Judgment :- 1. The judgment-debtor, whose objection to the execution of the decree for money on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits of Act 17 of 1977 was dismissed, is the revision petitioner. The lower court denied him relief under Act 17 of 1977 only on the ground that the debt sought to be realised being arrears of mesne profits decreed, is a tortuous liability exempted from the purview of Act 17 of 1977. This is challenged in this revision petition. 2. The decree is one for recovery of property with mesne profits on the basis of a trespass. The decree schedule property is a narrow strip of land and according to the defendant-judgment-debtor there was a bona fide dispute as regards the right over this narrow strip of land and though ultimately the plaintiff succeeded in establishing his title over the land, the liability for mesne profits cannot be said to be in the nature of a tortuous liability and hence the debt is not one exempted from the purview of the Act. According to the decree-holder when the title to the property is found to be with him the possession of the property by the defendant is a wrongful possession of the property of another person and every wrongful possession would amount to a civil wrong and the recovery of the property with mesne profits is equivalent to awarding of damages for the period during which the wrongful possession was in force. It will be useful at this stage to notice the relevant provisions of the Act S.2 Clause (3)(c) reads as follows: "2. Definitions. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, (3) "debt" means any liability in cash or kind, whether secured or unsecured, due from or incurred by a debtor on or before the date of commencement of this Act, whether payable under a contract, or under a decree or order of any court, or otherwise, and subsisting on that date, but does not include (a) x x x x (b) x x x x (c) any liability arising out of a breach of trust or any tortuous liability; or" S.3(a) and (b) and Explanations II and III read as follows: 3. Discharge of debt - Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, or in any contract or other instrument having force by virtue of any such law or in any decree or order of court, with effect on and from the commencement of this Act (a) every debt and the interest thereon payable by a debtor to a creditor shall be deemed to be wholly discharged; (b) no civil court shall entertain any suit or other proceeding against a debtor for the recovery of any debt or part of a debt or any interest thereon; Explanation II.- For the purpose of this section, a suit in which a decree in respect of a debt is prayed for shall be deemed to be a suit for the recovery of the debt notwithstanding that other reliefs are prayed for in such suit, and a decree shall be deemed to be a decree in respect of a debt notwithstanding that other reliefs are granted in such decree: Provided that a suit or decree for possession of land shall not be deemed to be a suit for recovery of, or a decree in respect of, a debt by reason merely of mesne profits being also prayed for or included in such suit or decree. Explanation III. - Nothing in this section shall debar a decree-holder from enforcing reliefs other than in respect of a debt, where the decree contains independent reliefs." On the basis of these provisions the petitioner's counsel contends that the liability for mesne profits is not to be treated as a tortuous liability, for it that was the case, it was contended that the proviso to Explanation II quoted above was unnecessary. Explanation II provides that a decree granting a relief for recovery of a debt though grants other reliefs will be deemed to be a decree in respect of a debt and clause (b) of S.3 prohibits the civil court from entertaining any proceeding in pursuance of such a decree. The proviso contains an exception, that is to say, a decree for possession though grants a relief to recover mesne profits will not be deemed to be a decree in respect of a debt. The proviso contains an exception, that is to say, a decree for possession though grants a relief to recover mesne profits will not be deemed to be a decree in respect of a debt. According to the petitioner's counsel if liability for mesne profits is in the nature of a tortuous liability exempt from the scope of the Act the proviso to Explanation II would not have stated or referred to the relief for mesne profits granted by the decree. A decree for possession is not a decree in respect of a debt. A decree for mesne profits will not be a debt under the definition and so an express provision like the proviso will be superfluous. So it is argued that a decree for mesne profits is really a debt coming within the scope of the definition. This proviso was not noticed in the decision in Kunhamina v. Ammoty Mariam (1979 KLT. 73) and so according to the petitioner's counsel that decision calls for re-consideration. This submission calls for an examination of the nature of the liability for mesne profits and how far the proviso referred to above can be sought to affect the true character of the decree for mesne profits. Mesne profits is defined in S.2 (12) of the CPC. as follows: "2 (12) "Mesne profits" of property means those profits which the person in wrongful possession of such property actually received or might with ordinary diligence have received therefrom, together with interest on such profits, but shall not include profits due to improvements made by the person in wrongful possession;" From this definition one fundamental thing to be remembered is that the liability for mesne profits will arise only if the person is possession is in wrongful possession of another's land. In other words only if an action for trespass can be filed against the person in possession and decreed he will be liable for mesne profits. Every possession of land belonging to another will not amount to a trespass. A person may be in possession of another's land as a lessee, mortgagee, sometimes even a licensee may be in occupation of another's land. All these are not in the nature of trespass. They are only permissive in character and if the person entitled to is not given back the land, a suit for possession and for rent or compensation for use and occupation may lie. All these are not in the nature of trespass. They are only permissive in character and if the person entitled to is not given back the land, a suit for possession and for rent or compensation for use and occupation may lie. A liability to compensate the rightful owner for the use and occupation of his land may not be a liability in the nature of mesne profits. Mesne profits will arise only if a person is in wrongful possession. In other words the person in possession must be a trespasser. A trespass over another's land is a tort and the liability arising therefrom is certainly a tortuous liability. But this should not be confused with the relief that a person wronged is entitled to. In the case of a tortuous liability he is entitled to damages for the wrong committed to him. Everything suffered from this wrong will go into the measure of damages. There is a difference in this regard so far as mesne profits is concerned. 3. Where the defendant wrongfully deprives the plaintiff of his land, the plaintiff will generally wish to recover not the value of the land, but the land itself. The principal action is therefore an action for the recovery of the land historically better known as the action for ejectment. Damages will thus generally be limited to the loss arising from the period of wrongful occupation by the defendant. Such damages are recoverable in an action for mesne profits and the normal measure of damages is the market rental value of the property occupied or used for the period of the wrongful occupation or user. This measure is consonant with the name of the action for wrongful occupation as one for mesne profits. The expression "mesne" means intermediate; middle. The definition given in the CPC therefore correctly represents the principle behind the award of mesne profits., A person in wrongful possession is made liable for the profit actually received or might with ordinary diligence have received therefrom. This measure is, as said earlier, different from the measure in the case of other tortuous liability, but that does not affect the principle on which a person is made liable for mesne profits for trespass on another's land. That remains the same, namely, a tortuous liability. This measure is, as said earlier, different from the measure in the case of other tortuous liability, but that does not affect the principle on which a person is made liable for mesne profits for trespass on another's land. That remains the same, namely, a tortuous liability. We are supported in this conclusion by the decision of the Privy Council in Girish Chundar Lahiri v. Shoshi Shikhareswar Roy (ILR. 27 Calcutta 951). At page 967 Lord Hobhouse states thus: "The learned Judges say that the Court has still jurisdiction to give or refuse interest as it chooses. Their Lordships agree, because mesne profits are in the nature of damages which the court may mould according to the justice of the case." In Kunjo Behary Singh v. Madhub Chandra Ghose (ILR. 23 Calcutta 884) Petheram, C. J. observes as follows at page 888: "In order to ascertain whether a suit for mesne profits is within this definition, it is necessary to consider carefully what a suit for mesne profits really is. If any person, by force or fraud, takes possession of immovable property which belongs to another and deprives the true owner of the possession of his property, he commits a trespass, for which trespass the owner of the property may compel him by civil suit to pay him damages in the nature of mesne profits, the measure of such damages being as described in the Civil Procedure Code, S.211 (explanation), "mesne profits of property mean those profits which the person in wrongful possession of such property actually received, or might, with ordinary diligence, have received therefrom, together with interest on such profits" So that a suit for mesne profits is an action for damages for a trespass to immovable property in which the measure of the damages may. or may not, be the amount of the profits which the wrong-doer has actually received from the property." In Ramasami Reddi v. Authi Lakshmi Animal (ILR. 34 Madras 502) it is observed thus: - "A claim for mesne profits when the plaintiff has been ousted from possession is essentially one for damages. Though the measure of the profit is what, under the explanation to S.211 of the Civil Procedure Code, the defendant might with due diligence have received, the claim still stands in damages for trespass." Again in Balgovind v Dwarku Prasad (AIR. Though the measure of the profit is what, under the explanation to S.211 of the Civil Procedure Code, the defendant might with due diligence have received, the claim still stands in damages for trespass." Again in Balgovind v Dwarku Prasad (AIR. 1929 Patna 530) Courtney-Terrell, C. J. after quoting the definition of mesne profits under S.2 (12) C. P. C. stated thus: "As was said by Das, J. in the case of Tilakdhari Singh v. Ram Prasad Singh ((1921)62 I.C. 25) "The true criterion is not the loss caused to the person wronged but the gam made by the wrong-doer". With this explanation I am in entire agreement. On the other hand the principle to be applied in assessing damages is that the plaintiff should be restored by a monetary compensation to the position which he would have occupied but for the wrongful acts of the defendant, provided always that such loss as he proves is the natural and direct consequence of the defendant's acts; see Lord Macnaghten's judgment in United Horse Shoe ana Nail Co. v. Stewart ( (1889) 13 A. C 401- 59 L T. 561)" This difference in the measure of damages is further high-lighted by Vivian Bose, J., as he then was, in Ramnath v. Mohanlal (AIR. 1939 Nagpur 23) at page 26: "The truth of the matter is that the word wrongful in S.2 (12), Civil P. C. is used in a special sense. It does not mean possession which is wrongful for all purposes. It only means that the person who has no right to possession as against the party for certain purposes including mesne profits but not wrongful for all purposes. Thus he is not liable for all losses which the party kept out of possession may have sustained but only for such profits as he actually received or which with due diligence he might have received." In the light of these decisions with which we fully agree a claim for mesne profits whether coupled with the relief for possession or independently of it, is a claim for redress against a tort committed and the lability is a tortuous liability. In this view the decision in Kunhamina v. Ammotty Mariam (1979 KLT. 73) and the earlier decision of Khalid, J. in Abdukutty v. Abdul Mani (1976 KLT. 591) state the correct principle in respect of a claim for mesne profits. 4. In this view the decision in Kunhamina v. Ammotty Mariam (1979 KLT. 73) and the earlier decision of Khalid, J. in Abdukutty v. Abdul Mani (1976 KLT. 591) state the correct principle in respect of a claim for mesne profits. 4. The next question is whether the legislature in enacting the proviso to Explanation II quoted above intended to take out the liability for mesne profits from out of a tortuous liability and make it a debt to which the Act will apply. Explanation II provides that a decree for recovery of a debt shall be deemed to be a decree in respect of a debt notwithstanding that other reliefs are granted in such decree. Left alone this will suggest that if there is a decree for money even if that decree grants other reliefs the decree-holder will have no right to execute the decree. A decree for mesne profits is a decree for money and ordinarily it is understood as a decree for recovery of a debt and this will give room for a doubt regarding a decree for possession granted along with it. A decree for possession with mesne profits is a decree granted in the case of a trespass on land. To make it clear that the whole relief in respect of a tortuous liability is exempted this proviso is added to the Explanation. In other words to allay the fears that may occur that such a decree also will be taken in by the Explanation the Legislature has only declared or clarified the position by the proviso. The proviso is sometimes made use of for such a purpose to allay the fears. This should not be understood as taking a particular claim out of the general provision in an enactment. The proviso is sometimes made use of for such a purpose to allay the fears. This should not be understood as taking a particular claim out of the general provision in an enactment. We are supported in this view of the scope of the proviso by the decision of the House of Lords in West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Society ((1897) A.C. 647) At pages 655 and 656 it is observed thus: "Of course a proviso may be used to guide you in the selection of one or other of two possible constructions of the words to be found in the enactment, and show when there is doubt about its scope, when it may reasonably admit of doubt as to its having this scope or that, which is the proper View to take of it; but to find in it an enacting provision which enables something to be done which is not to be found in the enactment itself on any reasonable construction of it, simply because otherwise the proviso would be meaningless and senseless, would, as I have said, be in the highest degree dangerous. And for this reason: one knows perfectly well that it not unfrequently happens that persons are unreasonably apprehensive as to the effect of an enactment when there is really no question of its application to their case; they nevertheless think that some Court may possibly hold that it will apply to their case, and they suggest if it is not intended to be applicable no harm would be done by inserting a proviso to protect them; and, accordingly, a provision is inserted to guard against the particular case of which a particular person was apprehensive, although the enactment was never intended to apply to his case, or to any other similar cases at all. If the construction contended for were adopted the result would be this: Having put in a proviso which was thought to be needless in order to satisfy certain persons, or a particular class of persons, and allay their fears, you would have the enactment so construed against the intention of the legislature as to impose a liability upon a number of people who were not so apprehensive, or perhaps were not present, and therefore either did not think it necessary or were not in a position to protect their own interests by a proviso. My Lords, I am satisfied that many instances might be given where provisoes could be found in legislation that are meaningless because they have been put in to allay fears when those fears were absolutely unfounded, and when no proviso at all was necessary to protect the persons at whose instance they were inserted." The use of a proviso to allay the fears has also been recognised by the Supreme Court as can be seen from the decision in Madanlal v. Changdeo Sugar Mills Ltd. (AIR. 1962 SC. 1543) at page 1552 where it is observed thus: "As has been observed by Craies 'On Statute Law', provisos are often inserted "to allay fears" or to remove misapprehensions." We therefore hold that this proviso which takes out the decree for possession with mesne profits from the category of a decree in respect of a debt mentioned in the Explanation cannot be understood to mean that a decree for mesne profits is a debt within the meaning of the word 'debt' or anything other than a decree for tortuous liability exempted from the purview of the Act. The lower court is right in holding that the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of Act 17 of 1977 to claim a statutory discharge of the decree for mesne profits. In the result the Civil Revision Petition fails. It is dismissed, but in the circumstances we make no order as to costs.