S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) IN this second appeal filed at the instance of to original plaintiffs of regular civil suit No. 16 of 1977 on the file of the Learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Kalol (Panchmahals district) this court (N. H. Bhatt J.) at the stage of admission framed the following substantial questions of law for decision:1. Whether it is competent to the State Government or Development Commissioner under see. 305 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) to call for and examine the record or proceedings of any panchayat or of any committee thereof which is final under sec. 220 (3) of the Act?2. Whether it would be competent to a civil court in a suit to go behind aa order of the District Panchayat or its committee in an appeal under sec. 290 (1) of the Act and which order is final under sec 290 of the Act ?3. Whether a resoiution of a Nagar panchayat selecting a tax which it proposes to levy and specifying the rate at which it in to be levied under rule (3) of to Gujarat Gram and Nagar Panchayats (Taxes and Fee) Rules 1954 are in referred to as the Taxes and Fee Rules) ceases to operate or could be Tax after a corresponding resolution of the Panchayat selecting a tax or a fee an deciding the rate at which it is to be levied passed under rule 3 (b) of the Taxes and Fees Rules is set aside?4. Whether the Gujarat Gram and Nagar Panchayat (Procedure) Rules 1963 haw application in the matter of Nagar Panchayat passing a resolution under rule 3 of the Taxes and Fees Rules ? as the present second appeal arises for consideration after the amendment of sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure by Embedding Act of 97 I have to decide this appeal in the light of the aforesaid four Substrate questions of law which have been formulated by the learned Judge admitting this second appeal. ( 2 ) IN order to appreciate the background of the factual events which led to the filing of the second appeal before this court it is necessary to glance through a few relevant facts. ( 2 ) IN order to appreciate the background of the factual events which led to the filing of the second appeal before this court it is necessary to glance through a few relevant facts. I will refer to the appellants as plaintiffs and the respondent Kalol Nagar Panchayat as the defendant for the sake of convenience in the later part of this judgment. Defendantkalol Nagar Panchayat which functions under the provisions of the Gujarat Panchayat Act 1961 is a duly constituted Nagar Panchayat under sec. 13 of the Panchayat Act. It functions in Kalol town in the Panchayat district. It had decided to levy octroi taxes in a meeting dated 7-11-1974 and had finally decided to levy taxes on 18-12-1974. Certain citizens of Kalol town feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decision of the defendant Nagar Palika filed two appeals to the District Development officer Godhra being appeals nos. 16 and 17 of 1975. The District Development Officer heard the parties and came to the conclusion that the people of Kalol were not given adequate opportunity by the Nagar Palika for submitting their oral submissions before taking a decision to impose the proposed octroi tax on various items. Accordingly the District Development Officer Godhra set aside resolution No. 25 dated 18-12-1974 passed by the defendant Nagar Palika and he also set aside notification issued by the defendant Panchayat of 20-12-1974 which was issued by the defendant Panchayat under Rule 4 of the Taxes and Fees Rules. the defendant Panchayat thereafter preferred Special Civil Application No. 1678 of 1975 before this court but after sometime they withdrew the said petition. It appears that after passage of sometime the defendantpanchayat passed a fresh resolution No. 42 dated 25-8-1976 and selected octroi taxes and its rates and issued notices to general public to submit their objections on or before 28-9-1976 and to submit their oral submissions in the meeting which was to be held on 29-9-1976 for that purpose. On that day the defendant Panchayat passed resolution No. 5c by majority of votes and decided to recover octroi tax from 1-12-1976. It appears that thereafter some aggrieved citizens of Kalol again carried the matter to the District Panchayat in appeal. The said appeal was preferred under sec. 178 (6) of the Panchayat Act. The said appeal was numbered appeal No. 14 of 1976-77. It appears that thereafter some aggrieved citizens of Kalol again carried the matter to the District Panchayat in appeal. The said appeal was preferred under sec. 178 (6) of the Panchayat Act. The said appeal was numbered appeal No. 14 of 1976-77. Many contentions were raised in the said appeal but the appeal committee decided one point and held in favour of the appellants and by its order dated 26-11-1976 the appeal committee of the District Panchayat took the view that earlier resolution dated 7 which was passed by the defendant Panchayat was not set aside by any subsequent orders of the District Panchayat at any time and the said resolution was holding field. Consequently the subsequent resolution passed by the defendant Panchayat being resolution No. 42 dated 25-8-1976 inviting objections and resolution No. 50 dated 29-9-1976 whereby it decided to recover octroi taxes from 1-12-1976 were inoperative in law. The defendant Panchayat thereafter carried the matter in revision under sec. 305 of the Panchayat Act before the Development Commissioner. The Additional Development Commissioner who heard the revision allowed the same by his order dated 31-1-1977. The revisional authority took the view that the appellate order passed by the district Panchayat was not correct and was liable to be set aside and instead resolution passed by the defendant Panchayat dated 29-9-1976 was required to be held as valid one. ( 3 ) UNDER the aforesaid circumstances the present plaintiffs who are aggrieved citizens of Kalol town gave a statutory notice under sec. 320 of the Panchayat Act to the defendant Panchayat and thereafter filed regular civil suit No. 16 of 1977 in the court of the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Kalol for a declaration that the impugned resolutions No. 42 dated 25-8-1976 and No. 50 dated 29-9-1976 as passed by the defendant Panchayat were unauthorized inoperative illegal and were null and void and that pursuant to the said resolutions the defendantpanchayat was not entitled to recover octroi taxes. The plaintiff also prayed for consequential injunction permanently restraining the defendantpanchayat from recovering octroi taxes to the basis of these resolutions. The plaintiffs contended that the earlier resolution dated 7-11-1874 was not set aside at any time by the appellate authority and hence it was holding the field. In that view of the matter subsequent resolution No. 42 dated 25-8-1976 was null and void and inoperative at law. The plaintiffs contended that the earlier resolution dated 7-11-1874 was not set aside at any time by the appellate authority and hence it was holding the field. In that view of the matter subsequent resolution No. 42 dated 25-8-1976 was null and void and inoperative at law. The Nagar Panchayat could not have ignored the earlier resolution dated 7-11-1974. The plaintiffs contended that the said resolution was in breach of rules 3 and 3 (b) of the Taxes and Fees Rules. It was further contended that the opportunity for oral submissions given to the plaintiffs was unreal and imposition of octroi taxes by the defendant Panchayat was contrary to the rules of natural justice and was unauthorized. ( 4 ) THE defendant Panchayat by its written statement Ex. 13 resisted the suit and contended that full opportunity was given to the members of the public to submit their objections and thereafter final resolution was passed on 18-12-1974. It was further contended that the District Development Officer had set aside the entire proceedings for octroi taxes in appeals Nos. 16 and 17 of 1975 when final resolution dated 18-12-1974 was set aside and it was not correct to say that only resolution No. 25 and notification under Rule 4 were set aside by the District Development Officer. It was further contended that resolution dated 7-11-1974 was never in existence or force when resolution No. 42 dated 25-8-1976 was passed. That resolution No. 42 was legal and valid. It was further contended that after passing of the aforesaid resolution No. 42 there was sufficient time given to the members of the public who filed their objections and opportunity was given for oral submissions in the meeting of 29-9-1976. Thus the defendant panchayat had followed all the procedural requirements of the rules and the Act and consequently the proposed imposition of octroi taxes by the defendant Panchayat cannot be called in question in a civil court by the plaintiffs. ( 5 ) ON the aforesaid pleadings the learned. trial Judge framed various issues and after recording evidence came to the conclusion that resolution No. 8 dated 7-11-1974 was already set aside by the District Development Officer by his appellate order in appeals Nos. 16 and 17 of 1975 Under these circumstances the defendant Panchayat had full authority to pass resolution No. 42 dated 25-8-1976 and the subsequent would No. 50 dated 29-9-1976. 16 and 17 of 1975 Under these circumstances the defendant Panchayat had full authority to pass resolution No. 42 dated 25-8-1976 and the subsequent would No. 50 dated 29-9-1976. It was further held that the proceedings leading to the passing of resolutions Nos. 42 and go were in consonance with the provisions of the Panchayat Act and the Rules and these Resolutions were validly passed. It was further held that residents of Nagar Palika of Kalol had full opportunity to represent when Resolution No. in tax passed. The learned trial Judge had named issue No. 7 pertaining to the effect of revisional order dated 31-1-1977 as passed by the development Commissioner on the appellate order passed by the District Development Officer in appeals Nos. 16 and 17 of 1975. The learned trial Judge held that the District Panchayat in appeals had decided ali the point and that the revisional order was not hit by the principle of natural justice and was not otherwise illegal. As a result of be aforesaid findings to which the learned trial Judge reached the plaintiffs suit was dismissed with costs. ( 6 ) THE dissatisfied plaintiffs carried the matter in appeal before the District court of Panchayat at Godhra. The said appeal was heard by learned Assistant Judge Panchamahals at Godhra who having record sidered the entire evidence on record agreed with the feedings of the trial court and dismissed the appeal of the plaintiffs. It is thereafter that the dissatisfied plaintiffs have filed this second appeal under secdon 100 of the made of Civil Procedure as amended by the Amending Act of 1976. Consequently the learned Single Judge who admitted this second appeal for final hearing framed the aforesaid four substantial questions of law for decision of this Court in exercise of his power under sec. 100 (4) of the Code. As provided by sec. 100 (5) I have to decide this appeal on these formulated substantial questions of law. ( 7 ) SO far as the first two substantial questions of law are concerned it must be state at the outset that they really do not arise at all from the judgment of the appellate court. These aforesaid law substantial question of law proceed on the assumption that the District Panchayat had passed appellate order under section 290 (1) of the Panchayat Act. These aforesaid law substantial question of law proceed on the assumption that the District Panchayat had passed appellate order under section 290 (1) of the Panchayat Act. it is only the that assumption that the questions are framed us to whether such it appellate order being final under section 290 (3) of the Act can be revised by the State Government under section 305 of the Act. or such finer can be challenged before a civil court in a suit. of capitulate the relevant facts on this aspect it appears clear front there record of the case that that the defendant Nagar Panchayat passed the impugned resolutions Nos. 42 and 50 in 1976 the dissatisfied Plaintiffs challenged these resolutions seeking to levy octroi taxes by preferring appeal No. 14 of 1976-77 before the District Panchayat. The appellate order is on the record at Ex. 39. It is clearly mentioned to the top of this appellate order that the appeal was preferred under sec. 178 (6) of the panchayats Act. Under the said section and person aggrieved by the nssmerat levy or imposition of any tax or fee may appeal to the district panchayat within the prescribed period. Section 178 (6) will have to be read with section 290 A (i) which states :-"290a (1)- Notwithstanding anything contained sec. 131 the appellate were conferred on a district panchayat under secs. 93 178 and 290 shall be exercisable by an Appeal committee of the district panchayat which shall consist of the President of the panchayat and four other members of the panchayat as may be chosen by the Panchayat from amongst its members. " sub-sec. (7) of section 290 A provides :- "any decision given by the Appeal committee in the exercise of the powers conferred on It by this section shall be deemed to be the decision of the district panchayat. "thus the appellate power of District Panchayat as conferred by sec. 178 of the Panchayat Act is an independent appellate own which can be exercised by the appellate committee of the said panchayat as per the enabling provision of section 290a (1) and once the appellate committee exercises its appellate power its decision is deemed to be the decision of the District Panchayat. It is interesting to 4ate that neither in sec. 178 (6) nor in sec. It is interesting to 4ate that neither in sec. 178 (6) nor in sec. 290a (7) there is any provision district such an appellate order shall be final. On the other hand sec. 290 (h) provides as under:- "save as otherwise provided in this Act an appeal shall lie to the district panchayat against any order or decision of a gram panchayat or nagar Panchayat or taluka panchayat affecting any individual or institution. "sub-SEC. (2) of sec. 290 pertains to period of limitation with which we are not concerned and then follows sub-sec. (3) of sec. 290 which has been the kingpin of the two substantial questions of law. Sub-sec. (3) of sec. 290 reads thus: "the district panchayat may pass such order on the appeal as it may deem just and proper and the order on appeal shall be final. " a conjoint reading of sec. 290 (1) and secs. 178 (6) and sec. 290a (1) makes it clear that the District Panchayat exercises appellate jurisdiction under various provisions of the Panchayat Act. Firstly appellate jurisdiction is conferred on the District Panchayat under sec. 93 which is concerned with the control on erection of buildings within the limits of a gram or Nagar Panchayat. Appellate jurisdiction is conferred on the district panchayat by sec. 93 (2) which provides that if the gram or nagar panchayat refuses to give permission to erect any building then the aggrieved person can prefer an appeal against such an order of refusal to the district panchayat. Consequently sec. 93 (2) contemplates one type of appellate jurisdiction of the district panchayat. Then follows sec. 178 under which any decision of the panchayat pertaining to a tax matter can be made the subject matter of appeal under sec. 178 (6 ). This is second type of appellate jurisdiction which is conferred on the district panchayat by sec. 178 and then follows sec. 90 (1) which starts with a non abstante clause meaning thereby that in all other cases save and except in the cases where separate appeals are provided by any other provisions an appeal can lie to the district panchayat against any order or decision of the gram panchayat or nagar panchayat or taluka affecting any individual or institution. Thus the appellate power conferred on the district panchayat under sec. Thus the appellate power conferred on the district panchayat under sec. 290 (1) is a residuary appellate power against any order or decision of the gram panchayat or nagar panchayat or taluka panchayat if it affects any individual or institution. On account of the nonobstinate clause with which sec. 290 (1) starts it is clear that the appellate power of the district panchayat can be exercised under sec. 290 (1) only in cases where appeals to district panchayat are not provided by other procvisions of the Panchayat Act. The finality which is attached to the appellate order of the district panchayat under sec. 290 (3) is a limited finality which is attached only to the appellate orders passed by the district panchayat in exercise of its residuary appellate jurisdiction as conferred by sec. 290 (1 ). It is clear that in the present case the appellate jurisdiction which the district panchayat exercised was not its appellate jurisdiction under sec. 290 (1) at all but it was its separate and independent jurisdiction under sec. 178 (6) read with sec. 290a (1 ). Consequently to such a decision of the district panchayat passed in exercise of its appellate powers under sec. 178 (6 ). no finality can attach. Sub-sec. (3) of sec. 290 cannot attach any finality to any orders passed by the district panchayat in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under other provisions of the Act viz. sec. 93 or sec. 178. As in the present case the appellate order under Ex. 39 was passed in exercise of the powers of the district panchayat under sec. 178 (6) of the Act there was no question of any finality being attached to this order under sec. 290 (3) which cannot be pressed in service at all by the plaintiffs. It is therefore clear that such an appellate order which is not made final under the Act could be very well revised under sec. 305 of the Act in exercise of suo motu revisional jurisdiction as sec. 290 (3) which cannot be pressed in service at all by the plaintiffs. It is therefore clear that such an appellate order which is not made final under the Act could be very well revised under sec. 305 of the Act in exercise of suo motu revisional jurisdiction as sec. 305 in terms provided that the State Government may call for and examine the record of proceedings of any panchayat or of any committee thereof or of any officer (except any proceedings of the Nyaya Panchayat or of the District or the Sessions court in judicial proceedings in revision or reference from the proceedings of a Nyaya Panchayat) for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed and may revise or modify the order as it shall deem just. As the appellate order Ex. 39 passed by the appellate committee of the district panchayat under secs. 178 (6) and 290a (1) read with sec. 290a (7) was deemed to be the decision of the District Panchayat it could clearly be revised by the State Government in exercise of its power under sec. 305 of the Act. ( 8 ) IN view of the aforesaid clear and admitted factual position on the record of this case it is apparent that the first and the second substantial questions of law do not service at all for any decision as they do not arise out of the record of this case and out of the judgment of the appellate court. As the appellate order was not passed by the district panchayat under sec. 290 (1) of the Act at all the first two substantial questions of law which are framed on the assumption that the order was passed by the district panchayat under sec. 290 (1) and had become final under sec. 290 (3) do not really survive for any decision. ( 9 ) BUT even assuming that such questions do survive for consideration even then the first question is required to be answered in the affirmative that is it is competent to the State Government under sec. 305 of the Panchayats Act to call for and examine the record of proceedings of any district panchayat and revise any appellate order passed therein even though it may have been made final under sec. 290 (3) of the Act. The reason for this answer is obvious. 305 of the Panchayats Act to call for and examine the record of proceedings of any district panchayat and revise any appellate order passed therein even though it may have been made final under sec. 290 (3) of the Act. The reason for this answer is obvious. Under sec. 290 (3) what is made final is any order passed in appeal by the district panchayat in exercise of its power under sec. 290 (1 ). Any individual or institution that is affected by an order or decision of the gram panchayat. or nagar panchayat or Taluka panchayat is entitled to file an appeal to the district panchayat under sec. 290 (1) and the appellate order passed to such case is made final that is between the parties such an order must rest where it is. But so far as the State Government is concerned the jurisdiction conferred on it is suo motu revisional jurisdiction which entitles the State Government to call for the record and proceedings of any panchayat or committee thereof or any officer as mentioned in the said section for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any orders passed therein. Thus suo motu revisional power is an independent supervisory power conferred on the State Government by the legislature. It cannot be whittled down by any finality attached to the appellate orders passed by the district panchayat between contesting parties under sec. 290 Qua such parties the order may be final but so far as revisional jurisdiction of the State Government is concerned it remains untouched by any such finality which may be attached to such an appellate order. The aforesaid position of law is now well settled by a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of EVEREST APARTMENTS CO. OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. BOMBAY V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS A. I. R. 1966 S. C. 1449 The Supreme Court in that case had an occasion to consider a similar question which arose under the provisions of the Maharashtra Co operative Societies Act 1960 Under sec. 23 (3) of the Act an order passed in appeal by the Registrar at the instance of the aggrieved party was made final. After such appellate order was made by the Registrar and it had acquired finality under the provisions of sec. 23 (3) of the Act an order passed in appeal by the Registrar at the instance of the aggrieved party was made final. After such appellate order was made by the Registrar and it had acquired finality under the provisions of sec. 23 (3)of the Act the State Government in exercise of its suo motu revisional power under sec. 154 of the Act was requested to revise the order. The State Government took the view that because of the finality which attached to the appellate order under sec. 23 (3) it could not exercise its suo motu revisional power even at the instance of the aggrieved party. The Government order refusing to exercise in its revisional power was unsuccessfully challenged before the High Court of Bombay and thereafter special leave petition was filed in the Supreme Court. Allowing the appeal which arose out of leave petition the Supreme Court held that the Government had wrongly refused to exercise its suo motu revisional jurisdiction on the assumption that the appellate order of the Registrar had become final so far as the State Government was concerned. The Supreme Court held that the finality that attaches to the appellate order is qua the concerned party but such finality does not take away suo motu revisional powers of the State Government which stand on their own and the Government was not bound by such finality of the appellate order. In that connection the Supreme Court made the following pertinent observation:-"government can exercise its powers under sec. 154 in all cases with one exception only and the finality of the order under sec. 23 (3) does not restrict the exercise of the power. The word final in this context means that the order is not subject to an ordinary appeal or revisions but it does not touch the special power legislatively conferred on Government. Though the words on an application of a party which occur in sec. 150 of the Act and in similar enactments in other Acts are not to be found in se. 154 that does not mean that a Party is prohibited from moving Government. As Government is not compelled to take action unless it thinks fit. the party who moves Government cannot claim that he has a right of appeal or revision. On the other hand Government should welcome such applications because they draw the attention of Govt. 154 that does not mean that a Party is prohibited from moving Government. As Government is not compelled to take action unless it thinks fit. the party who moves Government cannot claim that he has a right of appeal or revision. On the other hand Government should welcome such applications because they draw the attention of Govt. to cases in some of which government may be interested to intervene. " the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court really puts the controversy in the present case at an end and finally settles it in favour of the respondent defendant. Mr. Vakil however placed strong reliance on the Full Bench decision of this court in MADHAJI LAKHIRAM V. MASHRUBHAI MAHADEVBHAI RAJKOT AND OTHERS 3 G. L. R. 433. The Full Bench in the aforesaid decision took the view that under sec. 880 of the Tenancy Act once the word final was mentioned sub-sec. 5 thereof as it stood at the relevant time no further revision under sec. 76 of the Act could be entertained by the Revenue Tribunal at the instance of the aggrieved party. Now it is clear that sec. 76 of the Act did not confer any suo motu revisional powers are the Tribunal but it was merely a revision at the instance of the aggrieved party. In such a case it is obvious that finality attached to orders under sec. was would exclude further revisional jurisdiction of the Tribunal at the Distance of the aggrieved party. But so far as the presently case is concerned sec. 305 of the Panchayats Ace confers suo motu revisional powers and in case of suo motu revisional powers the finality attached to any orders can not whittle down such suo motu revisional powers as decided by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case. The Supreme Court decision in Everest Apartments case (supra) therefore squarely applies to the facts of the present case and not the decision of the Full Bench in Madhajis case (supra ). Consequently even assuming that the order under sec. 290 (3) had become final in the present case even then the suo motu revisional jurisdiction under sec. 305 of the Act was not excluded. this first question therefore if at all required to be answered will have to be answered in the affirmative. [the rest of the judgment is not material for the reports. ]appeal dismissed. .