JUDGMENT - M.L. PENDSE, J.:---The petitioners have filed this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to challenged the correctness of the judgment dated November 20, 1974, passed by the Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes dismissing their suit for eviction of the respondent. 2. The petitioners are the owners of the premises bearing No. 85, Dhanji Street, Bombay, having purchased the some same time in the year 1957. The premises consist of ground floor and the and the first floor and were originally let out to Mohanlal Nanhamal for the purpose of his business. The original letting was some time in the year 1940 and the monthly rent was Rs. 144.35. The respondent No. 1 Jamuna Shyam Sunder is the daughter of original tenant, while respondent No. 2 Gaya Prasad is the nephew. It is the contention of the petitioner that the front portion of the building was unlawfully sub-let by Mohanlal in favour of respondent No. 3 for running a flour mill. The petitioners further contend that the respondent No. 4 was inducted in the rest of the property as a sub-tenant unlawfully after coming into force of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). The petitioners further contend that respondent Nos. 5 and 6 were inducted by respondent No. 4 as his sublessees. 3. The petitioners terminated the tenancy of original tenant Mohanlal and instituted R.A.E. Suit No. 415/3263 of 1964 in the Court of Small Causes at Bombay claiming possession of the premises from the original tenant as well as respondents Nos. 3 to 6 on the ground that the original tenant was guilty of sub-letting, while the other respondents are not in the legal occupation. The petitioners also claimed possession on the ground that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by them for occupation. The claim in the suit was made under section 13(1)(e) and 13(1)(g) of the Act. The petitioners also claimed possession on the ground that the original tenant was guilty of profiteering and has also changed the user of the premises and has committed an act which has resulted into waste and damage to the premises. The petitioners also claimed that the premises were not used continuously for a period of six months prior to the date of the institution of the suit. 4. The petitioners also claimed that the premises were not used continuously for a period of six months prior to the date of the institution of the suit. 4. The suit was resisted by the original tenant Mohanlal, who died during the pendency of the suit and his legal representative are respondents Nos. 1 and 2, and also by respondents Nos. 3 to 6. The respondents Nos. 1 and 2 claimed that Mohanlal had not sub-let the front portion where respondent No. 3 is running a flour mill, but respondent No. 3 was only permitted to conduct the business of flour mill. The respondent No. 4 submitted that he was inducted as a sub-tenant in the year 1942 and he, in his turn, inducted respondents Nos. 5 and 6 in the year 1946 i.e. prior to January 19, 1948 when the Act came into force. The respondent claim that the sub-lease in favour of respondent No. 4 and further in favour of respondents Nos. 5 and 6 was not unlawful and was not hit by the provisions of section 13(1)(e) of the Act. The respondents also denied that the premises were required by the petitioners bona fide for their personal occupation. It was further contended that greater hardship would be caused to the respondents by passing the decree than to the petitioners by refusing it. The claim of the petitioners on other grounds like non-user, change of user, profiteering and waste and damage to the property was denied. 5. The trial Court, after recording the evidence, both oral and documentary, by its judgment dated April 18/22, 1969, decreed the claim of the petitioners on two counts. On the ground of bona fide personal requirement, it was found by the trial Court that the petitioner has successfully established that they are in need of additional accommodation. The issue of hardship was also answered in favour of the petitioners. On the issue of sub-letting, the trial Court recorded a finding that respondent No. 4 was inducted in the premises as a sub-tenant only in the year 1960, i.e. after the Act came into force. The respondents Nos. 5 and 6 were inducted as sub-tenants of the entire first floor by respondents No. 4. On the issue of sub-letting, the trial Court recorded a finding that respondent No. 4 was inducted in the premises as a sub-tenant only in the year 1960, i.e. after the Act came into force. The respondents Nos. 5 and 6 were inducted as sub-tenants of the entire first floor by respondents No. 4. As regards respondent No. 3, it was held that he was a sub-tenant inducted after the act came into force and his defence that he was merely conduction a four mill on behalf of the original tenant was not proved. The trial Court held, against the petitioner in respect of other grounds like change of user, profiteering, etc. 6. Three appeals were preferred before the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court by respondent No. 1, respondent No. 4 and respondents Nos. 5 and 6 together. All the three appeals were heard together and by a common judgment delivered on November 20, 1974, the appeal were allowed and the suit was dismissed. The Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the original tenant Mohanlal had not sub-let the premises in the front portion to respondent No. 3, but respondent No. 3 was merely a Conducting Agent for running the business of flour mill on behalf of Mohanlal. The Appellate Court further held that respondent No. 4 was inducted as a sub-tenant prior to year 1947 and so also respondents Nos. 5 and 6 and, therefore, there was no unlawful sub-letting. On the issue of bona fide requirement, the finding was recorded against the petitioners and so also on the question of hardship. Though, the petitioners have preferred cross-objections challenging the findings recorded by the trial Court refusing relief on other grounds under which possession was sought before the Appellate Court, the learned Advocate for the petitioners did not argued the cross-objection. The petitioners have challenged the impugned judgment by this petition. 7. During the pendency of this petition, on October 9, 1979, the petitioners and respondent No. 4 have entered into a settlement and accordingly, this Court has passed a consent decree between the petitioners and respondent No. 4. The petition is now argued only against the remaining respondents. 8. The petitioners have challenged the impugned judgment by this petition. 7. During the pendency of this petition, on October 9, 1979, the petitioners and respondent No. 4 have entered into a settlement and accordingly, this Court has passed a consent decree between the petitioners and respondent No. 4. The petition is now argued only against the remaining respondents. 8. Shri Abhyankar, the learned Counsel appearing in support of the petition, submitted that the finding of the lower Appellate Court that respondent No. 3 was not a sub-tenant but merely an Agent of Mohanlal conducting the business of flour mill, is incorrect and it ought to have been held that he was a sub-tenant inducted after coming into operation of the Act. The finding of the Appellate Court that respondents Nos. 4, 5 and 6 were inducted as sub-tenants prior to coming into operation of the Act is also incorrect and contrary to the facts on record. Shri Abhayankar also seriously challenged the finding of the Appellate Court that the petitioners have failed to establish the requirements. In view of these submissions, it is first necessary to decide whether the respondents Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 entered the premises as sub-tenants prior to coming into operator of the Act. The Act LVII of 1947 came into force on January 19, 1948. Prior to this Act, Bombay Act, No. VII of 1944 was in force in the city of Bombay. The Act of 1944 did not prohibit the sub-letting but, on the other hand, by section 10 of that Act sub-letting was permitted. Section 10 of that Act provided that a tenant may sub-let any portion of his premises to a sub-tenant provided he forthwith intimates in writing to his landlords the fact of his having so sub-let and also the rent at which it is sub-let. A plain reading of this section makes it clear that there was no prohibition for sub-letting of the premises . The present Act prohibits the tenant from Sub-letting the premises or any part thereof and the sub-letting has been made a ground for eviction of the tenant. That is a crucial difference between the Act of 1944 and the present Act. The petitioners have filed the suit after coming into operation of the Act of 1947 and the petitioners would be entitled to a decree for eviction against the head tenant i.e. respondents Nos. That is a crucial difference between the Act of 1944 and the present Act. The petitioners have filed the suit after coming into operation of the Act of 1947 and the petitioners would be entitled to a decree for eviction against the head tenant i.e. respondents Nos. 1 and 2 provided it is established that the head tenant has sub-let the premises or part thereof after the coming into operation of the Act. i.e., after January 19, 1948. 9. The Appellate Court has found that the original tenant Mohanlal had entered into an agreement of conducting the business of flour mill with respondent No. 3. Shri Abhyankar disputes the correctness of this finding, but in my judgment, the finding recorded by the Appellate Court is in accordance with the evidence on record. The respondent No. 1 has stated that Mohanlal had permitted respondent No. 3 to conduct the flour mill business which he was doing earlier. The respondent No. 1 further stated that after the demise of her father, she is in the business of flour mill and respondent No. 3 is conducting on her behalf. The original tenant Mohanlal died in April 1966. The respondent No. 1 has produced two agreements dated November 10, 1948 and October 1, 1966 (Exs. 5 and 6) on record. These are the agreements of leave and licence and these agreement permit respondent No. 3 to conduct the business on behalf of Mohanlal and after his demise on behalf of respondent No. 1. An attempt was made to suggest that the two agreement of leave and licence are executed by way of camouflage to suppress the real transaction. The lower Appellate Court has given sound reasonal for repelling this argument and I find no infirmity in the reasoning. The finding of the lower Appellate Court that respondent No. 3 was not inducted as a sub-tenant must be upheld. 10. The petitioners claim that respondent No. 4 was inducted in the premises as a sub-tenant by Mohanlal in the year 1960, while on the other hand, the respondent claim that respondent No. 4 became a sub-tenant in the year 1942. The lower Appellate Court has relied upon the evidence of respondent 4, Govind Ramchandra Samant, who stated that he entered the premises in the year 1942. The lower Appellate Court has relied upon the evidence of respondent 4, Govind Ramchandra Samant, who stated that he entered the premises in the year 1942. The Appellate Court also relied upon the cross-examination of petitioner No. 2 who stated that he could not deny that respondent No. 4 was in occupation of the suit premises since the year 1941. The lower Appellate Court also relied upon Ex. 11 which are the two receipts and Ex. 13 which are the assessment orders of the Income Tax Department to hold that there is a documentary evidence to established that respondent No. 4 was in possession, at least, from the year 1948. The Appellate Bench has accepted the oral testimony of respondent No. 4 became sub-tenant in the year 1942. I do not find any infirmity in the reasoning of the lower Appellate Court and the finding recorded, being a pure finding of fact, cannot be disturbed in exercise of the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 11. Shri Abhyankar then submitted that even assuming that respondent No. 4 was inducted in the year 1942, there is no evidence whatsover to establish that respondents Nos. 5 and 6 were inducted as further subtenants of respondent No. 4 prior to the coming into operation of the present act. The submission of the learned Counsel is without any merit. The respondent No. 4 has stepped into the witness-box and has stated on oath that he sub-let the premises to respondents Nos. 5 and 6 on July 29, 1946 at the rent of Rs. 50/- per month. The respondent No. 4 has also produced his account books, but there is hardly any cross-examination of respondent No. 4 on behalf of the petitioners. The petitioners could have very easily pointed out that there is no entry of receipt of amount of Rs. 50/- in July 1946 in the account books of respondent No. 4 but in absence of cross-examination, it will have to be presumed that there must be such an entry apart from this evidence of respondent No. 4, on behalf of respondent No. 5, Baldeo Ambalal has stated that the creation of sub-lease was in the years 1946. The lower Appellate Court has relied upon this evidence and I find no reason to take a contrary view. The lower Appellate Court has relied upon this evidence and I find no reason to take a contrary view. Though, I have heard Shri Abyankar at great length on this point, it must be remembered that in exercises of extra-ordinary jurisdiction, the findings of facts cannot be disturbed unless they are perverse. After perusing the judgment of the Appellate Court, I have no hesitation whatsover in holding that the finding is not only not perverse but is absolutely correct and is in accordance with the evidence on record. 12. As the finding of the Appellate Court that the respondent No. 3 was not inducted as sub-tenant and respondents Nos. 4 to 6 came into possession prior to the coming into operation of the Act of 1947 is upheld, the ground floor eviction of the head tenant i.e. respondent Nos. 1 and 2 under section 13(1)(e) of the Act must fail. The tendency of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 can be terminated and possession can be recovered provided the tenant has unlawfully sub-let the premises, since the coming into operation of the Act. As the respondents Nos. 1 and 2, or their predecessor Mohanlal, had not sub-let the premises after the coming into operation of the act, the ground under section 13(1)(e) of the Act must fail. The sub-letting in favour of respondent No. 4 and further sub-letting by respondent No. 4 in favour of respondents Nos. 5 and 6 was prior to January 19, 1948 and was permitted by the provisions of section 10 of the Act of 1944. Shri Abhyankar attempted to urge that the respondents Nos. 5 and 6 would have no rights in the leased premises as it was not open for a sub-tenant to create further sub-lease. It is not necessary for me to enter into that question because the rights or the interests of respondents Nos. 5 and 6 would require determination only in case the interest of the head tenant is determined for any reason. The interest of the head tenant i.e. respondents Nos. 1 and 2 could not be determined because the ground under section 13(1)(e) of the Act has failed and the question would require consideration provided the interest of the tenant is determined for any grounds provided under section 12 or section 13 of the Act. The interest of the head tenant i.e. respondents Nos. 1 and 2 could not be determined because the ground under section 13(1)(e) of the Act has failed and the question would require consideration provided the interest of the tenant is determined for any grounds provided under section 12 or section 13 of the Act. It is now well-settled that what is contemplated by determination of an interest under section 14 Act is not merely the termination of contractual tenancy but the extinguishment of the interest by passing of the decree. 13. Shri Abhyankar then submitted that the petitioners are entitled to recover possession from the head tenant i.e. respondents Nos. 1 and 2 on the ground that the premises were reasonably and bona fide required for occupation. The trial Court held that the petitioners have established their requirement and further held that greater hardship would be caused to the petitioners by refusal of the decree than by passing the decree against the respondents. In appeal the Appellate Bench very carefully considered the question in paragraph 63 onward of the judgment and recorded a finding that the petitioners need is not genuine or resonable or bona fide. The Appellate Court noticed that the bona fide requirement was based on two counts (1) that ground floor is required for godown as their business is increasing and (2) that the first floor is required for housing their employees. The petitioners examined Firoz Kachwala, the petitioner No. 2 in support of the claim. The witness did not give any details in examination-in-chief as to how many employees are to be provided with accommodation and how many employees are working with them. In cross-examination, the witness stated that the petitioners are interested in two concern : (1) M.A. Kachwala Co. and (2) Safe Glass Corporation Pvt. Ltd. The Safe Glass Corporation Pvt. Limited had factory at Worli and the built-up area is 2,000 sq. feet, besides the building which is in possession of the tenants. Firoz Kachwala, in his deposition, merely stated that their business is expanding and gave the figures of turn-over. The petitioners also examined their Clerk Anilkumar Jethalal Bhatt, who admitted that Kachwala Company had a godown in their possession in the years 1963 and 1964. feet, besides the building which is in possession of the tenants. Firoz Kachwala, in his deposition, merely stated that their business is expanding and gave the figures of turn-over. The petitioners also examined their Clerk Anilkumar Jethalal Bhatt, who admitted that Kachwala Company had a godown in their possession in the years 1963 and 1964. The witness further stated that the petitioners were tenants and they have lost the possession but he does not know the reason why the possession was lost. It is obvious, as found by the Appellate Court, that the petitioners are deliberately suppressing the relevant material from the Court and avoiding to state what are the premises in their occupation and what was their requirement. The lower Appellate Court also found that the petitioners had secured two more godowns during the pendency of the suit. The Appellate Court recorded the finding, after careful consideration of the evidence, that petitioner have failed to lead any evidence establish that possession is required for housing their employees. The Safe Glass Corporation Pvt. Limited is a private company and the petitioners did not lead any evidence to show that they are in the managements of the company or bound to provides accommodation to its employees. The evidence on record indicates that 13 person are employed by M/s. Kachwala Company, out of which 9 are labourers and 6 of them are staying on the first floor in the building adjacent to the suit premises. The evidence further established that he labourers are engaged on salary basis, so also on daily basis. It is difficult to appreciate whether the petitioners are really serious to provide housing for the labourers employed on daily basis. The Appellate Court also recorded a finding that the premises is dispute are not convenient for being used for residential purposes because there are no sanitary arrangements or water connection to the building. The petitioners led evidence of Architect Kotasthane to suggest that they can makes these arrangements but it was obvious that such arrangements could not be made unless a large amount is spent. On the strength of this vague and unsatisfactory evidence, the petitioner could never succeed in establishing the bona fide requirement. The finding recorded by the lower Appellate Court and the reasons thereof are in accordance with the evidence on record and it is not possible to find any fault with it. 14. On the strength of this vague and unsatisfactory evidence, the petitioner could never succeed in establishing the bona fide requirement. The finding recorded by the lower Appellate Court and the reasons thereof are in accordance with the evidence on record and it is not possible to find any fault with it. 14. The question of hardship would not arise in view of the finding that the petitioners failed to establish their requirement of the suit premises. Shri Abhyankar submitted that even assuming that there may be hardship to respondents Nos. 1 to 3 by their eviction, the question of hardship should not be considered against respondents Nos. 5 and 6 because they were inducted unlawfully. I find no merit whatsoever in this submission. The respondents Nos. 5 and 6 were inducted in July 1946, i.e. long prior to the coming into operation of the Act. As the interest of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in the tenanted premises is not determined, the possession of respondents Nos. 5 and 6 cannot be termed as unlawful. The finding of the lower Appellate Court that greater hardship would be caused to the respondents by passing the decree for eviction than refusing the decree to the petitioners is just and proper in the circumstances of the case and requires no interference. As the petitioners have failed to establish either of the grounds under section 13(1)(e) or section 13(1)(g) of the Act, the petition must fail and the judgment of the Appellate Bench must be upheld. 15. Accordingly, the rule is discharged, but in the circumstances of the case, there will be no orders as to costs. Petition failed. -----