JUDGMENT 1. - This is the defendant's appeal in a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment against the judgment and decree dated 16-10-1979 of the Additional District Judge No. 1, Jodhpur, upholding the decree for eviction passed by the Munsif, Jodhpur City dated 5-10-1977. 2. The controversy in this appeal is very limited, so it is not necessary to refer to the pleadings of the parties in detail. The plaintiff case is that the defendant did not make payment of rent with effect from 1-2-1969 to 31-9-1969, Consequently he filed suit for ejectment No. 534 of 1969, which was dismissed on payment of rent. On 12-2-1970, the defendant further committed default in payment of rent with effect from 1-12-1972 to 31-5-1973 for more than six months. Thus, he committed second default. 3. The defendant resisted the suit on the ground that he was neither a defaulter in the earlier suit nor he is defaulter in the second suit, so the plaintiff's suit on the ground of default deserves to be dismissed. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the following relevant issues were framed : HINDI MATTER 334368 A 5. Issue No. 1, 8 and 9 were decided by the trial court in favour of the plaintiff and it was held that the defendant obtained the benefit under section 13(4) as it then stood of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act. The defendant is now precluded from taking benefit of sub-section (6) of section 13 of the Act. Reliance was placed on a decision in Sobhraj v. Bhanwar Lal, 1974 W L N. 270 : 1974 R.L W 251 . 6. Issues No. 2 was also decided in favour of the plaintiff. Issues No. 3 and 4 were also found in favour of the plaintiff' and against the defendant. Consequently, the plaintiff's suit for eviction Was decreed. 7. The defendant preferred an appeal. The learned Additional District Judge framed the following two points for determination:- (1) Whether the defendant has committed default in payment of rent ? (2) Whether the present suit is based on second default? if so, shat is its effect ? 8. Consequently, the plaintiff's suit for eviction Was decreed. 7. The defendant preferred an appeal. The learned Additional District Judge framed the following two points for determination:- (1) Whether the defendant has committed default in payment of rent ? (2) Whether the present suit is based on second default? if so, shat is its effect ? 8. This appeal involves only the following substantial question of law:- "Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case it can be said that the defendant had obtained benefit as contemplated in proviso to sub-section (7) of section 13 of the Act (as it stood then)?" 9. I have heard Shri Hastimal Parekh, learned counsel for the appellant, and Shri L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the respondent. 10. Before adverting to the real point in controversy, it is necessary o state the relevant facts. In the earlier Civil Suit No. 534 of 1969, based on the ground of default, the defendant-tenant of the first date of hearing presented the following application under section 13(4) of the Act (as it stood then):- HINDI MATTER B 11. After presentation of the aforesaid application payment of rent was made by the defendant to the plaintiff A sum of Rs. 142/- was paid on 12-2-1970. Thereupon the Court recorded the following order on that date:- HINDI MATTER C 12. Shri H. M. Parekh, learned counsel for the appellant, vehemently and strenuously urged that the defendant in his application for deposits of rent, the clearly, categorically and unequivocally, stated that he is not a defaulter. He has tendered rent time and again and even rent was dent through money order and rent was also offered through a registered letter to the plaintiff that he may collect the same from him. This being so he sought and order for deposit of rent to the tune of Rs. 453.66 in court expressly stating that deposit is being made without prejudice. He made it clear in his application that he is taking the action without prejudice to his right and expressly stating that he is not a defaulter. He simply sought an order from the court for depositing the aforesaid amount and did not make any prayer for dismissal of the suit on the ground of deposit of rent. He made it clear in his application that he is taking the action without prejudice to his right and expressly stating that he is not a defaulter. He simply sought an order from the court for depositing the aforesaid amount and did not make any prayer for dismissal of the suit on the ground of deposit of rent. Shri Parekh also submitted that it was the plaintiff's counsel who expressed that the suit was merely based of default and the defendant has paid rent and interest. On the basis of this statement of the plaintiff's counsel, the Court proceeded of dismiss the suit. Shri Parekh urged that in these circumstance' of the case, it cannot he said that the defendant obtained any benefit under the main provision of sub-section(7) of section 13 of the Act consequent to the payment of rent by the tenant to the landlord. He contended that when the tenant was emphatically refuting the landlord's plea of default, an inquiry ought to have been held as to whether the amount of rent, as and when had become due, was tendered by the tenant to the landlord or not. Without holding of any such inquiry, the tenant cannot be adjudged to be a defaulter. No such inquiry was held in that case and consequently the plaintiff is not entitled to take any advantage of the proviso to sub-section (7), as no benefit has been taken by the defendant-tenant of getting the suit for eviction dismissed and proviso to sub-section (7) (as it then stood) is not attracted. He emphasised on the word "obtained" occurring in the proviso and submitted that the defendant did not obtain any benefit, as no such prayer was made by him. The dismissal of the suit was ordered by the court as a consequence of payment of rent and interest. The defendant was simply passive in seeking an order for deposit of payment of rent and was not active in getting the suit dismissed. The benefit has simply been trusted upon him, as there was no option left to the court except to dismiss the suit in consequence of payment of rent by the tenant under section 13(1) of the Act. The benefit has simply been trusted upon him, as there was no option left to the court except to dismiss the suit in consequence of payment of rent by the tenant under section 13(1) of the Act. He distinguished the cakes of Sobhraj v. Bhanwarlal (supra) and Bhikam Chand v. Jugal Kishore, (1979 R. L. W. 137) on the ground that deposit of rent was not made by the tenant without prejudice of their right and further they did not simply pray to the court for passing an order for depositing the rent. They further sought dismissal of the suit consequent to the deposit of payment of rent Shri Parekh submitted that rent control legislation is a beneficial legislation, the object whereof is to give benefit to the tenants by providing them relief against the landlords' action for eviction. Under the social condition where there is paucity of accommodation, proviso to sub-section (7) should be construed beneficially in the interest of the tenant. When no inquiry on the question of default has been conducted, the proviso to sub- section (7) may be interpreted in the manner that without holding of inquiry, it cannot be said that the defendant had taken the benefit of dismissal of the suit as a result of deposit or payment of rent under section 13(4) of the Act. Reliance was placed by Shri Parekh on a decision of the Supreme Court in Shamcharan Sharma v. Dharamdas (1980) 2 S. C. C. 151) . Reference was also made by Shri Parekh to a Division Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in Kahan Chang Makan v. B. S. Bhambri and others (A. I. R. 1977 Delhi 2471 . 13. Shri L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, on other hand, with equal vehemence, urged that the expression "without prejudice" no doubt has been used twice by the defendant in his, application dated 29-1-70 in the earlier suit marked Ex. 4 in the present suit. The use of this expression in the beginning of the application is meaningless rather it negatives what the defendant wants to convey. Still user of this expression second time may be taken to mean that the tenant is seeking an order for deposit of rent without prejudice. 4 in the present suit. The use of this expression in the beginning of the application is meaningless rather it negatives what the defendant wants to convey. Still user of this expression second time may be taken to mean that the tenant is seeking an order for deposit of rent without prejudice. Notwithstanding such an expression, the tenant wanted to avail the benefit of payment of tent under sub-section (7) as he knew very well that on such deposit of rent the only course open to the court is to dismiss the suit. When rent is deposited or paid, the court is not empowered to pass a decree for eviction, as under sub-section (7) there is legislative injunction against the court in passing the decree for eviction. He submitted that there is no question of tenant remaining passive or benefit being thrusted upon him. Shri Mehta invited the attention of the court on the scheme of the provisions contained in sub-section (3) to (7) of section 13 and section 19 A and pointed out that in a case based on default, section 13 nowhere contemplates holding of any inquiry with regard to tendering or offering of rent by the tenant. He also invited my attention to the fact that the application Ex. 4 was neither accompanied with by any affidavit nor accompanied with money order coupon with an enforcement of refusal nor accompanied with postal receipt of the registered letter or its acknowledgements or original registered letter with an endorsement of refusal. He pointed out that if the landlord had refused acceptance of rent in despite the same having been tendered to him, then it was open to the tenant to deposit the same under section 19-A. Admittedly the tenant did not deposit the amount of rent under section 19 A. He submitted that there are series of decisions of this court taking a consistent view that where the tenant deposits or pays rent under section 13 (4) of the Act, then proviso to sub-section (7) is attracted and it have been held that the tenant had obtained such benefit of getting the suit of eviction dismissed and so he is not entitled to claim any further benefit. He conceded that there is no direct case of this court where an application like Ex. He conceded that there is no direct case of this court where an application like Ex. 4 may have been presented stating that an order for deposit may be passed and that the deposit is without prejudice to the tenant's rights. As regards the question of construction of proviso to sub-section (7), he urged that it all depends on the nature of the provisions to be construed. If a provision is capable of two interpretations, one favouring the landlord and the other favouring the tenant, then in such a situation, it can possibly be said that the construction which may favour the tenant, may be adopted. But when a provision is not open to such a construction then the provision, as it exists, has to be given that meaning which it conveys. In the rent control legislation, there are some provisions. which favour the tenants and there are some which favour the landlord. The court has to strike a proper balance, while construing the provisions of such legislation. 14. In the light of the controversy raised in this appeal, it would be proper to read the relevant provisions of section 13 (then stood):- "Section 13-Eviction of tenant.-(i) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract no Court shall pass any decree or make any order, in favour of a landlord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, evicting the tenant so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent therefor to the full extent allowable by this Act, unless it is satisfied:- (a) that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for six months ; xx xx xx (3) for the purpose of clause (a) of sub-section (1) a tenant shall be deemed to have paid or tendered the amount of any rent due from him, if he has remitted such amount to the landlord by postal money order at his ordinary address. (4) In a suit for eviction on the ground set forth in clause(a) of sub-section (1), with or without any of the other grounds referred to in that sub-section, the tenant shall, on the first day of hearing or on or before such date as the court may, on an application made to it, fix in this behalf, or within such time, not exceeding two months, as may be extended by the court, deposit in court or pay to the landlord an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was past paid, for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous for that in which the deposit or payment is made together with interest on such amount calculated at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date when any such amount was payable upto the date of deposit and shall thereafter continue to deposit or pay, month by month, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate. (5) If in any suit referred to in sub-section (4), there is any dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant, the court shall determine, having regard to the provisions of this Act, the amount to be deposited or paid to the landlord by the tenant, within fifteen days from the date of such other, in accordance with the provisions of section (4). (6) If a tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount referred to in sub-section (4) or sub-section (5), on the date or within the time specified therein, the court shall order the defence against eviction to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit. (7) If a tenant makes deposit or payment as required by sub-section (4) or sub-section (5), no decree for eviction on the ground specified in clause (a) of sub-section (1) shall be passed by the court but the court may allow such costs as it may deem fit to the landlord : Provided that a tenant shall not be entitled to any relief under this sub-section if having obtained such benefit or benefit under section 13-A in respect of any such accommodation, if he again makes a default in the payment of rent of that accommodation for six months". "Section 19-A Deposit of rent by tenant -(1) Every tenant shall pay rent within the time fixed by contract or in the absence of such contract, by the fifteenth day of the month nest following the month for which it is payable. (2) Where the landlord does not accept any rent tendered by the tenant within the time referred to in sub-section(1) or where there is bona fide doubt as to the person or persons to whom the rent is payable, the tenant may deposit such rent with the court and such deposit of rent shall be a full discharge of the tenant from the liability to pay rent to the landlord." 15. It would appear from clause (a) to sub-section (1) of section 13 that the plaintiff can bring an action for eviction on the ground that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for six months. Sub-section (3) contains a deeming provision. When the tenant has remitted the amount of rent due from him to the landlord by postal money order, then the tenant shall be deemed to have paid or tendered the amount of rent. Under sub-section (4) the tenant is under an obligation to deposit in court or pay to the landlord the amount of rent due together with interest @ 6 per annum on the first date of hearing or within such time fixed by the court on the tenant's application. The tenant is further under an obligation to deposit rent month by month by the fifteenth of each succeeding month. Sub-section (5) makes a provision that when there is any dispute with regard to the amount of rent payable by the tenant, then in that case the court is required to determine the amount to be deposited or paid to the landlord by the tenant, within fifteen days from the date of such order, in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (4). Sub-section (6) gives a mandate to the court to order the defence against eviction to be struck out, if the tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount referred to in sub- section (4) or sub-section (5), on the date or within the time specified therein. Sub-section (6) gives a mandate to the court to order the defence against eviction to be struck out, if the tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount referred to in sub- section (4) or sub-section (5), on the date or within the time specified therein. The prevision of sub-section (7) laid down that the court will not pass a decree for eviction on the ground of default if the tenant makes deposit or payment as required by sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) and the casts have been made discretionary with the court to be allowed to the landlord s hen the suit for eviction is being dismissed. Proviso to sub-section (7) is in the nature of exception. It lays down that where the tenant has obtained benefit either under sub-section (7) or benefit under section 13-A once, he will be not entitled to any relief under this sub- section in case he again makes a default in payment of rent for six months. Sub-section (1) of section 19-A, requires the tenant to make payment of rent within the times fixed by contract or in the absence of such contract by the fifteenth day of the month next following the month for which it is payable, and sub-section (2) thereof lays down that where the landlord does not accept any rent tendered by the tenant within the time referred to in sub-section (1) or where there is bona fide dispute as to whom the rent is payable then it is open to the tenant to deposit such rent with the court and such deposit of rent will be a full discharge of the tenant of the liability to pay rent to the landlord. 16. The question arises as to how the law deals with the situation when the truant's case is that he is not a defaulter, as he has tendered the amount of rent as and when it become due and has not been accepted by the landlord. If the tenant has tendered the amount of rent then in that case he cannot he held to be a defaulter and ground (a) is not available to the landlord for eviction of the tenant. If the tenant has tendered the amount of rent then in that case he cannot he held to be a defaulter and ground (a) is not available to the landlord for eviction of the tenant. Where the tenant on the first date of hearing comes forward with a case that he is not a defaulter inasmuch as he has tendered the amount of rent as and when it fell due, is there any provision which may come to his rescue. There does not appear to be any such provision. In Saligram v. Narottam Lal (1971 RLW 555) the Division Bench of this Court has held that sub-section (4) would be applicable even in a case where in the plaint a false allegation is made that the tenant has committed default as envisaged in clause (a) of sub- section (1) of section 13. The view taken in Vishwanath Singh v. Gopilal (1970 RLW 223) by Bhargawa, J., was over-ruled and the interpretation put by Lodha, J., was approved and it was observed that if the tenant disputes the amount of rent paid by him, he could raise a dispute about it on the first date of hearing and the court shall determine it under sub-section (5) and then order as to whether the tenant is at all liable to pay rent. It may be pointed out that under section (4) the tenant is under an obligation not only to deposit or payment, but is also under an obligation to pay interest on the arrears of rent. If the tenant wants to absolve himself from payment of interest, it is open to him to deposit the amount of rent under section 19-A and further such deposit under section 19(A) shall absolve him from making Payment over again under section 13(4) The full Bench of this Court in Martin & Harries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Prem Chand (1974 RLW 115) has held that Saligram's case (supra) has been correctly decided and answered the question in this way that in case a tenant has deposited rent under section 19-A of the Act, he would not be required to make a fresh deposit of the same amount in Court under sub-section (4) of section 13 of the Act. But such a tenant must raise a dispute in respect thereof, on the first day of hearing of the suit, under sub- section (5) of section 13 of the Act and, in that event, the court would allow the tenant an adjustment of the amount so deposited by him, white calculating the amount payable to the landlord to receive under the aforesaid provisions and should direct be landlord to receive payment of the amount already in deposit under Sec 19-A of Act and also direct the tenant to make payment of the remaining amount, if any, to the landlord. It is true that section 19-A(2) does not make it obligatory for the tenant to deposit the rent when the same has not been accepted by the landlord on being tendered or offered to him, but when such deposit is not made under section 19-A by the tenant, the tenant is under an obligation to deposit or pay amount of rent together with interest thereon as envisaged and provided under sub-section (4). If he wants to avail the benefit provided under sub-section (7). The proviso to sub-section (7) thus has to be interpreted in the light of the scheme of the various provisions of the Act. Sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) and sub-section (7) no where provides that where the tenant offers or tenders the amount of rent then the landlord's suit is liable to be dismissed, though he may be directed to deposit or pay of amount of rent. If the tenant wants to avoid his liability of eviction despite the facts that he has offered and tendered the amount of rent, he should deposit the amount of rent under section 19-A and that will also absolve him from liability of payment of interest, but in case he does not so act, then he is required to deposit or pay rent and interest as provided under sub-sections (4) and (5). In that circumstances he would not incur the liability of eviction under sub-section (7). 17. In that circumstances he would not incur the liability of eviction under sub-section (7). 17. In Shobhraj v. Bhanwarllal (supra), C. M. Lodha, 1., (as he then was), had an occasion to consider the question as to whether proviso to to sub section (7) is attracted to a case where the tenant has obtained benefit under section 13-A. In that case it was contended that proviso to Section 13 (7) cannot apply inasmuch as it is not proved that the appellant had committed a default previously. While dealing with this question Lodha, J., observed as under : "It is true that in the previous suit no enquiry was held into the allegation of default because the appellant had applied under section 13-A of the Act within the time prescribed therein and consequently the suit for ejectment was dismissed without holding any enquiry into the allegation made by the parties. The proviso however makes it clear that a tenant shall not be entitled to any relief under this sub-section (sub-section (7), if having obtained such benefit or benefit under section 13-A in respect of any such accommodation for six months. It is not the requirement of law that there must be a finding as to the previous default. What is required is that the tenant must have obtained the benefit under S. 13-A. That the appellant has admittedly done previously." 18. In Bhikam Chand v. Jugal Kishore (supra) Shri S. K. Mal Lodha, J., agreed with the view taken in Sobhraj's case (supra) In Bhikam Chand's case (supra) the earlier suit was based on default. The trial court determined the amount of rent and interest and directed the defendant to deposit the same within fifteen days. In that case the parties then entered into compromise and it was observed that the manner and mode of payment of the amount that was determined by the Additional Civil Judge, was specified in the compromise arrived at between the parties. It is, therefore, clear that defendant had obtained the benefit of section 13(7) (old) and this is a sufficient competence of it. It is, therefore, clear that defendant had obtained the benefit of section 13(7) (old) and this is a sufficient competence of it. Having so observed the learned Judge held that the defendant had taken benefit of section 13(7) (old) in the earlier Suit No. 119 of 1972 and repelled the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that since finding as to the default was not given in it, it cannot be held that he has availed of the benefit of section 13(7) (old) in that suit. 19. In Rameshchandra v. Ramesh Chandra (1977) W. L. N. (UC) 431 earlier quit was filed on the ground of default and the tenant deposited all arrears of rent and interest thereon on the first date of hearing under section 13(4). Consequently, the suit was dismissed. The second suit vas also based on the ground of default The defendant contested the suit and denied having committed any default in payment of rent. The trial court held that the defendant had taken the advantage of section 13(4) of the Act in the previous suit filed by the plaintiff. It further held that no second default within the meaning of section 13(1)(a) of the Act was committed by the defendant, as he had deposited arrears of rent under section 19-A of the Act. Accordingly the suit was dismissed. On appeal the Additional District Judge held that the tenant had committed second default by non-payment of rent for more than six months and subsequent deposit of arrears of rent by the tenant under section 19-A of the Act would not protect him from eviction. On appeal by the tenant, Modi, J. held that the deposit of arrears of rent under section 19-A after having became a defaulter within the meaning of section 13 (1) (a) of the Act was of no consequence to the defendant as he had already taken benefit or section 11(4) of the Act in the previous suit. The proviso to sub-S. (6) of sub-section 13 clearly provides that a tenant shall not be entitled to any relief under section 13(4) if he having obtained such benefit again makes a default in the payment of rent of that accommodation for six months. The proviso to sub-S. (6) of sub-section 13 clearly provides that a tenant shall not be entitled to any relief under section 13(4) if he having obtained such benefit again makes a default in the payment of rent of that accommodation for six months. Since the defendant in that case had neither paid nor tendered rent to the landlord continuously for more than six months, he became a defaulter within the meaning of section 13(1)(a) of the Act. The subsequent deposit of the arrears of rent by the defendant under section 19-A of the Act would have protected him from eviction under section 13(4) of the Act, if he had not taken benefit of section 13(4) of the Act in the earlier suit. 20. It is true that the above cases can be distinguished on facts, as contended by Shri Parekh and also conceded by Shri Mehta. Shri Mehta, however, urged that the law enunciated in these cases, has application to the present case, as well, inasmuch as the defendant moved an application under section 13(4) and made payment of rent under that very provision. Although he did not pray for an order of dismissal in the application, it is still obvious that he availed the benefit of dismissal of the quit by making payment of rent under this provision, notwithstanding the fact that he stated that he hid offered rent and that he intends to deposit the rent without prejudice. I find force in this submission of Shri Mehta. Merely stating that the tenant wants to deposit the rent without prejudice, would be of no consequence. Similarly it is also of no consequence that he stated that he had offered rent and he is not a defaulter. In the instant case to me, it appears to be so obvious that the tenant wanted to avail the benefit of deposit or payment of rent under section 13(4), so moved the application under that provisions and in fact made the payment of rent to the landlord and thus he clearly availed the benefit under sub-section (7) (as it then stood). It would not make any difference that he did not make a prayer in the application for deposit of rent that the suit may be dismissed. It would not make any difference that he did not make a prayer in the application for deposit of rent that the suit may be dismissed. It was not necessary for the tenant to make such a prayer, as dismissal of the suit was an inevitable consequence under the main provision of sub-section (7) When the tenant makes deposit or payment of rent knowing it fully well that on deposit or payment of rent the court will have to dismiss the suit, it cannot be said that the tenant did not intend to avail the benefit of dismissal by moving an application under subsection 13(4) of the Act. The court could not proceed with the suit and was bound to dismiss it on compliance of sub-section (4). As regards the construction of the proviso to sub-section (7), it may be pointed out that the construction has to be made in the light of the tenant's conduct and action and in the light of the scheme of the various provisions of the Act. The rule of construction adopted in Shyam Charan Sharma v. Dharamdas (supra) case, has based on the provisions as contained in the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court were concerned with the construction of sub-section (6) of section 13 of that Act. The word "may" was used in that provision in connection with the ordering of the defence against eviction to be struck out and in that connection their Lordships observed that:- "Section 13(6) vests, in the court, the discretion to order the striking out of the decree against eviction. In other voids, the Court having regard to all the circumstances of the case, may Cr may not strike out the defence. If Section 13 were to he construed as mandatory and not as vesting a discretion in the court, it might result in the situation that a tenant who was deposited the arrears of rent within the time stipulated by Section 13(1) but who fails to deposit thereafter the monthly rent on a single occasion for a cause beyond his control may have his defence struck out and be liable to summary eviction. We think that Section 13 quite clearly confers a discretion, on the court to strike out or not to strike out the defence, if default is made in deposit or payment of rent as required by Section 13(l). We think that Section 13 quite clearly confers a discretion, on the court to strike out or not to strike out the defence, if default is made in deposit or payment of rent as required by Section 13(l). If the court he is the discretion not to strike out the defence of a tenant committing default in payment or deposit as required by Section 13(1), the court surely has the further discretion to condone the default and extend the time for payment or deposit. Such a discretion is a necessary implication of the discretion not to strike out the defence. Another construction may lead, in some cases, to a provision of the object of the Act, namely, the adequate protection of the tenant'." 21. I may also refer the case of Mst. Bega Begum and others v. Abdul Ahad Khan and others (1971) 1 SCC 273) , cited by Shri Mehta. While dealing with the provisions of Jammu and Kashmir Houses and Shop Rent Control Act, 1966, their Lordships proceeded to consider the rent control legislation in a way so as to strike a balance between landlord and tenant and that it should be interpreted in such a way so as to achieve the object of enabling the landlord to evict the tenant where the statute so provides. 22. The case of Kahan Chand Makan v. B.S. Bhambri and others (supra) cited by Shri Parekh, relates to the provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. There the provisions are entirely different from the provisions of the Act here. It was held in that case that where deposit of arrears of rent has been made by the tenant in compliance with an order specifically passed under Section 15 (1), the benefit of section 14(2) cannot he availed of by the tenant in a subsequent proceeding for his ejectment on the same ground. The existence and proof of such an order in earlier proceeding covered by section 14(1)(a) is essential in order to deprive the tenant of the protection which section 14(2) gives him. 23. The decision in Moti Lal v. Mangla Prasad and others (AIR 1958 Allahabad 794) cited by Shri Parekh is on the meaning of the word "obtain" in section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. 23. The decision in Moti Lal v. Mangla Prasad and others (AIR 1958 Allahabad 794) cited by Shri Parekh is on the meaning of the word "obtain" in section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Considering that provision it was observed that it has been used in the sense of the meaning which connotes purpose or effort behind the action of the candidate. The word has not been used in the sub-section in the sense of a mere passive receipt of assistance without the candidate being even conscious of the fact that the assistance has been rendered. This authority, in my opinion, instead of helping the appellant against him. It cannot be said in the instant case that the appellant was only a passive receiver of the benefit under section 13(7) in the earlier suit It was he, who moved application under section 13(4) and by payment of rent obtained the benefit of dismissal of the suit. This authority is of no help to the appellant. 24. Thus, having regard to the scheme of the provisions of the Act, as considered above, and having regard to the conduct of the appellant in moving an application and making payment of rent and interest I hold that the appellant obtained the benefit under sub-section (7) (as it stood) in the earlier suit. Having obtained that benefit, he is not entitled to such benefit second time. It is not in dispute that the defendant has committed default second time, as well, which is the basis of the present suit. 25. Shri Parekh, faintly and half-heartedly, submitted that in this suit the tenant had submitted an application under section 151, Civil Procedure Code, read with section 13(5) of the Act on 8-11-1975. That application may be treated as an application under the Amended section 13-A. Notwithstanding that the application is made beyond 30 days of the coming into force of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Ordinance (No. 26 of 1975), the court in its discretion can condone the delay far which reliant, was placed on Shyam Charan Sharma v. Dharamdas (supra). Shri Parekh pointed out that on 13-11-1975 the court determined rent and interest to be paid or deposited within one month Payment of Rs. 100 was in dispute so this sum was reduced from the total amount to be paid. Shri Parekh pointed out that on 13-11-1975 the court determined rent and interest to be paid or deposited within one month Payment of Rs. 100 was in dispute so this sum was reduced from the total amount to be paid. The order was passed without prejudice to the rights of the parties. The tenant deposited the amount of rent as ordered so it is urged that he may bet given the benefit of the amended section 13 A. 26. The argument of Shri Parekh on the face of it is untenable. The application, as presented with its contents and prayer, cannot at all be conceived to be one under section 13-A. Neither it embodies the prayer as contemplated under that provision nor it is filed within the prescribed time. The question of condonation in the circumstances of the case does not arise and the decision relied upon does not in any way assist Shri Parekh. The contention is thus negatived. 27. On behalf of the appellant an application has been moved praying for adding new substantial questions of law, but the same is not pressed, so it is rejected and no other point has been pressed before me. 28. In the result this appeal has no force, so it is hereby dismissed with no orders as to costs.Appeal dismissed. *******