JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - Decree-holders have preferred this appeal against the reversing decision of the learned District Judge of Puri vacating the rejection of an objection under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. The short facts necessary for disposing of this appeal are these : Respondent no. 1 was a tenant of a premises located in the town of Puri under the appellants and the predecessors-in-interest of the other respondents. An application for eviction was filed in House Rent Control Case No. 14 of 1961 and on 3-4-1963, the Controller passed an order of eviction. The said order was upheld in appeal by the Additional District Magistrate in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 7 of 1973 disposed of on 31-12-1963. Execution Case No. 74 of 1976 was filed on 2.2.1966 and there was an objection under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that in the absence of a notice determining the lease as provided under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, the order of eviction was a nullity and the execution case was not maintainable. On 1-5-1967, the execution case was dismissed, but the dismissal was vacated in appeal on 19-10-1970 with a direction that the execution case be restored. On 10-12-1971, a further appeal by the judgment-debtor to this Court in M.A. No. 116 of 1970 was dismissed. On 17-8-1972, the execution case was, however, dismissed for default. The decree-holders applied for its restoration under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but that too was dismissed. On 2-5-1974, a fresh execution case was filed and therein the Judgment-debtor raised an objection that the application for execution was barred by limitation Act of 1963 applied. The executing Court took the view that Article 136 was applicable, inasmuch as the order of eviction was treated to be a 'decree' in terms of section 15 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act. The lower appellate Court has reversed that finding. 3. Mr. Mohapatra in support of the appeal contends that the learned District Judge has clearly gone wrong in holding that the order of eviction passed by the Controller and upheld in appeal was not a 'decree'. The lower appellate Court has reversed that finding. 3. Mr. Mohapatra in support of the appeal contends that the learned District Judge has clearly gone wrong in holding that the order of eviction passed by the Controller and upheld in appeal was not a 'decree'. Section 15 of the House Rent Control Act provides :- "The order of the Controller made under section 7 directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house, shall he deemed to be a decree and shall be executable as such in the Court of the Munsif within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the house is situate." Interpreting a similar provision in section 13 of the previous Act (Act 31 of 1958), a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Lakshman Kumar Patnaik v. Sm. Binapani Sahu I.L.R. 1963 Cuttack 905 held :- "Question arises whether the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code would apply to the execution proceedings before the Munsif under section 13 of the Act and appeals would lie as prescribed in the Civil Procedure Code. In A.I.R 1948 P.C. 12 Adaikappa v. Chandrashekhar. Their Lordships observed : 'The true rule is that where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country are seized of such dispute, the Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies, if authorised by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises on a special statute which does not in terms confer a right of appeal.' Their Lordships' view was followed in A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 357 N.S. Thread Co. v. James Chadwick and Bros. On the aforesaid authorities, the Civil Procedure Code would apply to proceedings in execution before the Munsif under section 13 of the Act............" Another Single Judge in the case of Baidyanath Sharma v. Sabitribala Mitra and others 35 (1969) C.L.T. 464, held :- "Section 15 of the 1968 Act provides that the order of the Controller made under section 7 directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house, shall be deemed to be a decree and shall be executable as such in the Court of the Munsif within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the house is situate. It would be noticed that the Legislature became aware of the difficulty in section 13 of the 1958 Act and remedied the situation by making provision in section 15 of the 1968 Act that all orders of eviction under section 7 are to be deemed as decrees and would be executable in the Court of the Munsif. The position that would emerge now is that the order of the House Rent Controller passed on 12-9-1963 would be executable in the Court of the Munsif under section 15 of the 1908 Act......" The relevant words in section 15 are "deemed to be a decree" and "executable as such". Law is fairly settled that the Court is to ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created and after ascertaining this the Court is to assume all those facts and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries for giving effect to the fiction. See State of Travancore Cochin and others v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashewnut Factory, Quilon AIR 1953 S.C. 333 , and Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi v. S. Teja Singh AIR 1959 S.C. 352 . It was again pointed out in the case of State of Bombay v. Pandurang Vinayak and others AIR 1953 S.C. 244 , that after ascertaining the purpose full effect must be given to the statutory fiction and it should be carried to its logical conclusion and to that end it would be proper and even necessary to assume all those facts on which alone the fiction can operate. It would not be out of place to quote the oft-quoted speech of Lord Asquith : "If one is bidden to treat an imaginary State of affairs as real, one must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in tact existed, must inevitable have flowed from or accompanied it..... The statute says that one must imagine a certain state of affairs. It does not say that, having done so, one must cause or permit one's imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs......." See East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council (1951) 2 All. E.R. 587. Mr. The statute says that one must imagine a certain state of affairs. It does not say that, having done so, one must cause or permit one's imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs......." See East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council (1951) 2 All. E.R. 587. Mr. Mohanty for the respondents on the other hand has relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City-I, Bombay v. Amarchand N. Shroff by his heirs and legal Representatives AIR 1963 S.C. 1448 , and Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay City II v. Shakuntala and others AIR 1966 S.C. 719 , in support of the contention that the deeming provision should not be given undue intention so as to improperly enlarge the scope of deeming. In the instant case, the Legislature intends to make the order under section 7 of the House Rent Control Act (Orissa Act 4 of 1968) equivalent to a decree as defined in section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and in clear terms says that such an order which is demed to be a decree shall be executable as a decree. In view of the clear terms of section 15 of the 1968 Act, there is no scope for the contention that the order is deemed to be a decree for any limited purpose. For all purposes of execution, it is deemed to be a decree. It is unnecessary to look into these Supreme Court decisions in view of the clear provision in section 15. 4. Article 136 of the new Limitation Act (36 of 1963) provides :- "For the execution of any decree (other than a decree granting a mandatory injuction) or order of any civil Court. Twelve years. Where the decree or order becomes enforceable or where the decree or any subsequent order directs to any payment of money or the delivery of any property, to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, when default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which execution is sought, takes place : Provided......." According to the decree-holders, Article 136 applies and since the execution petition has been filed within twelve years there is no bar of limitation. The judgment-debtor has contended that Article 137 which is the residual Article applies. The judgment-debtor has contended that Article 137 which is the residual Article applies. That Article provides that any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in that division would have to be filed within three years for execution when the right to apply accrues. It is conceded by Mr. Mohanty that if Article 136 applies, there would be no scope for the residuary Article to be invoked. In my opinion, in clear terms Article 136 is applicable. A learned Single Judge of this Court has also taken the same view in the case of Nanda Kishore Moharana v. Mahabir Prasad Lath 44 (1977) C.L.T. 505. I have also been cited a decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of M.V. Ali v. Kuniannamma Philipose 1975 K.L.T. 527, expressing a similar opinion. Mr. Mohanty for the respondents relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of The Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum v. T.P. Kunhaliumma AIR 1977 S.C. 282 , in support of his contention that Article 137 applied. According to him the decision of the House Rent Controller did not amount to a decree of the Civil Court for all purposes and, therefore, the residuary Article applied. Nothing has been said by the learned Chief Justice in the The Kerala Electricity Board, Trivandram v. T.P. Kunhaliumma AIR 1977 S.C. 282 , which would in the facts of the present case make Article 137 applicable. In that case before the Supreme Court, the dispute arose out of claim for compensation under the provisions of the Indian Telegraphs Act. The Board under the special Act had given a smaller compensation and an application was made to the District Judge with local jurisdiction for enhanced compensation as provided by the statute. The order granting compensation passed by the Board never amounted to a decree of the Civil Court within the meaning of Article 136 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, the Supreme Court rightly held that Article 137 applied and the period of limitation was 3 years from the date when the right to apply accrued. The order granting compensation passed by the Board never amounted to a decree of the Civil Court within the meaning of Article 136 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, the Supreme Court rightly held that Article 137 applied and the period of limitation was 3 years from the date when the right to apply accrued. There is no force in the submission that in view of the Supreme Court decision in the The Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandram v. T.P. Kunhaliumma AIR 1977 S.C. 282 , the entire tenor has changed and a new avenue of law has opened and the earlier cases have ceased to be good authority. In the circumstances, I must hold that Article 136 of the Limitation Act is the appropriate Article to apply and, therefore the execution petition filed on 2-5-1974 to execute the original order of eviction dated 3-4-1963 is within time and the plea of limitation raised under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure had been rightly negatived by the executing Court and the decision of the executing Court has been wrongly reversed in appeal. 5. In this Court an application for accepting additional evidence has been filed by the Judgment-debtor. He intends to raise a new contention for the first time to the effect that the order of eviction was a nullity on account of the fact that by the time eviction application was made there had already been a final decree in the family of the landlords and the property stood allotted to one of them and not all the three. It is also contended that there were other irregularities which affected the order of eviction. Mr. Mohanty concedes that the new ground which is sought to be introduced by asking for admission of new documents is essentially one of fraud. I do not think, the executing Court is entitled to refuse execution of a decree on the ground of fraud. Consensus of judicial opinion has always required fraud to be pleaded and proved in an independent action and besides I am also not satisfied that any justifying grounds have been made out for receiving additional evidence at the second appellate stage. The application for receiving additional evidence is accordingly rejected and the new ground is, therefore; not permitted to be raised. 6. The appeal has to succeed. The application for receiving additional evidence is accordingly rejected and the new ground is, therefore; not permitted to be raised. 6. The appeal has to succeed. I would accordingly set aside the appellate decision and restore the order of the executing Court. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. Final Result : Allowed