JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows :–– The plaintiff has alleged that one Netai Maity was the owner of the property in question. He had three wives. Benode was the son of his first wife and he pre-decased his father leaving his son, Gaur, defendant No. 1, Akhil was the son of his second wife. His third wife gave birth to two sons, Kokil and Kalipada. Netai died leaving his three sons, Akhil, Kokil and Kalipada and grandson, Gaur. Thereafter Akhil died unmarried and his. 4 annas' share was acquired by his step-brothers, Kokil and Kalipada. Subsequently, Kali died and his interest was acquired by his brother, Kokil. The plaintiff is Kokil's son. Hence the plaintiff has 12 annas' share while Gour, defendant No.1, has the remaining 4 annas' share in the property of the schedule Ka. As regards the property of the schedule Kha Netai had 8 annas' share and the remaining share was held by one Kirtibas. The plaintiff has 6 annas' interest in Netai's 8 annas' share in that property and Gour has 2 annas' share therein. Subsequently the plaintiff purchased the 8 annas' share of Kirtibas from his heirs and thus he acquired 14 annas' share therein. Gour settles 6 cents of land out of the property of schedule Kha with one Madan Mohan Samanta from his own share. In the R.S. Khatian, defendant No.1 increased his share and had it erroneously recorded in the record-of-rights. The plaintiff asked for partition, which was refused by Gour. Hence the suit for partition, for a declaration that the entry in the R.S. Khatian is erroneous and for a permanent injunction. 2. Defendant No. 1 has filed a written statement. His case is that he has 8 annas' share in the property of the schedule Kha to the plaintiff. His uncle Akhil used to live with him. Akhil orally sold his share in the property to him for Rs. 99/- and he has possession therein. Regarding .6 decimals of land of the schedule Kha to the plaint it was jointly settled with Madan by the plaintiff and also by him. Subsequently, he purchased that land from Madan and is in possession thereof as a tenant under the State of West Bengal. 3. 99/- and he has possession therein. Regarding .6 decimals of land of the schedule Kha to the plaint it was jointly settled with Madan by the plaintiff and also by him. Subsequently, he purchased that land from Madan and is in possession thereof as a tenant under the State of West Bengal. 3. The learned Munsif believed the defendant's version, decreed the suit in part, declared that the plaintiff had 8 annas' share in the property of the Ka schedule and 12 annas' share in the property of the schedule Kha. He directed that .6 cents of land belonging to Gour, defendant No.1, was to be kept out of account. Against that decision the plaintiff preferred an appeal. Defendant No.1 also filed a cross-objection. The learned Additional District Judge accepted the plaintiff's version, allowed the appeal and the cross-objection, and found that the plaintiff had 12 annas' share in the property of the schedule Ka and 14 annas' share in the property of the schedule Kha to the plaint. He held that 6 decimals of land out of the property of the schedule Ka would go out of the hotchpotch, as held by the learned Munsif. He rejected the plaintiff's claim for declaration that the entry in the R. S. record-of-rights was wrong. The prayer for permanent injunction was also rejected. Hence this appeal by the defendant No.1. 4. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that this Court should hold that, as a matter of fact, Akhil sold his share in the property to defendant No. 1. The Court issued a commission. The Pleader-Commissioner found existence of ails. The presence of ails shows that the defendant possessed his land separately to the exclusion of others. He paid rents separately, as will appear from the Dakhilas filed by him. The record-of-rights is also in his favour. The cases in (1) Dwarka Nath Chowdhury v. Atul Shib Banerjee, 17 CWN 595 at p. 602, (2) Adam Umar v. Bapu Bawaji, I.L.R. 33 Bom. 116, (3) MT. Maharaja v. Bajrangbali, AIR 1925 Oudh 748, (4) Kassim Hassan v. Hazra Begum, 32 CLJ 151 at p. 165 and (5) Haripada Chowdhury v. Ramkrishna Roy, 60 CWN 257 at p. 262 have been cited. 116, (3) MT. Maharaja v. Bajrangbali, AIR 1925 Oudh 748, (4) Kassim Hassan v. Hazra Begum, 32 CLJ 151 at p. 165 and (5) Haripada Chowdhury v. Ramkrishna Roy, 60 CWN 257 at p. 262 have been cited. It has been stated that appellant's possession regarding Akhil's share in the property was adverse from the inception and that fact is being proved by the existence of the ails. This point arises out of the pleadings and argument. The plaintiff was not at all taken by surprise. Moreover according to Mullah's Hindu Law, the doctrine of representation was recognised before the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into operation. Gour, defendant No. 1, is Benode's son. Gour's father pre-deceased Netai, who was the actual owner of the property. Since the doctrine of representation is recognised by Hindu Law, the Court should hold that Gour acquired 1/3rd share in the property because succession will go by stripes and not per capita. 5. It has been argued on behalf of the respondent that adverse possession was not pleaded. The written statement shows that the suit is barred by limitation. That issue was actually raised but abandoned before the learned Munsif. In the appellate court also the question of ouster was expressly abandoned. The case in (6) Nirmal Chandra Das v. Mahitosh Das, 40 CWN 777 has been cited. It has been argued that adverse possession will have to be exercised to the knowledge of the other party. In the case of (7) Mohd. Seraj v. Adibar Rahaman, AIR 1968 Cal. 550 at P. 553, it has been stated that where the issue of limitation was not pressed in the trial court, it cannot be agitated in appeal. In the case of (8) S. Karish v. Sakina in AIR 1964 SC 1254 at p. 1256 the alternative case was that the title was extinguished by allowing an uninterrupted adverse possession of the real owner. But the alternative claim must be clearly made and proved. Since there is no pleading in this respect, the Court should hold that the suit is not barred by adverse possession. The decision of the learned Additional District Judge regarding the shares is correct because Netai died before the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 came into operation. 6. Let us first take up the question (of Succession to the property of) Netai. The decision of the learned Additional District Judge regarding the shares is correct because Netai died before the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 came into operation. 6. Let us first take up the question (of Succession to the property of) Netai. The latter had four sons and so the 4 sons would get 4 annas' share each in the property. The doctrine of representation will come in aid of the appellant, Gour, and he would get the 4 annas' share of his father. It is common ground that after Netai's death, Akhil died leaving his step-brothers, Kokil and Kalipada. Under the Hindu Law the stepbrothers would inherit to the exclusion of the nephew, Gour. Hence Akhil's share in the property would pass to his step-brothers, Kokil and Kalipada. When Kalipada died, his interest in the property would go to his brother, Kokil. Hence the submissions made on behalf of the appellant in this respect cannot be accepted. I, therefore, find that the learned Additional District Judge rightly found that the plaintiff had 12 annas' share in the Ka property and 14 annas' in the Kha property and defendant No. 1 had 4 annas' share in the property of the schedule Ka 2 annas' share in the property of the schedule Kha. It is not necessary to deal with 6 decimal of land out of the property of the schedule Kha because both the courts have held that that property was jointly settled to Madan by the plaintiff and defendant No.1 and subsequently the defendant No.1 purchased it from Madan. 7. Then about the question of adverse possession. In the case of Dwarka Nath Chowdhury v. Atul Shih Banerjee, in 17 C.W.N. 595 the question of limitation was raised. But in this case, though the question of limitation was pleaded and raised in the issue, it was not pressed before the learned Munsif. The judgment of the first Appellate Court shows that the question of ouster was expressly given up in that Court. There is no averment of adverse possession in the written statement. It will appear from the written statement that possession was being exercised amicably and not adversely. In order to constitute ouster and adverse possession, the same must be exercised to the knowledge of the co-sharer. There is no averment of adverse possession in the written statement. It will appear from the written statement that possession was being exercised amicably and not adversely. In order to constitute ouster and adverse possession, the same must be exercised to the knowledge of the co-sharer. In the case in (9) P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, A.I.R. 1957 SC 314 at p. 318, it has been stated that law is that possession of one co-heir is possession of all the co-heirs and he is presumed to have joint title. He cannot render his possession adverse to others merely by any secret hostile animus on his part in derogation on the other co-heirs' title. There must be open assertion of hostile title coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment to the knowledge of others so as to constitute ouster. The onus is on him to show that by ouster he displaced the title of the lawful owner. In the circumstances of the case, this onus has not been discharged. It is, therefore, held that the suit is not barred by adverse possession and defendant No.1 did not acquire the share of Akhil in the property by oral purchase or by adverse possession. The decision of the learned Additional District Judge cannot be disturbed. The appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.