Judgment S.K.Jha, J. 1. The plaintiff here is the appellant against Judgment of reversal. 2. The appellant had filed the suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession for the land described in Schedule A of the plaint and also for mesne profits from the date of dispossession till the date of delivery of posses-session. His case, in short, was that he purchased through two sale deeds (Exts. 2 and 2/a) dated 25-4-1961 the suit land measuring 15 kathas 12 dhurs in mouza Dariyapur. Under Plot No. 47 appertaining to khata No. 22 from two persons, namely, Shiva Singh and Mathura Singh. Thereafter he came in possession of the land and grew crops over it. According to the appellants case, there was a partition in the family of the ancestors of Shiva Singh and Mathura Singh aforementioned in the year 1908. The land in dispute fell to the twelve annas co-sharers. In the year 1915 there was a second partition in that family. The disputed land was allotted to the share of Radhey Hazari, the father of Shiva Singh and grand-father of Mathura Singh. It may incidentally be mentioned that Shiva Singh is the father of Mathura Singh. In the year 1954 there was a partition among the sons of Radhey Hazari and the suit land fell to the share of Shiva Singh and his son Mathura Singh from whom the appellant purchased the land, Thereafter, Prameshwari Hazari filed a Title Partition Suit No. 4 of 1956 in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Begusarai. In order to exert pressure on vendors of the plaintiff, Prameshwari Hazari got registered a Kebala with respect to the land involved in the suit on 19-5-1961 after antedating its date of execution to 17-4-1961. A proceeding under Sec.144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was started which was ultimately converted into one under Sec.145 of the Code. In that proceeding the possession of defendants first party respondents first party was declared by the Magistrate. Thereafter the defendants-respondents are said to have forcibly dispossessed the plaintiff-appellant. In the meantime, the Title partition Suit No. 4 of 1956 abovementioned was decreed in terms of a compromise Petition which formed a part of the decree. The disputed land was confirmed under the decree to be in possession of Shiva Singh, the vendor of the plaintiff. Thereafter the appellant filed the instant title suit. 3. In the meantime, the Title partition Suit No. 4 of 1956 abovementioned was decreed in terms of a compromise Petition which formed a part of the decree. The disputed land was confirmed under the decree to be in possession of Shiva Singh, the vendor of the plaintiff. Thereafter the appellant filed the instant title suit. 3. The case of the defendants first party respondents first party was that a sate deed was executed by Prameshwari Hazari and his sons on 17-4-1961 in favour of Mossamat Sugawati Devi, respondent No. 6 and she came in possession of the suit land on the basis of sale-deed which has been marked Ext. A-l/3. Although the Sale deed was registered on 19-5-1961, it had, in fact, been executed on 17-4-1961. The further case of the contesting defendants was that the suit land was recorded in the names of one Brijlal Hazari and his brother in the last survey of record of rights. The Co-sharers of the family had already partitioned their land prior to the last survey and entries were made in the survey records of right in accordance with their possession over the lands. The disputed land fell to the share of Brijlal Hazari in the mutual partition among their brothers. After the death of Brijlal Hazari, Prameshwari Hazari came in its possession until he sold the land to Mossamat Sugawafi, who came in its possession 4. The trial Court decreed the suit holding that the transfer in favour of Mossamat Sugawati Devi, respondent No, 6, who was defendant No. 2 in the suit was hit by the doctrine of lis pendens as engrafted in Sec. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The lower appellate Court has not directed its mind to this aspect of the case at all. 5. Mr. The lower appellate Court has not directed its mind to this aspect of the case at all. 5. Mr. Kailash Roy, learned Counsel for the appellant urged that the transfer in favour of defendant No. 2 respondent No. 6 Sugawati must be held to be bad, since the transaction took place during the pendency of the Title Partition Suit No. 4 of the 1956 which ultimately resulted in a compromise decree by which admittedly it was declared that the parties had already partitioned all their lands as was the case of Shiva Singh and Mathura Singh prior to the institution of that suit and that the suit land amongst others had always remained in possession of Mathura Singh and Shiva Singh who alone had title to such land even before the institution of the aforesaid Title Partition Suit No. 4 of 1956. By the compromise decree the stand taken by the appellant in this suit was fully accepted. This being the admitted position, I have no doubt that the transfer in favour of defendant No. 2 Sugawati would be hit by Sec. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The relevant portion of the compromise decree runs in the following terms. The different branches of the family as mentioned in paragraph 2 (E) of that petition were completely separated from one another in every respect and that they had exclusive title and possession over their respective property. They were in separate exclusive possession of the suit property as a result of previous partition the details of which were given in the various schedules attached to the petition. The compromise decree accordingly establishes that the land in dispute exclusively belonged at all relevant time to Shiva Singh and Mathura Singh. Sugawati with her eyes open and knowing about the pendency of the title partition suit had taken a sale deed on 17-4-196! assuming that that is the correct date of execution of the document. It is not the case of the-defendants that the earlier Title Partition Suit No. 4 of the 1956 was collusive in nature nor is it anybodys case that the compromise decree which was passed in the suit was in any way fraudulent or collusive. All that is said in the written statement of the defendants is that the allegations made in the plaint with regard to the title partition suit and its compromise were not correct. All that is said in the written statement of the defendants is that the allegations made in the plaint with regard to the title partition suit and its compromise were not correct. There is not a breath of whisper with regard to either the suit being collusive or the decree being fraudulent, The relevant portion of Sec. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act reads thus; 52. During the pendency in any Court having authority with the limits of India...of any suit or proceeding which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the right of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein except under the authority of the Court.... Admittedly, there was no authority of the Court for transferring the land in dispute on 17-4-1961 or on any other date. Sugwatis rights, therefore, must be held subject to the decree, albeit in terms of a Compromise, passed in Title Partition Suit No. 4 of 1956. The lower appellate Court seems to think that since Sugawati was not a party in the title partition suit, she cannot be held to be bound by the decree passed in that suit which was between her vendor and the vendors of the plaintiff appellant. This is clearly an erroneous approach in law. The doctrine of Us.pendens embodied in Sec. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is based upon sound principles of law and equity. It would plainly be impossible that any action or suit could be brought to a successful termination if alienations pendente lite were permitted to prevail.The only exception is with regard to any suit or proceeding which is collusive in nature If the suit or other legal proceeding is not collusive in nature then even though the suit ends in a compromise decree between the parties, the transferee from the unsuccessful party during the pendency of the suit shall be bound by the decree passed in the previous suit. Learned Counsel for the appellant rightly pressed into service the decisions in the cases of Tinoo-dhan Chatterjee V/s. Trailokhya Charan Sanyal, 17 CalWN 413, Hukum Chand and Ors. V/s. Raja Ram Bahadur Singh and Anr., AIR 1919 Pat 146, Mst. Learned Counsel for the appellant rightly pressed into service the decisions in the cases of Tinoo-dhan Chatterjee V/s. Trailokhya Charan Sanyal, 17 CalWN 413, Hukum Chand and Ors. V/s. Raja Ram Bahadur Singh and Anr., AIR 1919 Pat 146, Mst. Ramdulari Kuer and Ors. V/s. Upendra Nath Basu, AIR 1925 Pat 462 and Gouri Dutt Maharaj V/s. Sukur Mohammad and Ors., AIR 1948 PC 147. It is a well settled principle of law that the mere fact that a suit is terminated by a consent decree does not take it out of the operation of the doctrine of lis pendens as enunciated in Sec. 52. A suit in order to be contentious or not collusive need not be contested in all its stages. A non-collusive suit is one in which a party having difference in a matter puts the law in motion as against the other. A Division bench of this Court in the case of Hukum Chand (supra) held that the doctrine of lis pendens, as embodied in Sec. 52, applies to transfers during the pendency of a suit even when that suit is terminated by a compromise decree. The only requirement in such cases is that the Court should be satisfied that the compromise is not a collusive arrangement entered into with the object of defeating a purchaser. As has been held by Privy Council in the case of Gouri Dutt Maharaj, (supra) the broad purpose of Sec. 52 is to maintain the status quo unaffected by the act of any party to the litigation pending its determination. The applicability of the section cannot depend on matters of proof or strength or weakness of the case on one side or the other in bona fide proceedings. In the instant case, the Court of appeal below has led stress on the fact that Sugawati was not a party to the compromise decree. It is not a prerequisite for the applicability of Section 52 that any transferee pendente lite must be a party to the compromise entered into between the parties, who have bona fide put the law into motion for setting a bona fide dispute. 6 Learned Counsel for the respondents urged that in a partition suit the doctrine of lis pendens does not apply, I am unable to accept this contention as being well founded in law. 6 Learned Counsel for the respondents urged that in a partition suit the doctrine of lis pendens does not apply, I am unable to accept this contention as being well founded in law. Learned Counsel placed reliance upon a decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Shaik Khan Ali V/s. Pestoriji Eduljee Guydar, 1 CalWN 62. That was a case in which in a partition suit the shares of the parties were admitted and it was admitted case of the contesting parties that they wanted a partition by metes and bounds. In that event, the transfer by one of the admitted co-sharers was held not to be hit by the doctrine of lis pendens. It is no doubt true that if in a partition suit the shares of all parties are admitted, the doctrine of lis pendens is inapplicable because in the event of a decree being passed, the transferee would be entitled to substitute security. That is not the case here. As already stated above, the compromise decree clearly states that there had already been a previous partition in the family by metes and bounds in which the disputed land had fallen to the share of Shiva Singh and Mathura Singh, who were in actual possession of the same before the institution of the suit. The effect of the decree thus would . be that there was no unity of title and unity of possession between the parties on the date of the institution of the suit and that makes all the difference. 7. For the foregoing reasons, I would allow this appeal, set aside the Judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court and restore that of the trial Court. The appellant shall be entitled to costs throughout.