JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is a petition filed by the petitioner, who was employed as Upper Division Clerk in the Cost Accounts Section of, the Accounts department of the Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited, Bhopal-respondent No. 3. ( 2. ) ON 27th April, 1965, an order was issued transferring the petitioner from Accounts Department, Bhopal to the Liaison and Purchase Officer at bombay. The petitioner protested against the aforesaid transfer, and ultimately by order dated 23-8-65 his services were terminated on the ground that he remained absent for more than 30 days. In substance, treating the petitioner to have abandoned his service, this order was passed under standing Orders. ( 3. ) BEFORE these orders of termination were passed, the petitioner had filed an application before the Labour Court, Bhopal under section 31 (3) of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act challenging the order of transfer. But later, when his services were terminated, this application was amended and the order of termination was also challenged. In this application submitted by the petitioner, the Labour Court by its order dated 11-9-68 held that the termination was legal and proper and the same was maintained by the Industrial Court holding that it was an order under Standing Order No. 42 (10 ). A revision petition was also filed by the petitioner which was also dismissed in motion hearing by order dated 31-3-1971. ( 4. ) IN October, 1974, the petitioner submitted a fresh application under section 31 (3) to the Labour Court alleging that the others, whose services were terminated under similar circumstances, have been re-employed and he therefore, sought a relief of re-employment although it appears that the petitioner in this application again narrated the whole story. In the written statement filed by respondent No. 3, a preliminary objection was raised that matter pertaining to the termination of his service having been decided finally, this application cannot be entertained. The learned Labour Court framed a preliminary issue which was decided on 14-2-1977 and the application of the petitioner was thrown out. The Labour Court held that as the matter has already been decided, this application cannot be entertained as it was barred by the principles of res judicata. The learned Labour Court framed a preliminary issue which was decided on 14-2-1977 and the application of the petitioner was thrown out. The Labour Court held that as the matter has already been decided, this application cannot be entertained as it was barred by the principles of res judicata. The petitioner against this, preferred a revision before the Industrial Court on 9th March, 1977 contending that the cause of action in the present application was different from the cause of action in the earlier case and it was also contended before the Industrial Court that this application is based on section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act which gives right to the petitioner to be considered for re-employment but the revision-petition was also dismissed by order dated 25th August, 1977. Consequently, the present petition has been filed. ( 5. ) ACCORDING to the learned counsel, the Industrial Court in the impugned order held that the present application filed by the petitioner is barred by constructive res-judicata as according to him, the prayer should have been made along with his earlier application wherein he had challenged the order of termination. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the two causes of action are absolutely different. According to the learned counsel, as stated in the application, the cause of action for the present application arose when some others, whose services were terminated earlier, were re-employed and therefore, the petitioner submitted the present application under section 31 (3) praying that under Schedule II Item 6, he also could make prayer for being considered for re-employment on the same ground on which others have been re employed. It was contended by the learned counsel that this relief could not have been asked for in the earlier petition wherein the petitioner challenged the order of termination itself which fell under Item I of schedule II and the cause of action for the present application arose only when respondent No 3 considered the case of some of the persons whose services were terminated earlier and gave them re-employment that the petitioner also got a cause of action to approach the Labour Court for the relief. It was contended by the learned counsel that section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes act has been referred to indicate that under section 25-H of the Iudustrial disputes Act, it has been provided that those who are retrenched from service shall always get preference whenever occasion arises for re-employment to those who were strangers or new comers. According to the learned counsel, in view of the desision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, all cases of termination may fall within the ambit of retrenchment. However, he contended that it may depend on the facts of each case as to whether the termination in a particular case may or may not fall within the ambit of retrenchment. But the learned Tribunals, by throwing out the application on a preliminary objection have not even examined as to whether the petitioner is entitled to be considered for re-employment on the basis of allegations made by him in his application. The learned counsel frankly conceded that although some aver-ments have been made indicating that challenge was thrown to the action taken against the petitioner but that matter having been decided once for all could have been omitted from consideration. The prayer was that as respondent No. 3 has considered the cases of some of the employees mentioned in the application, whose services were terminated earlier and have now been reemployed on being satisfied above their explanations, the petitioners case could also be considered on merits. It was also contended by the learned counsel that the principles of constructive res judicata strictly cannot be applied to the industrial dispute. But he contended that even if they are applied, it will not be applicable in this case as the cause of action for re-employment is altogether different than the question of challenging the order of termination. According to the petitioner, there is nothing to indicate that this cause of action was available to the petitioner when he made his earlier application as the Tribunals have not even enquired into the facts alleged in the application. He, therefore, contended that there was no material on the basis of which the principles of constructive res judicata could be made applicable. He, therefore, contended that the Labour Court as well as the industrial Court have refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by Law, in throwing out the application on that preliminary objection. ( 6. He, therefore, contended that there was no material on the basis of which the principles of constructive res judicata could be made applicable. He, therefore, contended that the Labour Court as well as the industrial Court have refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by Law, in throwing out the application on that preliminary objection. ( 6. ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent contended that the application made by the petitioner before the Labour Court clearly goes to show that he was challenging the order of termination and the ground on which order of termination was passed. He also contended that even when originally he submitted the application challenging the order of termination, in the alternative he could have sought the relief of re-employment as he is now seeking and as this relief was not sought by him although which was available to him when he made his earlier application, the principles of res judicata will be applicable and the Tribunals were right in throwing out the application on the preliminary ground. The learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court reported in State of U. P. v. Nawab hussain ( (1977) 2 SCC 806 ) wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court have accepted that even in industrial dispute, the principles of constructive res judicata will be applicable. ( 7. ) IT was also contended by the learned counsel that an application under section 31 (3) could only be made by an employee as defined in subclause (D) of section 2 of the M. P. Industrial Relations Act and in view of that application, an employee, who is out of employment, could only be deemed to be an employee in view of the explanation enacted to the definition in respect of the order terminating his service and as the present petition, as submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, does not challenge the order of termination, the petitioner could not be treated as an employee as defined in sub-clause (13) of section 2 and therefore, he has no locus standi to file the present petition. It was also contended by the learned counsel that Schedule 2 Item 6 no doubt talks of recruitment or reinstatement of an unemployed person but, according to the learned counsel, this could not be read in isolation as item 1 deals with the legality of an order under the Standing Orders and the consequence of examination of legality may result in reinstatement of a person thrown out of employment. He, therefore, contended that the present application could not have been entertained. It was also contended by the learned counsel that the manner in which the learned counsel for the petitioner has made submission in this Court was not a case before the Tribunals (Labour Court and Industrial Court ). According to the learned counsel, before the Labour Court, the real question agitated was the legality of the order of termination. He, therefore, contended that if the matter was placed before the Tribunals in the manner in which it was hit by the principles of res judicata or constructive res judicata, now those orders could not be set aside in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on altogether new grounds which were not placed before the Tribunals. ( 8. ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner contended that a reading of the application made by the petitioner clearly discloses that although a part of the application is devoted to the petitioners own story but the cause of action apparently is stated to be when some other persons, whose services were terminated, were re-employed after their explanations were accepted and it is very clear from this application that what the petitioner prayed for in the present application was that his case should also be considered on the same principle and this, according to the learned counsel, could be contended by the petitioner under Item 6 of Schedule II and, therefore, all applications should be made under section 31 (3) of the M. P. Industrial Relations Act. As regards the objection about the definition of the term employee as provided for in sub-clause (13) of section 2 of the M. P. Industrial Relations Act, the learned counsel contended that the definition of the term "workman" under the Industrial Disputes Act (sub-clause (2) of section 2) is practically identical and he contended that this definition was interpreted by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in a decision reported in National Buildings Construction corporation Ltd. v. Pritamsingh Gill ( AIR 1972 SC 1579 ) wherein their Lordships were considering the definition in the context of section 33c of the Industrial Disputes Act and their Lordships clearly held that the definition is widely worded and it has to be construed in such a manner which would advance the purpose of legislation and that from this point of view, according to the learned counsel, the petitioner, who was an employee once and whose service has been terminated when seeks the relief of consideration for re-employment, he seeks on the basis of the fact that he was an employee once in an industry whose services have been terminated and if, in this context, the language of the definition of the term employee in sub-clause (13) of section 2 is read, the petitioner would clearly fall within the ambit of this definition and his application could not be thrown out. ( 9. ) THE application, which was submitted before the Labour Court, no doubt in the first few paragraphs has narrated the whole story and it appears that in these paragraphs the petitioner made a grievance about the manner in which his services were terminated but in paragraph 7 of his application, he clearly stated that respondent No. 3 being satisfied on the explanations given by some of the persons, who were in employment earlier and whose services were terminated, has re-employed them, and he has named those persons in this paragraph of his application. He also stated that the orders of re-employment have been issued on 7-8-1967 and on this basis he prayed that having learnt about this re-employment of some of these persons, he made an approach to respondent No. 3 on 31-7-1974. He also stated that the orders of re-employment have been issued on 7-8-1967 and on this basis he prayed that having learnt about this re-employment of some of these persons, he made an approach to respondent No. 3 on 31-7-1974. But as the petitioner was not offered re-employment or considered for that, he submitted the present application before the Labour Court even before the order of termination was passed, because initially he challenged the order of transfer itself and after the order of termination was passed on 23-8-1965, he amended his application and challenged the order of termination as well. It is therefore, clear that when his initial application was submitted, the question of re-employment was not there. At that time, what he challenged was the order of transfer and the order of termination of service. It is also very clear that an employee, whose termination is in dispute, could not think of re-employment or recruitment unless the termination order is finally held to be legal and valid. It is, therefore, clear that at the time when the petitioner submitted his initial application challenging the order of transfer and the order of termination, there was no cause of action for recruitment or re-employment as apparently, which is clear from the present application, it arose for the first time in 1967 when some other persons named in the application were re-employed and, therefore, it could not be contended that the petitioner in his initial application was bound to seek the relief of recruitment or re-employment when he was only challenging the legality of the order of termination. The decision on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondents i. e. (1977) 2 S. C. C. 806 has approved the decision in Devilal Modis case wherein it was laid down : "this rule postulates that if a plea could have been taken by a party in proceeding between him and his opponent, he would not be permitted to take that plea against the same party in a subsequent proceeding which is based on the same cause of action; but basically, even this view is founded cm the same considerations of public policy, because if the doctrine of constructive res judicata is not applied to writ proceedings, it would be open to the party to take one proceeding after another and urge new grounds every time; and that plainly is inconsistent with considerations of public policy to which we have just referred. " It is, therefore, clear that if the plea could have been taken by the petitioner when he filed the initial petition for the relief, which he seeks now, the principles of constructive res judicata will be attracted. But as it is clear that this plea was not available to the petitioner at that time, the question of application of this principle does not arise. ( 10. ) IT is not in dispute that under section 31 (3), the petitioner could approach the Labour Court for a change in the industrial matters enumerated in Schedule II. Schedule II of the M. P. Industrial Relations Act reads: schedule II (Section 31) 1. The propriety or legality of an order passed or action taken by an employer acting or purporting to act under the standing orders. 2. Adequacy and quality of materials and equipment supplied to the employees. 3. Health, safety and welfare of employees (including water, dining sheds, rest sheds, latrines, urinals, creches, restaurants and such other amenities ). 4. Matters relating to trade union organisation membership and levies. 5. Construction and interpretation of awards, agreements and settlements. 6. Employment including- (i) reinstatement and recruitment; (ii) unemployment of persons previously employed in the industry concerned. 7. Payment of compensation for closure, lay-off and retrenchment. 8. Assignment of work and transfer of employees within the undertaking. 4. Matters relating to trade union organisation membership and levies. 5. Construction and interpretation of awards, agreements and settlements. 6. Employment including- (i) reinstatement and recruitment; (ii) unemployment of persons previously employed in the industry concerned. 7. Payment of compensation for closure, lay-off and retrenchment. 8. Assignment of work and transfer of employees within the undertaking. Item I of this Schedule provides for the matters about the legality of an order passed under the Standing Orders or purporting to pass under the Standing orders; whereas, item 6 talks of reinstatement and recruitment. Subclause (2) of this item refers to unemployment of persons previously employed in the industry concerned. This item 6 therefore, refers to recruitment and unemployment of persons previously employed. It could not be disputed that what the petitioner is seeking at present in the impugned petition is recruitment on the basis of his previous employment and therefore, it could not be contended that this would not be covered under item 6 of the Schedule. It is, therefore, clear that if the application would not have been thrown out, as it was on the question of res judicata, the petitioner was entitled to get the matter inquired into by the Labour Court with regard to his prayer in the light of item 6 of Schedule II of the M. P. Industrial Relations Act. ( 11. ) IT was contended by the learned counsel that the petitioner, who is no longer in employment, will not fall within the ambit of the term employee as provided for in sub-clause (13) of section 2 of the M. P. Industrial Relations act. This section 2, the definition provision, starts with "in this Act unless the context otherwise requires" and then sub-clause (13) is enacted and this sub-clause has further been explained by explanation of the language and the explanation is in controversy. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, the petitioners case would not fall within the ambit of this explanation; whereas, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, it will be covered by this explanation. The Explanation reads : "an employee who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched from employment or whose employment has been otherwise terminated shall, in respect of matters relating to such dismissal, discharge, retrenchment or termination, be deemed to be an employee for the purposes of this Act. The Explanation reads : "an employee who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched from employment or whose employment has been otherwise terminated shall, in respect of matters relating to such dismissal, discharge, retrenchment or termination, be deemed to be an employee for the purposes of this Act. " The language of this section indicates that an employee, who has been discharged, will be covered by the definition of employee, if the proceedings are in respect of the matters relating to such discharge. The words used are very significant. It is not that he will be an employee when the discharge is in question but the language used is "in respect of matters relating to such discharge" and it is clear that the relief of recruitment or re-employment, which the petitioner is seeking, is on the basis of his termination earlier and, therefore, there is hardly any doubt that this matter is relating to the termination and, therefore, this would squarely fall within the ambit of this definition. ( 12. ) LEARNED counsel for the respondents wanted to contend that this will only include the cases where the termination itself is in challenge but once that is held to be valid, the petitioner could not fall within the ambit of the definition of the term employee as provided for in sub-clause (13) of section 2. It is now clear that while interpreting these statutes, the purposes of statutes will have to be kept in mind and it is only that interpretation, which would advance the purpose of the scheme of the statutes, will be adopted and not the one which would defeat the purpose. It is now clear that while interpreting these statutes, the purposes of statutes will have to be kept in mind and it is only that interpretation, which would advance the purpose of the scheme of the statutes, will be adopted and not the one which would defeat the purpose. The words must be understood in the light of the scheme of the law and it is how their Lordships of the supreme Court have interpreted the term workman which occurs in section 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act: " "workman" means any person (including an apprentice) , employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be expressed or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person- (i) who is subject to the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Air force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950) or the Navy (Discipline) Act, 1934 (34 of 1934); or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding five hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature. "the language used is "in this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context" and the definition has been provided for as stated above and their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed : "now, it is noteworthy that section 2 of the Act, which is the definition section begins as is usual with most of the definition sections, with the clause "unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context". This clearly indicates that it is always a matter for argument whether or not this statutory definition is to apply to the word "workman" as used in the particular clause of the Act which is under consideration, for this word may both be restricted or expanded by its subject matter. The context and the subject matter in connection with which the word "workman" is used are accordingly important factors having a bearing on the question. The propriety or necessity of thus construing the word "workman" is obvious because all parts of the Act have to be in harmony with the statutory intent. Keeping this in mind we may turn to the purpose and object of section 33-C of the Act. This section was enacted for the purpose of enabling individual workmen to implement, enforce or execute their existing individual rights against their employers without being compelled to have recourse to section 10 by raising disputes and securing a reference which is obviously lengthy process. Section 33-C of the Act has accordingly been described as a provision which clothes the Labour Court with the powers similar to those of an executing Court so that the workman concerned receives speedy relief in respect of his existing individual rights. The primary purpose of the section being to provide the aggrieved workman with a forum similar to the executing Courts it calls for a broad and beneficial construction consistently with other provisions of the Act, which should serve to advance the remedy and to suppress the mischief. It may appropriately be pointed out that the mischief which section 33-C was designed to suppress was the difficulties faced by individual workmen in getting relief in respect of their existing rights without having resort to section 10 of the Act. To accept the argument of the appellant, it would always be open to an unfair, unsympathetic and unscrupulous employer to terminate the services of his employee in order to deprive him of the benefit conferred by section 33-C and compel him to have resort to the lengthy procedure by way of reference under section 10 of the Act thereby defeat ing the very purpose and object of enacting this provision. This, in our view, quite clearly brings out the repugnancy visualised in the opening part of section 2 of the Act and such a position could hardly have been contemplated by the Legislature In order to remove this repugnancy section 33-C (2) must be so construed as to take within its fold a workman, who was employed during the period in respect of which he claims relief, even though he is no longer employed at the time of the application. In other words the term "workman" as used in section 33-C (2) includes all persons whose claim, requiring computation under this sub- section, is in respect of an existing right arising from his relationship as an industrial workman with his employer. By adopting this construction alone can we advance the remedy and suppress the mischief in accordance with the purpose and object of inserting section 33-C in the Act. We, are, therefore, inclined to agree with the view taken by the Madras decisions and we approve of their approach. According to Shri Malhotra, in cases where there is no dispute about the employees right which is not denied, he will be entitled to file a suit. Whether or not the right of suit can be claimed by the employee, we are not persuaded on the basis of this argument to accept the construction canvassed on behalf of the appellant and deny to a dismissed employee the benefit of speedy remedy under section 33-C (2)of the Act. " It is, therefore, clear that the petitioner will be covered under the definition of the term employee as provided for in sub-section (13) of section (2) of the m. P. Industrial Relations Act. ( 13. ) THE Labour Court as well as the Industrial Court did not examine the application of the petitioner on merits but threw it only on the ground that it is hit by res judicata or constructive res judicata. As discussed earlier, the principles of constructive res judicata will not be applicable to the case of the petitioner and, therefore, the application filed by the petitioner could not be thrown out on that preliminary ground alone. It is, therefore, clear that the Labour Court as well as the Industrial Court refused Jo exercise jurisdiction vested in them by law. ( 14. ) THE petition is, therefore, allowed. It is, therefore, clear that the Labour Court as well as the Industrial Court refused Jo exercise jurisdiction vested in them by law. ( 14. ) THE petition is, therefore, allowed. The orders passed by the labour Court as well as by the Industrial Court are quashed and the petition submitted by the petitioner is sent back to the Labour Court for its disposal in accordance with law. The petitioner shall be entitled to the costs of this petition. Counsels fee Rs. 200 if certified. The amount of security deposited by the petitioner shall be refunded to him. Petition allowed.