Judgment :- 1. The short question in this revision is whether the decree-holders are entitled to recover possession of items 1,3,7,9 and one half of item 8 of the suit property. The claim by the first respondent is one of possession under S.7B of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. That claim having been accepted by the court below this revision has been filed. 2. One half of the suit properties belong to the first defendant's tavazhi and the other half belong to two other persons who are predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiffs. One Chathan took a Kuzhikanom lease of one half of the first defendant's tavazhi and also obtained a kuzhikanom lease over the other half. He transferred his leasehold right to one Nani in 1930. In the year 1944 the first defendant granted a melcharth to the second defendant in the suit who is the first respondent in this revision. On the basis of such melcharth the second defendant instituted a suit O. S.551 of 1944 for recovering the entire property from Nani. He obtained a decree and in execution of the decree took possession of the entire property on 15-7-1945. Thereafter, in 1946, the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner here original plaintiff in the suit filed the suit for partition" of the one half right and recovery of such one half from the second defendant who had by that time recovered the entire property from Nani apparently on the basis of melcharth given by the first defendant who had only right to one half share. Whether the second defendant would get the rights of a lessee by reason of recovering the property from the lessee Nani and would hold the plaintiffs' one half as the lessee in place of Nani was the main question in controversy in the suit. Ultimately the matter came to this court in second appeal and in S. A. 331 of 1958 this court held that by reason of recovering the property from Nani the second defendant who took the melcharth from the first defendant would not get lessee's right in regard to plaintiff's one half. Therefore a decree for partition was granted. This was confirmed in an appeal against the second appeal. A. S.68 of 1963. When the matter came up before the execution court for delivery benefit of S.7B of the Kerala Land Reforms Act was urged and that plea succeeded. Therefore a decree for partition was granted. This was confirmed in an appeal against the second appeal. A. S.68 of 1963. When the matter came up before the execution court for delivery benefit of S.7B of the Kerala Land Reforms Act was urged and that plea succeeded. The petitioners here who challenge that order are the successors-in-interest of the original plaintiff. 3. The elements required to apply S.7B are: (1)A person who claims the benefit of the section must be in occupation of land of another on 1-1-1970. (2) Such occupation must be on the basis of a registered deed purporting to be a lease deed. (3) He or his prodecessor-in-interest must have been in occupation of such land on 11th day of April, 1957. It is immaterial whether the lease was granted by a person who bad no right over the land or who was not competent to lease the land. 4. That the first defendant who was owner of one half only was not competent to lease the entire property has been found in the suit and of course that is the correct position. He had no right over that half and he was not competent to lease that half. Notwithstanding that if the three conditions are satisfied, then the benefit under S.7B would be available in respect of that portion of property. That the second defendant was in occupation on 1141957 is admitted. That he was in occupation on 1-1-1970 is also admitted. Then the only question is whether his occupation was on the basis of a registered deed purporting to be a lease deed. No doubt he took a melcharth which was a registered deed and purported to be a lease deed. The only controversy that yet remains is whether his occupation was "on the basis of" the melcharth. 5. The revision petitioners' counsel Sri Balasubramanian contends that when the melcharth was executed in favour of the second defendant, the second defendant was not in possession, that he got possession independently and if so this is not a case where the second defendant could be said to be in possession under the melcharth or in possession on the basis of the melcharth. This plea is. no doubt, attractive at first sight. But it is easy to find that but for the melcharth the second defendant would not have come into possession of the property. This plea is. no doubt, attractive at first sight. But it is easy to find that but for the melcharth the second defendant would not have come into possession of the property. The first defendant was admittedly the owner of half of the property and as lessor he directed the second defendant to recover possession from the earlier lessee Nani. The suit was instituted on the basis of the melcharth. A decree was obtained on that basis and possession was also recovered on the basis of the melcharth Thus the second, defendant came into possession by putting in action the melcharth taken by him though when the melcharth was given he was not put in possession. It would not be right to say that only when a person who executes lease is able to put the other in possession that the lessee could be said to be in possession under the lease. The simplest instance one can think of is the case of an owner of property executing a lease directing the lessee to obtain possession from the earlier lessee or to obtain possession from a trespasser or from a person who holds under some arrangement. In such a case if the lessee, on the basis of the right obtained by him, gets possession he is thereafter a lessee in possession under the lease deed. It does not matter that when the lease was granted he was not put in possession. Of course, the case would be different where be comes into possession independent of that lease. In such an event he would have come into possession even without the lease and therefore his possession cannot be said to be under the lease. For the purpose of S.7B the words "on the basis of" indicate that he comes into possession by virtue of the document of lease obtained by him and on the authority of such lease. 6. The view that I have taken here is in no way contrary to the view expressed either in Kaliyannan v. Narasimha Iyer (1974 KLT. 286 or in 1974 KLT. Short Notes Case No. 66). The question I have considered here did not come up for decision in that form in either of these cases. 6. The view that I have taken here is in no way contrary to the view expressed either in Kaliyannan v. Narasimha Iyer (1974 KLT. 286 or in 1974 KLT. Short Notes Case No. 66). The question I have considered here did not come up for decision in that form in either of these cases. I am referring to these cases only because the learned counsel for petitioner referred to these as if a contrary view was expressed by this court in these cases. 7. In view of this, in this case the second defendant must be found to have come into possession on the basis of a lease deed executed by a person who was not competent to execute the lease in regard to the disputed portion of the property and possession on the requisite dates having been found with the 2nd defendant it must be held that the view taken by the court below that the 2nd defendant is a deemed tenant is right. The revision is dismissed. But in the event any amount has been deposited by the revision petitioner pursuant to the decree for payment to the second defendant it goes without saying that the petitioners will be entitled to withdraw the same from the court. Parties are directed to suffer costs in the circumstances of the case. Dismissed.