S.K. MAL LODHA, J.— The plaintiff-respondents instituted a suit for specific performance and possession and in the alternative, for the award of Rs. 1500/- as compensation for the breach of contract. The suit was dismissed by the Munsif, Sanchore, by his judgment dated October 16, 1973. An appeal was preferred by the plaintiffs and the learned Civil Judge, Jalore, vide judgment dated May 3, 1974 accepted the appeal and directed Mst. Kanu to get the sale-deed (Ex.l) registered and to put the plaintiffs in possession over the land measuring 27 bighas 3-1/2 biswas of khasra No. 210 situated in Sanchore and Gajja and Achla (defendants No.2 and 3 respectively) were directed to join the conveyance so as to pass title to the plaintiffs. Aggrieved against the appellate judgment, the defendants have come up in appeal to this Court under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. A few facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal may be noticed: 3. Smt. Kanu is alleged to have sold her land measuring 27 Bighas 3-1/2 Biswas out of khasra No. 210 situate in Sanchore to the plaintiffs for Rs. 1500/-on August 3,1965 and executed a sale-deed (Ex.1) on the same day on a stamp of Rs. 48/-. It was not registered on the same day because the Office of the Sub-Registrar was closed. The old accounts between the plaintiffs and Mst. Kanu were settled and the balance of Rs. 1100/- was adjusted towards the sale price. The plaintiffs paid Rs. 400/- in cash to her (Smt. Kanu). According to the plaintiffs, she was misguided by others and, therefore, she sold the same land to the defendants Gaja and Achla (defendants No. 2 and 3 respectively) by means of sale-deed, which was registered on May 29, 1966. The plaintiffs have averred that defendants No.2 and 3 had knowledge about the transfer in their favour when they obtained the sale-deed of the land in suit in their favour. The plaintiffs therefore, filed the suit for specific performance and possession and in the alterative for the return of the sale price, stamp expenses with interest @ 12% till realisation. A joint written statement was filed by the defendant appellants. It was denied that Smt. Kanu had sold half of khasra No. 210 measuring 54 Bighas 7 Biswas. The plaintiffs therefore, filed the suit for specific performance and possession and in the alterative for the return of the sale price, stamp expenses with interest @ 12% till realisation. A joint written statement was filed by the defendant appellants. It was denied that Smt. Kanu had sold half of khasra No. 210 measuring 54 Bighas 7 Biswas. It was, however, stated in para 1 of the written statement that the thumb-marks of Smt. Kanu were taken representing the papers to be that of money dealings. In para 1 of the written statement amongst other it was mentioned as under: ^^eSaus dksbZ [ksr cspku dk fy[kr ugha djok;k /kks[kk ckth ls vaxwBk djok;k bldk bYe eq>s rc gqvk tc eSaus [ksr dh jftLVªh izfroknhx.k xtk o vpyk ds gd esa lc jftLVªkj lkapkSj ds le{k djokbZ fnukad 30-07-66 dks oknh us mDr nLrkost Sub-Registrar lkapkSj ds le{k isk fd;k ftl ij mlh jkst Sub-Registrar lkapkSj us bldk QSlyk esjs gd esa fd;k udy QSlyk lkFk isk gSA** It was stated in the written statement that Smt. Kanu of her own accord sold the land in dispute to defendants No. 2 and 3. It was also pleaded that Smt. Kanu was an old and illiterate lady and advantage of illiteracy and old age was taken in obtaining the thumb-marks. A rejoinder was filed by the plaintiffs denying the allegations made in the written statement. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the learned Munsif framed the issues, which when translated into English read as under: 1. Whether Smt. Kanu sold her share of khatedari field No. 210 to the plaintiffs for Rs. 1500/- and executed the sale-deed in dispute for the same? 2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get a decree for specific performance of the contract on the basis of the sale-deed ? 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get the sale-deed registered? 4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get the possession of the land in dispute? 5. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get Rs. 49. 20p for the nonjudicial stamps on which the sale-deed was written on August 3, 1965? 6. Whether the sale of the land by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendants No. 2 and 3 on August 9, 1966 is liable to be set aside? 7. 5. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get Rs. 49. 20p for the nonjudicial stamps on which the sale-deed was written on August 3, 1965? 6. Whether the sale of the land by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendants No. 2 and 3 on August 9, 1966 is liable to be set aside? 7. If the suit is not decreed for the specific performance of the contract, whether in the alternative the plaintiffs are entitled to get Rs. 1500/- from the defendants? 8. Whether the sale deed dated August 3, 1965 is forged and without consideration? 9. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get the costs and compensation from the defendants? 10. Relief. The plaintiffs examined UK Chand (PW 1), Pratapmal (PW 2), Ridmal (PW 3), Amarlal (PW 4), Bhagwana (PW 5), Lakha (PW 6), Sawa (PW 7) and Ladumal (PW 8). In rebuttal, Sm. Kanu (DW 1), and Gajja (DW 2) were examined on behalf of the defendants. 4. After trial, the learned Munsif, by his judgment dated October 16, 1973 dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiffs went in appeal and the learned Civil Judge, Jalore accepted the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the learned Munsif and decreed the suit of the plaintiffs for specific performance of the contract (Ex.1) dated August 3, 1965. Defendant No. 1, Smt. Kanu, was directed to get the sale-deed (Ex. 1 Registered and to put the plaintiffs in possession over the land in dispute described in para 1 of the plaint. Defendants No.2 and 3 were directed to join in the conveyance so as to pass title which resides in them to the plaintiffs. A further direction was also given that in case, the defendants failed to do so within three months, the plaintiffs may apply to the court for executing the aforesaid decree on behalf of the defendants. 5. It may be stated that during the pendency of this appeal, defendant-appellant No. 1 (Smt. Kanu) died and in her place Smt. Vadu w/o Jagga, as her Dalai representative, was substituted. 6. I have heard Mr. Rajendra Mehta, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. Mangilal Shreemali, learned counsel for the respondents and have gone through the record. 7. 5. It may be stated that during the pendency of this appeal, defendant-appellant No. 1 (Smt. Kanu) died and in her place Smt. Vadu w/o Jagga, as her Dalai representative, was substituted. 6. I have heard Mr. Rajendra Mehta, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. Mangilal Shreemali, learned counsel for the respondents and have gone through the record. 7. Before I proceed to examine the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties, it will be useful to state the findings recorded by the learned Civil Judge: 1. that the sale-deed(Ex.l) was executed with consideration whereby deciding issue No. 1 in favour of the plaintiffs, 2. that defendants No. 2 and 3 were not the purchasers with value having no knowledge of the prior contract existing in favour of the plaintiffs and thus the contract can be specifically enforced against them, 3. that the defendants have not pleaded laches, acquiescence or delay on the part of the plaintiffs as such, the specific performance of the agreement could not be denied particularly when no prejudice was going to be caused to the defendants, 4. that the defendant No. 1 had received full consideration. All her defences were found wholly unsustainable, as such the plaintiffs were entitled to the relief of specific performance and. 5. that the court need not pass the order regarding cancellation of the subsequent sale-deed inasmuch as defendants No.2 and 3 are also to join defendant No. 1 in the conveyance so as to pass title which resided in them to the plaintiffs. It was argued, in the first instance, by Mr. Rajendra Mehta, learned counsel for the appellants that there is no averment of readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract by the plaintiffs in the plaint and, therefore in, the absence of such an averment, the suit for specific performance ought not to have been decreed by the lower appellate court In support of his argument, he referred to section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (No. XLVII of 1963) (for short the Act hereafter). The material portion of section 16 of the Act is as under: "16. Personal bars to relief: Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person: (a).................. (b).................. The material portion of section 16 of the Act is as under: "16. Personal bars to relief: Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person: (a).................. (b).................. (c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of such has been prevented or waived by the defendant. Explanation: for the purposes of clause (c),— (i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in Court any money except when so directed by the Court; (ii) the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction." On the basis of Prem Raj V. D.L.F. Housing and Construction (P.) Ltd.(l), R.P. Rai vs. Rajdeva Rai(2), Sankatha Prasad vs. Abdul Aziz Khan(3)Har Pratapsingh vs. Satyanarain Misra(4), he submitted that the requirement of the provisions of sec. 16(c) of the Act are mandatory. On the other hand, Mr. Mangilal Shreemali learned counsel appearing for the respondents, urged that the aforesaid point was not raised by the defendants either in the written statement or before any of the courts below, and, therefore he should not be allowed to raise this point. He also submitted that had he taken this point either in the trial court or in the first appellate court, steps would have been taken by the plaintiffs to remove the alleged defects. According to him, the question of readiness and willingness is one which can only be determined on the basis of the evidence, and as such it being a mixed question of law and fact should not be permitted to be raised in second appeal. He invited my attention to Nurual Hasan V. Mahbub Bux (5) and State of Gujrat V. Vora Solebhai Gulamali (6). Reference was also made to section 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure and it was pressed that the objection that the averment of readiness and willingness was not made in the plaint does not effect the consequence. He invited my attention to Nurual Hasan V. Mahbub Bux (5) and State of Gujrat V. Vora Solebhai Gulamali (6). Reference was also made to section 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure and it was pressed that the objection that the averment of readiness and willingness was not made in the plaint does not effect the consequence. He decision of the case on merits and as such it is not of much also contended that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, from the plaint, compliance of the provisions of section 16 (c) of the Act can be inferred. He relied on Kamdev Nath Choudhary V. Devendra Kumar Nath (7). 8. The copies of the plaint and written statement were shown to me by the learned counsel for the defendants, as the same were not readable which are on the record. It is clear from the plaint that the sale-deed (Ex. 1) dated 3-8-1965 was written on a non-judicial stamp paper and it was executed. It is also stated that the sale deed could not be registered as the office time of the Sub-Registrar was over on that day and, therefore, the defendant agreed to get it registered. In para 2 of the plaint it was stated that the sale consideration was Rs. 1500/- out of which Rs. - which were found due from Smt. Kanu were adjusted towards the sale price and Rs. 400/- were paid in cash. In para 3, it is mentioned that the plaintiffs spent Rs. 48/- in connection with the stamps etc. and Rs. 1.20 were paid cash on being asked by defendant No. 1 which she failed to return. The sale-deed, which was executed by defendant No. 1 was presented for registration in the office of the Sub-Registrar by the plaintiffs. But despite information, she d|id not appear before the Sub-Registrar for registration and tried to avoid it. From these averments in the plaint, it is clear that whatever was performed by nothing remained and willing to the plaintiffs in respect of the contract was averred and that to be performed by them. It was observed by a learned Judge of the Gauhati High Court in Kamdevs case (7) as under : "The plaintiff instead of expressing in so many words that he was ready perform the contract did deposit the entire consideration money into Court. It was observed by a learned Judge of the Gauhati High Court in Kamdevs case (7) as under : "The plaintiff instead of expressing in so many words that he was ready perform the contract did deposit the entire consideration money into Court. This is a clear manifestation of his "readiness and willingness" and the act of deposit is full and complete compliance of the provisions of section 16." 9. I respectfully agree with the view taken in the above case. In my opinion, there is substantial and due compliance of the provisions of section 16 (c) of the Act, and the plaintiffs cannot be non-suited in the absence of specific objection being raised in the written statement by the defendants on the ground that they have failed to ever and prove that they had performed or have always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by them. At the risk of repetition, it may be stated that from the averments made in the plaint, so far as plaintiffs are concerned, there remained nothing to be performed, for, even after the execution of the sale-deed (Ex. 1), they presented it for registration before the Sub-Registrar when Smt. Kanu failed to get it registered. In view of this, it is not necessary to examine the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the parties. The first contention raised by Mr. Rajendra Mehta, learned counsel for the appellants is, therefore, rejected. 10. It was next argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that no issue, regarding the fact that defendants No. 2 and 3 had no knowledge of the earlier sale-deed, was framed by the trial court and that has caused serious prejudice to the defendants. Before the lower appellate court, it was contended on behalf of the defendants that defendants No.2 and 3 were bonafide purchasers of the land in dispute with consideration and were having no knowledge of the previous sale in favour of the plaintiffs and, therefore, the contract alleged by the plaintiffs cannot be specifically enforced. Section 19 of the Act material for examining the aforesaid argument of the learned counsel for the appellants is as follows: "19. Relief against parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title. Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter, specific performance of a contract may be enforced against: (a).................................... Section 19 of the Act material for examining the aforesaid argument of the learned counsel for the appellants is as follows: "19. Relief against parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title. Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter, specific performance of a contract may be enforced against: (a).................................... (b) any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract, except a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract; (c)............. (d)............. (e)............. provided....................." A joint written statement was filed on behalf of defendants No.l to 3. The plea that defendants No.2 and 3 were bonafide purchasers with consideration without notice of the prior sale was not taken in it. The burden of proving that the subsequent transferee (defendants No.2 & 3) had taken the subsequent transfer for value who had paid money in good faith and without notice of the original contract (first contract) is on the subsequent transferee. In other words, it lies upon the party seeking to revoke the prior contract to adduce prima facie evidence that he is the bonefide transferee for value without notice. Even after the plaintiffs allege in pleadings that the subsequent transferees had notice of the contract in their favour, the burden of proving that they are bonafide purchasers without notice lies initially on the subsequent purchasers, The averments for invoking section 19(b) of the Act, as stated above, were not made by defendants No.2 and 3. The learned Civil Judge has mentioned in the impugned judgment that DW. 2(Gajja) hed stated that Smt Kanu never told him that the land in dispute has been sold by her to the plaintiffs and in the cross-examination, it was stated by him that he was having no knowledge of the fact that prior to the sale of land to him, the plaintiffs had presented the sale deed before the Sub-Registrar. The learned Civil Judge after considering the statement of DW.2 Gajja, opined that this defendant has not stated anything about the value of the land and about his purchasing it in good faith In the absence of specific averments in the written statement and in the light of the statement of DW.2 Gajja, the learned Civil Judge reached the conclusion that defendants No. 2 and 3 were not purchasers with consideration and without notice. As the defendant had failed to plead an established exception provided in section 19(b) of the Act, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that in the absence of an issue to the affect that defendants No.2 and 3 have no knowledge of earlier sale-deed cannot be accepted. 11. The third contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Judge of the Lower Appellate Court committed a serious error of law when he decided issue No. 1 in favour of the plaintiffs. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, the statement of PW. 4 Amarlal was not properly appreciated, and had he properly appreciated the statement of PW4 Amarlal and the other witnesses then he would not have come to the conclusion to which he did respect of issue No. 1. Issue No. 1 was to the effect whether Smt. Kanu had sold half of her share of field No. 210 to the plaintiffs for Rs, 1500/- and executed the sale deed in regard to it. The learned Civil Judge considered the statement of Uk chand (PW1), Partapmal (PW2), Amarlal (PW 4) and Lakha (PW 6). He critically scrutinised these statements. In the light of Ex. 2 he took note of this part off the statement of Amarlal (PW4) that the previous accounts between the parties were not settled in his presence and no money was adjusted and that after the sale-deed was reduced into writing the entry E to F was made after seeing the Khata. The learned Civil Judge also examined the statement of DW l Smt. Kanu and characterised it as vague and opined that she has not specifically denied the execution of the sale-deed (Ex. 1). I have already quoted the relevant portion of para 1 of the written statement having bearing on the question relating to the execution of the sale-deed (Ex. 1) After consideration the afore said oral and documentary evidence, the learned Civil Judge, recorded the finding that the plaintiffs have successfully proved the execution of the sale-deed (Ex. 1) and that it was with consideration. The consideration of the sale was Rs. 1500/-out of which Rs. 400/- were paid in cash by the plaintiffs to defendant No. 1 Smt. Kanu and Rs. 1100/- were adjusted towards the Khata (Ex. 2) Amarlal (PW 4) has scribed the document. 1) and that it was with consideration. The consideration of the sale was Rs. 1500/-out of which Rs. 400/- were paid in cash by the plaintiffs to defendant No. 1 Smt. Kanu and Rs. 1100/- were adjusted towards the Khata (Ex. 2) Amarlal (PW 4) has scribed the document. Pratapmal (PW 2) is the person in whose presence Amarlal (PW 4) wrote the document and Smt. Kanu put her thumb-mark on it, which was verified by him at the place marked C to D as an attesting witness. Lakha (PW 6) deposed that the sale-deed (Ex, 1) was written by Amarlal (PW 4) at the request of Smt. Kanu who had put her thumb mark on it and he signed as an attesting witness. This witness has further stated that Rs. 400/- were paid in cash and Rs. 1100/- were adjusted. The learned Civil Judge on a consideration of the evidence has recorded the finding on issue No. 1 against the defendant and in favour of the plaintiffs. I am not satisfied that the finding on issue No. 1 which is one of fact stands vitiated on account of any error of law or on account of any substantial error of procedure. The third contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants, therefore, fails. 12. The fourth contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the learned Civil Judge in view of section 20 of the Act has not exercised his discretion properly when he granted a decree for specific performance inasmuch as performance of the contract would involve some hardship which could not be foreseen, whereas non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiffs. The relevant portion of section 20 of the Act reads as under; "20. Discretion as to decreeing specific performance: (1) The jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so: but the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. (2) The following are cases in which the Court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance: (a).............................. (2) The following are cases in which the Court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance: (a).............................. (b) Where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee, whereas non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff; (c) Where the defendant entered into the contract under circumstances which, thought not rendering the contract voidable, makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance. Explanation: 1.................. Explanation: 2. The question whether the performance of a contract would involve hardship on the defendant within the meaning of clause (b) shall, except in cases where the hardship has resulted from any act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract, be determined with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the contract, (3)............... (4)..............." 13. According to clause (b) of section 20 the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance where performance of the contract (1) would involve some hardship on the defendant which he did not foressee (2) but its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff. Hardship to operate as a defence must have existed at the time of the contract. Hardship subsequently arising, may be a ground for refusing specific performance if it results from some act or conduct of the plaintiff, but not if it is due to some act of the defendant himself. The court may refuse specific performance when undue hardship would be entailed on the defendant by specific enforcement of the contract. It was pointed out by Fry in his Treatise on "specific performance". "If the contract has been entered into by a competent party and is unobjectionable in its nature and circumstances, specific performance is as much a matter of course as are damages. The mere hardships of the results will not affect the discretion of the Court to grant specific performance." The hardship may consist in a forfeiture, penalty, heavy outlay of money, or any other loss not contemplated by the party at the time the contract was entered into. It may also arise out of an inequality either in the inception of the contract or in its operation Having considered the contract and its terms, I am unable to hold that hardship will be caused to the defendants when specific performance of the contract has been decreed. It may also arise out of an inequality either in the inception of the contract or in its operation Having considered the contract and its terms, I am unable to hold that hardship will be caused to the defendants when specific performance of the contract has been decreed. In these circumstances, the contention that specific performance should not have been granted because of hardship is rejected. 14. An argument was also raised, in this connection, that there has been laches and delay in instituting the suit for specific performance of the contract and, therefore the plaintiffs would be deemed to have abandoned their rights. In this connection reliance was placed on Rameshwar Prasad Bhai vs. Mt. Anandi Devi (8) and Bhageran Rai vs. Bhagwan Singh (9). The sale-deed was executed on August 3, 1965. The suit was instituted on August 2, 1968. Subsequent sale-deed in favour of defendants No.2 and 3 is of July 29, 1966. It is clear that the suit was instituted within the period of limitation. It is correct that specific performance being an equitable remedy should be sought without undue delay. The doctrine of laches was explained at length by the Supreme Court in Satyanarayana vs. Yellojirao (10), it was observed as under: "In England the relief of specific performance pertains to the domain of Equity; in India to that of statutory law. In England there is no period of limitation for instituting a suit for the said relief and, therefore, merely delay-the time lag depending upon circumstances may itself be sufficient to refuse the relief, but, in India, more delay cannot be a ground for refusing the said relief, for the statute prescribes the period of limitation. If the suit is in time, delay is sanctioned by law; if it is beyond time, the suit will be dismissed as barred by time; in either case no question of equity arises." If, therefore, laches is understood to mean more delay or want of diligence in anforcing a claim, than in Indian Law nothing less than the expiration of the statutory period can suffice for negativing the claim to specific relief. It was further observed as under: "Laches is understood in English Law also in the sense of negligent conduct which leads to an inference of waiver or abandonment of rights or which has contributed to a material change of situation prejudicing the rights of the defendant. It was further observed as under: "Laches is understood in English Law also in the sense of negligent conduct which leads to an inference of waiver or abandonment of rights or which has contributed to a material change of situation prejudicing the rights of the defendant. In such a case it would be inequitable to allow the remedy the of specific performance. In this sense the doctrine of laches has application to India. Abandonment, wiver or estoppel would bar not only the remedy of specific performance but the remedy of damages as well since "either there will be no subsisting right or there will be a bar against its assertion." If, therefore, the doctrine of laches is confined to them, the subs-tentive part of section 22 of the Act of 1877(=section 20 of the Act of 1963) "becomes otiose". The discretion vouchsafed by section 22 should, therefore, comprise a field unoccupied by the three cases of abandonment waiver and estoppel. Subbarao, J. observed: "It is really difficult to define that field. Diverse situations may arise which may induce a Court not to exercise the discretion in favour of the plaintiff. It may better be left undefined except to state what the section says, namely, discretion of the Court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a Court of Appeal." In the case in hand, the defendants have not pleaded laches and delay on the part of the plaintiffs. Apart from this, the suit for specific performance of the contract was instituted within the statutory period and, therefore, except for some delay there are no circumstances which should induce a court to refuse in its discretion to give a relief of specific performance There is no room for debate that to deprive the plaintiff of the right to specific performance, the delay should be such as to amount to "an abandonment, acquiescence or waiver or, at the least an alteration in the position of the defendant, in that the other party has been put in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy mere afterwords to be asserted." The argument that the learned Civil Judge has not exercised his discretion properly when he granted specific relief, for, there were laches and delay on the part of the plaintiffs has no force. 15. 15. It was lastly argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that having regards to the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Civil Judge should have granted the alternative prayer of the plaintiffs for payment of compensation as it is an adequate relief. Under section 21 of the Act it is open to plaintiff to ask for specific relief or damages in the alternative in the same suit. He may also pray for judgment for compensation for the breach of the contract either in addition to, or in substitution for specific performance. 16. The learned Civil Judge noticed Fateh Singh vs. Gopi (11). Defendant No. 1 Smt. Kanu bad received full consideration. She executed the sale-deed. As she failed to get it registered, the plaintiffs presented it before the Sub-Registrar for registration. It was not disputed by the learned counsel for the appellants that no order u/s 77 of the Registration Act refusing to register the sale-deed (Ex. 1) was passed. The plaintiffs instituted the suit for specific performance of the contract relating to agricultural land. The defences taken by them (defendants) were negatived. In these circumstances, the learned Civil Judge was right when he held that the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of specific performance of the contract and not to compensation, which was claimed in the alternative by them. The discretion to decree the specific performance has not been exercised arbitrarily but in the facts and circumstance of this case, it is sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles. It cannot be said that the discretion has not been exercised properly. 17. No other point was argued by any of the learned counsel for the parties. 18. As all the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been rejected, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 19. As there is no merit in this appeal, it is, accordingly, dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs of this appeal.