JUDGMENT H. S. Thakur, J.—This is an appeal filed by the appellant under Paragraph 32 of the Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order, 1948, against the decree and judgment passed by the learned District Judge, Kangra, Camp at Chamba, affirming the decree and judgment passed by the learned Senior Sub-Judge, Chamba. 2. The appellant was defendant No. 1 in the suit whereas proforma respondents 2 to 4 were defendants 2 to 4 respectively, in the suit. The parties to the appeal would be referred to as plaintiff and defendants respectively hereinafter. Now the facts of the case may be briefly stated. The plaintiff Bakshi Ram had filed a suit against the defendants for possession of land measuring 12 bighas and 13 biswas as detailed in the plaint, situate at Mohal Dhar Kolian, Pargana Nagali, Tehsil Bhatiat. The case of the plaintiff was that defendant No. 4 was the owner of the land in dispute and the plaintiff had been a tenant thereof. The plaintiff had prepared a part of the land for showing maize crop therein but the defendants 1 to 3 on 23rd of May, 1965 illegally trespassed into the land and cultivated maize therein, whereas they interfered with the possession of the plaintiff in Banjar land by letting loose their cattle therein. It was also contended by the plaintiff that when he obtained a copy of Jamabandi in respect of the land in dispute it was discovered that defendant No. 4 Shri Kansh, in order to dispossess the plaintiff, had collusively sold the land to defendant No. 1. It was also averred by the plaintiff that the defendants 1 to 3 had no right to interfere with the possession of the plaintiff in the land in dispute. On the contrary it was contended by defendants 1 to 3 that defendant No. 4 was the owner of the land, but for the last about two years he had sold the land to defendant No. 1 and since that time the defendant No. 1 became its owner. The defendants 1 to 3 further pleaded that the plaintiff was not a tenant of the land and that no forcible possession, as alleged, was taken from him. Their further plea was that defendant No. 1 who is father of defendants 2 and 3 had been in continuous possession of the land for the last 10/12 years. The defendants 1 to 3 further pleaded that the plaintiff was not a tenant of the land and that no forcible possession, as alleged, was taken from him. Their further plea was that defendant No. 1 who is father of defendants 2 and 3 had been in continuous possession of the land for the last 10/12 years. The said defendants completely denied the possession of the plaintiff in the land or being its tenant. 3. After recording the evidence of the parties the learned Senior Sub-Judge, Chamba, by his judgment and decree dated 2nd of August, 1968 decreed the suit of the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree passed by the trial court, the defendant No. 1 preferred an appeal in the Court of the District Judge, Kangra. The learned District Judge after examining the entire evidence on record and hearing the parties dismissed the appeal of defendant No. 1 on 13th March, 1970, with costs and affirmed the decree and judgment passed by the trial court. The appellant who was defendant No. 1 in the trial court preferred this second appeal in the Delhi High Court (Himachal Bench) at Simla on 2nd of June, 1970. It is really sad that the appeal remained pending for such a long time. 4. As pointed out earlier above, this is a second appeal under Paragraph 32 of the Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order. 1948. Under Paragraph 32 of the said order, in a second appeai this Court has jurisdiction even to go into questions of fact besides going into questions of law. 5. Shri D. K. Khanna, learned counsel for the respondents, has taken a preliminary objection that the appeal is not competent in terms of Paragraph 32 (i) (b) (ii). The relevant portion of this Paragraph is reproduced below for ready reference: — "32. (1) A second appeal shall lie to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any of the following cases from an appellate decree of a District Court on any ground which would be a good ground of appeal if the decree had been passed in an original suit, namely :— (a) ............... (1) A second appeal shall lie to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any of the following cases from an appellate decree of a District Court on any ground which would be a good ground of appeal if the decree had been passed in an original suit, namely :— (a) ............... (b) in a land suit, (i) if the value of the suit is two hundred and fifty rupees or upwards, or the decree involves directly some claim to, or question respecting, property of like value, and the decree of the District Court varies or reverses otherwise than as to costs the decree of the Court below, or (b) if the value of the suit is one thousand rupees or upwards, or the decree of the District Court involves directly some claim to, or question respecting, property of like value." The value for the purpose of jurisdiction in the plaint on the basis of multiple of land revenue and cesses has been assessed at Rs. 131. IOP. As such the present appeal is not governed by Paragraph 32 (1) (b) (i). The learned counsel for the respondents has contended that even under Paragraph 32 (i) (b) (ii) the appeal is not maintainable as the decree of the District Court does not involve directly some claim to, or question respecting, property of the value of one thousand rupees or upwards. The learned counsel has drawn out attention to a judgment of this Court in Sunder and others v. Kirpu and others, 1979 ILR Himachal Series 355, In this case the claim was in respect of tenancy rights in a land, and a Division Bench of this Court, while interpreting sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) above, held that the prejudice against which the appellants have complained of is with regard to their tenancy rights and therefore these tenancy rights should be considered as the property regarding which a direct dispute exists. If the valuation of these tenancy rights can be put to more than rupees one thousand, then, of course, sub-clause (n) of clause (b) would apply. On the basis of this judgment, it is argued by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 that the value of the property in suit being much below rupees one thousand a second appeal is not competent. On the basis of this judgment, it is argued by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 that the value of the property in suit being much below rupees one thousand a second appeal is not competent. It is further contended by the learned counsel that according to the facts established on record, the entire land in dispute had been sol-j by defendant No. 4 to defendant No. 1 for a sum of Rs. 350/- only. As such the maximum value of the property cannot exceed Rs. 350/. 6. On the contrary, it is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant-defendant No. 1, that in his Grounds of Appeal it has been specified that the value of the suit is more than Rs. 5,000/- and the decree of the District Judge involves directly some claim to this property the value of which is more than Rs. 5,000. The defendant No. 1 has also sworn an affidavit in support of this fact. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that no counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent to controvert this fact. As such it is contended by the learned counsel that this valuation of the appellant has to be accepted. 7. It is not disputed that the property in dispute is measuring more than 12 bighas. It is also not in dispute that the appellant had purchased the I land in dispute on the basis of an oral sale for a sum of Rs. 350/-, The | vendor, however, was his brother. For the reasons to be recorded later on and as observed by the courts below, this sale by a brother in favour of his own brother was made with a purpose to defeat the rights of the plaintiff in the land and to take possession of the same. As such the valuation given in the mutation attesting the sale in favour of the appellant cannot be presumed to be correct. The land manifestly appears to have been undervalued. We are of the opinion that even if the value of the land may not be Rs. 5000/- or above, the value cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be less than Rs. 1000/-. As such we are of the view that the second appeal under Paragraph 32 (I) (b) (ii) is competent. 8. We are of the opinion that even if the value of the land may not be Rs. 5000/- or above, the value cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be less than Rs. 1000/-. As such we are of the view that the second appeal under Paragraph 32 (I) (b) (ii) is competent. 8. Coming to the merits of the case, it is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the plaintiff did not possess any tenancy rights in the land and the courts below have gravely ened in holding that he was the tenant of the land in dispute. It is pointed out by the learned counsel that the plaintiff who appeared as P. W. 1 did not precisely explain as to how and on what terms he was settled as a tenant in the land. The learned counsel has drawn our attention to several judgments. Those decisions are : Gulab Singh v. Nanaji, AIR 1929 Nagpur 13 (1) ; Ambika Singh v. State, AIR 1961 Allahabad 38 and Radhakrishna Hazra v. Joykrishna Hazra, AIR 1967 Calcutta 204. In Gulah Singh (supra) it is observed that a tenancy cannot he created by any implication or acquiescence, but can only be created by a contract. So far as the judgments in Ambika Singh (supra) and Radhakrishna Hazra (Supra) are concerned, they relate, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant, to when cross-examination of a witness on a certain point is necessary and if a witness is not cross-examined on any point, what is its effect on the value of the evidence. So far as the propositions of law as laid down in these authorities are concerned, there is no dispute. But, in our opinion, these decisions are not relevant to the facts of the case for the reasons to be given in this judgment later on. 9. We find that both the courts below have thoroughly considered the oral and documentary evidence on record and have come to a positive finding of fact that the plaintiff was in possession of the land as a tenant at the relevant time when he was dispossessed from the land in dispute. The plaintiff was dispossessed from the land when the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act had come into force. The plaintiff was dispossessed from the land when the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act had come into force. Under that Act, a tenant was entitled to acquire proprietary and other rights in the land held by him under tenancy on payment of a nominal compensation. In order to safeguard the interests of the tenants, section 45 of the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act was reshaped and is reproduced as under:— "45. Presumption in favour of entries in records of rights and (periodical) records: An entry made in a record of rights in accordance with the law for the time being in force or (a periodical) record in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter and the rules there under, shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved or a new entry is lawfully substituted therefore : Provided that notwithstanding anything contained in this section any entry made in the areas comprised in Himachal Pradesh immediately before 1st November, 1966, during the period between the first day of April, 1948 and the first day of April. 1956 in record of rights or in a periodical record whereby the land is shown as under self cultivation shall not be presumed to be true." It appears that the appellant and defendant No. 4, in order to deprive the plaintiff of his rights as accrued to him under the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, collusively managed to get a mutation of sale attested in his favour. The claim of the appellant is negatived by the Jamabandi (Ex. PC) wherein the plaintiff is shown as a tenant-at-wil! and in the column of rent, there is an entry that he pays the rent to defendant No. 4. At the time when the mutation copy (Ex. DC) was attested this Jamabandi was in existence and the appellant as also the other defendants knew that the land in dispute was held under tenancy by the plaintiff. Even in the Khasra Girdwari (Ex. PD) the plaintiff is shown in possession of the land in dispute right from the year 1962 till Rabi 1965. The learned counsel for the respondents has referred to section 45 of the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act reproduced above and has vehemently argued that an entry in the revenue record is presumed to be correct. PD) the plaintiff is shown in possession of the land in dispute right from the year 1962 till Rabi 1965. The learned counsel for the respondents has referred to section 45 of the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act reproduced above and has vehemently argued that an entry in the revenue record is presumed to be correct. He has also drawn our attention to the decision in the case Nizam Din and others v. Godar and others, AIR 1934 Privy Council 40. It is observed in this judgment that there is statutory presumption that the entries in the record-of-rights are correct. It is further observed that the mere fact that the Patwari has committed some irregularities in submitting the report on which the order of mutation i9 passed is insufficient to displace the presumption that arises under section 44 of the Pun jab Land Revenue Act. It may be pointed out that section 45 of the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act is a material reproduction of section 44 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act. The learned counsel for the appellant has pointed out that entries in the revenue records have not been properly substituted in favour of the plaintiff as required by the procedure for making records under Sections 35 to 38 of the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act. We are not satisfied with the contention raised by the learned counsel. As is evident from Exs. PA and PB, the procedure for substitution of entries was made by the officials of the Revenue Department and the entry was incorporated in the presence of tenants and other right-holders. Even if there was any formal defect in substituting the entry in favour of the plaintiff that would not help the appellant as the official acts are supposed to have been properly done. Otherwise also, the appellant was aware of the entry in the revenue record and he deliberately entered into a transaction of sale with defendant No. 4 who was his brother. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that there is no merit U2 this appeal and the same is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed- -