Judgment Hari Lal Agrawal, J. 1. This application arises out of a proceeding initiated by one Ramchandra Sah (respondent No. 3) against the petitioner under Sec.20 of the Minimum Wages Act claiming certain amount of money on account of wrongful deduction from the rate of wages applicable to his case. Details of the claim is not necessary to be stated for the point which is being raised before me on behalf of the petitioner. 2. An application was filed by the Labour Inspector of the Minimum Wages Act on behalf of the employee (respondent No. 3) before the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Purnea, who admittedly is an authority appointed under Sub-section (1) of Sec.20 of the Minimum Wages Act to decide the question in issue. This proceeding was pending before the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms when the Governor of Bihar issued a notification dated 4th October, 1977 in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1) of Sec.20 of the Act, thereby appointing every circle officer in the State of 8Bihar to be an authority to hear and decide all claims arising out of payment of less than minimum rates of wages etc., a copy of the said notification has been filed as Annexure 10 to the supplementary affidavit of the petitioner. On issuance of this notification the Deputy Collector Land Reforms by his order dated 8-2-1978 contained in Annexure 7 transferred the case in question to the file of the Anchal Adhikari, Bhawanipur Anchal (respondent No. 1) for disposal. The Anchal Adhikari on receipt of the record, by his order dated 19-6-1978 (Annexure 5) disposed of the proceeding directing the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 185/- to respondent No. 3 within a week therefrom. The petitioner has accordingly come to this Court. 3. Mr. S.C. Mukerjee appearing for the petitioner has advanced an argument that the order of transfer of the case by the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms by his order dated 8-2-1978 to respondent No. 1 was itself without jurisdiction, in as much as no power to transfer of any pending case was conferred upon the Deputy Collector and accordingly in the absence of such a specific power the order of transfer by the Deputy Collector was without jurisdiction. The Anchal Adhikari who therefore received the case in pursuance of such an invalid order, was not competent to dispose of the file. The Anchal Adhikari who therefore received the case in pursuance of such an invalid order, was not competent to dispose of the file. In support of this contetion he placed reliance upon the case of Kamdeo Yadav V/s. Chamak Lal Yadav C.W.J.C. No. 5191 and 5192 of 1978., decided on 29th August, 1979 where a learned single judge of this Court accepted such an argument and directed the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms to himself to try the case. I do not find much discussion in the order of the learned single judge and would refer to an earlier bench decision of this Court in the case of Ram Janam Gorari V/s. Narbadeshwar Singh and Ors. -- . That was a case under the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 and arose out of a proceeding under Sec.16(3) of the Act. The case was filed before the Sub-divisional Officer and in the meantime by a notification dated 27th May, 1967 a concurrent territorial jurisdiction was created in the land reform Deputy Collector. The Sub-divisional officer in view of the said notification transferred the application from his file to the file of the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms in circumstances similar to the present case before the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms no objection was taken regarding the validity of the order of transfer by the Sub-divisional officer and the parties proceeded on merits of the case. Objection was, however, taken for the first time in this Court in the writ jurisdiction and it was held that the power of transfer of case was conferred only upon the collector of the district under the provision of Sec.31(2) of the Ceiling Act and therefore the Sub-divisional Officer had no authority to make a transfer. It appears that the State Government has subsequently issued an ordinance being Bihar Ordinance No. 1 of 1979 whereby two Sections, 27 (A) and 27 (B) have been inserted in the main Act by Section 8 of the ordinance. Sec.27 (B) empowers "Any subordinate authority if so authorised by the State Government by an order in writing in this behalf" to withdraw or recall any case pending at any time before any authority appointed under Sub-section (1) of Sec.20 of the Act and transfer the same to another appointed authority for disposal in the prescribed manner. Sec.27 (B) empowers "Any subordinate authority if so authorised by the State Government by an order in writing in this behalf" to withdraw or recall any case pending at any time before any authority appointed under Sub-section (1) of Sec.20 of the Act and transfer the same to another appointed authority for disposal in the prescribed manner. The insertion of this provision, therefore, makes it evident that the power of transfer has to be conferred upon an authority. This provision further indicates that the Deputy Collector make an effective order of transfer, should be authorised by the State Government by an order in writing in this behalf by issuing a notification in the official gazette. Apart from the fact that this provision would not apply from a retrospective date and would have no bearing on the question argued before me, as the order of transfer was made before the insertion of the new provision. The Sub-divisional Officer being an authority subordinate to the State Government could derive power to transfer a pending proceeding only after such a power was conferred upon him by notification of the State Government. 4. The power in an authority or a Court to transfer a proceeding or a case pending before it, to another Court of competent jurisdiction is not inherent in it. The power to transfer a proceeding or a suit which may be instituted in more than one Court, or more than one authority, must be specifically conferred by a statute and the authority cannot transfer the proceeding/case to another in the absence of such a power. This restriction on the power of a Court or authority is based upon a rule of prudence and public policy inasmuch as it is general principle of law that a plaintiff as arbiter litis has right to choose his own frorum. This right can be curtailed by making adequate provisions for transfer of a proceeding under certain circumstance from the chosen forum to another. It is for this purpose that the Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure, which are the two main procedural laws regulating the proceedings of the two main branches of litigation in the country, provide adequate machinery for transfer of cases at different stages and level, from one Court to another. It is for this purpose that the Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure, which are the two main procedural laws regulating the proceedings of the two main branches of litigation in the country, provide adequate machinery for transfer of cases at different stages and level, from one Court to another. It is in keeping with this principle that a provision of transfer has been made in other legislations where there is a possibility of the matter being tried by more than one authority. Reference has already been made in this connection to Sec.31(2) of the Ceiling Act, which is an enactment of the State legislature, and the notification in question, namely, Ordinance No. 1 of 79 conferring power of transfer of the proceeding under the Minimum Wages Act. There is a line of cases where it has been held that if a transfer is made by one Court to another, the transferee Court also being competent to decide the case, and if the parties join issues without objection and go to trial upon merits, the order of transfer cannot subsequently be impeached on the ground that it was a mere irregularity which could be waived and the decree was not open to attack by reason thereof. In view of this established principle, I, sitting in a Division Bench, have doubted the corrections of the Bench decision in Ram Janama Geravis case and have referred the matter to a larger bench. However sitting singly, and until the correctness of the said decision is tested by a larger Bench. I, following the principle of judicial amity, feel bound to accept the contention of Mr. Mukherjee that the order of the Anchal Adhikari is vitiated on account of defect of jurisdiction. 5. The application is accordingly allowed and the order of the Anchal Adhikari contained in Annexure 5 is quashed and he is directed to transmit the records of the case, the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms for disposal of the proceedings in accordance with law. However, if in the meantime he is conferred with the powers under the provisions of the Ordinance mentioned above to transfer the proceeding pending before him, then it will be open to him to re-transfer the proceeding for disposal in accordance with law. There will be no order as to cost.