ORDER A.N. Varma, J. - This is a petition by a landlord of a shop, of which respondents - Nos. 2 and 3 are the tenants. It is directed against an order passed by IVth Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr dated 29-8-1978 allowing an appeal filed by the-said respondents and rejecting the application filed by the petitioner for the release of the shop in his favour. 2. These are the relevant facts. The petitioner filed an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and. Eviction) Act, 1972 (U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972- hereinafter referred to as the-Act) for the release of the shop in dispute which is situate in Mohalla Grouse Ganj, Bulandshahr. In the application, the petitioner asserted that he has no-other shop except the one in dispute which he purchased on 5-3-1974 for a sum of Rs. 20,000 for the needs of the family. The petitioners family, besides himself and his wife, consists of four sons and three daughters. The eldest son Sheo Shankar had done hopelessly in studies and was entirely unfit for being employed anywhere. However, he has shown inclination towards business. The-petitioner has, therefore, decided that Sheo Shanker should start kirana business. 3. The petitioner himself is carrying on cloth business in partnership with others in a shop which has been taken on rent by one of the partners. The petitioner has no other shop where he could engage his son in business. As for the tenant, he is running a flour mill and an oil expeller in the shop in dispute-which he could easily shift to various other shops which are available in the-same town in business localities. The petitioner thus bona fide required the-shop in dispute and the hardship which he was likely to suffer, if the application for release was dismissed, would be Much greater than that likely to be suffered by the tenant in case the application was allowed. 4. The application was contested by respondents Nos. 2 and 3, who asserted that the landlord did not bona fide require the shop in dispute. His son, Sheo-Shanker had no experience of business, and it was, therefore, wrong to say that the shop was required for him. The tenants have been in occupation of the shop for forty years and had earned substantial good will in respect thereof. 2 and 3, who asserted that the landlord did not bona fide require the shop in dispute. His son, Sheo-Shanker had no experience of business, and it was, therefore, wrong to say that the shop was required for him. The tenants have been in occupation of the shop for forty years and had earned substantial good will in respect thereof. They would, therefore, suffer much greater hardship as they have no other place available to them for shifting their business. 5. The Prescribed Authority held that the petitioner does not have any other shop, that he bona fide required it for his son, who was not fit for any other employment, that the tenants have available to them several shops pointed out by the landlord in the same town, and that, therefore, on a comparison of respective hardship, the landlord would suffer to a much greater extent than the tenants. On these findings, the Prescribed Authority allowed the application of the petitioner and granted the release of the shop. 6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the tenants filed an appeal which has been allowed by the learned District -Judge by the order against which this petition is directed. The learned District -Judge concurred with the Prescribed Authority in so far as the question whether the petitioner bona fide required the shop in dispute was concerned. In agreement with the Prescribed Authority, the learned District Judge has held that the petitioner does not have any other shop, that the shop is genuinely needed by the petitioner for establishing his son, Sheo Shanker in business. 7. On the question of comparative hardship, however, the learned District Judge differed with the Prescribed Authority and held that the tenants would suffer much greater hardship than the landlord. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the finding of the learned District Judge on the question of relative hardship is vitiated by patent error of law, and is completely arbitrary being based upon irrelevant and imaginary considerations. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand urged that the finding of the learned District Judge on the question of relative hardship is perfectly sound and correct and calls for no interference. 9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the view that this petition must succeed. The order passed by the learned District Judge is wholly unsustainable in law. 10. 9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the view that this petition must succeed. The order passed by the learned District Judge is wholly unsustainable in law. 10. In support of the petitioners case that the tenant has several shops available to him in the same town situate in important business localities, such as Civil Lines, Lal Talab Market, Ansari Road etc., the petitioner filed an affidavit along with a number of letters issued by the Municipal Board, Zila Parishad, and one Sri Raj Kumar Garg, owner of a large number of shops in Deputy Ganj, Bulandshahr, which is a big market area. These letters gave the details of the shops which were available at Bulandshahr in different markets. The shops were said to be owned by the Municipal Board, Zila Parishad and Sri Raj Kumar Garg. The letters were duly proved on affidavit of the petitioner, by which signatures of the authorities writing the letters were duly verified. The learned District Judge has, however, brushed aside the evidence relating to the existence of alternative shops available in the same town on grounds which seems to me entirely unsustainable, arbitrary and whimsical. 11. The learned District Judge has observed that if the shops are available in the same town, the landlord himself should take them on rent rather than expect the tenants to take on rent those shops. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Anandi Nath Mukharji v. 2nd Addl. District Judge, Lucknow reported in 1978 All LJ 1314, in which it has been observed that that as between the landlord and the tenant, it is the latter who should be required to hire another accommodation rather than the landlord. The observations made in the said decision do support the contention of the petitioners counsel. However, the reason why the learned District Judge held that the landlord should himself take one of the shops pointed out by him or. rent is that whereas the landlords son has to start a business so that he could make the beginning anywhere without any prejudice, the tenants have goodwill in respect of the shop in dispute having been carrying on business therein for the last forty years. Consequently, it would be unfair to expect the tenant to go elsewhere. rent is that whereas the landlords son has to start a business so that he could make the beginning anywhere without any prejudice, the tenants have goodwill in respect of the shop in dispute having been carrying on business therein for the last forty years. Consequently, it would be unfair to expect the tenant to go elsewhere. In my judgment, this is weighing the scales far too much against a landlord. If the view taken by the learned District Judge is accepted, the landlord intending to start a business can never expect to get his shop. For his claim could always be defeated by a sitting tenant on the short ground that the landlord has to make a start, while the tenant has already been in the business for a longer time. The landlord intending to start business would thus never be able to compete with the claim of the sitting tenant. The learned District Judge thus fell into a manifest error of law in dismissing the petitioners need on the ground that he should himself take the shops pointed out by him on rent. 12. The learned District Judge has next brushed aside the alternative shops suggested by the landlord on the ground that the said shops were not situate in the same locality. This again appears to be entirely inadequate and improper consideration for ignoring the existence of alternative accommodation for the tenants. In the case of Bega Begam v. Abdul Ahmad Khan reported in (1979) 1 SCC 273 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court construing the provisions of Jammu and Kashmir Houses and Shop Rent Control Act, 1966, which are in pari materia with the provisions of aforesaid U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, in so far as the consideration of relative hardship is concerned, have held that the tenant is not entitled to insist on getting an alternative accommodation of the same nature in the same locality. Their Lordships have observed that this would be asking for too much and that merely because the tenants had been in occupation of the accommodation for twenty years, they could not be allowed to dictate to the landlord that till they had got similar accommodation in the same locality, they could not be evicted. Their Lordships have observed that this would be asking for too much and that merely because the tenants had been in occupation of the accommodation for twenty years, they could not be allowed to dictate to the landlord that till they had got similar accommodation in the same locality, they could not be evicted. The learned District Judge, therefore, was not right in holding against the petitioner just because a similar shop was not available in the same locality. On that ground, the learned District Judge could not have ignored the numerous shops which had been suggested by the landlord as being available in other business localities of the town. 13. The learned District Judge also appears to have misconceived the law as regards the burden of proof in this matter. The learned District Judge has repeatedly observed that the landlord has not proved whether the shops pointed out by him were suitable for the business being carried on by the tenant. He has observed "There is nothing on the record to show that the alternative accommodation, if available to the tenants would be suitable for their business and they can shift to it without substantial loss' This was ah entirely wrong approach. Both the landlord and the tenant are required to adduce evidence in support of their respective stand that one would suffer greater hardships than the other. This is clear from a plain reading of the 4th proviso to Section 21 (1) of the aforesaid Act. This conclusion also finds support from the observations made by the Supreme Court in Bega Begams case (supra) in which their Lordships have held that each party has to prove their relative advantages and disadvantages and that the entire onus cannot be thrown on the landlord to prove that lesser hardship would be caused to the tenant than to the landlord. It was, therefore, equally the duty of the tenants to have established that the shops pointed out by the petitioner were not suitable for their business or that they would suffer substantial loss by the shifting of the business. The learned District Judge has also held against the landlord on the ground that the shops suggested by him did not belong to him and that, therefore, he could not have offered those shops as an alternative accommodation to the tenants. The learned District Judge has also held against the landlord on the ground that the shops suggested by him did not belong to him and that, therefore, he could not have offered those shops as an alternative accommodation to the tenants. The learned District Judge has observed that inasmuch as Rule 16 (1) (f) of the Rules framed under the aforesaid Act was not applicable to a non-residential accommodation, there was no question of considering the offer of an alternative accommodation made by the landlord. This is an erroneous approach. The landlord was not "offering". He was merely "suggesting and pointing out" that there are shops available in the same town to which the tenants could shift their business. 14. From the evidence adduced by the landlord, it was amply esablished that the shops belonging to Raj Kumar Garg, Zila Parishad and Municipal Board of Bulandshahr in different business localities were available. However, both the tenants as well as the learned District Judge have spurned the offer or suggestion made by the landlord on wholly improper, arbitrary and whimsical grounds. Both the courts below have found that the need of the landlord was genuine and pressing, and that the landlord does bona fide require the shop in dispute. He has no other shop available for enabling his son to start a business of kirana. They have also found that the petitioners son cannot be engaged in the partnership business which is being carried on by the petitioner with others. It has also been found that the petitioners son Sheo Shanker has been very poor in studies and he cannot be usefully engaged in anything except business. There is thus the landlord on the one hand having no other shop available to him for the above purpose, and on the other hand the tenants who have available to them shops in the same town, may be in a different locality. The Prescribed Authority was, therefore, right in allowing the application. The learned District Judge has rejected the application of the landlord on improper grounds. He has also observed that the details of the localities and the numbers of the shops were not pointed out by the landlord. The learned District Judge has clearly erred there. From the various Annexure Nos. The Prescribed Authority was, therefore, right in allowing the application. The learned District Judge has rejected the application of the landlord on improper grounds. He has also observed that the details of the localities and the numbers of the shops were not pointed out by the landlord. The learned District Judge has clearly erred there. From the various Annexure Nos. 4 to 9 read with the petitioners affidavit (Annexure 1'), every relevant detail about the shops suggested by the landlord can be ascertained. On a totality of the circumstances, I am clearly of the opinion that the landlord would suffer much greater hardship than the tenant. The learned District Judge has committed a patent error in arriving at the contrary conclusion. 15. The result is that this petition succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the learned District Judge dated 29-8-1978 is quashed. The respondents Nos. 2 and 3 are, however, allowed six months time to vacate the shops in dispute. They would hand over vacant possession of these shops to the petitioner during these six months. They would also pay in advance damages for use and occupation at the rate of the rent of the shop for these six months within two months from today. In the event of default, respondents Nos. 2 and 3 shall be liable to be evicted forthwith. The parties will,bear their own costs.