JUDGMENT K.N. Goyal, J. - These four special appeals and one writ petition involve a common question of law and, as such may be conveniently disposed of by a common judgment. 1 he special appeals have all been filed by the State against a judgment of the learned single Judge allowing four writ petitions. The petitioners in all the five writ petitions were appointed as Police Constables. Their services were terminated by giving them one month's pay in lieu of notice under the rules promulgated by Appointment (B) Department Notification No. O. 230/11 - B - 1953, dated January 30, 1953. The contention of the petitioners was that under the provisions of Para 543 of the U.P. Police Regulations, their appointment could have been made only in a substantive capacity on probation and they could not have been appointed in a temporary capacity as contended on behalf of the State. Under Para 541, a probationer's services can be dispensed with before his confirmation, but that can be done only after he is called upon to show - cause as to why he should not be discharged and after a consideration of his representation. As this was not done the impugned orders of termination are assailed. This contention made in the four writ petitions aforesaid has prevailed with the learned single Judge, and the same contention has been advanced on behalf of the petitioner in the fifth writ petition which is originally before us and which has been filed after the petitioner unsuccessfully assailed the termination order before the Public Services Tribunal. 2. For the sake of convenience, the respondents in the four appeals whose petitions have been allowed, will also hereinafter be referred to as the petitioners. 3. Undisputably, there is no appointment order in favour of any of the petitioners. It is further undisputed that, according to their service books, their services were described as temporary. It was further admitted in the four writ petitions, which have been allowed as aforesaid, that the posts, on which they were appointed, were permanent posts and that clear vacancies for the permanent appointments did exist. The contention on behalf of the State, however, was that notwithstanding the availability of clear vacancies, the appointments of the petitioners were made in a temporary capacity. The contention on behalf of the State, however, was that notwithstanding the availability of clear vacancies, the appointments of the petitioners were made in a temporary capacity. Similar seems to be the position with regard to the writ petition which is before us after the petitioner was unsuccessful before the Tribunal. In this case also, the averment in para 1 of the writ petition to the effect that the post was permanent and that no other constable was having any lien to that post has not been specifically rebutted in para 3 of the counter - affidavit. We may, therefore, assume that in all the five cases clear vacancies for permanent posts did exist. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri Lalloo Singh and Sri Manna, did not contend that the petitioners should be deemed to have been confirmed after the end of a maximum period of probation. Their contention was that although the petitioners continued to be probationers an order of termination could not be issued under the 1953 Rules aforesaid, but only under Para 541 after giving an opportunity of representation to the petitioners. 5. No material was placed in any of the writ petitions for contending the orders to be arbitrary or violative of Article 16 of the Constitution. It was thus not contended that the case fell within the rule laid down in the Manager, Govt. Branch Press v. D. B. Belliappa, 1979 Lab. I. C. 146 (S.C.) or in S. R. Venketaraman v. Union of India [(1979) 2 S. C. C. 491]. 6. The only question that thus arises for consideration in these cases is whether the petitioners were to be deemed to be appointed on probation under Para ;541 of the Police Regulations and, if so, whether the termination orders passed under the 1953 Rules were invalid for violation of the said Para 541. Para 541 occurs in Chapter XXXVII which is headed "Training of Head Constables and Constables" and reads as follows :- "541.(1) A recruit will be on probation from the date he begins to officiate in a clear vacancy. Para 541 occurs in Chapter XXXVII which is headed "Training of Head Constables and Constables" and reads as follows :- "541.(1) A recruit will be on probation from the date he begins to officiate in a clear vacancy. The period of probation will be two years except in the following cases : (a) those recruited directly in the Criminal Investigation Department or District Intelligence Staff will be on probation for three years, and (b) those transferred to the Mounted .Police will be governed by the directions in Paragraph 84 of the Police Regulations. If at the end of the period of probation conduct and work have been satisfactory and the recruit has been approved by the Deputy Inspector - General of Police for service in the force, the Superintendent of Police will confirm him in his appointment. (2) In any case in which either during or at the end of the period of probation, the Superintendent of Police is of opinion that a recruit . is unlikely to make a good Police Officer he may dispense with his services. Before, however, this is done the recruit must be supplied with specific complaints and grounds on which it is proposed to discharge him and then he should be called upon to show - cause as to why he should not be discharged. The recruit must furnish his representation in writing and it will be duly considered by the Superintendent of Police before passing the orders of discharge. (3) Every order passed by a Superintendent under sub - paragraph (2) above shall, subject to the control of the Deputy Inspector - General be final." 7. It may be mentioned here that more or less similarly worded provisions occur in Chapter XXXVI which is entitled "Training of Sub - Inspectors" in Paras 534 and 537. 8. The 1953 Rules promulgated by Appointment (B) Department, as mentioned earlier, have been replaced with retrospective effect, i. e., with effect from 30th January, 1953 itself, by the U. P. Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975. 8. The 1953 Rules promulgated by Appointment (B) Department, as mentioned earlier, have been replaced with retrospective effect, i. e., with effect from 30th January, 1953 itself, by the U. P. Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975. For the purposes of these cases there is no substantial difference between the 1953 Rules and the 1975 Rules, but it will be proper to refer to the 1975 Rules, although the impugned orders in all the five cases made a reference to the 1953 Rules Four of those orders, which were dealt with in the judgment of the learned single Judge, were passed much before the 1975 Rules were published, while the order in fifth writ petition, which is originally before us, was passed a few days after the promulgation of the 1975 Rules. Apparently, in ignorance of the promulgation of the new Rules, the appointing authority made a reference to the 1953 Rules as the source of its authority. Nothing, however, turns on this because it is not disputed that if the authority concerned did have the power to pass a particular order, mere citation of the wrong source of authority does not make the order invalid. Indeed, no grievance is made on behalf of the petitioners on this score From the 1975 Rules, the provisions of Rules 1 (3) and 2 may be quoted here : "1 (3). They shall apply to all persons holding a civil post in connection with the affairs of Uttar Pradesh and who are under the rule - making control of the Governor, but who do not hold a lien on a permanent post under the Government of Uttar Pradesh." "2. Definition - In these rules "temporary service" means officiating or substantive service on a temporary post of officiating service on a permanent post under the Uttar Pradesh Government." 9. Para 541 aforesaid came up for interpretation before a Full Bench of this Court in Nanak Chand v. State of U. P., (1971 All L. J. 724); the Full Bench held that there was nothing in the Police Regulation to fervent the authorities from making temporary appointments or creating temporary post of police constables. It was also held that Para 541 did not apply to all police constables, but only to those police constables who were appointed as probationers. If the appointment was in a temporary capacity, then Para 541 did not apply. It was also held that Para 541 did not apply to all police constables, but only to those police constables who were appointed as probationers. If the appointment was in a temporary capacity, then Para 541 did not apply. It was further held that Para 541 was not shown to have statutory force and it appeared merely to embody administrative directions as to what was necessary by way of training and experience before a police officer could be considered fit for permanent appointment. It was also observed that, as explained on behalf of the State in supplementary counter - affidavits in those cases; the procedure now followed by the police administration was to keep all police recruits in the temporary post until the Head of the Department decided to bring them into the permanent strength, whereupon those who were found suitable were absorbed in clear vacancies, the last two years of temporary service being then counted as a probationary period. It was further held that temporary Police Officers, like other temporary Government servants, were covered by the 1953 Rules and their services were terminable on one month's notice or one month's pay in lieu of notice. The arguments on behalf of the petitioners in that case that they were governed solely by the provisions of the Police Act and the Rules issued there under was rejected and it was further observed, in the alternative, that the 1953 Rules could also be treated as having been issued, as regards police officers, in exercise of the rule - making power conferred on the State Government by Section 46 (2) of the Police Act. On "these findings, the termination orders were upheld. 10. The Public Services Tribunal has noticed this Full Bench decision in its order, but the decision does not appear to have been cited before the learned single Judge although his decision is of October, 1974. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioners have, however, contended that the Full Bench decision was distinguishable on the ground that in that case it was clearly found that the posts had been advertised as temporary, while in the present cases, the existence of clear vacancies in permanent posts is undisputed. The Full Bench did not consider the question whether temporary appointments could be made otherwise than on probation even when the appointments were made on permanent posts which were clearly vacant. 12. The Full Bench did not consider the question whether temporary appointments could be made otherwise than on probation even when the appointments were made on permanent posts which were clearly vacant. 12. As laid down in Director Panchayat Raj, U. P. v. Babu Singh Gaur (A.I.R. 1972 S. C. 420) : and (A.I.R. 1977 S. C. 1267) : there is nothing to inhibit the continuance of a temporary Government servant from continuing in a temporary capacity even after the post, on which he was originally appointed, is converted into a permanent post. Thus, on principle, there is nothing to prevent an initial appointment in a temporary capacity on a post which was permanent and which was clearly vacant. The Full Bench decision in Nanak Chand (supra) was not based merely on the circumstance that the posts in which the appointments were made were temporary. It is true that the words of Para 541, from the date he begins to officiate in a clear vacancy" were not quoted or expressly discussed by the Full Bench. The learned Judges, however, did observe as follows :- "We are fully satisfied, however, that Chapters XXXVI and XXXVII were never meant to apply to temporary recruits It has been explained in the supplementary counter - affidavits filed on behalf of the State that the procedure now followed by the police administration is to keep all recruits in temporary posts until the Head of the Department decided to bring them into the permanent strength, whereupon those who are found suitable are absorbed in clear vacancies, the last two years of temporary service being then counted as a probationary period." (Emphasis supplied). 13. It is thus clear that the words "from the date he begins to officiate in a clear vacancy", were certainly present to their Lordships mind and their implication was considered. 14. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the implication of Para 541 (1) is that every recruit must necessarily be placed on probation. Any other interpretation would, according to the argument, mean that the Court is substituting the following sentence for the first sentence of this sub - paragraph. A recruit, if appointed on probation, will be on probation from the date he begins to officiate in a clear vacancy." 15. Any other interpretation would, according to the argument, mean that the Court is substituting the following sentence for the first sentence of this sub - paragraph. A recruit, if appointed on probation, will be on probation from the date he begins to officiate in a clear vacancy." 15. It has been contended that it is not permissible to add the words "if appointed on probation" to the words of the sub - paragraph. This argument runs counter to the categorical pronouncement of the Full Bench that this paragraph does not apply to temporary recruits at all. In other words, it applies only to appointments made in a substantive capacity on probation It has further been explained by the Full Bench in Para 7 that : "The misapprehension that temporary posts in the police force are not contemplated by the Police Act and the Police Regulations seems to have arisen on account of the complete absence from the Police Regulations of any rules or instructions in respect of temporary police officers." 16. Their Lordships added. "But this is probably due to the fact that the regulations in questions were framed long ago, at a time when it was not considered necessary to have any temporary posts." 17. Thus, Para 541 of the Regulations does not deal with the question as to whether every appointment must necessarily be in a substantive capacity or on probation. If temporary posts can be created and appointments made thereto 'without any express provision in the Regulations in that behalf and such appointments are not violative of Para 541, there seems no reason why it should not be held in view of Babu Singh Gaur and Nand Kishore Tandon's (A.I.R. 1977 S C. 1267) cases (supra -, that temporary appointments to permanent posts can also be made The rule of strict literal interpretation applies only where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous That is not the case here. As noted in the report of the Committee on Ministers Powers, 1932 (C. M. D. 4060, Reprinted 1966, P. 49). As noted in the report of the Committee on Ministers Powers, 1932 (C. M. D. 4060, Reprinted 1966, P. 49). "Regulations on the whole tend to be somewhat less well drafted than Government Bills as originally presented to Parliament." The interpretation canvassed on behalf of the petitioners also involves the substitution of the following sentence for the first sentence of this sub - paragraph : "Every recruit, if appointed against a permanent post for which a clear vacancy exists, will be on probation from the date of his appointment, and if appointed against a temporary post will begin to officiate as probationer from the date of availability of a clear vacancy for a permanent post." Indeed, this sub - paragraph deals only with the period of probation in the case of appointments made on probation, but does not exclude the making of temporary appointments, i.e., appointments otherwise than in a substantive capacity. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that the words "except in the following cases" occurring in Para 541 also indicate that save in the two classes of cases enumerated in clauses (a) and (b) of this sub - paragraph, every recruit shall be on probation. This does not appear to be correct. The words "except in the following cases' govern the words "the period of probation will be two years." Thus, these exceptions mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) have nothing to do with the interpretation of the first sentence of Para 541(1). The contention of learned counsel that the exception mentioned in clause (b) does not relate to period of probation is also not correct Para 84 deals with the mounted police. Although in the case of mounted police the normal period of probation is two years, there are special provisions qualifying this normal period. It has been mentioned in Para 84 that constables transferred from the foot police to the mounted branch may count only up to 16 months' period put in a probationers in the foot police even if they have actually put in much more while they were in the foot police. In other words, even if a constable, while serving in the foot police and remaining unconfirmed has completed two years while so saving, he has to serve a further period of probation of at least eight months in the mounted police. In other words, even if a constable, while serving in the foot police and remaining unconfirmed has completed two years while so saving, he has to serve a further period of probation of at least eight months in the mounted police. Although Para 84 deals with some other matters as well it does deal with period of probation, Thus, it is clear that the two exceptions mentioned in Cls. (a) and (b) relate only to the period of probation. The words "except in the following cases" do not, therefore, show that in all other cases every recruit shall be recruited on probation and not otherwise. 19. It has also been contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that the Full Bench did not consider the effect of State of UP. v. Babu Ram Upadhya (A.I.R. 1961 S. C. 751) wherein certain Police Regulations were held to be statutory and mandatory. The paragraph considered therein was contained in Chapter XXXII, and their Lordships (per Subba Rao, J.) observed : "Paragraph 477 of the Police Regulations shows that the rules in Chap. XXXII thereof have been framed under See. 7 of the Police Act. Presumably, they were also made by the Government in exercise of its powers under Section 46 (2) of the Police Act." 20. In fact, there was no controversy at all in regard to the statutory character of Para 486; the controversy was whether it was mandatory and justiciable in view of the "pleasure" doctrine. Thus, we find nothing in that authority to detract from the binding character of the Full Bench ruling which deals only with Para 541. In any case, the paragraph in question, if it were applicable, would have been binding and enforceable even if it were not statutory, vide para 9 of Amarjit Singh v. State of Punjab (A.I.R. 1975 S C. 984) So, the correctness or otherwise of the observation of the Full Bench about the non - statutory character of this paragraph has become immaterial. But the view of the Full Bench that this paragraph does not apply to temporary posts does clearly imply that it does not apply to temporary appointments against permanent posts either, and we find no reason to adopt a different interpretation. 21. But the view of the Full Bench that this paragraph does not apply to temporary posts does clearly imply that it does not apply to temporary appointments against permanent posts either, and we find no reason to adopt a different interpretation. 21. That apart, it appears from R. 3 (1) of the U. P. Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975, that these rules override anything to the contrary in the existing rules or orders on the subject of termination of temporary service. Temporary servant has been defined in Rule 2 quoted earlier as including officiating service on a permanent post. Thus, Para 541 stands overridden by Rule 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners, however, contended that Para 541 of the Police Regulations was a special provision relating to constables and, therefore, it should prevail as against the general provisions contained in the 1975 Rules. In one way, the 1975 Rules can be treated as a special provisions relating to termination of temporary service. These rules are expressly stated to have overriding effect over all existing rules and orders. The presumption of special provision excluding the general provisions cannot, therefore, avail in favour of the provisions of the Police Regulations. 22. Thus, in this view of the matter, the petitioners were not entitled to succeed. 23. Learned counsel for the petitioners also contended that the four of the petitioners had been serving in pursuance of the orders of the learned single Judge for several years and no fault had been found with their work or conduct. That question is not before us and it will always be open to the petitioners to make any representations before the authorities and it is for the authorities to give such redress if any to them as they think fit after considering all relevant circumstances. 24. In the result, all the four special appeals are allowed. The order of the learned single Judge under appeal is set aside and all the five petitions are dismissed, but without any order as to costs.