( 1 ) THIS second appeal under S. 100 CPC as it was before the 1977 amendment is by the 2nd defendant against the concurrent findings of the Courts below. ( 2 ) THE facts may be briefly stated a,s fallows: the 1st respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for maintenance against the respondent-defendant-1 who had deserted her for over a period of eight years. She made the appellant-defendant No. 2 a party to the proceedings because about three months prior to, the filing of the suit the appellant had purchased from defendant No. 1 (respondent-2) two items of property described in the suit as items 3 and 4 of the suit schedule. The respondent-plaintiff, among other reliefs, sought for a charge to be created on suit schedule items 3 and 4 as well, for ensuring and securing payment of her maintenance if she succeded in the suit ( 3 ) AMONG several issues framed by the trial Court issue No. 5 was as follows: "is not the 2nd defendant a bonafide purchaser for value without notice" the trial Court came to the conclusion, on appreciating the evidence on record, that the sale in favour of the appellant as per Ex-D1 was a transaction which was entered into between the defendants after coming to know that the plaintiff was going to present a suit for maintenance. It was in that circumstance that the trial court held that under the terms of S. 39 of the Transfer of Property Act the suit schedule properties 3 and 4 were liable to be charged for ensuring payment of maintenance to the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree in so far as it affected the suit schedule properties 3 and 4, the appellant preferred R. A. 278/ 1972 in the lower appellate Court. The lower appellate Court also came to the conclusion, on appreciating the evidence on record, that issue No, 5 should be answered against the appellant. ( 4 ) IN this Court, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has urged many grounds in the grounds of appeal, but they are mere repetitive grounds and can be summarised into two grounds only. ( 5 ) THE first of such grounds is that the Courts below erred in coming to the conclusion that the appellant had not passed any consideration in respect of Ex-D1, the sale deed conveying suit schedule properties 3 and 4. ( 5 ) THE first of such grounds is that the Courts below erred in coming to the conclusion that the appellant had not passed any consideration in respect of Ex-D1, the sale deed conveying suit schedule properties 3 and 4. This conclusion is not the finding of the Court on an issue raised in the suit. The conclusion reached was solely in connection with issue No. 5 which was raised only to test whether the appellant was a bonafide purchaser without notice or with notice, and solely for the purpose of creating a charge in terms of S. 39 of the Transfer of Property Act therefore, the mere observations made by the trial Court in the matter of passing of consideration in respect of the transaction as per Ex-D1 can at best be observations not amounting to voiding the sale transaction under Ex d-1. In fact, it is not voided. Therefore this ground is not of much assistance to the appellant in pointing out any error of law in the relief granted on the basis, of the finding in respect of is:ue No. 5. ( 6 ) THE 2nd ground is to the effect that even after the alienation under Ex. D-1, on account of the purchase made of another garden land under Ex D2, the 2nd respondent-1st defendant had sufficient property which was adequate security in respect of which alone the charge should have been created for the payment of maintenance ordered by the Courts below and it was not correct in law for the Courts below to create a charge in respect of the properties conveyed to the appellant under Ex d1. In support of this ground, the learned Counsel has relied upon the decision of Andhra Pradesh High court in the Banda Manikyam v. Venkayamma, AIR 1957 AP 710. In the said case, learned Judge observed as follows:"though the right of the wife to separate maintenance does not form a charge upon her husband's property, ancestral or self-acquired, yet, when it becomes necessary to enforce or preserve such a right effectively, it could be made a specific charge on a reasonable portion of the property. In the said case, learned Judge observed as follows:"though the right of the wife to separate maintenance does not form a charge upon her husband's property, ancestral or self-acquired, yet, when it becomes necessary to enforce or preserve such a right effectively, it could be made a specific charge on a reasonable portion of the property. If the right of maintenance is imperilled or jeopardised by the conduct and dealings of the husband or father with reference to his properties, the Court can create a charge on a suitable portion thereof securing the payment of maintenance to the wife or children. " ( 7 ) IT is the learned Counsel's contention that once it was proved that the husband had other properties, it was unnecessary to create charge on the properties alienated by the appellant. The learned Counsel has relied upon that portion of the observation which is underlined (italics) by me. ( 8 ) I do not see how that is really of any assistance to the appellant because the charge is created in terms of statutory provisions contained in S. 39 of the Transfer of Property Act. Once the Courts below came to the conclusion based on the finding of facts that the transfer under Ex-Dl was not a bonafide transfer without notice, then S. 39 of the Transfer of Property Act should operate without hindrance as was held by this Court in the decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Kare More Sharabhanna rudrappa v. Basamma, AIR 1962 Mys. 207- = 1962 Mys LJ 267 The Court" held as follows:"after that partition the third defendant purported to gift all his properties in favour of defendants 4 and 5 who are the sons of the second defendant. The Courts below have come to the conclusion that the partition in question was effected with a view to defeat the claims of the plaintiffs and that the plaintiffs had been compelled to leave the house some time prior to that partition. They have also come to the conclusion that the Gift deed Exhibit B-2 (dated 23-5-1972) in favour of defendants 4 and 5, the sons of the second defendant, was also executed with the same object in view. In the opinion of the first appellate court, despite the gift under Ex. They have also come to the conclusion that the Gift deed Exhibit B-2 (dated 23-5-1972) in favour of defendants 4 and 5, the sons of the second defendant, was also executed with the same object in view. In the opinion of the first appellate court, despite the gift under Ex. B2 the plaintiffs are entitled to a charge over the properties gifted in view of s. 39 of the Transfer of Property act. The Courts below did not set aside either the partition deed or the gift deed as the transactions covered by those deeds had been voluntarily entered into by the. third defendant whatever might have been his motive in so doing. Therefore, all that we have to consider in this appeal is whether the provisions contained in s. 39, T. P. Act can be availed of in justification of the charge granted by the Courts below. . . . . . . . The next question is, had the plantiffs right to receive maintenance from the profits of the suit property. If they had such a right, then they can rely on s. 39 in support of the charge granted in their favour. " ( 9 ) AFTER discussing several cases including the decision rendered by viswanatha Sastry, J. as he then was in Banda Manikyam's case (1) the division Bench came to the conclusion that:"the charge in question is claimed not under S. 18 or under S. 20 of the "a of but under S. 39 of the T. P. Act. We have earlier come to the conclusion that the wife as well as the minor children have a right to receive maintenance from the profits of the immoveable property of the husband or the father as the case may be. " ( 10 ) IN fact, the contention urged in the said case of Rare More was somewhat similar to the contention urged in this appeal by the learned Counsel for the appellant. ( 11 ) THEREFORE, the Courts below correctly extended the benefit to, the plaintiff which flows from the provisions of S. 30 of the Transfer of Property Act by creating a charge on suit schedule properties 3 and 4 without voiding the transaction under Ex D-1. I, therefore see no error of law in the judgments of the Courts below in so far as the appellant is affected. I, therefore see no error of law in the judgments of the Courts below in so far as the appellant is affected. ( 12 ) IN the result, this second appeal is dismissed. But, in the circumstances of the case, parties will bear their respective costs in this Court. --- *** --- .