A. M. AHMADI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner a Co-operative Society registered under the Gujarat Co-operative Society Act 1961 (hereinafter called the 1961 Act) made an application under the newly inserted sub-section (2) of section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure for leave of the Court to institute a suit against the State of Gujarat for a declaration that the order passed by the Additional Registrar of Co-operative Societies dated 16/08/1980 in Revision Application No. 177 of 1980 was unconstitutional and void and therefore unenforceable at law and for certain other incidental reli- efs. The learned Judge in the City Civil Court Ahmedabad rejected the application holding that the impugned order was intra vires sec. 155 of the 1961 Act and was therefore prima facie legal and valid and the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain such a suit having regard to the provisions contained in sec. 166 of the said Act. It is this other passed by the learned Judge in the City Civil Court which is challenged in this Revision Application. ( 2 ) SUB-SEC. (2) of sec. 80 which came to be inserted for the first time by the Amending Act 1976 reads as under :a suit to obtain an urgent or immediate relief against the Government (including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir) or any public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity may be instituted with the leave of the Court without serving any notice as required by sub-sec. (1) but the Court shall not grant relief in the suit whether interim or otherwise except after giving to the Government or public officer. as the case may be a reasonable opportunity of showing cause in respect of the relief prayed for in the suit:provided that the Court shall if it is satisfied after hearing the parties that no urgent or immediate relief need be granted in the suit return the plaint for presen- tation to it after complying with the requirements of sub-sec. (1)SUB-SECTION (1) of sec. (1)SUB-SECTION (1) of sec. 80 provides that no suit shall be instituted against the Government or against a public officer in respect of any act purpo- ting to be done by such officer in his official capacity until the expira- tion of two months next after notice in writing is served in the manner provided thereunder. The purpose of this requirement is to give the Gove- rnment or the public officer an opportunity to settle avoidable litigation at the threshold. This requirement very often created difficulty in the way of a party whose civil rights were threatened by some act done by a public officer in his official capacity when the concerned public officer refused to maintain the status-quo during the notice period. It was thou- ght only fair that the Government acting through its public officers is not allowed to defeat the just rights of a party which are threatened by some act of its public officer by insisting on compliance of the technical requi- rements of sec. 80 and at the same time refusing to stay its hands to enable the party to comply with the said requirements. Therefore in order that a litigant who is required to obtain an urgent or immediate relief against the Government or any public officer in respect of any act pur- porting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity is not deprived of his legal remedy sub-section (2) of Sec. 80 was inserted to enable the litigant to move the Court without satisfying the requirements of sub-section (1) thereof. At the stage when the Court is called upon to grant leave for instituting a suit against the Government or any public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity all that the Court has to consider is whether the requirements of sub-section (2) of sec. 80 are satisfied. If the Court finds on a perusal of the plaint of the suit proposed to be lodged against the State Government or any public officer that the plaintiff is in need- of an urgent or immediate relief against the State Government or its public officer whose act is under challenge the Court may grant leave to such a litigant to sue without serving any notice as required by sub- sec. (11) of sec 80 of the Code. (11) of sec 80 of the Code. The requirements to be satisfied ares that the proposed suit is against the Government or any public officer (ii) that it challenges any act purporting to be done by such public offi- cer in his official capacity and (iii) that the matter is so urgent that the plaintiff cannot be expected to wait for a period of two months after the service of the notice under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 80. The test is therefore one of urgency of the matter and if the Court is satisfied that the matter is so urgent that it cannot brook delay the Court must grant leave to the litigant under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 80 of the Code to institute 8 suit for- thwith. It is of utmost importance to see that the legal rights of a party are not sacrificed at the altar of technicalities. Once the requirements of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 80 are satisfied the Court must ordinarily grant leave to the party to institute a suit without requiring it to comply with the provisions of sub-sec. (1) thereof. There is nothing in sub-sec. (2) of sec. 80 to suggest that at the stage of granting leave to institute a suit without service of notice as required by sub-sec. (1) the Court is required to con- sider whether the suit is prima facie maintainable or that the Court has jurisdiction to entertain such a suit. These are matters which the Court may consider while granting relief to the litigants interim or otherwise after the plaintiff has been permitted to file a suit having regard to the urgency of the matter If the Court is of the opinion that no urgent or immediate relief is necessary it may return the plaint for presentation to it after complying with the requirements of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 80. If the Court pronounces upon the merits of the impugned order or on the question of jurisdiction as in the instant case there would be no point in returning the plaint for presentation to it after complying with the requirements of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 80. It is therefore obvious that at the stage of granting lea- ve under sub-sec. (2) of sec. (1) of sec. 80. It is therefore obvious that at the stage of granting lea- ve under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 85 the Court has merely to consider whether the requirements of that sub-section are complied with and if the Court is of opinion that they have been duly complied with the Court should grant leave to that plaintiff to institute the suit without serving any notice as required the sub-sec. (1) of sec. 80. The Court can certainly consider the merits or demerits of the plaintiffs case when it is called upon to grant relief whether interim or otherwise after the institution of the suit. I am therefore of the opinion that in the instant case the learned trial Judge committed an error in refusing to grant leave under sub-sec. (2) of sec 80 of the Code by coming to the conclusion that the impugned order is prima facie legal and valid and intra vires sec. 155 of the 1961 Act and that the Civil Court he no jurisdiction to entertain try and dispose of such a suit having regard to the provisions of sec. 166 of the said Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 3 ) IN the result this Revision Application succeeds and the order passed by the learned Chamber Judge is set aside and the matter will ga back to the trial Court for passing appropriate orders under sub-sec. (2 1 of sec. 80 of the Code The rule is made absolute accordingly. .