JUDGMENT-The factory of the petitioners-Asian Paints (India) Ltd. is in existence since 1942. The provisions of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1943 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") are applicable to the petitioners. The petitioners have been paying the prescribed employer's and employees contributions. However, with regard to the period from the 1st quarter of 1962 to the 4th and the last quarter of 1967, the 1st respondent-Employees' State Insurance Corporation has made a claim of employer's special contribution of Rs. 10,309 and employees' contribution of Rs. 10,307-89 in respect of over-time payments. Further, from the first quarter of 1965 to the 4th and the last quarter of 1971, the 1st respondent has made a claim on account of employer's special contribution of Rs. 3,504 and employees' contribution of Rs. 2,707-77 in respect of labour charges paid to contractors' employees and casual workers etc. According to the 1st respondent, the petitioners-Company had given inspection of its books of accounts on 29th, 30th and 31st October 1975 for the said years and accordingly, the 1st respondent, by its letter dated 17th January 1976, part of Ex. D (collectively) to the petition, addressed to the petitioners, referred to the visit of the 1st respondent's Insurance Inspector to the petitioners' factory and informed the petitioners of their failure to pay the employer's special contribution and employees' contribution for the said two periods and on the said two counts, namely, over-time payments and labour charges, and called upon the petitioners to pay the said amounts immediately. The petitioners, by their letter dated 17th February 1976, while acknowledging the said letter, pointed out that the claim was highly belated and not maintainable under the provisions of law and, therefore, the petitioners would not comply with the requisitions contained in the said letter. The petitioners further denied that they had made payments as alleged or that they were liable to pay the contributions claimed by the 1st respondent or at all. In view of these contentions, the petitioners asked the 1st respondent to close the matter. 2. The petitioners further denied that they had made payments as alleged or that they were liable to pay the contributions claimed by the 1st respondent or at all. In view of these contentions, the petitioners asked the 1st respondent to close the matter. 2. The 1st respondent did not choose to reply the said letter dated 17th February 1976, but by a letter dated 11th March 1976 as being issued by the Regional Director, E. S. I. Corporation, Bombay, addressed to the petitioners, referred to the various provisions of the Act (sections 73A to 73 E) and stated that the employer's special contribution was required to be paid within 30 days and the quarterly return in Form SC-2 was required to be submitted to his office within 45 days from the date of each quarter ending on 31st March, 30th June, 30th September and 31st December, and regretted that the petitioners had not so far paid employer's contribution for the quarters ended on 31-3-1962 to 31-12-1971 amounting to Rs. 13,812 as claimed in the said letter dated 17-1-1976 and the amount of employer's special contribution due from the petitioners was not known to his office on account of non-submission of SC-2 returns. In these circumstances, the petitioners were asked to show cause as to why assessment should not be made on ad-hoc basis after working out the total wages of Rs. 250 per month per employee in accordance with the Government of India Notification No. S. O. 929 dated 24tn March 1972. The petitioners' attention was also drawn to Regulation 31-A of the Employees' State Insurance (General) Regulations, 1950, where under interest at 6% per annum in respect of each day of default or delay in payment of contributions is payable on the arrears of employer's special contribution from the date on which the contribution became payable till the date of payment. The petitioners' attention was also drawn to section 85 of the Act, where under the petitioners were liable for prosecution. Attention was also drawn to section 73 of the Act, where under employer's special contribution is recoverable as arrears of land revenue under section 5 of the Revenue Recovery Act, 1890. The petitioners' attention was also drawn to section 85 of the Act, where under the petitioners were liable for prosecution. Attention was also drawn to section 73 of the Act, where under employer's special contribution is recoverable as arrears of land revenue under section 5 of the Revenue Recovery Act, 1890. The petitioners were called upon to pay the employer's special contribution and to submit SC-2 returns immediately and in any case within 21 days from the date of issue of that letter, failing which the office shall have no other course but to resort to legal proceeding against the petitioners. This letter was signed by the Deputy Regional Director for the Regional Director. 3. By another letter dated 11th March 1976 issued by the Regional Director, Bombay, and addressed to the petitioners, the 1st respondent inter alia stated that under section 40 of the Act the principal employer of a factory is required to pay employees' contribution. The 1st respondent also stated therein the manner in which the same has to be paid under Regulations 29 and 31 by affixing contribution stamps and the manner of its submission under Regulation 26. It was also stated that the petitioners had failed to pay the employees' contribution of Rs. 12,915-66 for the period from January 1962 to December 1971 in respect of over-time, labour charges, etc. as pointed out in the said letter dated 17-1-1976. Attention was also drawn to Regulations 29 and 31-A and provisions of sections 85 and 45A of the Act. The petitioners were also asked to make note that under section 45A the Corporation can by order determine the amount of contributions payable in respect of the employees of the petitioners' factory and under section 45B request the Collector to recover the same as arrears of land revenue. The petitioners were further called upon to pay the amount not later than 21 days from the receipt of the said letter; otherwise the Corporation would prosecute under section 85 and determine the amount under section 45A and. ask the Collector to recover the same under section 45B without reference to the petitioners. This letter was signed by one O. N. Wali for Regional Director. The 1st respondent's Advocate Shri Jayakar stated that Shri O. N. Wali was the Deputy Regional Director at the relevant time. 4. ask the Collector to recover the same under section 45B without reference to the petitioners. This letter was signed by one O. N. Wali for Regional Director. The 1st respondent's Advocate Shri Jayakar stated that Shri O. N. Wali was the Deputy Regional Director at the relevant time. 4. The petitioners, by their letter dated 9th April 1976 addressed to the Deputy Regional Director, referred to the letter dated 11th March 1976 (the first letter relating to the payment as per section 73A) and submitted that the claim was highly belated and not maintainable under the provisions of law and, therefore, the petitioners were unable to comply with the requisition made by the Corporation. The petitioners also denied liability for payment and asked that the matter be closed. 5. The 1st respondent's Regional Director, by a communication dated 30th April 1976 addressed to the Collector of Bombay Suburban District, made an application under section 5 of the Revenue Recovery Act, 1890, for the recovery of employer's special contribution under section 73D of the Act in respect of a claim for Rs. 21,547 against the petitioners. (These particulars are taken from the subject of the communication). In paragraph 3 of the said communication, it was stated that the petitioners' factory was required to pay employer's special contribution of Rs. 13,812 for the quarters ending on I /62 to IV /1971 to the Corporation. In paragraph 4, it was stated that a sum of Rs. 7735 was due as interest at 6% per annum under Regulation 31A from the date on which employer's special contribution became payable till 30-4-1976 and the same may be recovered along with the above arrears. The Collector was requested to recover further interest at the rate of Rs. 6 per day for each of the day from 1-5-1976 till the date of recovery. In paragraph 5, it was pointed out that the petitioners had failed to pay the amount of Rs. 21,547. A Challan was also forwarded. This communication was again signed by O. N. Wali. 6. The 1st respondent also addressed another communication dated 30th April 1976 to the Collector of Bombay Suburban District, the subject of which related to an application under section 5 of the Revenue Recovery Act, 1890 for the recovery of employees' contribution under section 45B of the Act in respect of a claim for Rs. 20,148-66 against the petitioners. 6. The 1st respondent also addressed another communication dated 30th April 1976 to the Collector of Bombay Suburban District, the subject of which related to an application under section 5 of the Revenue Recovery Act, 1890 for the recovery of employees' contribution under section 45B of the Act in respect of a claim for Rs. 20,148-66 against the petitioners. It was stated therein that the petitioners were required to pay Rs. 12,915-66 as employees' contribution for the period from January 1966 to December 1971 plus Rs. 7233 as interest at the rate of 6% per annum for each day of delay I default upto 30-4-1976, and that the amount of contribution payable in respect of employees had been determined in accordance with section 45A of the Act on the basis of inspection of records produced before the Insurance Inspector. The Collector was further requested to recover interest at the rate of 6% per annum from 1-5-1976 till the date of recovery and that all these amounts be recovered as arrears of land revenue as provided in section 45B of the Act. A Challan was also forwarded along with the letter. This letter was also signed by the said O. N. Wali, Deputy Regional Director. 7. After these communications, the Naib-Tahsildar (the 2nd respondent herein) for Recovery of Government dues, Bombay Suburban District, by notice dated 13th May 1976 addressed to the petitioners, required them to pay Rs. 21,547 within ten days together with the notice fee. By another notice dated 14-5-1976, the said Naib-Tahsildar also demanded payment of Rs. 20,148-66 from the petitioners. 8. The petitioners filed the present petition on 24th May 1976 and a rule was issued. Prayer clause (a) leads to some confusion about the letters, but if this clause is carefully read with the exhibits to the petition, the position becomes clear. The impugned letters are two letters both dated 11th March 1976 (Ex. E (collectively) to the Petition), two letters both dated 30th April 1976 addressed by the Regional Director to the Collector (part of Ex. G (collectively), and two notices dated 13th May 1976 and 14th May 1976 respectively (part of Ex. G (collectively). The petitioners seek a writ of certiorari requiring the 1st and the 2nd respondents to forthwith withdraw and for cancel the impugned letters of demand dated 11th March 1976 (Ex. G (collectively), and two notices dated 13th May 1976 and 14th May 1976 respectively (part of Ex. G (collectively). The petitioners seek a writ of certiorari requiring the 1st and the 2nd respondents to forthwith withdraw and for cancel the impugned letters of demand dated 11th March 1976 (Ex. E (collectively) to the Petition) and letters of demand dated 30th April 1976, 13th May 1976 and 14th May 1976 (Ex. G (collectively) to the Petition) and to forbear them from implementing the same. 9. The arguments in the present case had proceeded on the footing that both the letters dated 11th March 1976 addressed by the Regional Director to the petitioners and the two letters dated 30th April 1976 addressed by the Regional Director to the Collector were based on the determination of the amounts of contribution payable by the petitioners under section 45·A of the Act. Shri Jayakar had justified these impugned letters under section 45·A of the Act. However, while stating the fact, Shri Jayakar stated that only the claim in respect of employee's contribution was determined under section 45·A and not the amount claimed by way of employer's special contribution and that the same was determined under section 73-A (1) of the Act. 10. The 1st respondent and the 2nd respondent have filed their respective affidavits in reply. The 1st respondent has disclosed various letters addressed to the petitioners. Relying upon these letters, Shri Jayakar, by way of preliminary objection, contended that the petitioners have suppressed these letters and, therefore, the petition is liable to be dismissed. There is no merit in this objection. The letters are in the nature of normal communications relating to the visits of the Insurance Inspector between January 1963 and September 1974. These letters mostly touch upon subjects and matters which are not relevant for the petition, though in each of the letters a general statement is made that the Ledger was not produced for inspection and the same being an important document should be produced along with other records for inspection. The notings on the letters indicate that the Office of the Regional Director was repeatedly urging the Insurance Inspectors concerned to complete the inspection and to submit the report immediately. The notings on the letters indicate that the Office of the Regional Director was repeatedly urging the Insurance Inspectors concerned to complete the inspection and to submit the report immediately. The petition contains all the relevant material necessary for determining the points involved and, therefore, having regard to the allegations contained in the petition, it cannot be said that the petitioners are guilty of suppressing any documents having a bearing on the subject matter so as to mislead the Court and thereby forfeit their right to seek redress under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 11. Another preliminary objection was that the petitioners should have sought remedy from the Employees' Insurance Court which alone could adjudicate the dispute raised by the petitioners. In this connection, Shri Jayakar relied upon an unreported judgment in Jankiprasad Ramprasad Maree v. Regional Director, E. S. I. C., Bombay and others 1. In that case, the petitioner was a Director of a Mill which was nationalised under the Sick Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1974. The Mill was required to contribute the employees' and the employer's contribution incurred before the nationalisation of the Mill. The petitioner in that case had contended that he was a Director of a public limited company and therefore could not be treated as a principal employer and could not be held liable for special contribution. Another ground taken was that he was not given any opportunity of being heard prior to the issue of recovery notice. The petitioner in that case had also denied liability on various other grounds. My brother Pendse J. refused to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as, in his opinion, the Court was not required to decide each and every claim made by the party when alternate efficacious remedy is provided and available under the Act. The refusal to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 in that case was on the basis of the facts of that case and the contentions raised therein. The only contention which is similar in this case is about the notice being issued without giving an opportunity of being heard. The refusal to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 in that case was on the basis of the facts of that case and the contentions raised therein. The only contention which is similar in this case is about the notice being issued without giving an opportunity of being heard. In any case, I feel that on merits of the case before me, it is a fit and proper case where the Court should not shirk to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India merely on the ground that alternative remedy is available. For reasons to be indicated hereafter, in my opinion, the alternative remedy is not the proper course which the petitioners should be made to follow. 12. In this connection, it was pointed out to Shri Jayakar that the 1st respondent could have also sought adjudication through the Employees' Insurance Court. Shri Jayakar stated that the present petition was filed in May 1976 and because of that and of the stay obtained by the petitioners by depositing the whole amount, the 1st respondent could not have sought relief in the Employees' Insurance Court. 13. The next preliminary objection taken was that the petitioners had already filed an application in the Employees' Insurance Court being Application No. 105 of 1975 disputing the claim of the 1st respondent Corporation in respect of the labour charges on which the contribution for the period from 1972 to 1974 had been demanded. Since that application is pending, the question of liability on account of labour charges would be determined in that application. I am not impressed by this objection. The pendency of that application cannot affect the decision of the present petition. If, according to the 1st respondent, the pendency of the said application has any effect on the claims made by the 1st respondent Corporation, then it was open to the 1st respondent not to have proceeded to recover the amounts in the manner sought to be done until the disposal of that application. 14. Shri Jayakar raised another preliminary objection on the basis of an application No. 28 of 1972 filed by the petitioners against the 1st respondent in the Employees' Insurance Court and decided on 26-9-1973 declaring that the contributions were payable in respect of payments made towards over-time. 14. Shri Jayakar raised another preliminary objection on the basis of an application No. 28 of 1972 filed by the petitioners against the 1st respondent in the Employees' Insurance Court and decided on 26-9-1973 declaring that the contributions were payable in respect of payments made towards over-time. According to Shri Jayakar, since the contribution in respect of over-time is also the subject-matter of the present petition, in view of the decision of the Employees' Insurance Court, the present petition is not maintainable. No doubt, the issue whether the payment for over-time is covered by the definition of wages under the Act has been decided against the petitioners in the said application. The petitioners' liability for the period from February 1968 to January 1971 is also determined. The determination of these issues is no answer to the points raised by the petitioners for challenging the validity and legality of the impugned communications, whereby certain amounts determined under sections 73A and 45A of, of the Act are sought to be recovered by way of arrears of land revenue by the 2nd respondent. 15. Shri Ramaswami, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners, principally raised two contentions, firstly, that the determination of the amount under section 45A of the Act is invalid for the main reason that the principles of natural justice have been breached as no opportunity was given to the petitioners of being heard before the amount was determined; secondly, that both the claims are time-barred. On the other hand, Shri Jayakar submitted that the Employees' State Insurance Act is a piece of social legislation enacted in ~he interest of the employees and, therefore, if the conditions of section 45A are complied with by the Corporation, the Corporation could determine the amount itself without taking recourse to the Employees~ Insurance Court under section 77. The disposal in the Court takes unduly long time and in order to fulfil the object of the legislation and to confer the benefits like sickness benefit, maternity benefit, disablement benefit and several other benefits covered under Chapter V of the Act, the Corporation has to act expeditiously under section 45A. Shri Jayakar further submitted that by determining the amount under section 45A, the amount is quantified and a certificate is issued and, therefore, it is not necessary to go before the Court. Mrs. Shri Jayakar further submitted that by determining the amount under section 45A, the amount is quantified and a certificate is issued and, therefore, it is not necessary to go before the Court. Mrs. Chagla appearing on behalf of the 2nd respondent supported Shri Jayakar and contended that it was the petitioners who had failed to furnish the returns and produce the necessary -records required by law and, therefore, it became incumbent on the Corporation to inspect the accounts and to issue the recovery letters or orders. Both sides relied upon various cases. 16. In order to appreciate this contention, it is necessary to have a bird's eye view of the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 39 speaks of -contribution payable under the Act in respect of an employee. The contribution comprises of amount payable by the employer which is styled as "the employer's contribution" in the Act, and the contribution payable by the employee which is styled as "the employees' contribution". Both these contributions are payable to the Corporation-the 1st respondent. The rates are specified in the First Schedule to the Act. A week is considered to be a unit in respect of which all contributions are made payable under the Act. The contributions payable in respect of each week, under sub-section (4) of section 39, ordinarily fall due on the last day of the week. Section 40 appears to be a charging section. The principal employer (defined in section 2 (17) has to pay in respect of every employee, whether directly employed by him or by or through an immediate employer (defined in section 2 (13) ), both the employer's contribution and the employee's contribution. Sub-section (2) of section 40 empowers the principal employer concerned to recover from the employee the employee's contribution by deduction from his wages. The principal employer concerned is debarred from recovering or deducting the employer's contribution from the wages under sub-section (3) of section 40. sub-section (4) of section 40 makes the principal employer concerned a kind of a trustee for the amounts recovered by him under sub-section (2). Subsection (I) of section 44 requires every principal and immediate employer to submit to the Corporation returns in such form and containing such particulars relating to persons employed by him as may be specified in regulations made in this behalf. Subsection (I) of section 44 requires every principal and immediate employer to submit to the Corporation returns in such form and containing such particulars relating to persons employed by him as may be specified in regulations made in this behalf. Sub-section (3) of section 44 requires every principal and immediate employer to maintain such registers or records as may be required by regulations made in this behalf. Sub-section (2) of section 45 authorises an Inspector appointed by the Corporation under sub-section (I) of this section to require any principal or immediate employer to furnish to him such information as he may consider necessary for the purposes of the Act, or to enter any office, establishment, factory or other premises occupied by such principal or immediate employer and require any person found in charge thereof to produce to such Inspector and allow him to examine such accounts, books and other documents relating to the employment of persons and payment of wages or to furnish to him such information as he may consider necessary; or to examine the principal or immediate employer, his agent or servant, or any person found in such factory, establishment, office or other premises; to make copies of, or take extracts from, any register, account book or other document maintained in such factory, establishment, office or other premises. This authority is to be used for the purposes of ascertaining whether any of the provisions of the Act have been complied with or not. Section 45-A relates to determination of contributions payable in respect of the employees and section 45-B enables the Corporation to recover any contribution payable under the Act as an arrear of land revenue. The terms of section 45- A will be reproduced hereafter. 17. Sub-section (1) of section 73-A is again a charging section and requires every principal employer to pay to the Corporation a special contribution called "the employer's special contribution" at the rate specified under sub-section (3). Under sub-section (4) of section 73-A, the employer's special contribution falls due as soon as the liability of the employer to pay wages accrues, but may be paid to the Corporation at such intervals within such time and in such manner as the Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, specify. Under sub-section (4) of section 73-A, the employer's special contribution falls due as soon as the liability of the employer to pay wages accrues, but may be paid to the Corporation at such intervals within such time and in such manner as the Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, specify. Section 73-B empowers the Central Government to specify a special authority for decision of any question or dispute arising in respect of the employer's special contribution payable or recoverable where there is no Employee's Insurance Court. The text of this section will be reproduced hereafter. Section 73-C speaks of benefits under Chapter V to depend upon employees' contribution. Under this section, the payment of the employees' contribution for any week in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IV (covering sections 38 to 45-B and section 40 being a charging section in respect of both the employer's contribution and the employees' contribution), for the purpose of Chapter V (i.e. benefits relating to sickness, maternity, disablement, etc.), have effect as if the contributions payable under Chapter IV in respect of that employee for that week had been paid, and shall accordingly entitle the employee as an insured person to the benefits specified in Chapter V if he is otherwise entitled thereto. Section 73-D deals with the employer's special contribution payable under Chapter V -A to be recovered as if it were an arrear of land revenue. Section 73-E empowers the Corporation to call for additional information or return for the purpose of determining whether the employer's special contribution is payable under Chapter V-A or for determining the amount thereof. 18. Chapter VI relates to adjudication of disputes and claims. Section 74 speaks of the Constitution of Employees' Insurance Court. Section 75 relates to matters to be decided by that Court. Section 76 is regarding institution of proceedings. Section 77 relates to commencement of proceedings. Section 78 speaks of powers of Employees' Insurance Court. Section 81 makes provision for reference to High Court on any question of law. Section 82 provides for appeal to the High Court if the matter involves a substantial question of law. 19. Coming to the provisions of penalties, section 85 prescribes imprisonment extending to three months or fine upto Rs. Section 78 speaks of powers of Employees' Insurance Court. Section 81 makes provision for reference to High Court on any question of law. Section 82 provides for appeal to the High Court if the matter involves a substantial question of law. 19. Coming to the provisions of penalties, section 85 prescribes imprisonment extending to three months or fine upto Rs. 500 or both in cases inter alia if a party fails to pay any contribution which he is liable to pay, or fails or refuses to submit any return required by the regulations, or is guilty of non-compliance with any of the requirements of the Act or the rules or the regulations in respect of which no special penalty is provided. 20. This is the brief analysis of the provisions of the Act. I propose to divide the consideration of the provisions of S. 45A falling under Chapter IV dealing with contributions and the provisions of section 73A and the connected provisions falling under Chapter V-A. Shri Ramaswami pointed out that Chapter V-A has ceased to be operative with effect from 1-7-1973. Shri Jayakar agreed with this and stated that the 1st respondent's claim in the present petition relates to the period from the first quarter of 1962 to the fourth quarter of 1972 and, therefore, at the relevant time the provisions of Chapter V-A were applicable. 21. Section 45A is in these terms :- "45A. (I) Where in respect of a factory or establishment no returns, particulars, registers or records are submitted, furnished or maintained in accordance with the provisions of section 44 or any Inspector or other official of the Corporation referred to in sub-section (2) of section 45 is obstructed by the principal or immediate employer or any other person, in exercising his functions or discharging his duties under section 45, the Corporation may, on the basis of information available to it, by order, determine the amount of contributions payable in respect of the employees of that factory or establishment. (2) An order made by the Corporation under sub-section (1) shall be sufficient proof of the claim of the Corporation under section 75 or for recovery of the amount determined by such order as an arrears of land revenue under section 45B." 22. The understanding of this section does not create any problem because the language is clear. (2) An order made by the Corporation under sub-section (1) shall be sufficient proof of the claim of the Corporation under section 75 or for recovery of the amount determined by such order as an arrears of land revenue under section 45B." 22. The understanding of this section does not create any problem because the language is clear. The conditions laid down for the application of this section are two. One is non-compliance or non-observance of the provisions of section 44 which, as noticed above and as contained in the body of section 45-A itself, relate to employer's failure to furnish returns and maintain registers. The second condition, which is in the alternative, is the non-compliance of the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 45 to the extent of obstruction caused by the principal employer or immediate employer or any other person when an Inspector appointed by the Corporation is exercising his functions or discharging his duties under section 45. In either of these two situations, namely, one under section 44 or the other under subsection (2) of section 45, the Corporation may, on the basis of information available to it, by order, determine the amount of contributions payable in respect of the employees of that factory or establishment. This appears to be the operative part of the section. It enables the Corporation to determine the amount of the employees' contribution on the basis of information available to it. The source of information is not clarified. Sub-section (2) lays down that an order under sub-section (1) shall be "sufficient proof" of the claim of the Corporation for two purposes. One is for the purpose of section 75, i.e. if any question or dispute arises of the various types indicated in clauses (a) to (g) of sub-section (I) of section 75 of the claims to be decided by the Employees' Insurance Court as indicated in sub-section (2) of section 75. The other purpose is for the recovery of the amount as an arrear of land revenue under section 45-B. The expression "sufficient proof” used by the Legislature indicates that the Legislature did not intend to declare the amount determined by the Corporation to be a conclusive proof because it has taken care not to use the expression "conclusive proof" as understood in the Law of Evidence. There are several expressions which are used in legal parlance such as "prima facie proof", "sufficient proof", "reasonable proof" "conclusive proof". The ordinary meaning has to be given to the expression "sufficient proof" in 1he absence of any interpretation provided by the Act itself. The word "sufficient" ordinarily means "adequate". Why has the Legislature declared the determination of the amount by the Corporation as being sufficient proof of the claim of the Corporation under section 75? The intention seems to be that when the Corporation or the principal employer or immediate employer who is liable to pay the amount determined by the Corporation were to carry the matter to the Employees' Insurance Court, then the Corporation can urge before the Employees' insurance Court that the amount determined by the Corporation is a "sufficient proof" of the amount due and this may throw the burden on the principal employer or immediate employer to show that the amount determined by the Corporation is not based on valid and correct information, on the basis of which the amount has been determined, or the Corporation may urge before the Court concerned that the order determining the amount is a sufficient proof in case the matter is not contested in the Employees' insurance Court. It would be nevertheless open to the Court to demand better evidence than sufficient proof depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. The declaration contained in sub-section (2) of section 45A does not and cannot impair the right of the Court to ask for such proof as convinces the Court to determine the question or dispute in favour of the party concerned. The second limb of the declaration is with regard to the recovery of the amount determined by such order as an arrear of land revenue under section 45 B. 23. The nature of the function performed by the Corporation under section 45A was not in dispute. Shri Jayakar fairly stated that the function is of a quasi-judicial character, but nevertheless, according to Shri Jayakar, there is no question of giving an opportunity to the principal or immediate employer of being heard before determining the amount of contribution payable in respect of the employees. Shri Jayakar fairly stated that the function is of a quasi-judicial character, but nevertheless, according to Shri Jayakar, there is no question of giving an opportunity to the principal or immediate employer of being heard before determining the amount of contribution payable in respect of the employees. The nature of the function of the Corporation shows that on the basis of information available to it, it determines the amount in respect of employees' contribution and fastens the liability on a principal or immediate employer. The Corporation acts as an adjudicating organ when it determines the amount of employees' contribution. The Corporation relies upon information coming into its hands. The order passed by the Corporation becomes executable by the authority designated under the Revenue Recovery Act, 1890 and for the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966, in case the Corporation wants to recover the amount by having recourse to section 458. With this adjudicating character, can it be said that it is fair that the Corporation should decide without giving an opportunity to the person concerned of meeting the information which is going to form the basis of the order for determining the amount of employees' contribution? Does justice and fair-play not require that the information be disclosed and the party be called upon to give his say? Can the rules of natural justice and fair-play be denied to a party who is being sought to be made liable by the Corporation under section 45A? It may be that the conduct of the party is condemnable because it bas breached the provisions of section 44 by failing to file the returns or to maintain the records in accordance with that section or it may be that the party is guilty of causing obstruction to the officers of the Corporation when they are discharging their duties under section 45 (2). But for all this, the rule of natural justice cannot be made inapplicable. For breach of the provisions of the Act. adequate penalties are provided by prosecuting the party. That factor cannot dissuade the Court when it comes to the question of considering whether the principles of natural justice and fair play are applicable under section 45A or not. 24. Shri Ramaswami relied upon a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in B. M. K. Industries v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation2. That factor cannot dissuade the Court when it comes to the question of considering whether the principles of natural justice and fair play are applicable under section 45A or not. 24. Shri Ramaswami relied upon a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in B. M. K. Industries v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation2. In that case, the Division Bench had the occasion to consider the provisions of section 45A and the learned Judges addressing their minds to the famous case of A. K. Kraipak and others v. Union of India3 made the following observations in connection with section 45A :- "However, in our opinion, the very phraseology used in section 45A clearly indicates that the employer will have to be given an opportunity before the amount is determined by the Corporation. It is no doubt true that because of certain acts and omissions on the part of the employer the Corporation is forced to take recourse to the provisions of section 45A of the Act. However, the Corporation is obliged to pass an order determining the amount of contribution. It is obvious that the Corporation when it proceeds to determine the amount of contribution payable by the employer will have to depend upon the information available to it. For this it had to come to an objective conclusion. This is the only manner in which it could carry out the duties imposed on it. Even though there is no lis, in the sense that there are not two contending parties before it, the Corporation will have to hear the defaulting employer who might be affected by the decision. Though therefore there is nothing express one way or other in section 45A or other provisions of the Act or regulations casting a duty upon the Corporation to act judicially or in quasi-judicial manner, as the order of determination of liability will adversely affect the employer the principles of natural justice would apply to these proceedings. Therefore, it is not correct to say that by necessary implication the principles of natural justice have been excluded by the provisions of section 45A and, therefore, the said section is bad on that count or it confers any arbitrary power on the Corporation," 25. As the last sentence indicates, the validity of section 45 was also under challenge and hence opinion was expressed in that fashion in the last sentence. As the last sentence indicates, the validity of section 45 was also under challenge and hence opinion was expressed in that fashion in the last sentence. The Division Bench, it seems, has endorsed the view of the Gujarat High Court in Dhrangdhre Chemical Works Ltd. v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation and others4, that the various provisions of the Act clearly lay down the guidelines for the exercise of the powers and the power which the Corporation is expected to exercise is quasi-judicial in nature and, therefore, it has to follow the elementary principles of natural justice by giving a person an opportunity to make a representation in that behalf before the amount is determined. The Division Bench also followed the decision of the Supreme Court in E. S. I. Corporation v. Central Press 5 and also in Royal Talkies, Hyderabad v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation6• 26. Shri Jayakar, however, contended that the decision of the Division Bench of this Court is not relevant because in that case he had conceded on behalf of the Corporation that the notice as well as certificates of recovery issued by the Corporation should be quashed as the Corporation was prepared to give a reasonable opportunity to the employer to put forward his case in that behalf. In this connection, the Division Bench has made the following record in the judgment :- "Mr. Jaykar, learned counsel appearing for the Corporation, has conceded before us and in our opinion rightly, that the notice as well as certificates of recovery issued by the Corporation should be quashed as the Corporation is prepared to give a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner-employer to put forward its case in this behalf." Since this record appears in the last but one paragraph of the judgment, it was felt by me that the statement was made at a late stage after the Court had declared its mind. Shri Jayakar stated that be had to make the said concession on behalf of the Corporation for two reasons, firstly, that the report which was the basis of the information was not made available and so not produced in that case as done in this case and, secondly, the Corporation could not produce the recovery certificates in that case which are produced in the present case. If I were to consider the correctness of the reasons for making the concession as claimed on behalf of the Corporation, I regret to say that I cannot accept the same. In so far as the question of the recovery certificates is concerned, Shri Ramaswami pointed out that the recovery certificates are very much referred to in the judgment while setting out the facts. The narration of the facts ii1hows that the Regional Director of the Employees' State Insurance Corporation had issued two separate recovery certificates dated 14th July 1971 requesting the Naib Tahsildar, Recovery of Government Dues, to recover the amount as arrears of land revenue. Now, with regard to the question of producing the report, the report was in the custody and possession of the Corporation and, therefore, it could not have formed part of the petition. In the present case, I had directed the Corporation to show me the material which was made the basis of determining the amount under section 45A and thereupon the report was disclosed. It is obvious that in that case the Division Bench had not thought fit to ask for the production of the report. I am, therefore, not satisfied that the binding character of the judgment of the Division Bench can be watered down or the decision can be made irrelevant by saying that the Corporation had made a concession as suggested on behalf of the Corporation. 27. Shri Jayakar made reference to the opinion expressed by Pendse J. ~n an unreported judgment given in Misc. Petition No. 1214 of 1975 decided on 4-10-1979, to which reference has already been made. In the case before Pendse J., reliance was placed on the decision of the Division Bench in the case of B. M. K. Industries. The learned Judge, however, did not follow the Division Bench for the following reasons :_ “ In the first instance, the decision of the Division Bench proceeds on the concession made by the learned counsel appearing for the Corporation. Secondly, it is difficult to appreciate how a notice is required to be given before the service of demand notice or recovery notice. The Regional Director makes a claim on the strength of documents available before him, and if the claim is disputed by the person, a remedy is provided under the Act itself. Secondly, it is difficult to appreciate how a notice is required to be given before the service of demand notice or recovery notice. The Regional Director makes a claim on the strength of documents available before him, and if the claim is disputed by the person, a remedy is provided under the Act itself. Chapter VI of the Act provides for adjudication of dispute and claims arising under the Act and section 75 enables any person to approach the Employees' Insurance Court if any question or dispute arises as to the liability arising under the Act. The service of demand notice or a recovery notice does not conclude the claim of the person against whom the notice is served, but a complete code is provided for adjudication of the grievance by the Act itself. The Employees' Insurance Court can adjudicate a dispute and the powers have been given to stay implementation of demand notice or the recovery notice under the provisions of section 83 of the Act. Even an appeal is provided against an order of the Employees' Insurance Court to the High Court under section 82 (2) of the Act. In these circumstances, in my judgment, it would be futile to claim that the Regional Director must serve a notice before issuance of a demand notice or a recovery notice. It is not that the principles of natural justice are violated merely because an opportunity is not given before a demand notice is served. If such interpretation is given to the provisions of the Act, it would lead to absurd results. An inquiry is not contemplated before the issuance of a demand notice because on service of demand notice if a dispute is raised, the complete procedure is provided under the Act itself. In my judgment, the reliance by Mr. Parshurampuria on the decision of the Division Bench is not accurate because the Division Bench was not really deciding the issue and the observations made therein are only on a concession made." 28. As regards the question of concession, I have given my reasons showing that there is no substance in the stand now taken by the Corporation that the decision of the Division Bench proceeds on the concession made by the Counsel for the Corporation. As regards the question of concession, I have given my reasons showing that there is no substance in the stand now taken by the Corporation that the decision of the Division Bench proceeds on the concession made by the Counsel for the Corporation. The other observations made by the learned Judge in giving a go by to the clear pronouncement of the Division Bench do not appeal to me. I think that I am obliged by judicial decorum and judicial loyalty to follow the decision of the Division Bench which clearly interprets the provisions of section 45-A and lays down the law. As a Single Judge, I cannot brush aside the decision of the Division Bench if I find that it is applicable to the facts of the case. It is to be noticed that the Division Bench was mindful of the provisions of section 75 of the Act which provide for adjudication of disputes and claims before the Employees' Insurance Court. The reference made to the provisions of section 83 in the judgment of Pendse J. as providing stay of implementation of demand notice or recovery notice is not correct. Section 83 relates to stay of payment pending appeal. It says that where the Corporation has presented an appeal against an order of the Employees' Insurance Court, that Court may, and if so directed by the High Court, shall, pending the decision of the appeal, withhold the payment of any sum directed to be paid by the order appealed against. This provision cannot be construed to mean stay of implementation of demand notice or recovery notice. The provisions of section 45-A read with section 45-B make it clear that there is no stage in between for stay of implementation of demand notice or recovery notice. Furthermore, under section 45-A, it is not a question of issuing a demand notice. Under section 45-A, the Corporation determines the amount of the employees' contribution. As indicated above, under sub-section (2) of section 45-A the order is considered to be sufficient proof and gives the Corporation the right to straightway recover the amount by way of an arrear of land revenue through the machinery provided under the Land Revenue Code or other relevant provisions. As indicated above, under sub-section (2) of section 45-A the order is considered to be sufficient proof and gives the Corporation the right to straightway recover the amount by way of an arrear of land revenue through the machinery provided under the Land Revenue Code or other relevant provisions. In my view, the judgment of the Division Bench is clear on the point that the employer will have to be given an opportunity of being heard before the amount is determined by the Corporation under section 45-A. It is obligatory on the Corporation to hear a defaulting employer who might be affected by the Corporation's decision under section 45-A. Under that section, the Corporation acts as a quasi-judicial authority and, therefore, having regard to the object and scope of section 45 A, the principles of natural justice would apply to these proceedings. 29. My eyes also fell on a decision of a single Judge of the Madras High Court referred to in Regional Director, E. S. I. Corporation v. Fibre Bangalore (P.) Ltd.,7. At page 90 of AIR 1980 Karnataka, the case of Free India (P) Ltd. v. The Regional Director, Employees' Insurance Corporations, is cited, wherein Ramaprasada Rao J. has observed :- The determination under section 45A (1), which the Corporation has to make, is not an administrative order, but is a quasi-judicial one which will impinge upon the rights of the parties. That being so, the principles of natural justice have to be adhered to and the determination of liability being made after due notice and a reasonable enquiry. Even section 45B says that any contribution payable under this Act may be recovered as an arrear of land revenue. It is not al ways compulsory for the Corporation to have recourse to the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act. A fortiori in a case where the quantum of liability is in dispute recourse to such a summary procedure is not permissible " Thus, it is not only the view of our High Court that the principles of natural justice are applicable to section 45A but also of the Madras High Court. 30. In any case, the law of the land is laid down by the Supreme Court and even if there is any scope for argument, that is also laid to rest. 30. In any case, the law of the land is laid down by the Supreme Court and even if there is any scope for argument, that is also laid to rest. Three Judges of the Supreme Court including the Chief Justice Shri M. H. Beg had occasion to consider the provisions of section 45A in E. S. I. Corporation, Bhopal v. Central Press9. Their Lordships considered the scheme of the Act in a brief manner. In that case, the appeal arose out of the proceedings initiated on 12-7-1961 by the Corporation under section 75 of the Act claiming contributions from the respondents for various periods between 27-9-1959 and 31-3-1965, which they were liable to pay under section 40 of the Act. The respondents in that case had failed to maintain the registers or records and to submit returns of wages paid as required under section 44 and hence the matter was taken to the Insurance Court. The Insurance Court dismissed the application on the ground that there was no provision for deciding such a dispute on an "ad hoc basis". In this connection, the Supreme Court said that the Insurance Court had failed to perform its mandatory duty to decide the dispute. In connection with section 45A, the learned Judges' opinion is :- "The powers of the Corporation are given in section 45A of the Act, introduced by Act 44 of 1966, whereby the Corporation may, on the basis of the information available to it, determine the amount of contributions payable and make necessary demands. Apparently, the scheme of the Act, after the amendment, is that the Corporation itself should, in a case where there is omission on the part of the employer to maintain records in accordance with section 44 of the Act, determine the amount of contributions on the strength of such information as it may collect. It can then make the demand. If the employer refuses to comply with the demand so made, the matter can come up before Employees' Insurance Court under section 75 of the Act. The Court should give the Corporation a direction to perform its duty where it considers that this should be performed by the Corporation. It cannot decline to perform its own duty because the Corporation has failed to discharge its function." 31. The Court should give the Corporation a direction to perform its duty where it considers that this should be performed by the Corporation. It cannot decline to perform its own duty because the Corporation has failed to discharge its function." 31. In that case, the Employees' Insurance Court had rejected the application on the ground that it was difficult for that Court to determine the basis of wages in a particular factory so as to enable a calculation of the amount of contributions to be made by the employer. In this connection, their Lordships pointed out that the Employees' Insurance Court had ample powers to decide the matter before it. The' following observations must be taken note of:- "Moreover, the Corporation has itself to collect the information initially and make a provisional demand on the basis of that information under section 45A in such a case." The Supreme Court has used the expression "provisional demand" worked out on the basis of the information initially collected by the Corporation under section 45A. This expression seems to have been used to convey that the amount determined by the Corporation is not of a final character but of a provisional nature, The Insurance Court had refused to consider the application on the ground that there was no provision for deciding a dispute on an ad hoc basis It seems to me that the calculations worked out by the Corporation were on ad hoc basis, as I will point out hereafter in the present case also, the calculations seem to be on ad hoc basis. This inference of mine appears to be justified. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have remarked that they fail to understand what is precisely meant boy '·ad hoc basis"'. It seems that the relevant material which led to the Employees' Insurance Court describing the dispute on ad hoc basis was not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court and hence the said remark. The Supreme Court also makes it clear in paragraph 5 of the judgment that the Employees' Insurance Court should be apprised of the information (collected by the Corporation under section 45A) and is under a duty to determine the basis of calculation itself. Sub-section (2) of section 45A, as discussed above, carries the expression "sufficient proof" for the purpose of section 75. Sub-section (2) of section 45A, as discussed above, carries the expression "sufficient proof" for the purpose of section 75. Therefore, when the information collected by the Corporation, which is made the basis of determination of the amount of the employees' contribution under section 45A and is to be treated on the footing of sufficient proof, is tested before the Employees" Insurance Court under section 75, the Corporation has to apprise that Court of the information collected by it for arriving at the determination of the employees' contribution and, as indicated by the Supreme Court, the Employees' Insurance Court is under a duty to determine the basis of calculation itself. This means that the amount determined by the Corporation under section 45A (1) is not final and that it has to be scrutinised by the Employees' Insurance Court. I feel that it is in these circumstances that their Lordships of the Supreme Court seem to have used the expression "provisional demand", thereby making us understand that the amount determined by the Corporation under section 45A is provisional. My reading of the judgment, as indicated above, is that the determination of the amount under section 45A enables the Corporation to make the basis of its claim when it applies to the Employees' Insurance Court under section 75 and it is for the Corporation then to satisfy that Court that the amount arrived at by the Corporation is correct on the basis of the information collected by it, and that the determination of the amount under section 45A is not of a final and conclusive character so as to enable the Employees' Insurance Court to pass a decree or order for payment on the basis of the Corporation's determination. 32. In Royal Talkies, Hyderabad v. E. S. I. Corporation (supra), the Supreme Court had to consider whether the employees of cycle stand and can teen run in a cinema theatre by the contractors were covered by the definition of "employee" and whether a cinema owner was liable as principal employer for their contribution. The other point which fell for consideration was about the fixation of liability under section 45A when the employer had disputed liability to pay contribution. Royal Talkies, the appellant in that case, had lost the appeal on all legal contentions and had sought the benefit of natural justice. The other point which fell for consideration was about the fixation of liability under section 45A when the employer had disputed liability to pay contribution. Royal Talkies, the appellant in that case, had lost the appeal on all legal contentions and had sought the benefit of natural justice. Their Lordships agreed to apply the principle of natural justice and said :- "The assessment of the quantum of the employers' contribution has now been made on an ad hoc basis because they merely pleaded non-liability and made no returns. On the strength of section 45A the contribution was determined without hearing. In the circumstances of the case,-and the learned Attorney General has no objection-we think it right to direct the relevant Corporation authorities to give a fresh hearing to the principal employers concerned, if sought within 2 months from today, to prove any errors or infirmities in the physical determination of the contribution. Such a hearing, in tune with the ruling of this Court in the Central Press case, is fair and so we order that the assessment shall be reconsidered in the light of a de novo hearing to the appellants and the quantum of contribution affirmed or modified by fresh orders." 33. These observations amply make it plain that the principles of natural justice are made applicable to section 45A of the Act. The reason seems to be that the assessment of the quantum of the employers' contribution was made on an ad hoc basis. It was on ad hoc basis because the Royal Talkies had not filed any returns. That means that the Royal Talkies had not followed the provisions of section 44. The reason for giving an opportunity was that Royal Talkies should have a chance to prove any errors or infirmities in the physical determination of the contribution. In these circumstances, it is too late in the day now to say that the Corporation is the absolute monarch in determining the amount under section 45A and what it decides is final. The Corporation is duty bound to give an opportunity to an employer who is sought to be held liable and who denies liability. 34. The reason for the application of the principles of natural justice is obvious because the Corporation acts as an adjudicating body. It determines the rights of a party. The Corporation is duty bound to give an opportunity to an employer who is sought to be held liable and who denies liability. 34. The reason for the application of the principles of natural justice is obvious because the Corporation acts as an adjudicating body. It determines the rights of a party. Such a function cannot be lawfully discharged by the Corporation without pointing out the information collected by it on the basis of which it desires to determine the liability of the employer. In Mahinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election CommissiOl1er~ New Delhi1(t, it is observed: "Natural justice is a pervasive facet of secular law where a spiritual touch enlivens legislation, administration and adjudication, to make fairness a creed of life. It has many colours and shades, many forms and shapes and, save where valid law excludes, it applies when people are affected by acts of authority. It is the bone of healthy Government, recognised from earliest times and not a mystic testament of judge-made law. Kraipak's case marks the watershed in the application of natural justice to administrative proceedings. The dichotomy between administrative and quasi-judicial functions vis-a-vis the doctrine of natural justice is presumably obsolescent after Kraipak's case." (See paragraphs 43, 44 and 45 of the judgment). In that case, one of the guidelines for the application of the principles of natural justice is that if civil consequences ensued from an order, hearing is necessary. A civil right being adversely affected is a sine qua non for the invocation of the audi alterarn pattern rule. This guideline can be traced from several paragraphs commencing from paragraph 65 onwards. In the present case also, civil consequences ensued on account of the determination of the amount by the Corporation as the petitioners are sought to be held liable both for the employees' contribution as well as the employer's contribution and, therefore, the petitioners are entitled to be heard by the Corporation before the Corporation determines the liability of the petitioners under section 45A of the Act. 35. Shri Jayakar relied upon the decision of this Court in Messrs. Associated Bearing Co. Ltd. v. The E. S. I. Corporation11. In that case, at the instance of the Corporation, two communications had been addressed to the Tahsildar of Haveli requiring him to recover employees' special contribution under section 73D and employees' contribution in respect of canteen employees. 35. Shri Jayakar relied upon the decision of this Court in Messrs. Associated Bearing Co. Ltd. v. The E. S. I. Corporation11. In that case, at the instance of the Corporation, two communications had been addressed to the Tahsildar of Haveli requiring him to recover employees' special contribution under section 73D and employees' contribution in respect of canteen employees. Acting on the report of the Insurance Inspector the Corporation had determined the respective contributions on the basis that the number of canteen employees was 30 and accordingly informed the petitioner Company in that case about the demand. A second communication was sent by the Corporation drawing attention of the petitioners to the fact that the necessary amount of employers' special contribution in respect of canteen employees had not been paid and they should show cause as to why assessment should not be made on ad hoc basis after working out the total wages. of Rs. 250 per employee. The petitioners in that case were also informed that the employers' special contribution was recoverable as arrears of land revenue along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum under Regulation 31A. The petitioners, however, took no steps to dispute their liability or to dispute the demand and consequently, steps were taken by the Corporation to have the amounts recovered as arrears of land revenue by making applications to the Tahsildar, Haveli. The Tahsildar informed the petitioners about the request made by the Corporation for recovery of the amount and asked them to deposit the amount. The contention raised before the Division Bench on behalf of the petitioners in that case was that section 45A of the Act required the Corporation to determine the amount of contributions payable by the employer by an order and since no order had been passed, the demand itself was bad in law. Rejecting this contention, the learned Judges said:- "If there was any specific averment made that the requirements of section 45A have not been complied with, the Corporation would have been in a position to meet this contention effectively. Apart from that, the petitioners have been positively informed that the amount of contribution has been determined as stated in the communications sent to the petitioners. In our view, this would be sufficient compliance with the provisions of section 45A. Apart from that, the petitioners have been positively informed that the amount of contribution has been determined as stated in the communications sent to the petitioners. In our view, this would be sufficient compliance with the provisions of section 45A. The order contemplated by section 45A is the order determining the amount and whenever the amount is determined, it must be assumed that section 45A has been complied with." 36. Shri Jayakar, relying upon the above observations, contended that in the present case, the two orders both dated 30th April 1976 (part of Ex. G (collectively) to the Petition) are the orders directing the Collector of Bombay Suburban District to collect the dues as arrears of land revenue and the notices dated 13-5-1976 and 14-5-1976 are recovery certificates and that these orders and certificates are a sufficient compliance of the provisions of section 45A. In the present case, I am not considering the question whether the provisions of section 45A have been complied with by the Corporation or not. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioners and as discussed above was whether the principles of natural justice should have been complied with before determining the amount under section 45A. I am unable to see how the above observations of the Division Bench are of any assistance to the Corporation. One pertinent fact to be noticed is that in the case of Associated Bearing Co., the Company had not challenged or disputed their liability or demand made by the Corporation. That in itself makes a world of difference. The contention raised in that case was not even pleaded, and the above observations show that in the absence of the same, possibly the Corporation was not in a position to meet the same effectively. 37. Reverting to the facts of the present case, Shri Jayakar was requested to produce the material which formed the basis of determination of the amount under section 45A. Shri Jayakar produced a copy of the enquiry report. Apart from this report, Shri Jayakar stated that there were no other notings or rough papers and that this is the only document in the file which formed the basis of the information for acting under section 45A. The enquiry report refers to ledger leash book/voucher/SC-2. Shri Jayakar produced a copy of the enquiry report. Apart from this report, Shri Jayakar stated that there were no other notings or rough papers and that this is the only document in the file which formed the basis of the information for acting under section 45A. The enquiry report refers to ledger leash book/voucher/SC-2. Shri Jayakar stated that the figures mentioned in the report were taken from the books of accounts of the petitioners during the course of inspection on 29th, 30th and 31st October 1975. The amounts arrived at by way of employer's special contribution and employees contribution are shown as "ad hoc", There is a note of the Insurance Inspector, Bhandup, saying that "R. O. may press the above dues". This report indicates that the amounts arrived at were ad hoc and tbis is similar to what was found in the Central Press case and also in Royal Talkies' case. On the basis of these ad hoc figures, the Corporation has determined the same amount as the amount payable on account of employees' contribution. 38. Another thing which came to light was that under section 45A it is the Corporation which is authorised to determine the amount of contribution in respect of employees' contribution. The question arose as to who in fact had determined the amount in the name of the Corporation. This enquiry led to Shri Jayakar producing Resolution No. Ins. III/4 (7) 2/64 dated 11-1-1968 stating that at its meeting held on 18-11-1967 the Employees' State Insurance Corporation had passed the following resolution:- "Resolved that the powers of the Corporation under section 45A to determine by order the amount of contributions payable shall be exercised (i) by the Director General in respect of a factory situated anywhere in India except Jammu and Kashmir, (ii) by a Regional Director in respect of a factory situated within his region, and (iii) by an Assistant Regional Director in respect of a factory situated within the area in his charge." 39. In the present case, the relevant letter dated 11-3-1976 issued in connection with section 45-A as well as the one addressed to the Collector of Bombay Suburban District dated 30-4-1976 being an application under section 5 of the Revenue Recovery Act, 1890, for recovery of the employee's contribution under section 45-B, are admittedly signed by the Deputy Regional Director and not by the Regional Director and for the Assistant Regional Director. According to Shri Jayakar, under the said resolution, the petitioner's factory is situated within the region of the Regional Director. It is, therefore, clear that the Regional Director alone could have made the determination of the amounts under section 45-A and not the Deputy Regional Director. I had specifically asked Shri Jayakar to show me if there was any other document or material on record besides these two documents, indicating the determination of the amount of employees' contribution by the Corporation under section 45- A. Shri Jayakar, after taking instructions, stated that there was no other document. This error is of a serious character and goes to the root of the matter. An officer not authorised by the Corporation to determine the amount under section 45-A has chosen to determine the amount and set the machinery of recovery in motion. The Regional Director alone could have exercised the power under section 45-A to determine the amount of the employees' contribution. This, in my opinion, is a fatal flaw and is sufficient to quash the impugned letter s or orders or certificates. In my judgment, the petitioners were entitled to a hearing before the passing of the impugned orders, i. e. before the determination of the amount under section 45-A in respect of the employee's contribution. The order fixing the recovery of the amount of employees' contribution determined by the Corporation in respect 01 overtime payments for the period from the 1st quarter of 1962 to the fourth quarter of 1967 aggregating to Rs. 10,307-89 and the employees' contribution in respect of labour charges for the period from the 1st quarter of 1965 to the fourth quarter of 1971 aggregating to Rs. 2,607-77 under section 45-A, is liable to be quashed. 40. This takes me to the question of the employer's special contribution. The provisions of Chapter V -A of the Act are attracted. These provisions have ceased to have effect from 1-7-1973. 2,607-77 under section 45-A, is liable to be quashed. 40. This takes me to the question of the employer's special contribution. The provisions of Chapter V -A of the Act are attracted. These provisions have ceased to have effect from 1-7-1973. Section 73-1, however, provides that on the provisions of Chapter V-A ceasing to have effect, the provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, shall hold the field. The amount of the employer's special contribution claimed is from the first quarter of 1962 extending to the fourth quarter of 1971 in respect of overtime and labour charges and, therefore, covered during the lifetime of Chapter V-A. Sections 73-8 and 73-D are in these terms:- "73-8. (1) [f any question or dispute arises in respect of the employer's special contribution payable or recoverable under this Chapter and there is no Employees' Insurance Court having jurisdiction to try such question or dispute, the question or dispute shall be decided by such authority as the Central Government may specify in this behalf. (2) The provisions of sub-section (1) of section 76, sections 77 to 79 and 81 shall, so far as may be, apply in relation to a proceeding before an authority specified under sub-section (1) as they apply in relation to a proceeding before an Employees' Insurance Court. 73-D. The employer's special contribution payable under this Chapter may be recovered as if it were an arrear of land revenue." 41. We have noticed more than once that section 73-A attracts liability of a principal employer to pay to the Corporation a special contribution called "the Employer's special contribution" at the rate specified under sub-section (3) of that section Section 73-8 (1) shows by implication that if any question or dispute arises in respect of the employer's special contribution payable or recoverable under Chapter V-A, then it is the Employees' Insurance Court which has jurisdiction to try such question or dispute and that question or dispute is to be decided by the Employees' Insurance Court. The purpose of enacting section 73- B (1) was that in case in any area there is no Employees' Insurance Court, then the Central Government was to create an authority as a substitute for the Employees' Insurance Court and that is why under sub-section (2) of section 73-B various other provisions are made applicable to that authority in order to enable it to act as effectively as an Employees' Insurance Court. 42. In this connection, the ruling of the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Regional Director, E. S. I. Corporation v. Fibre Bangalore Pvt. Ltd., cited above, is of significance. In that case, a Division Bench of that Court had referred the following question of law to the Full Bench for its opinion :- "Whether in the case of a disputed demand for contribution under the E. S. I. Act by the E. S. I. Corporation, the latter alone should raise a dispute before the Employees' State Insurance Court in accordance with sections 75 and 77 of the E. S. I. Act or any other provision therein; or, whether it is the Employer against whom such levy is made, and by whom it is disputed, who should raise such a dispute before the E. S. I. Court for adjudication?" It is not necessary to refer to the facts of that case as the answer given by the Full Bench can be understood without knowing the facts. The learned Judges had considered various provisions of the Act including section 45-A, 45-8 and 75. The argument which was raised was the construction of the provisions of sections 45-A and 45-B in the context of the scope and purpose of section 75 of the Act. The argument on behalf of the respondent-Company in that case was whether, even where the Corporation has, in the class of cases to which section 45-A is clearly attracted, determined, by order, the amount of contributions payable under that section, the Corporation has, before invoking the provisions in the Act enabling the recovery of the contributions as arrears of land revenue, to seek an adjudication of the claim before the Insurance Court if the employer disputes the claim. The main contention put forth on behalf of the respondent-Company was that the provisions of section 75 are clear to the effect that wherever there is any dispute even if the dispute relates to the subject- matter of a determination made by the Corporation under section 45-A, the Corporation must necessarily seek the resolution of the dispute before the Insurance Court. The Full Bench, after considering the cases cited before it and the relevant provisions of the Act, has made the following observations in paragraph 5 : "After a careful consideration of the matter, we are of the opinion that what emerges from a conspectus of the relevant provisions of the Act is that in cases where the requirements of section 45-A are attracted and satisfied and where the Corporation is enabled to and does make an order under and in accordance with that section determining the amount of contributions payable in respect of the employees of the factory or establishment, the Corporation can proceed to recover the amount so determined as an arrear of land revenue though the employer affected by that: order may raise a dispute in regard thereto. The Corporation is not compelled to seek an adjudication before the Insurance Court by reason alone of the fact that the employer disputes the claim so determined. Indeed the expression determine occurring in section 45-A is far too strong to permit of its being understood as meaning any thing but a decision which, unless set aside by the Insurance Court in exercise of its powers under section 75, is enforceable under section 45-B. This in our opinion, is the dear effect of the provisions in sub section (2) of section 45-A read with section 45-B. In such lit case, if the employer seeks to dispute and avert his liability it is for him to institute proceedings before the Employees insurance Court.'" 43. Since the question referred to the Fun Bench was of a comprehensive nature, the Court did not rest its opinion at what has been quoted above. Since the question referred to the Fun Bench was of a comprehensive nature, the Court did not rest its opinion at what has been quoted above. The Court proceeded to further examine the provisions of sections 77 (1) and 77 (1-A) and after re-affirming its opinion that in case~ where a claim for contributions by the Corporation has received prior determination under section 45-A and the employer raises disputes on such a determination, it is not necessary that the dispute be resolved by the Insurance Court before such a claim can acquire the dement of enforceability as arrear of land revenue, the Full Court proceeds to add the following:- "However, in cases where there is and can be no determination under section 45-A and where the claims are disputed by the employer, it is necessary for the Corporation to take its claim before the Insurance Court for a resolution of the dispute". These observations make it clear that the learned Judges had placed the determination of the amount of the employees' contribution under section 45-A in one category and in that category, according to the Full Bench, if the employer seeks to dispute and avert his liability of a claim determined under section 45-A, it is for him to institute proceedings before the Employees' Insurance Court. The second category, or rather the other category, is of cases in which there is and can be no determination under section 45-A and in those cases, if the employer disputes the amount claimed by the Corporation, it is the Corporation which has to knock at the door of the Insurance Court for a resolution of the dispute. In other words, in respect of a claim determined under section 45-A, it is the employer who has to make an application under section 75, but in a case where the claim is otherwise than section 45-A. it is the Corporation which has to make an application under section 75. In other words, in respect of a claim determined under section 45-A, it is the employer who has to make an application under section 75, but in a case where the claim is otherwise than section 45-A. it is the Corporation which has to make an application under section 75. The answer given by the Full Bench to the question referred to it must be noted in order to bring home the above opinion emerging from the judgment :- "Where, in cases to which provisions of section 45-A of the Act are attracted, the Corporation by an order made in accordance with that section determines the amount of contributions payable and that claim is disputed by the employer, it would not be necessary for the Corporation to seek a resolution of that dispute before the Insurance Court. Such a claim is recoverable as arrears of land revenue. If the employer disputes the claim, it is for him to move the Insurance Court for relief. In other cases other than cases were determination of the amount of contributions under section 45-A is made, the Corporation, if its claim is disputed by the employer, should seek an adjudication of the dispute before the Insurance Court before enforcing recovery". 44. The provisions of section 73 B were not considered by the Full Bench in reaching the above conclusion. But as I have humbly pointed out, by implication section 73B points out, rather unmistakably, that if any question or dispute arises in respect of the employer's special contribution payable or recoverable, then that question is to be decided by the Employees' Insurance Court. It may be hardly immaterial as to who goes to the Court first. In the light of the decision of the Karnataka High Court also, it is clear that any dispute regarding the employer's special contribution is to be decided by the Employee's Insurance Court. In the case before us, the petitioners had disputed their liability soon after the receipt of the letter dated 17-1-1976 by their letter dated 17-2-1976. Subsequently, when the Corporation sought to make a demand under section 73A, at that stage too the petitioners had denied liability for the reasons mentioned in their letter dated 9-4-1976. In the case before us, the petitioners had disputed their liability soon after the receipt of the letter dated 17-1-1976 by their letter dated 17-2-1976. Subsequently, when the Corporation sought to make a demand under section 73A, at that stage too the petitioners had denied liability for the reasons mentioned in their letter dated 9-4-1976. This correspondence shows that a question or a dispute existed between the petitioners and the Corporation with regard to the employer's special contribution and involved a question of liability or the right to recover the same. In these circumstances, the Corporation could not have proceeded to seek the recovery of the amount claimed by it by making use of the provisions of section 730 which says that the employer's special contribution payable may be recovered as if it were an arrear of land revenue. The Corporation had no power and authority to seek recovery of the amount without the question or dispute involved having been decided by the Employees' Insurance Court. The placement of section 730 took place when the entire body of Chapter V-A was incorporated in the Act by Act 53 of 1951. Subsequently, the Legislature added sections 45A and 45B by Act 44 of 1966 with effect from 17-6-1967. Section 458 provides that any contribution payable under this Act may be recovered as an arrear of land revenue. The natural meaning to be given to this provision is that any type of contribution payable under the Act may be recovered as an arrear of land revenue. This includes both the employees' contribution as well as the employer's special contribution. In the face of the existence of section 730 on the statute book whereby the employer's special contribution was recover· able as an arrear of land revenue, the duplication of the same provision under section 45B was unnecessary. However, the inclusion of section 45B, when read with section 45A, and in view of the existence of section 73D, can be reconciled by understanding the word "contribution" used in section 458 as meaning contribution other than the employer's special contribution. In this manner, harmony is restored to the provisions introduced with effect from 17-6-1967. It is not the case of the petitioners that the provisions of section 73D have been invoked by the Corporation mala fide. In this manner, harmony is restored to the provisions introduced with effect from 17-6-1967. It is not the case of the petitioners that the provisions of section 73D have been invoked by the Corporation mala fide. It is probable that the Corporation acted in good faith by invoking section 73 D in the absence of any decision of a Court to the contrary. The decision of the Karnataka High Court, to which the Corporation was a party, was banded out on 19th April 1978. 45. This takes me to the last question about the Corporation's Claim being time-barred. Section 77 (1) lays down that the proceedings before an Employees' Insurance Court shall be commenced by application. Sub-section (IA) added with effect from 28-1-1968 and the relevant Explanation contained in clause (b) are in these words ;- "77. (1A) Every such application shall be made within a period of three years from the date on which the cause of action arises. Explanation.-For the purpose of this sub-section,- (a) . (b) the cause of action in respect of a Claim by the Corporation for recovering contributions from the principal employer or a claim by the principal employer for recovering contributions from an immediate employer shall not be deemed to arise till the date by which the evidence of contributions having been paid is due to be received by the Corporation under the regulations." 46. According to Shri Ramaswami, the relevant regulations are Regulations 4 and 26 and, according to Shri Jayakar, Regulation 31. These provisions have received the consideration of the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court (A I R 1980 Karnataka 80). The learned Judges say that the provision merely provides a "deemed dale" for the arising of the "cause of action" by providing that it shall not be earlier than the date by which the evidence of payment of contribution is required to be filed. Thus, the question which is normally a question of fact as to when a cause of action arises is sought to be confined by Explanation (b). In respect of a claim by the Corporation for recovery of contributions from the principal employer, the cause of action does not arise by statutory fiction till the date by which the evidence of contributions having been paid is due to be received by the Corporation under the regulations. In respect of a claim by the Corporation for recovery of contributions from the principal employer, the cause of action does not arise by statutory fiction till the date by which the evidence of contributions having been paid is due to be received by the Corporation under the regulations. In order to work the starting point of the cause of action, what is relevant is the date by which the evidence of contributions having been paid is due to be received by the Corporation. Under Regulation 26 (c), an employer, being in possession of a Contribution Card in respect of any person, shall send it by registered post or messenger, together with a return in duplicate in Form 6 to the appropriate office, within 42 days of the termination of the contribution period to which it relates. Regulation 31 says as follows :- "31. Time for payment of contribution :-An employer who is liable to pay contribution in respect of any employee shall pay those contributions within the following periods ;_ (a) within 21 days of the last day of the wage period in which the contribution falls due; (b) within 14 days of the termination of employment, irrespective of whether the employment is terminated with or without notice; (c) within 21 days after the termination of the contribution period in respect of every employee, whichever period is earlier: Provided that in the case of an exempted employee the token stamp in respect of any week shall be affixed within such time as the contribution in respect of that week would have been payable if the provisions of Chapter V A of the Act had not been in force. Explanation-For the purpose of this regulation, the expression 'wage period' shall have the meaning assigned to it in Schedule I to the Act." 47. Regulation 26 (2) says that for purposes of section 77 of the Act, the due date by which the evidence of contributions having been paid must reach the Corporation shall be the last of the days specified inter alia in clause (c) of sub-regulation (1). Regulation 4 provides for "Contribution and Benefit Periods". I do not think that Regulation 4 has any significance for the purpose of the period of limitation. Regulation 26 concerns contribution cards and unless there is a contribution card in existence, Regulation 26 would have no application. Regulation 4 provides for "Contribution and Benefit Periods". I do not think that Regulation 4 has any significance for the purpose of the period of limitation. Regulation 26 concerns contribution cards and unless there is a contribution card in existence, Regulation 26 would have no application. It is not the case of the petitioners that contribution cards in respect of the persons for whom over-time and labour charges were claimed by the Corporation, were in existence. Therefore, Regulation 26 has no application. Regulation 31 which provides for time for payment of contribution covers all cases where an employer who is liable to pay contribution has to pay the same within the specified periods. As soon as the amount of contribution falls due, the period of limitation commences after the expiry of the number of days provided under clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Regulation 31. In the present case, the correspondence disclosed in the affidavit in reply made on behalf of the Corporation shows that either the Corporation was not taking inspection or the petitioners were not giving inspection. Shri Jayakar could not point out any provision from the Act or the Rules or Regulations to show that the period of limitation is to commence from the date when the Corporation chooses to take inspection of books of accounts of an employer. The provisions pointed out to me do not show that the starting point of limitation can be held in abeyance after the employer's liability for contribution arises. On the contrary, the provisions of Explanation (b) to section 77 (1A) show that the period of limitation starts after the evidence of contributions having been paid is due to be received by the Corporation under the regulations. In the light of this discussion, the present claims are time-barred. 48. In the result, all the impugned letters and certificates which were the subject of challenge are liable to be set aside. 49. In view of the above discussion, the petition is allowed. The rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a). There shall, however, be no order as to costs. 50. Shri Ramaswami points out that a sum of Rs. 41,695-66 was deposited in Court pursuant to the order of this Court with liberty to the 1st respondent-Corporation to withdraw the same on furnishing a Bank guarantee to the satisfaction of the Prothonotary and Senior Master. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. 50. Shri Ramaswami points out that a sum of Rs. 41,695-66 was deposited in Court pursuant to the order of this Court with liberty to the 1st respondent-Corporation to withdraw the same on furnishing a Bank guarantee to the satisfaction of the Prothonotary and Senior Master. Shri Jayakar states that the 1st respondent-Corporation has not withdrawn the amount. Shri Ramaswami applies that the amount of Rs. 41,695-66 be ordered to be repaid to the petitioners. Shri Jayakar states that the amount should continue to remain in Court for another four weeks to enable him to consider whether the Corporation would like to go in appeal against the present judgment. 51. In my opinion, the amount of Rs. 41,695-66 should be repaid to the petitioners. If the 1st respondent-Corporation desires to go in appeal, it will be open to the Corporation to obtain the necessary directions from the Appeal Court, if the Appeal Court considers that it is necessary in the ends of justice that the petitioners should again be directed to redeposit the amount of Rs. 41,695-66. It is to be noted that a large sum of Rs. 41,695-66 is lying idle since about August 1976. The 1st respondent-Corporation has not cared to withdraw the money for whatever reasons. The Prothonotary and Senior Master to act on the Minutes. Petition allowed.