S.K. MAL LODHA, J.—This is a second appeal by the defendant-tenant (appellant) against the judgment and decree dated April 5, 1973, passed by the Additional District Judge, Sriganganagar, by which he confirmed the decree for arrears of rent and ejectment dated October 27, 1972 of the Civil Judge, Sri-Ganganagar. 2. A few facts deserve recall here: The Plaintiff respondent (Landlord) instituted a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment against the defendant-appellant. The case of the plaintiff-respondent was that the defendant-appellant is a tenant on monthly rent of Rs. 60/- p.m. in shop No. 52/4. Gole Bazar, Sriganganagar. The month of tenancy, according to the plaintiff, is 1st of every English calender month. The rent from April 1, 1969 to August 31, 1969 amounting to Rs. 300/- was due from the defendant. The ejectment was sought on the ground that the shop was let out for business purposes, but the defendant has kept it closed for the last six years preceding the date of the institution of the suit whereby contravening the terms of the tenancy. An additional ground for ejectment under Section 13 (1) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was also averred in para 4 of the plaint, with which I am not concerned in this appeal. The plaintiff served a notice dated August 2. 1969 upon the defendant under Sec. 196 of the Transfer of Property Act, terminating the tenancy on the expiry of August 31, 1969. As the defendant failed to vacate the shop, the plaintiff instituted a suit on September 5, 1969 for Rs, 300/- as arrears of rent and ejectment against the defendant in the court of Munsif, Sriganganagar. He also claimed pendente lite and future interest. 3. The suit was contested by the defendant on various grounds. It was, inter alia, pleaded by him that he has been carrying on whole-sale business in the shop and has been using it as a Godown and that the shop always remains open and his Muneem sits on it. It was also submitted that the shop was not kept locked. The suit was contested by the defendant on various grounds. It was, inter alia, pleaded by him that he has been carrying on whole-sale business in the shop and has been using it as a Godown and that the shop always remains open and his Muneem sits on it. It was also submitted that the shop was not kept locked. It was pleaded that right from the very inception of taking the shop on rent, he has been carrying on business in a Tehbazari shop and later on in shop No. 25; thai the plaintiff knew it fully well that he had another shop when the shop in suit was rented out to him and that thus, he is estopped from contending to the contrary. 4. The learned Civil Judge framed issues arising out of the pleadings of the parties. Issues No. 2 and 4, are as under: "2. Has the defendant not used the shop in suit without reasonable cause for the purpose for which the same was let out to him for a continuous period of six months preceding the date of suit? 4. As per allegations of defendants written statement in para 8 and 9 is the plaintiff estopped?" The plaintiff examined P.W. 1 Gulab Singh, P.W. 2 Kishanlal, P.W. 3 Avtar-Singh and P.W. 4 Prabhu Dayal. The defendant examined himself as D.W. 1, D.W. 2 Babulal and D.W. 3 Pukhram. 5. The learned Civil Judge recorded the following findings: (1) That the defendant has acquired another suitable shop but he cannot be evicted from the shop in suit under section 13 (1) (i) of the Act; (2) That the defendant has not used the shop in suit without reasonable cause for the purpose for which, the same was let out to him for a continuous period of more than six months preceding the date of the suit; and (3) That notice in suit complied with all the requirements of S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, and, therefore, it is valid. In view of the findings recorded by the learned Civil Judge, the plaintiffs suit for possession of the shop by ejectment therefrom and for Rs. 300/-as arrears of rent was decreed against the defendant with costs and pendente lite and future rent @ Rs. 60/- per month till the date he (defendant) vacates the shop. In view of the findings recorded by the learned Civil Judge, the plaintiffs suit for possession of the shop by ejectment therefrom and for Rs. 300/-as arrears of rent was decreed against the defendant with costs and pendente lite and future rent @ Rs. 60/- per month till the date he (defendant) vacates the shop. The defendant was allowed two months time to vacate the shop. Feeling aggrieved, the defendant went in appeal and the learned Additional District Judge, by his judgment dated April 5, 1973, dismissed the appeal. 6. Before the learned Additional District Judge finding on issue No. 2, which included the finding on issue No. 4, was assailed The learned Additional District Judge, after taking into consideration the relevant portion of the plaint and the evidence bearing on issue No. 2, recorded the following findings: (1) that the plaintiff has proved that the shop was given to the defendant for business and that he has not used the shop for more than six months without any reasonable cause and, thus, the ground given in section 13 (1) (i) is established; and (2) that mere acceptance of rent does not amount to acquiescence and the plaintiff is not estopped from taking this as ground for ejectment. 7. I have heard Mr. H.C. Jain, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Rajendra Mehta for the respondent. 8. Appearing for the appellant, Mr. Jain raised the following contentions: (1) that ingredients under section 13 (1) (j) of the Act for ejecting the appellant from the shop did not exist in this case and that closing of the shop in the circumstances, of this case, at any rate, will not amount to non-user within the meaning of the aforesaid provision of the Act. (2) that the evidence on which the learned Additional District Judge has recorded the finding that shop in suit has not been used by the defendant for more than six months without any reasonable cause, is not sufficient, is for reaching the conclusion to which be did, for, closure of the shop is not material for holding that it is non-user under section 13 (1) (j). (3) that in the first instance, the burden was on the plaintiff to show that the defendant has not used the shop without reasonable cause for the purpose, for which it was let out for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit, which, he has failed to discharge and in the alternative if the defendant is to prove that he had not used the shop without reasonable cause, the non-framing of issue is this regard has materially prejudiced the defendant. Mr. Rajendra Mehta strenuously opposed the above contentions and submitted: (1) that the foundation for evicting the defendant under section 13 (l)(j) of the Act were laid down in paras 3 and 5 of the plaint and that even if paras 3 and 5 are laconic, the claim of the plaintiff to eject the defendant under section 13 (1) (j) of the Act should not be defeated on account of the defect in them. (2) that the concurrent finding regarding non-user of the shop by the defendant being based on appreciation of the evidence, is not open to challenge in second appeal under section 100, C. P. C. being one of fact; (3) that all the conditions contemplated under section 13(1) (j) of the Act are satisfied and, therefore, the decree for ejectment passed by the learned Civil Judge and confirmed on appeal by the learned Additional District Judge does not call for any interference by this Court; and (4) that so far as the point that the defendant has not used the shop without reasonable cause is concerned, this question does not arise in view of the fact that the case of the defendant is that he has been carrying on the business in the shop and using it as a Godown. In the alternative it was urged that so far as proving of reasonable cause is concerned, the facts relating thereto are within the special knowledge of the defendant for proving that he has not used the shop without reasonable cause. 9. I have bestowed my most anxious and thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties. 10. Before I proceed to examine these contentions, I consider it necessary to notice the pleadings of the parties in this regard. 9. I have bestowed my most anxious and thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties. 10. Before I proceed to examine these contentions, I consider it necessary to notice the pleadings of the parties in this regard. Para No. 3 of the plaint reads as under: ^^¼3½ ;g fd eqnk;yk us fiNys dbZ lkyksa ls nqdku tSj cgl cUn j[kh gSA ;g nqdku eqnk;yk dks dkjksckj ds fy;s nh xbZ FkhA nqdku cUn j[kus ds dkj.k nqdku dk ewY; de gks x;k gS vkSj blls eqnbZ ds gd feyfd;r ij foijhr izHkko iM+rk gSA nqdku dks fiNys N% lky ls cUn j[k dj eqnk;yk ds dkuwu fdjk;snkjh dk mYya?ku fd;k gS vkSj ;g csn[kyh dk Hkkxh gSA** Para No. 5 of the plaint is as follows: ^^;g fd eqnk;yk dh ekg cekg fdjk;snkjh uksfVl fnukad 2-8-69 tSj nQk 106 VªkalQj vkQ izksiVhZ ,DV nsdj lekIr dh tk pqdh gS tks rkjh[k 31-8-69 ds vUr ls lekIr dh xbZ gSA ;g uksfVl eqnk;yk dks rkjh[k 5-8-69 dks izkIr gks pqdk gSA eqnk;yk dh vksj bl uksfVl dk tks mRrj Hkstk x;k gS mlesa dqy rF; xyr c;ku fd;s x;s gSA nqdku tSj cgl esa dksbZ Fkksd dkjksckj ugha gksrk vkSj uk gh og xksnke ds :i esa bLrseky djus dk dksbZ gd ugh gSA fe;kn fdjks;nkjh rkjh[k 31-8-69 ds vUr ls lekIr gksus ds ckn eqnk;yk us nqdku etdwj [kkyh djds mldk dCtk eqnbZ dks ugha fn;kA cl ;gh fcuk;s eq[kky;r gSA udy uksfVl kkfey nkok gSA** In reply to para 3 of the plaint, the defendant in the written statement, has stated asunder: ^^;g fd en ua- 3 vthZnkok otg xyr c;kuh rlyhe ughaA eqnk; ysg us nqdku eqruktk xksnke ok Fkksd dkjksckj ds fy;s yh Fkh vkSj kq: ls vc rd cjkcj blesa xksnke ok Fkksd dkjksckj dj jgk gSA nqdku eqruktk dHkh cUn ugha jgh u jgrh gS vkSj uk jgsaxhA xksnke ok Fkksd dkjksckj ds flyflys esa geskk [kqyh jgh gS vkSj [kqyh jgsaxhA ,d equhe bl ij gj le; cSBrk jgk gS nqdku dk ewY; de ugha gqvk gS u eqnbZ bl ij gj le; cSBrk jgrk gS nqdku dk ewY; de ugha gqvk gS u eqnbZ ds fdlh gdwd feyfd;r ij dHkh dksbZ foijhr izHkko iM+k gS fiNys 6 lky ls cUn j[kus dk okdk drbZ xyr gS eqnk;ysg us dkuwu fdjk;snkjh dk mYya?ku ugha fd;k gS mls dkuwuu csn[ky ugha fd;k tk ldrkA** In reply to para 5 of the plaint, it was stated that the contents of para No. 5 of the plaint are not admitted; that notice issued by the plaintiff is invalid and that the contents of the reply to the notice are correct. On the basis of the above referred paras of the pleadings, issue No. 2 as staled above, was framed. It appears from the order sheet dated July 10, 1970 that an application was moved on behalf of the defendant for the amendment of the issues. It may be stated here that during the trial, none of the parties raised any protest or demur against the form of issue No. 2. It may be mentioned here that during the trial of the parties the plaintiffs evidence for the first time was recorded on August 10, 1972. The plaintiff finished his evidence on August 22, 1972. The defendant examined his witnesses on September 15, 1972 and closed the evidence. 11. Material portion of S. 13 of the Act, for the present purpose, is as under; "13. Eviction of tenant: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no Court shall pass any decree, or make any order in favour of a landlord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, evicting the tenant so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent therefor to the full extent allowable by this Act, unless it is satisfied- ..................................................................................................................... (j) that the premises have not been used without reasonable cause for the purpose for which they were let out for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit." Section 13(1) (j) is in identical terms with that of section 13(l)(k) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Houses Rates Control Act (LVII of 1947). Clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 13 of the Act may be analysed as below: That the premises- (i) have not been used; (ii) without reasonable cause; (iii) for which they were let...... (iv) for a continuous period of six months...... immediately preceding the date of the suit. 12. It, therefore, follows that in order to succeed in evicting a tenant, the landlord must establish the following conditions: (1) that the premises have not been used for the purpose for which, it was taken on lesse by the tenant; (2) that the non-use is continuous for six months immediately before the filing of the suit; (3) that the tenant has no reasonable explanation to show the cause for non-use. Vaidya, i. in Achut vs. Sadasguv (1), while considering section 13(l)(k) of the aforesaid Bombay Act, observed as under: "To succeed in such a suit, the landlord must therefore, establish:- (1) that the premises have not been used for the purpose for which they were let; (2) that the said non-user was without reasonable cause; and (3) that such non user was for a continuous part of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit." Cl. (c) of S. 21(1) of the Mysore Rent Control Act (No. XXII of 1961) is more or less in the same terms with that of S. 13(l)(j) of the Act. It is clear from S. 21(6) of the aforesaid Mysore Act that the notice which it directs and the finding which it enjoins are necessary only when an eviction is made under Cl. (a) of Section 21(1). 13. Let me examine para 3 of the plaint, which has already been produced hereinabove. From a careful reading of para 3 of the plaint, it is abundantly clear to my mind that the defendant has closed the shop for the last seven years; that it was rented out for doing business and that by keeping the shop closed for six years he has contravened the law of tenancy and is liable to be evicted. It is true that in this para, the plaintiff has stated that on account of closure of the shop, its value has diminished and this has adversely affected the ownership rights of the plaintiff, which it was not necessary for the plaintiff to have stated. 14. In para 5, the plaintiff has merely refuted the contents of the reply to the notice given by the defendant. In particular, it was stated that in the shop in question, neither whole-sale business is carried out nor it is being used as a Godown. In addition to this, it was also stated that the defendant has no right to use the shop is question as a Godown. The learned Additional District Judge, while repelling the argument that ground envisaged by S. 13(l)(j) of the Act was not taken by the defendant and, therefore, the plaintiff cannot be granted the relief on that account, has observed that the Court should not consider the pleadings of the parties wish such technicality if from the pleadings substance having bearing on the question in controversy can be inferred. In this connection, reference was made to Deeplal vs. Gulabchand (2), wherein it was held that the pleadings should not be construed very strictly and the Court must look essential justice of the case. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Madan Gopal vs. Manraj (3), observed that it is well settled that the pleadings are loosely drafted in the courts, and the courts should not scrutinise the pleadings with such meticulous care so as to result in genuine claims, being defeated on trivial grounds. In the case in hand, as stated above. I have no hesitation in saying that the ground envisaged by S. 13 (1) (j) of the Act can easily be spelt out and construed in the light of the well recognised canons, it cannot be said that the defects in it are of such a grave nature so as to lake out from the ambit of the requirements of S. 13(1) (j) of the Act. 15. The next question that, therefore, crops up for consideration is whether the conditions which are necessary for evicting the defendant so contemplated by S. 13 (1) (j) of the Act, as pleaded in para 3, have been satisfied or not. 16. The learned Civil Judge, after scrutinising the statements of P. W. 1 Gulabsingh (Mukhtiar-Am of the plaintiff), P.W 2 Kishan Lal (Rent Collector of the plaintiff), P. W. 3 Autar Singh (Compounder of Dr. Nirmal Singh) and P. W. 4 Prabhu Dayal (Neighbour), D.W.1 Santilal (defendant), D W.2 Babulal and D. W. 3 Pukh Ram came to the conclusion that the defendant has not used the shop in suit for a continuous period of more than six months preceding the date of the suit. While recording this conclusion, he relied on the evidence produced by the plaintiff and rejected that of the defendant. In addition to that, the learned Civil Judge was of the opinion that the defendant has failed to produce documentary evidence which was in his possession and which could have conclusively proved his allegation". It appears that he was influenced by the fact the defendant could have produced the witnesses in support of his allegation that he was carrying on business in the shop in suit, which it failed to do so. The learned Civil Judge, after appreciating the evidence, decided issue No. 2 in favour the plaintiff and against the defendant. It appears that he was influenced by the fact the defendant could have produced the witnesses in support of his allegation that he was carrying on business in the shop in suit, which it failed to do so. The learned Civil Judge, after appreciating the evidence, decided issue No. 2 in favour the plaintiff and against the defendant. The learned Additional District judges affirmed the finding of the learned Civil Judge. He was of the opinion that the statements of D. W. 2 Babulal and D. W. 3 Pukhram do not reconcile with the statement of the defendant. According to the defendant, Pannalal, Sitaram and Kewalram used to sit on the shop in addition to him. None of the aforesaid persons were produced by the defendant. The learned Additional District Judges, on account of their non-production coupled with the fact that neither the cash memo nor the licence nor any other account book was produced to show that this shop was being used by the defendant, opined that the shop remained closed. It is clear from the allegation of the defendant that he has been carrying on whole-sale business in the shop, which was not held proved. Because of the aforesaid reasons, the learned Judge of the appellate court recorded the finding that the plaintiff has proved that the shop was rented out to the defendant for business and that it has not been used for more than six months without reasonable cause. 17. This finding in the appeal, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, does not conclude the matter, for, closing of the shop as has been deposed by the witnesses, does not amount to its non-user under S. 13(l)(j) of the Act. Learned counsel referred to Balwant Singh vs. Gurdial Singh (4), Mrs. K. Atma Ram vs. Kanwar Mohinder Singh (5), Ajit Singh vs. Inder Saran (6) and Sant Singh vs. Attar Singh (7). I have read these decisions with requisite care and I am satisfied that they are of no assistance for deciding the point canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant, namely, that the closure of the shop as is borne out from the record, does not amount to non-user within the meaning of S. 13(l)(j) of the Act. I have read these decisions with requisite care and I am satisfied that they are of no assistance for deciding the point canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant, namely, that the closure of the shop as is borne out from the record, does not amount to non-user within the meaning of S. 13(l)(j) of the Act. In Balwant Singhs case (4), the learned Chief Justice was concerned with section 13(2)(v) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (No. III of 1949). In Cl. (v) of S. 13(2) of the aforesaid Act. the words used are "the tenant has ceased to occupy the building for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause". It was held that section 13 (2) (v) covers a case where the premises are locked and have not been actually used for a period of ever four months and does not cover a case where the premises are continuously in use though the tenant himself does not stay there. To quote: "At worst such a case might be treated as one if the landlord is able to establish the relevant facts where the tenant has transferred his lessee right in favour of somebody else or that he has transferred the possession and user of the premises in favour of somebody else. That would be covered by clause (ii)(a) of sub-section (2) of section 13 of the Act, rather than by this clause (v)." In Mrs. K. Atma Rams case (5), section 13(2) (ii) (b) of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act (No. III of 1949) came up for consideration. The learned Judge, in para 11 of the report, amongst others, held that the onus of proving a certain ground of ejectment is always upon the landlord and if he fails to discharge this onus by producing cogent material so as to bring his case within the ambit of the aforesaid Act, he cannot claim eviction of the tenant. In Ajit Singhs case (6), during the course of arguments, it was contended that for determining the question a as to the purpose of letting including the incidental question as to the actual user of the premises, both the courts below had perhaps unintentionally ignored a number of press cuttings dated back to the early fifties which clearly brought out that the nature cure clinic and the children school have been popular project of Dr. K. and had found acceptance and attracted recommendation from very high quarters. This was not seriously disputed but he sought to justify the exclusion on the ground that the press cutting did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Dr. K. was running the clinic or the school in the premises in dispute nor establish the extent of the premises which was really being utilised by Dr. K. for the non-residential purposes. It was observed as under: "It would be useful to remember in this context that inspite of the consistent user of a premises for a composite purpose by Dr. Kachwaha and what now appears to be a dominant non-residential user did not invoke any objection either from the original owners of the property or the Rehabilitation Department or even by the present owners because none of them took any steps to prevent such misuser and the misuser was not made subject matter of an additional ground for the eviction of this tenant. Such consistent user of the premises by him for long years would appear to transform the purpose of letting, even if it was initially intended for a residence." I regret, I have not been able to appreciate as to how this authority of the Delhi High Court could be of any avail regarding the point with which I am concerned. In Mangilal vs. Satpal (8), ejectment was sought on that the tenant had allowed the premises to remain unoccupied for a period of more than four months. The learned Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that the expression occupation is not synonymous with the expression residence. For construing the words "premises have not been used" occurring in S. 13(l)(j) of the Act, the aforesaid authorities, relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, as I have mentioned above, are of no assistance and do not afford any useful guide for interpreting them. The words "premises have not been used" in my humble opinion, does not mean misuse as held in B. Bhoja vs. Anthanasiss Joseph Roche (9) while considering section 21(l)(o) of the Mysore Rent Control Act (No. III of 1882). The words "premises have not been used" in my humble opinion, does not mean misuse as held in B. Bhoja vs. Anthanasiss Joseph Roche (9) while considering section 21(l)(o) of the Mysore Rent Control Act (No. III of 1882). The learned Acting Chief Justice in para 17 of the report, observed as under : "The resultant position emerging from the discussion so far made is that in which a landlord seeks an order for possession on the ground of misuse, his application stands regulated by clause (o) of section 21(6) of the Rent Control Act read with sec. 21(6) of the Act, while the other transgressions prohibited by clause (o) of the Transfer of Property Act stand regulated by clause (b) of section 21(1) of the Rent Control Act." Section 13(l) (j) of the Act covers a case where the premises is closed and hence not been actually used for a period of six months or more. The closing of the shop in question for six months or more immediately preceding the date of institution of suit, in my opinion, amounted to non-user within the meaning of S. 13 (l) (j) of the Act. In the case in hand the shop in suit has not been used for business for more than six months immediately preceding the date of institution of suit, as has been concurrently found by the two courts-below. The finding is one of fact and no question of law can be said to involved in it. This finding is not vitiated on account of any error of law or of procedure. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Gaffar vs. Akal Kanwar (10), while dismissing the appeal, observed as under: "The first appellate Court is right in holding that the premises has not been used by the defendant-tenant for the purpose for which the shop was taken on rent for a period of more than six months. There is no substantial question of law involved in this appeal." It is true that this decision was rendered after the amendment of S. 100, C.P.C. by Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act, 1976, nevertheless as stated above, the finding that the shop in question has not been used for more than six months is one of fact and no question of law can be said to be involved in it. 18. 18. This takes me to the consideration of the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the condition mentioned in section 13 (1) (j) "immediately preceding the date of suit" has neither been alleged much less proved and, therefore, the decree for ejectment under section 13(l)(j) passed by the Civil Judge and confirmed by the learned Additional District Judge, cannot be sustained. So far as the foundation in pleadings is concerned, suffice it to state that the plaintiff has categorically stated in para 3 of the plaint that the defendant has closed the shop for the several years and that by closing it for the last six years, the defendant has contravened the law relating to tenancy Act. The suit was instituted on September 5, 1969. This shows that six years preceding the date of the suit, the shop of the plaintiff had remained closed. Not only that, prior to the institution of the suit, notice (Ex. 1) dated August 2, 1969 was issued to the defendant, in which it was stated that the defendant has closed the shop in question The learned Additional District Judge, in the impugned judgment, while considering the statement of P.W. 1 Gulab Singh has mentioned that in the cross-examination the witness has stated that for the last 5-6 months this shop is kept open and the defendant is not sitting on it and that the shop is being used for the last 5-6 months for the wholesale business. This statement stands supported by the statement of P.W. 2 Kishan Lal, P.W. 3 Avtarsing and P.W. 4 Prabhu Dayal. The statement of Gulab Singh was recorded on August 16, 1972. In the cross-examination, this witness has deposed: ^^vc nkok okyh nqdku vkt ls fiNys 5&6 ekg ls [kqy jgh gS ij izfroknh ml ij vc Hkh ugha cSBrh gSA vc 5&6 eghuksa ls bl nqdku ij dkSu vkneh cSBrk gSA eSa ugha tkurk D;ksafd eSa bl vkneh dks tkurk ughaA** So also, PW 2 Kishanlals statement was recorded on Aug. 16, 1972 that after the institute an of the suit and 4-5 months earlier from that day, the shop was open. P.W. 3 Avtarsinghs statement was recorded on August 20, 1972. He has stated that prior to 6-7 months from the date of recording to the statement, the shop is being kept open. 16, 1972 that after the institute an of the suit and 4-5 months earlier from that day, the shop was open. P.W. 3 Avtarsinghs statement was recorded on August 20, 1972. He has stated that prior to 6-7 months from the date of recording to the statement, the shop is being kept open. The statement of P.W. 4 Prabhu Dayal was recorded on August 22, 1972. The suit was instituted, as stated earlier, on September 5, 1969. The statements of these witnesses were recorded in August, 1972. It is clear from the statements of the aforesaid witnesses that the shop has been kept open prior to 6-7 months from the date of the recording of their statements. It is, thus, clear that the shop remained closed for more than six months preceding the date of the institution of the suit and was not used. Even after the institution of the suit the shop had remained closed as according to these witnesses, who have been believed by the learned Additional District Judge, the shop had been kept open only 6-7 months preceding the date of their depositions. A perusal of issue No. 2 shows that it is specifically mentioned therein that "has the defendant not used the shop in suit....... for a continuous period of six months preceding the date of suit." The original issue was amended by the trial court, after the decision of the revision by the High Court on February 4, 1972 and, thereafter, the parties produced their evidence. It is, therefore, futile for the learned counsel for the appellant to contend that there was no issue on the point regarding immediately preceding the date of the institution of the suit. The question of any prejudice does not arise. There is no necessity of framing any separate issue covering the aforesaid point. The finding of the learned Additional District Judge that the defendant has not used the shop for more than six months, does not call for any interference. 19. The other point that remains to be considered in regard to S. 13(1) (j) is that the plaintiff has not alleged that the premises have not been used without reasonable cause. It is correct that the plaintiff has not stated in the plaint that the defendant has not used the shop without reasonable cause. 19. The other point that remains to be considered in regard to S. 13(1) (j) is that the plaintiff has not alleged that the premises have not been used without reasonable cause. It is correct that the plaintiff has not stated in the plaint that the defendant has not used the shop without reasonable cause. It is also true that the plaintiff has not led any evidence regarding without reasonable cause. The question is whether the plaintiff is required to plead and prove the fact without reasonable cause. 20. Before I advert to the relevant law on the point, it may be mentioned that the plaintiff has come forward with a case that the shop is being kept closed for the last several years and that by keeping the shop closed for six years, the defendant has contravened the law pertaining to the tenancy. In para 5, it was stated that the defendant is neither carrying on whole-sale business nor the shop is being used as a Godown. On the contrary, the defendant in para 3 of the written statement has come forward with a case that he took the shop in suit on rent for godown and for carrying wholesale business and that from the very beginning, he has been carrying the business of whole sale and that he has been using it as a godown. It was further averred that the shop has never been kept closed and will not remain closed. In these circumstances, as per the plea taken by the defendant, the question that the shop has not been used, does not arise, for, according to him, he took the shop from the very beginning on rent for using it for whole-sale business and as godown and atleast upto the date when he filed the written statement in court on November 13,1969, there was no non-user of the shop and if that is so, the question that he has not been using the shop without reasonable cause, does not arise. Apart from this, the question that the shop has not been used without reasonable cause, in my opinion, relates to the facts, which are within the special knowledge of the defendant. The burden of proving the facts, which are within the special knowledge of the defendant, the defendant, lies on him under sec. 106 of the Evidence Act. Apart from this, the question that the shop has not been used without reasonable cause, in my opinion, relates to the facts, which are within the special knowledge of the defendant. The burden of proving the facts, which are within the special knowledge of the defendant, the defendant, lies on him under sec. 106 of the Evidence Act. In Mohanlal v. Kasturi Devi (11), it was held that facts necessary to establish any reasonable cause could only be in the knowledge of the tenant, and if he did not lead any evidence to establish those facts it was hardly the statutory duty of the Rent Controller to give a more detailed and specific finding as to reasonable cause for not occupying the shop. In Bhargavi Amma vs. Stephen (12), it was held that one ground for ejectment as laid down in section 11(4) (v)Kerala Building (Lease and Rent Control Act (No. II of 1965) is as follows: "If the tenant ceases to occupy the building continuously for six months without reasonable cause." The learned Judge held that if the facts as disclosed by the evidence shows that the tenant has ceased to occupy a building, the burden is on the tenant to show that he has reasonable cause for doing so. 21. Having regard to the defence taken in para 3 of the written statement, filed by the defendant, I am definitely of the opinion that it was neither necessary for the plaintiff to have pleaded about without reasonable cause" nor was it necessary for him to lead evidence in this regard. The defendant did not come even with an alternative plea to the effect that the shop remained closed or was not used without reasonable cause. In these circumstances, there was no occasion for any of the parties to lead evidence in regard to the point of without reasonable cause. 22. The upshot of the above discussion is that the findings of the learned Additional District Judge that the plaintiff has proved that the shop, which was given to the defendant on rent was for business, and that he has not used it for more than six months without any reasonable cause, are based on appreciation of evidence and that there is sufficient evidence on record to warrant the aforesaid conclusion. Thud, I am unable to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that the evidence fell short to prove non-user within the meaning of S. 13(l)(j) of the Act. The conclusion of the learned Additional District Judge that the plaintiff has proved the ground of eviction under section 13(l)(j) of the Act does not suffer from any infirmity. 23. No other point survives for my consideration. 24. For the aforesaid reasons, this appeal has no merit and it is, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs of this appeal. 25. Learned counsel for the appellant prays that six months time to hand over the vacant and peaceful possession of the shop to the plaintiff-respondent may be allowed to the defendant. Mr. Rajendra Mehta is agreeable to the grant of two months time on the condition that the defendant-appellant hands over vacant and peaceful possession to the plaintiff. In the circumstances of the case four months time is allowed to the defendant-appellant to hand over the vacant and peaceful possession of the shop in suit to the plaintiff. It is made clear that the plaintiff-respondent will be entitled to the entire rent mesne profits, of Rs. 60/- p.m. upto the date of delivery of possession to him.