service of workmen in industrial establishments. "further, the Supreme Court, after referring to the preamble of the Electricity (Supply) Act, the statement of objects and reasons and various provisions of that Act, came, to the conclusion, that that Act was meant to provide for the co-ordinated, efficient and economic development of electricity in India on a regional basis consistent with the needs of the entire region including semi-urban and rural areas. After considering s. 78 of that Act which empowered the Government to make rules and S. 79 which empowered the U. P. S. E. Board to make regulations in respect of matters specified in clauses (a) to (k) of the latter section, the court observed:"this, of course, is no more than the ordinary general power, with which every employer is invested, in the first instance, to regulate the conditions of service of his employees. It is an ancillary or incidental power of every employer. It is an ancillary or incidental power of every employer. The Electricity (Supply) act does not presume to be an Act to regulate the conditions of service of the employees of State Electricity boards. It is an Act to regulate the co-ordinated development of electricity. It is a special Act in regard to the subject of development of Electricity, even as the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act is a special act in regard to the subject of conditions of Service of Workmen in industrial establishments. If S. 79 (c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act generally provides for the making of regulations providing for the conditions of service of the employees of the Board, it can only be regarded as a generaj provision, which must yield to the special provisions of the Industrial employment (Stannding Orders) Act in respect of matters covered by the latter Act. " ( 16 ) BY applying the above test prescribed by the Supreme Court to determine whether an Act is a special Act or general Act, I have no doubt that the provisions for investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in the I. D. Act, the power of the adjudicating authorities to grant reliefs like reinstatement with back wages and continuity of service, the application of S. 25j of that Act to cases of lay-off and retrenchment, the application of other sections of Chapter VA of that Act, in the absence of any special rules, or orders cr notifications under the C. S. Act to cover cases of retrenchment, closure, etc. , and the special provisions in the I. D. Act relating to execution and operation of settlements and to awards which strengthen the hands of the workmen in exercising their right to collective bargaining with the employers, clearly indicate that the I. D. Act, insofar as it relates to adjudication of disputes involving the employment or non-employment or the conditions of service of the workmen covered by that Act and more particularly provided for in Schedules ii and III in that Act, is a special act providing for the workmen special remedies which are not obtainable either under common law or under a general law like the C. S. Act. These provisions reflect as well as project the mandate of Arts. 42 and 43 of the Constitution. These provisions reflect as well as project the mandate of Arts. 42 and 43 of the Constitution. ( 17 ) THE C. S. Act, as could be seen from its preamble, is an Act to consolidate and amend the laws relating to co-operative societies in this State and it generally provides for the establishment of societies, their registration, membership, rights and liabilities of members, powers of the general body, management of societies and their properties and funds, audit, winding up and dissolution and execution of awards, decrees and other matters. It is a local law but not a special law. S. 70 (1) (c) of the C. S. Act provides as follows:"70. Disputes which may be referred to the Registrar for decision: - (1) Nqtwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if any dispute touching the constitution, management or the business of co-operative societies' arises (c) between the society or its committee and any past committee,, any officer, agent or employee or any past officer, past employee or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of any deceased officer, deceased employee of the society, such dispute shall be referred to the registrar for decision and no Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceeding in respect of such dispute. "the disputes with which we axe concerned are covered by S. 70 (2) (d) which I have reproduced in para 6 supra. S. 117 of the C. S. Act prescribes the procedure for settlement of disputes and the power of the Arbitrator to whom a dispute is referred for decision under S. 70 (1) of that Act. Under s. 118 of the C. S. Act, no-Civil or revenue court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of any dispute required under s. 70 of that Act to be referred to the registrar. Here again, the exclusion of jurisdiction is in respect of civil or revenue courts. The I. D. Act being a special Act, it cannot be said that the labour Courts Industrial Tribunals are civil Courts attracting the bar of S. 118 of the C. S. Act. Even under S. 117 (1) (c) of the C. S. Act, the use of the words 'plaintiff' and defendant' wquld indicate that disputes under the i. D. Act stand on and different footing and are not covered by S. 70 of the C. S. Act. Even under S. 117 (1) (c) of the C. S. Act, the use of the words 'plaintiff' and defendant' wquld indicate that disputes under the i. D. Act stand on and different footing and are not covered by S. 70 of the C. S. Act. Under Rule 31 of the Rules framed under the C. S. Act, which prescribes the procedure of reference and arbitration, the Registrar or the Arbitrator, as the case may be shall give decision or award, in accordance with justice, equity and good conscience. The decision or award of the Arbitrator or the Registrar under the C. S. Act does not have the effect of an award under the I. D. Act, as is evident from Ss. 17a, 18 (3) and 19 (3) to (7) of the I. D. Act. ( 18 ) ALL these factors clearly indicate that the I. D. Act is a special Act and, therefore, the employees of co-operative societies who come within the definition of the word 'workman' under S. 2 (s) of ihe I. D. Act, have a right to have their disputes adjudicated by the appropriate authorities under the I. D. Act and their right has not been taken away by the provisions of S. 70 (1) (c) read with s. 70 (2) (d) of the C. S. Act. Since the petitioners in these petitions have only challenged the jurisdiction of the labour Court Industrial Tribunals, it is not necessary to record a finding on the contentions of the respondents that s. 70 (2) (d) of the C. S. Act is hit by the provisions of Art. 254 of the Constitution. This point should be appropriately decided in a case challenging the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator under s. 70 of the C. S. Act to decide an industrial dispute between a society and its employees. ( 19 ) IN the view I have taken that the i. D. Act is a special Act and the C. S. Act, a general Act, it is not necessary to consider the other competing contentions of the learned counsel for the parties since it follows that the remedy under the, I. D. Act is not taken away by Ss. ( 19 ) IN the view I have taken that the i. D. Act is a special Act and the C. S. Act, a general Act, it is not necessary to consider the other competing contentions of the learned counsel for the parties since it follows that the remedy under the, I. D. Act is not taken away by Ss. 70 (1) (c) read with 70 (2) (d) of the C. S. Act, Even accepting the contention that S. 70 of the C. S. Act as amanded declares a new forum for disputes between co-operative societies and their employees, which are covered by S. 70 (2) (d) of the C. S. Act, could it be said that in regard to the disputes between societies and their employees, which are industrial disputes, as in these cases, the jurisdiction of the Labour court. Industrial Tribunal is taken away in the absence of any express provision in the C. S. Act conferring an exhaustive procedure for the adjudication, of such disputes and an exclusive forum for deciding such disputes? There is no provision in the C. S. Act which provides for an exhaustive procedure or an exclusive forum which expressly or impliedly takes away the jurisdiction of the adjudicating authorities under the I. D. Act. The Supreme Court, in The premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar shantaram Wadke (6), while dealing with the jurisdiction of the Civil Court vis-a-vis the jurisdiction of the adjudicating authorities under the I. D. Act, observed as follows:"to sum up, the principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the Civil court in relation to an industrial dispute may be stated thus: (1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the civil Court. (2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to chopse his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. (3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. (3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. (4) If the right sought to be enforced is a right created under the act such as Chapter VA, then the remedy for its enforcement is either s. 33c or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be. "applying the above principles, it is clear that the employees of co-operative societies who are workmen under the I. D. Act, would be governed by principles nos. (3), (4) and (5) enunciated by the supreme Court quoted above and therefore, the workmen's remedy by an adjudication under the I. D. Act is not taken away by the C. S. Act. Further, the C. S. Act did not create any new right to the workmen and as observed by the House of Lords in PYX Granite co. v. Ministry of Housing (7 ). "where a statute creates a new right which has no existence apart from the statute creating it and the statute creating the right at the same time prescribes a particular method of enforcing it, then, in the words of Lord Watson in Barra-clough v. Brown (1897) AC at p. 622 the right and the remedy are given uno flatu, and the one cannot be dissociated from the other'. As Lord - herschell put it in the same case (1897) AC at p. 620, the party asserting the right cannot- 'claim to recover by virtue of the statute, and at the same time insist upon doing so by means other than those prescribed by the statute which alone confers the right'. "the petitions before me do not attract the above principle of law. In the circumstances, assuming that S. 70 (1) (c) of the C. S. Act provides for a new new forum, it cannot be said that the labour Courts or the Industrial Tribunals had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the references made by the State: Government or the applications under S. 33c (2) of the I. D. Act. In the circumstances, assuming that S. 70 (1) (c) of the C. S. Act provides for a new new forum, it cannot be said that the labour Courts or the Industrial Tribunals had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the references made by the State: Government or the applications under S. 33c (2) of the I. D. Act. Since I have held that the Labour court | Industrial Tribunal, as the ca,se may be, had jurisdiction to dispose of the reference made to it by the State government or the application under s. 33c (2) of the I. D. Act made by the workmen, as the case may be, I will deal with the petitions on their merits: w. P Nos. 2756, 2932, 4594 and 7046/ 1976, 3203/1978, 7650/1979; 3194; 3197; 4724 to 4726 and 4727/1980:-In these petitions the petitioners have only challenged the jurisdiction of the Labour courts/ Tribunals to proceed with the disputes pending before them. In view of what is stated above, the jurisdiction of the Labourcourt/tribunal is not taken away by Ss. 70 (1) (c) read with 70 (2) (d) of the C. S. Act. Hence, these petitions fail and are dismissed. The labour Courts shall proceed with the adjudication of the disputes expeditiously since they have been pending for a long time. W. P. Nos, 5942/1977 and 7975/1978: - the petitioners herein, apart from challenging the jurisdiction of the Labour court /tribunal, have also challenged the validity of their awards on merits. Apart from the contentions raised on the question of jurisdiction, which I have negatived, the learned counsel for the petitioners have no,t made any submissions on the validity of the awards on merits. Hence, I find no good ground to interfere with the said awards. Accordingly, these petitions are dismissed. The parties are directed to bear their own costs in each of these cases. --- *** --- .