ORDER M. P. Mehrotra, J. -This petition arises out of the proceedings under the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960. 2. The facts, in brief, are these: The petitioner was issued the notice under Section 10 (2) of the Act and it filed objections. They were decided by the Prescribed Authority by his order dated 24-1-1978, a true copy whereof is Annexure 10 to the petition. Thereafter an appeal was filed and the same was denied by the appellate court by its judgment dated 15-5-1978, a certified copy whereof is Annexure 12 to the petition. 3. Now the petitioner has come up in the instant petition and in support thereof, I have heard Sri H. S. Nigam, learned counsel for the petitioner. In opposition, the learned Standing Counsel has made his submissions. 4. Sri Nigam contended that the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of Section 6 (1) (f) of the Act. It appears that the petitioner was issued a licence under Section 26 of the Central Act No. 6 of 1882, which was the Companies Act then in vogue. The then S. 26 corresponded to Section 25 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 and to Section 25 of the Companies Act, 1956. Sub-clause (1) of Section 25 of the Companies Act lays down as under:- "25. Power to dispense with "Limited" in name of charitable or other Company.- (1) Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Central Government that an association- (a) is about to be formed as a limited, company for promoting commerce, art, science, religion, charity or any other useful object, and (b) intends to apply its profits, if any, or other income in promoting its objects, and to prohibit the payment of any dividend to its members, the Central Government may, by licence, direct that the association may be registered as a company with limited liability without the addition to its name of the word "Limited" or the words "Private Limited". 5. A copy of the memorandum and articles of association of the petitioner is Annexure 3 to the petition and Article III in the memorandum of association lays down the objects for which the association is established. It is obvious that it is a Christian Church Institution and the objects are wholly religious and charitable. The memorandum of association shows that it is dated 15-7-1908. It is obvious that it is a Christian Church Institution and the objects are wholly religious and charitable. The memorandum of association shows that it is dated 15-7-1908. Therefore, it is clear that it is an old Institution and has not come into existence in recent years for any ulterior motive. Indeed, the authorities below have also not doubted the genuineness of the Institution. The Prescribed Authority rejected the claim of the petitioner for being extended the benefit of Section 6 (1) (f) of the Act on the ground that in the school run by the Institution education was not provided free of costs. The Prescribed Authority observed : "Instead a regular fee is charged from the students studying in the school. In such circumstances it cannot be said that the school is a charitable institution." 6. The appellate court also rejected the claim by observing that:- "There is absolutely nothing on record to show that the appellant possessed land from before the 1st day of May, 1959 by or under a charitable waqf or institution nor there is any evidence to show that the income from the same is wholly utilised for charitable purposes. It is also important to mention that Section 5 of the aforesaid Ceiling Act does not at all exempt an association like the appellant. The appellant is, therefore, not at all entitled to any relief on this score." 7. In my view, the authorities below were not justified in rejecting the claim of the petitioner. The sale deeds which had been filed before the Prescribed Authority clearly showed that some land at least had been purchased by the petitioner before the 1st day of May, 1959. It was no ones case that the petitioner as a Church Institution was not a genuine one or that its incomes were being used for any private purpose. Normally, there is a presumption in respect of such institutions that their incomes are utilised for religious or charitable purposes. Moreover, I would be very hesitant to interpret the provisions contained in Section 6 (1) (f) of the Act in a manner that when there is undoubtedly any religious or charitable institution, the same should be denied the benefit of the said clause merely because some wrong Manager or Trustee or Director in the Institution has illegally spent moneys of the Institution for his personal gains. One must have a sense of proportion and perspective in these matters. It is not uncommon that even in best managed institutions some times wrong men take personal advantage of their position. What seems really material is the object of the Institution and broad manner in which it is run. However, in the instant case, I am satisfied that there is nothing to warrant any suspicion or doubt being raised regarding the activities of the Institution and the manner in which its incomes are being spent. The fact that certain fees are being charged from the students will not disentitle the Institution from claiming the benefit of Section 6 (1) (f) of the Act. In this connection a distinction must be kept in mind between the objects of the Institution and its powers. In this connection the following passage from the Commentary on Income-tax Act by Kanga and Palkhivala, Seventh Edition is relevant: "Thus if a trust created for relief of poverty employs men and women in a business enterprise so as to give them means of livelihood, or an educational trust in carrying out its purpose sells books at a profit, the purpose of the trust would still be charitable. In other words, where the purpose is relief of the poor, education or medical relief, and the activity for profit is carried on in the course of the actual carrying out of the primary purpose of the trust, the requirements of the definition of "charitable purpose" would be fully satisfied." 8. Learned Standing Counsel pointed out that not all the lands for which exemption was sought under Section 6 (1) (f) could be granted such exemption because many of the lands were acquired after 1st May, 1959. On the other hand, Sri Nigam said that even if the exemption was granted in respect of the lands which were admittedly shown to be acquired before 1st May, 1959, then the notice under Section 10 (2) of the Act will have to be discharged. I think, in this situation, I should allow this petition and the matter should go back to the appellate court for a fresh determination as to which lands were acquired before 1st May, 1959 and which were acquired after the said date. I think, in this situation, I should allow this petition and the matter should go back to the appellate court for a fresh determination as to which lands were acquired before 1st May, 1959 and which were acquired after the said date. After giving the necessary relief to the petitioner in respect of the lands which were acquired before 1st May of 1959, the appellate court will state whether there remains any surplus land and if no surplus land remains the notice under Section 10 (2) will be discharged. It is made clear that no other controversy shall be raised hereafter before the appellate court and as I have held above, the appellate court shall treat the petitioner entitled to the benefit of Section 6 (1) (f) of the Act and the only purpose for which the case is being remanded is to examine the sale deeds on record and to determine which of them relates to the period prior to 1st day of May 1959. In the circumstances, e no order as to costs.