ORDER: In August, 1970 the petitioner was appointed as an Inspector of Agencies, Alipurduar of the New Great Insurance Company of India Ltd. The terms and conditions of the contract of his employment were set out in tile letter dated 11th August, 1970 written by the Divisional Secretary of the said insurance company. The petitioner claims to have been confirmed in the said post with effect from 1st May, 1971. 2. After nationalisation of the General Insurance business, with effect from the "appointed day" (January 1, 1973), the petitioner had become an employee of the insurance company in which his employer, the New Great Insurance Company of India Ltd. had vested under the provisions of he General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act, 1972. Under S. 7 of the said Act the petitioner continued to have the same terms and conditions and the same rights of pension and gratuity until termination of his employment or until his remuneration and other terms and conditions were duly altered. Thereafter, in exercise of its powers under S. 16 of the General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act, 1972, the Central Government had framed a scheme for merger of the company in which the petitioner had been serving with the Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. The petitioner under the said merger scheme became an employee of the transferee company under the same terms and conditions and the same rights as to pension, gratuity and other incidental matters until termination or until his remuneration and terms and conditions were duly altered by the transferee company. 3. The Assistant General Manager, Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company Ltd., Eastern Region Office, Calcutta by his letter dated 31st March, 1976 advised the petitioner, that in view of his unsatisfactory performance, it had been decided by the management to terminate the petitioner's service with immediate effect. The petitioner was further informed that he would be paid one month's salary in lieu of the notice period and he might call at the Divisional Office an any working day to collect his dues (vide Anuexure 'D' to the writ petition). The said termination of the petitioner's service is the subject-matter of challenge in the present Rule. 4. The respondent have raised a preliminary objection that this writ application against the Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. The said termination of the petitioner's service is the subject-matter of challenge in the present Rule. 4. The respondent have raised a preliminary objection that this writ application against the Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd., which was a limited company and not a statutory was not maintainable and, therefore, the writ application should be dismissed in limini. 5. I am not prepared to subscribe to the extreme proposition that a writ application far any other purpose within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable against a company incorporated under the Companies Act irrespective of the questions whether the said company had committed breach of any statutory or public duty imposed upon it and whether there existed any other adequate alternative remedy for enforcement of such duty. It is significant that clause (1) of Article 226 lays dawn that every High Court may issue directions, orders or writs "to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any government". Thus, the Constitution itself has not exhaustively specified the said persons and authorities. The High Court's powers under Article 226(1) cannot be curtailed by making incorporated bodies not amenable to the said jurisdiction even in respect of their statutory or public duties and far breach of which no alternative remedies exist. In considering whether a writ application under Article 226 lies against "person" or an "authority", the correct test would be whether the said writ application is for enforcement of any statutory or public duty by the said person or authority. The said person may be a natural person or a juristic person like a statutory body or an incorporated body. In determining the maintainability of a writ application, the decisive factor is the nature and character of the duty which is sought to be enforced by applying for a writ of Mandamus. 6. Different considerations may arise in case of enforcement of any of the fights conferred by Part-III because the expression "State" has been defined in Article 12 of the Constitution in the context of the Fundamental Rights as under Part III. In this connection, I may refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in Rama Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1961 SC 564 (570), in- respect of the differences in the meaning of the expression "State" in Part-III and IV of the Constitution. . In this connection, I may refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in Rama Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1961 SC 564 (570), in- respect of the differences in the meaning of the expression "State" in Part-III and IV of the Constitution. . See also the observations of D. Basu, J. in Kartick Chandra Nandi v. West Bengal Industries Corporation Ltd. & Ors AIR 1967 Cal. 231 (234). The expression "other authorities" in Article 12 has been interpreted to include all constitutional and statutory authorities on whom powers He conferred by law vide Electricity Board, Rajasthan v. Mohanlal AIR 1967 SC 1857 and Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Roghvsanshi & Anr AIR 1975 SC 1331 (1342). Similarly, in the matter of applicability of Article 311 of the Constitution, the courts have made a broad distinction between the persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State and those employed under statutory and incorporated bodies including the government companies. 7. But even in respect of the above matters a new note seems to have been struck by Bhagwati, J. in his judgment in Ramona Dayaram Shetty. The International Airport Authority of India & Ors AIR 1979 SC 1628 . The learned Judge was inclined to accept the test of government instrument or agency as enunciated by Mathew, J. in Sukhdev Singh's case (supra). The International Airport Authority of India, which is a corporate body constituted under the International Airport Authority Act, 1971, had invited tenders for putting up and running a second class restaurant and two snack bars at the International Airport, Bombay. The said contract was awarded in favour of the respondent No 4. The appellant before the Supreme Court had filed a writ application, inter alia, alleging that his tender had been arbitrarily rejected and that the said authority had discriminated against him in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. Bhagwati, J. who delivered the judgment of the court in the said case at length considered the extent of statutory or executory powers of the authority concerned in the matter of awarding contracts and whether the International Airport Authority was a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. In this connection, Bhagwati, J, had considered a number of the pervious of the Supreme Court. In this connection, Bhagwati, J, had considered a number of the pervious of the Supreme Court. Bhagwati, J. in Ramana Dayaram Shetty case (supra) at page 1641, paragraph 19 indicated some of the factors which may have to be considered in determining whether a corporation is an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Bhagwati, J. in paragraph 14 of his judgment had referred to the Corporation which are established by statute or incorporated under a law such as the Companies Act, 1950 or the Societies Registration Act. Where a corporation is wholly controlled by the government not only in the matter of policy issue belt also in carrying out the functions entrusted to it by the law establishing it or by the charter of its incorporation, there could be no doubt that it would be an instrumentality or agency of the government With reference to a corporation incorporated under the law, their Lordships observed that one thing was clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by the government, it would go a long way towards indicating that such a corporation is an instrumentality or agency of the government. The test is to determine whether a corporation established by statute or incorporated under law is an instrumentality or agency of the government Bhagwati, J. in Ramana Dayaram Shetty’s case (supra), among other cases had referred to their previous decision in Praga Tools Corporation v. C.V. Imanual & Ors AIR 1969 SC 1306 (1309). Bhagwati, J. pointed out that in Praga Tools Corporation’s case (supra), there was neither a statutory nor a public duty imposed on the Corporation in respect of which enforcement was sought for in the said case. Bhagwati, J. also referred to the decision in Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1975 SC 1329 , and observed that the said decision did not lay down any principle or test for the purpose of determining when a corporation can be said to be an authority. Further, the Court appears to have held on the facts that the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, which was registered under the Societies Act, was not an agency of the government. Further, the Court appears to have held on the facts that the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, which was registered under the Societies Act, was not an agency of the government. Their Lordships proceeded to deal with the provisions of the International Airport Authority Act, 1971 and came to the conclusion that the said authority was an instrumentality or agency of the Central Government and, therefore, it fell within the definition of “State” in Article 12 of the Constitution. The learned Judge, however, dismissed the appeal because they doubted the bona fide of the writ application. Their Lordships also held that the appellant petitioner was guilty of delay and in the meantime the fourth respondent had already incurred considerable expenditure in setting up the snack bars and the restaurant. 8. In the present case the pertinent question is whether the respondent Insurance Company, committed any breach of its statutory or public duties in the matter of termination of the petitioner’s service. 9. The view I have taken in the case also finds support in the following observations of Shelat, J. in Praga Tools Corporation’s case (supra), right hand column. “A mandamus can issue, for instance, to an official of a society to compel him to carry out the terms of the statute under or by which the society is constituted or governed and also to companies or corporations to carry out the duties entrusted to them by the statutes authorising their undertakings. A mandamus would also lie against a company constituted by a statute for the purposes of fulfilling public responsibilities.” The learned Judge in Praga Tools Corporation’s case (supra), found that in the said case neither a statutory nor a public duty was imposed upon the company which was a non-statutory body and was incorporated under the Companies Act. Therefore, the writ petition against the company did not lie. 10. D. N. Singh, J. (as he then was) in Dr. Sudhir Chandra Neogy v. Calcutta Tramways Company Limited AIR 1960 Cal. 396 , followed the decision of the Bombay High Court in case of Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. Nagpur Electric Light and power Company AIR 1958 Bombay 498 (506), which held that a writ could issue at the instance of any consumer against a public utility concern in case of its failure to perform its duties under the statute. Sinha, J. however, in Dr. Sinha, J. however, in Dr. Sudhir Chandra Neogy’s case (supra), held that the company did not violate any provision of law for which there was no other adequate remedy provided. Sinha, J. further held that the company did not do anything was either illegal or unconstitutional and consequently the question did not arise about the jurisdiction to issue a writ. 11. In support of their preliminary objection, the respondents have relied upon the decision of Salil Kumar Datta, J. in Jogesh Chandra Chakravarty v. Union of India & Ors. 1978(1) CLJ 124 (: 1978 CHN 935 ) But this decision does not really support the preliminary objection raised by the respondents. The petitioner of the said case was an Assistant Manager, Calcutta Branch of the Sterling General Insurance Company Limited. The petitioner’s service was terminated with effect from 31st March, 1973. Salil Kumar Datta, J. discharged the Rule obtained by the petitioner, inter alia, on the ground that the dispute in the said case was a private one affecting one of the employees of the company which could not be enforced by a writ proceeding in the absence of other compelling circumstances. The termination though in breach of the contract of service was accordingly held not to be amenable to writ jurisdiction. At the same time, the learned Judge had referred to the decisions in Praga Tools Corporation’s case (supra), Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. Nagpur Electric Light and Power Company (supra) and Dr. Sudhir Chandra Neogy’s case (supra), which recognised that a writ may issue on a company, commanding it to perform its duties in the discharge of its functions under the statute regulation such functions. Further, in case, an employee is given a statutory guarantee in respect of his service, the aggrieved employee would be entitled to move the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. But the service of the petitioner of the said case was terminated before the scheme relating to the Sterling General Insurance Co. Ltd. was framed under S. 16(1) of the General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act. S. K. Datta, J. also observed that after the Central Government had framed the said merger scheme with effect form 1st January, 1974, the merged companies were dissolved without taking resort to the proceeding for winding up. Ltd. was framed under S. 16(1) of the General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act. S. K. Datta, J. also observed that after the Central Government had framed the said merger scheme with effect form 1st January, 1974, the merged companies were dissolved without taking resort to the proceeding for winding up. Under clause 6 of the Scheme every whole time officer of the merged company was to hold his office or service in the transferee company under the same terms and conditions and with the same rights as to pension, gratuity and other incidental matters until termination or until his remuneration, terms and conditions are duly altered by the transferee company. According to S. K. Datta, J. therefore it followed that every whole-time officer of the erstwhile insurers was given a statutory guarantee and the statute in respect of his services transferred to the transferee company under S. 16(1) clause (f) and the statutory scheme thereunder. S. K. Datta, J. recognised that if, therefore, there was a termination of service contrary to the provisions of the statutory scheme, the concerned employee may be entitled to obtain from the court a declaration that the impugned order was a nullity. 12. The respondents themselves have stated that in the year 1973 the undertaking of the New Great Insurance Company of India Ltd. had merged with the Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. under the Merger Scheme, 1973 and the services of the petitioner under clause 6 of the Scheme were duly altered by the transferee company. According to the judgment of S. K. Datta, J. in Jogesh Chandra Chakravarty’s case (supra), after the said merger, the petitioner obtained a statutory guarantee and a status in respect of his service under the transferee company. In the said view of the matter, the writ application by the petitioner could not be dismissed in limine. 13. The respondents have also relied upon the unreported judgment of Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. Matter No. 223 of 1978, National Forum of Special Assistants & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. disposed of on 18th June, 1979. ( 1979(2) CHN 385 ). The petitioners of the said case were employees of the Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. 13. The respondents have also relied upon the unreported judgment of Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. Matter No. 223 of 1978, National Forum of Special Assistants & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. disposed of on 18th June, 1979. ( 1979(2) CHN 385 ). The petitioners of the said case were employees of the Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. and had complained in a writ application under Article 226 that the Special Assistants had been categorised as superintendents in violation of clause 5 of the General Insurance (Nationalization and Revision of Pay Scales and other Conditions of Service of Supervisory, Clerical and Subordinate Staff) Scheme, 1974. The observations of Sabuasachi Mukherji, J. in the said case regarding the maintainability of the writ application appears to be in the nature of obiter. Secondly, in the said case, the petitioners had challenged the actions of the respondents on the ground that the same were violative of Article 16 of the Constitution which guaranteed equality of employment and appointment to offices under the State. The learned Judge relied upon the Supreme Court decision in Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli & Ors. v. Lakshmi Narain & ors. AIR 1976 SC 888 and the Division Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in M. L. Nohria v. The General Insurance Corporation of India, Bombay & Ors. (since reported in AIR 1979 Punjab and Haryana 183) and observe that “if at had been necessary for me to give my decision on this aspect of the matter. I would have held that no writ lay against the respondents, but in the view I have taken in the first aspect of the matter, it is not really necessary for me to rest my decision on this aspect of the matter.” 14. The decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in M. L. Nohria’s case (supra), and the above obiter observations of Sabuasachi Mukharji, J. have no manner of application to the facts of the present case. As already pointed out in he said cases the question was whether the General Insurance Corporation Ltd. had denied equality of employment and had thereby infringed Article 16 of the Constitution. As already pointed out in he said cases the question was whether the General Insurance Corporation Ltd. had denied equality of employment and had thereby infringed Article 16 of the Constitution. Both these decisions were on the basis that the service under the said Insurance Corporation of India which was an incorporated company did not amount to employment or appointment under the State as defied in Article 12 of the Constitution. In the present case before me, the petitioner has not applied for enforcement of his fundamental rights under Article 16. Secondly, when an application under Article 226 is made not for enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights but for "other purposes", the express on "any person or authority" in Article 226 (1) should not be interpreted on the basis of the definition of the expression "State" in, Article 12 of the Constitution. 15. The Division Bench of the Punjab and Harayana High Court in M.L. Nohria v. The General Insurance Corporation of India Bombay & Ors (since reported in AIR 1979 Punjab and Haryana 183), in the concluding paragraph of their judgment had held that the writ application against National Insurance Company Limited was not maintainable because the said company was neither a State nor a statutory corporation in view of the preponderance of authorities, I am unable to subscribe to the view that apart from the State only Statutory Corporations are amenable to the writ jurisdiction. The maintainability of a writ application for issue of a writ or writs for "any other purposes" has to be determined with reference to the character of the right claimed by the petitioner and the nature of the duty or obligations of the respondents. The decision of the Supreme Court in Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli & Ors v. Lakshmi Narain & Ors AIR 1976 SC 888 is distinguishable on facts. The said decision is not an authority for the proposition that no writ can be issued for enforcement of statutory or public duties of a body incorporated under the Companies Act. The Supreme Court in their later decision in Vaish Degree College's case (supra), had held that the Executive Committee of a degree college registered under the Registration of Co-operative Societies Act and affricated to the Agra University was not a statutory body. The Supreme Court in their later decision in Vaish Degree College's case (supra), had held that the Executive Committee of a degree college registered under the Registration of Co-operative Societies Act and affricated to the Agra University was not a statutory body. Therefore, the observations of the Supreme Court in Vaish Degree College's case (sapra), were made in the context of the facts of the said case. The Executive Committee of the college had terminated the services of the Principal who had thereupon filed a civil suit fur declaration and injunction. The Munsif had dismissed the suit on the ground that no case for declaration and injunction had been made out against the defendant-appellant, who was not a statutory body. On appeal, the First Additional Civil and Sessions Judge reversed the sad decision and decreed the plaintiff's suit and granted the injunction as prayed for. The Allahabad High Court affirmed the said decree with certain modifications. The Supreme Court thereafter allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and dismissed the plaintiff’s suit. Thus, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff-respondent’s appointment was not under a statutory body and therefore, the Court under S. 20(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 should properly exercise its discretion not to decree specific performance of the said contract of personal service. 16. I may now proceed to consider the merits of the petitioner’s case Mr. Moitra, learned advocate for the petitioner, has submitted that after the nationalisation of the New Great Insurance Company of India Ltd. the petitioner had acquired a status and, therefore, his service was no longer liable to be terminated that the impugned order which cast a stigma upon the petitioner was by way of penalty. Therefore, the termination of his service without giving him a reasonable opportunity of hearing was invalid. Mr. Moitra has lastly submitted that the purported termination of the petitioner’s service was not even in accordance with the terms contained in the appointment letter dated 11th August, 1970 issued by the New Great Insurance Company of India Ltd. (vide Annexure ‘A’ to the writ petition). 17. After the appointed day the petitioner’s service stood transferred in accordance with the provisions of S. 7 of the General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act, 1972. 17. After the appointed day the petitioner’s service stood transferred in accordance with the provisions of S. 7 of the General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act, 1972. The existing terms and conditions of such employees were altered he was still subject to the terms and conditions mentioned in his appointment letter. The petitioner has annexed to his writ petition, a copy of his said appointment letter issued on behalf of the New Great Insurance Company of India Ltd. appointing him as an Inspector of Agencies at Alipurduar. The Divisional Secretary of the Said Insurance Company in petitioner’s appointment letter stipulated:- “You are expected to secure for the Company a premium income ranging between Rs. 60,000/- and Rs. 65,000/- per annum. Your appointment will be in force so long as you show satisfactory result at the reviews which may be made form time to time. The Company also reserves the right to make suitable revisions in four remuneration in the right of your performance. This appointment referred to above is subject to termination by either party giving 30 days notice in writing.” 18. There is no material before me to indicate that the above terms and conditions relating to termination of service of the petitioner had been subsequently altered. In other words, the petitioner as an existing employee continued to serve under the same terms and conditions in respect of termination of his service mentioned in his aforesaid appointment letter. 19. The respondents in their affidavit-in-opposition affirmed by Sri Umanath Sadhu, Manager, Eastern Region of the Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. have stated that in terms of his contract of employment, the petitioner was expected to secure that in terms of his contract of employment, the petitioner was expected to secure business with collection of premium ranging between Rs. 60,000/- and 65,000/-. It was further provided that his performance would be scrutinised and reviewed from time to time. It appears from his service record that in he year 1973 the premium collection by the petitioner was Rs. 19.112.95P. with a cost ratio of 19.1%. During the year 1975 his premium collection was Rs. 13,796/- with an abnormal high cost ratio. In terms of the contract of his employment, the petitioner had been asked to appear before Inspector’s Screening/Review Committee. The Review Committee found the performance of the petitioner was extremely poor. 19.112.95P. with a cost ratio of 19.1%. During the year 1975 his premium collection was Rs. 13,796/- with an abnormal high cost ratio. In terms of the contract of his employment, the petitioner had been asked to appear before Inspector’s Screening/Review Committee. The Review Committee found the performance of the petitioner was extremely poor. The said deponent in paragraph 11 of his affidavit-in-opposition has stated that the petitioner’s service was terminated by a letter dated 31st March, 1976 by offering him one month’s salary in lieu of one month’s notice in terms of his contract of employment. The deponent has denied that the petitioner was dismissed from service or that any stigma was cast upon him. The said termination order was not a penal measure but was cast upon him. The said termination order was not a penal measure but was in accordance with the terms and conditions of his service, According to the respondents, the petitioner was not entitled to get any opportunity of hearing but in fact, the Review Committee had considered whether the petitioner’s performance was satisfactory or not. The Review Committee found that the performance of the petitioner was extremely poor. According to the respondents the petitioner’s service was terminated by offering him one month’s notice in terms of the contract of his employment and not by way of dismissal. The same was not a termination of his service with a stigma but one passed in exercise of contractual right. 20. Even after the petitioner’s service was transferred by operation of law and he became an employee of the national Insurance Company, the provision for termination of his employment by giving on month’s notice still continued. In this connection my attention has been drawn to the decision of a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in A. A. Nathan v. Union of India & Ors. reported in 1978 Labour & Industrial Cases 1062. The learned Single Judge held that the Insurance Company after nationalisation being a statutory body and having statutory status would be an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and, therefore, a writ could issue against such a company. reported in 1978 Labour & Industrial Cases 1062. The learned Single Judge held that the Insurance Company after nationalisation being a statutory body and having statutory status would be an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and, therefore, a writ could issue against such a company. Secondly the learned Judge held that the effect of S. 7 of the General Insurance Business Nationalisation Act, 1972 was that the employees whose services were taken over were given statutory guarantee that their services would be governed by the, terms and conditions which existed already till they were modified. Thus, S. 7 should be taken to have given a statutory force to the terms and conditions of service already existing, even though no statutory regulations had been immediately framed. The learned Single Judge in A. A. Nathan's case (supra), was not inclined to agree with the decision of this Court in J.C. Chakraborty v. Union of India, 82 CWN 134 : 1978 Labour and Industrial Cases 545. Although the 'earned Single Judge in A. A. Nathan's case (supra) was inclined to accept the contention that the mode of termination of service provided in the original order of appointment was still applicable, he held that the giving one month's salary in lieu of one month's notice was not in compliance with the terms of appointment of the petitioner. Therefore, the termination impugned in the said case was held to be invalid. I am inclined to agree with the above view that the terms and conditions of petitioner's appointment continued to apply even after by operation of S. 7. of the aforesaid Act, he became an employee of the national Insurance Company. The said terms were to be replaced by, Regulations under S. 16 of the said Act which had not been framed when the petitioner's service was purported to have been determined. The moot question is whether the respondents had terminated the petitioner's service in accordance with the terms and conditions of his employment or de hors the same. In the instant case, instead of giving one month's notice the respondents had offered one month's salary to the petitioner in lieu of such a notice. 21. Mr, Moitra has submitted that such an offer of one month's salary in lieu of one month's notice was not legal. In the instant case, instead of giving one month's notice the respondents had offered one month's salary to the petitioner in lieu of such a notice. 21. Mr, Moitra has submitted that such an offer of one month's salary in lieu of one month's notice was not legal. He has relied upon the above decision of the learned Single Judge in A. A. Nathan's case (supra), which had followed the earlier Division Bench decision of the Madras High Court in P. E. Warne v. Ouchterlony Valley Estate, 1956 (1) MLJ 556 : AIR 1956 Madras 505. I may now refer to the said Division Bench decision in P. E. Warne's case (supra). The said case arose out of a suit filed for recovery of damages for wrongful dismissal of the plaintiff who was employed as a Manager of an estate. The Division Bench at page 509 of the AIR Reports observed that it was settled law that in the absence of an express term in the contract or usage to that effect all employee cannot be dismissed withourt notice by paying his wages for the notice period in lieu of notice (vide Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 22, paragraph 280 page 167). The Division Bench in P. E. Warne's case (supra), further held that in the said case there was no express clause in the contract of service for payment of salary and allowance for the notice period in lieu of notice. Therefore the defendants were not entitled to terminate the plaintiff's service by offering him his pay for the notice period. 22. Mr. Ghosh, on the other had, has submitted that the offering of pay for the notice period would be perfectly legal. In this connection he has relied upon the following passage from the Modern Law of Employment (1963) by G. K. I Fridman : "(b) Wages instead of notice "Since a failure to give reasonable notice is a breach of an implied term in the contract of employment, a dismissal without such notice will be actionable; arid the damages recoverable will be the wages which would have been earned during the period of the notice. Hence payment of wages instead of the giving of notice will prevent the dismissal from being wrongful and actionable, for the payment of the wages is the payment of what are, in effect, liquidated damages in advance of an action. Hence payment of wages instead of the giving of notice will prevent the dismissal from being wrongful and actionable, for the payment of the wages is the payment of what are, in effect, liquidated damages in advance of an action. This means that, in general, other losses, such as expenses incurred as a result of the dismissal, will not be recoverable." Mr. Ghosh also has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in The Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Sharanpur v. Govtnd AIR 1962 SC 1500 . The said decision' deals with the scope and effect of S. 6E(2b) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act which correspond with S. 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Therefore, the said decision is not relevant for interpreting the terms and conditions of a contract of employment. 23. In my view, the Division Bench decision of the Madras High Court in P.E. Warner's case (supra), does not justify the submission that the impugned termination notice served upon the petitioner was illegal and, therefore, it should not be quashed. I have already pointed out that the aforesaid case before the Madras High Court arose out of a suit fur damages on the ground of wrongful dismissal. The observations of the Division Bench in P.E. Warner's case (supra), referred to above were made in the context of determination of the quantum of damage, to be awarded. The passages from Habbury's Law of England, Vol. 22 (2nd Edition) mentioned in the Division Bench decision in P.E. Warner's case (supra), also dealt with the measure of damages in case the servant elects to sue upon a quantum meruit. The paragraph 235 of Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 22 (2nd Edition), Part-IV deals with the duration and term nation of the contract of employment. According to sub-s. (5) of paragraph 247 of the said book, a general hiring which operates as a hiring for a year can only be terminated with the current year, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary, or a usage is established enabling the parties to determine the contract at some other date by notice, or there is a good ground for summarily ending the relation of m1ster and servant between the parties. According to Paragraph 248, there is a usage in domestic service, that a general hiring may be terminated at any time by a month's notice or payment of a month's wages, not including board wages. Of this usage the Courts will take judicial notice, In case of absence of custom the service is terminable by reasonable notice. Part V of the Haisbury's Laws of England, Vol. 22 (2nd Edition), deals with remidies for breach of contract, It has been stated in Paragraph 279 that if the servant elects to treat the contract as repudiated, and sues for damages for its breach, he is entitled to recover the estimated pecuniary loss resulting as a reasonable and probable consequence from the premature determination of his service. He is also entitled to the amount of wages earned but not paid at the date of his dismissal. The Paragraph 280 of the said book, as referred to in the aforesaid Madras Division Bench decision, deals with the case where the servant elects to sue upon a quantum meruit the amount recoverable as a reasonable sum for his service up to the date of his dismissal. He is not entitled to recover such sum as wages earned and remaining unpaid at the date and he cannot recover anything further, either in respect of wages for the remainder of the period for which he has e gaged, or by way pf damages for wrongful dismissal. The second sub-paragraph of Paragraph 280 of Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 22 (2nd Edition deals with the measure of damages in the following terms: "The servant cannot wait until the termination of the period for which he was engaged and sue for the whole amount of his wages, but where it is an express term of contract that a servant who is dismissed without notice is to be paid his wages for a certain period in lieu of notice, or where there is a usage to that effect, the measure of damages for the breach is the amount of such wages, which is to be regarded as liquidated damaged. The same principle applied where the contract specifies a particular sum o be payable as and for liquidated damages in the event of a breach in any other case the damages are to be measured by the amount of wages which the servant has been prevented from earning by reason of his wrongful dismissal, including the value of any other benefit to which he' is entitled by virtue of his contract and of which he is deprived in consequence of its breach, after taking into consideration the probabilities of his obtaining employment elsewhere". 24. The passage occuring at page 471 of Fridman's The Modern Law of Employment upon which the learned advocate for the respondent has relied deals with the measure of damages in case o dismissal in breach of the terms of a contract of employment. 25. In the instant case, it is true that the letter of appointment issued to the petitioner did not expressly state that the company may terminate the petitioner's employment by offering his wages for one month in lieu of the requisite notice. Sitting in writ jurisdiction I am not inclined to determine whether there was any established usage in the insurance business for termination of employment of the employees of the Insurance Companies by offering the pay in lieu of one month's notice. Even if there is no offer of such a notice, the payment would prevent the termination from being wrongful. 26. I accordingly, reject the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that the respondent company had acted illegally by terminating his employment by offering his one month’s pay in lieu of notice in the said duration. I have also found that the impugned termination of the petitioner's employment by giving one month's notice continued to remain in force even after the nationalisation of the general insurance business and that the petitioner became an employee of one of the nationalised insurance companies. 27. There is no substance in the submission of the petitioner that one month's pay in lieu of the notice was not simultaneously paid to the petitioner and therefore, the said termination notice was in, effective, This plea is unavailing. The respondents while terminating the petitioner's employment advised him to call at the divisional office on any working day to collect his dues. The respondents while terminating the petitioner's employment advised him to call at the divisional office on any working day to collect his dues. Thus, one month's pay in lieu of one month's notice was simultaneously tendered and it was open the petitioner to receive payment by calling at the divisional office. Further, at the highest, the said termination notice was to became effective on and from the date the petitioner would call upon and receive one month's pay from the divisional office Sitting in writ jurisdiction, I am not prepared to decide whither the petitioner was entitled to receive his full salary till he receives such payment. For the foregoing reasons, I discharge this Rule without any order as to costs. Rule discharged.