JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner, Tejbhan Singh, was appointed by the Assistant Engineer, Karauli, as a Work charged survey munshi, on Panchana Irrigation Project with headquarters at Karauli, vide office order, Ex. R/ l , dated, September 28, 1970. The appointment which was made in the first instance to last till February 28, 1971, appears to have been extended thereafter from time to time till the date on which the petitioner was retrenched. On August 30, 1974, the Executive Engineer, Irrigation, Sawai Madhopur (respondent 3 herein) passed on order, Ex. R/2, retrenching the petitioner in these terms : In compliance with letter, DLC 5/5053 dated, 1.8.1974, from the Superintending Engineer, Irrigation Circle Jaipur, you will be retrenched from 30-9-1974 because survey munshi is no longer required in this division. You may treat this letter as the requisite one month's notice under rule 26(2), Rajasthan P.W.D.(B & R) including Gardens, Irrigation, Water Works and Ayurvedic Departments, Work- charged Employees Service Rules, 1964 and section 25-F, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The petitioner has challenged the validity of the aforesaid order of retrenchment and filed the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the impugned order and for a direction to the State of Rajasthan, Chief Engineer, Irrigation, Rajasthan, the Superintending Engineer, Irrigation Circle, Jaipur, and the Executive Engineer, Irrigation. Construction Division, Sawai Madhopur (respondents 1,2,3 and 4 respectively) to reinstate the petitioner in service as a survey munshi with back wages and all other benefits flowing from such reinstatement. 2. The petitioner's case is that the retrenchment in question was made in clear violation of the instructions of the Chief Engineer, issued vide his office order (Ex. I) dated, May 1, 1972, directing the subordinate authorities in the Irrigation Department not to retrench any member of the work-charged staff, who had completed two years continuous service, pending the finalisation of the strength of such staff. His further case is that being the senior most munshi he was not liable to be retrenched unless those junior to him were also found to be surplus and thus retrenched. His further case is that being the senior most munshi he was not liable to be retrenched unless those junior to him were also found to be surplus and thus retrenched. He has in this connection referred to two seniority lists (Schedule A and Schedule B to the petition) of the work-charged staff, prepared by the Executive Engineer concerned, and pleaded that among 8 munshis he ranked at No. 1 in the seniority list, Schedule A and at No. 2 among 7 munshis as per list, Schedule B. His grievance is that the Executive Engineer in passing the impugned order of retrenchment, violated the principle of "last come first go" enacted in section 25-G, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, wtucn will, hereinafter, be referred to as the Act. 3. The petitioner also averred that the authorities concerned were annoyed with him on account of his activities of as a trade union leader. He mentioned in this context that he was at one time the Secretary, and thereafter the President of the Sawai Madhopur District Irrigation and Construction Department Karam chari Sangh. As an instance of the alleged annoyance of the employer, he referred to what he described as the refusal of the Assistant Engineer to pay his wages and his recourse to the Authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act to enforce the recovery of unpaid wages. He further complained that the authorities concerned ordered his transfer from Karauli to Mohanpura as a measure of harassment on July 17, 1974. According to him, he was not relieved by the Assistant Engineer from his charge at Karauli and at the same time he was not allowed to mark his attendance in the register at Karauli. 4. The petitioner further pleaded that some other work charged officials had been retrenched along with him and that while their retrenchment was withdrawn. vide order (Ex. 6), dated, September 29, 1974, his retrenchment was not withdrawn. He thus complained of arbitrary discrimination and violation of his fundamental right to equality guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. vide order (Ex. 6), dated, September 29, 1974, his retrenchment was not withdrawn. He thus complained of arbitrary discrimination and violation of his fundamental right to equality guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. He also referred in this context to the provisions of rule 23, Rajasthan P.W.D. (B & R) including Gardens, Irrigation, Water works and Ayurvedic Department Work-charged Employees Service Rules, 1964 (hereinafter called the Work- charged Rules) and pleaded that the termination of his service was in contravention of this rule which requires that while retrenching the staff, it shall be ensured that the person retrenched is the junior most in the particular cadre at his unit level. 5. Another grievance of the petitioner is that the employer did not pay him retrenchment compensation at the time of retrenchment. This, according to him is a violation of the mandatory provisions of section 25-F of the Act and therefore the impugned retrenchment is void according to law. 6. The respondents contested this writ petition and filed a return in answer to it. They admitted that, on being appointed as a work-charged survey munshi, the respondent joined duty as such on September 24, 1970, and that he was retrenched from September 30,1974. They also admitted the issue of office order Ex. 1 by the Chief Engineer, but explained that the requisite assessment was made in terms of that order and it was found that the services of a survey munshi were no longer needed in the sub-division which forms a unit for the purpose of the Workcharged Rules. That is why, according to the respondents, the petitioner was retrenched. The respondents also admitted that the seniority lists (Schedules A & B) were prepared on tentative basis. They described these lists as wrong because all types of munshis e.g. survey munshi, work munshi, and stare munshi were clubbed together. These lists, being tentative in nature, were rectified by the authority concerned on November 7, 1974 vide order Ex. R/8. 7. The respondents denied that they were annoyed with the petitioner on account of his alleged activities as a trade union leader. They denied that they had ever with held the payment of the wages earned by the petitioner. These lists, being tentative in nature, were rectified by the authority concerned on November 7, 1974 vide order Ex. R/8. 7. The respondents denied that they were annoyed with the petitioner on account of his alleged activities as a trade union leader. They denied that they had ever with held the payment of the wages earned by the petitioner. They explained that they had not allowed increments to the petitioner for the period of service put in by him before he was declared semi-permanent and that this was done by them according to their interpretation of the Rajasthan Work-charged Employees Rules, 1964. They pleaded that immediately on receipt of the ruling of the Authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act to the effect that the petitioner was entitled to such increments they paid the requisite amount without any delay. As for the petitioner's transfer from Larauk to Mohanpura, the respondents explained that this was a routine transfer ordered in the interest of work and that the petitioner refused to comply with the order. The respondents further explained that there was no question of relieving the petitioner of his charge at Karauli, for, being a work- charged employee, he had no charge as suck from which he could ask to be formally relieved. They pleaded that the petitioner was determined not to comply with the order of transfer and that he did not join at Mohanpura inspite of a telegram (Ex. R. 3) and letters (Ex. R. 4 and Ex. R. 5) sent to him requiring him to join at Mohanpura and telling him that his services were not required at Karauli. He kept avoiding compliance on one pretext or the other. 8. The respondents admitted that they had withdrawn the retrenchment order in respect of some munshis. They explained that they had needed the services of munshis and therefore they had withdrawn the retrenchment order issued in respect of that. They did not need the services of a survey munshi in this sub-division and therefore did not withdraw the retrenchment order issued in respect of the petitioner. They denied that any person junior to the petitioner as a survey munshi was retained in service in the unit in question. 9. The respondents averred that they had asked the petitioner, vide letter (Ex. P/9) dated, August 30, 1974, to collect Rs. They denied that any person junior to the petitioner as a survey munshi was retained in service in the unit in question. 9. The respondents averred that they had asked the petitioner, vide letter (Ex. P/9) dated, August 30, 1974, to collect Rs. 626.40 from the office by way of retrenchment compensation for his service from September 24, 1970 to September 30, 1974, and that if he did not collect the same as required, the responsibility for non-payment will be entirely his. The petitioner avoided receipt of this letter on September 30, with the result that it had to be sent by post. He acknowledged its receipt vide his replies Ex. R/ 10 & Ex. R/ 12 admitting that he did not attend office on September 30, 1974. The only ground given by the petitioner in Ex. R/10 for his refusal to collect the retrenchment compensation was that the amount offered was much less than he was entitled to receive on that score. He did not specify the amount by which the amount offered fell short. He did not complain that the amount was not tendered for payment to him on September 30, 1974. 10. The main points on which the petitioner's learned counsel assailed the order of retrenchment (Ex. R.2) may be summarised as follows : (a) The order in question is invalid in as much as the petitioner was (a) arbitrarily picked-out and retrenched while those juniors to him were retained in service. it is thus violative of the petitioner's fundamental right guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. (b) It contravenes the mandatory provisions of rule 23 of the Work charged Rules and is therefore null and void. (c) It also contravenes the provisions of sections 25-F and 25-G. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and is therefore, invalid. 11. Before discussing these points, it will be much better to dispose of some minor issues raised in the course of arguments. One such argument relates to the order, Ex. 1, dated, May 1, 1972, issued by the Chief Engineer directing the subordinate authorities in the Irrigation Department not to retrench any member of the work-charged staff who had completed two years' service pending the finalisation of the strength of such staff. One such argument relates to the order, Ex. 1, dated, May 1, 1972, issued by the Chief Engineer directing the subordinate authorities in the Irrigation Department not to retrench any member of the work-charged staff who had completed two years' service pending the finalisation of the strength of such staff. The respondents' answer to this argument, as stated in their return and counter affidavit and there repeated at the Bar, is that before they issued the impugned order, they had already made the requisite assessment of the strength of the work charged staff needed in this unit, in terms of the order Ex. 1, and decided that the services of a survey munshi were no longer required. There is no reason to disbelieve the respondents' return and counter affidavit in that behalf. The petitioner has placed no material on the record from which one may infer that the requisite assessment as to the requirements of Work-charged staff in this unit had not been made by the authorities concerned before issuing the impugned order. None seems to have been employed as a work-charged survey munshi in place of the petitioner after his services were terminated. Even otherwise, the petitioner cannot derive any advantage out of executive instructions of the nature contained in Ex. 1. Such instructions do not parse confer any legal right on the petitioner. If the termination of the petitioner's service was brought about in accordance with the Contract of service or the statutory rules applicable to him, or if he was retrenched according to law, the mere fact that the termination or retrenchment did not strictly accord to the executive instructions is used by a higher authority to his subordinate who issued the order of termination or retrenchment is no ground for striking down the order. 12. Another argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner is regarding his seniority as a munshi. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred in this connect to the seniority lists, Schedule A and Schedule 13. wherein the petitioner is shown senior to some other mush is who were retained in service on and after September 30, 1974, when the petitioner was retrenched. Now even these seniority lists are of no help to the petitioner for a variety of reasons. For one thing. these lists were avowedly tentative in nature and therefore subject to correction subsequently. wherein the petitioner is shown senior to some other mush is who were retained in service on and after September 30, 1974, when the petitioner was retrenched. Now even these seniority lists are of no help to the petitioner for a variety of reasons. For one thing. these lists were avowedly tentative in nature and therefore subject to correction subsequently. The respondents explained that in these lists all types of munshis were clubbed together for purpose of seniority and that therefore a correct list, Ex. R. 8, was issued subsequently indicating the seniority of each category of munshis, e.g., munshi, survey munshi, survey amin, store munshi and work munshi separately. 13. For another thing, these lists, if correctly studied in the light of the work-charged Rules would show that there is no question of the petitioner predicating of his status as a survey munshi being senior to the other munshis mentioned in these lists. It will be seen from Schedule A that the petitioner the was the only work charged munshi in the sub-division of Karauli. None of other munshis mentioned from serial number 2 to 8 in this list belonged in the Karauli subdivision. They belonged in either the Sawai Madhopur or Gangapur sub-divisions. The work-charged Rules provide for maintenance of seniority lists of work-charged start' sub-division-wise and not division-wise. Rule 4 which deals with recruitment and promotion lays down that a sub-division will be regarded as a unit for the purpose of establishment or the work-charged ,employees. Rule 6 which deals with maintenance of seniority lists of work charged employees requires that "seniority lists of each category shall be main charged for the purpose of promotion as well as retrenchment". It tailed in each unit is therefore clear that a sub-division is regard as a unit for the purpose of establishment of the work-charged employees and that seniority lists of each category of such employees, which are statutorily recognised, are the lists prepared in respect of such employees in a sub-division rather than a division. A seniority list of such employees for the whole division has no legal sanction behind it. As already stated, the petitioner was the only work-charged survey munshi in the Karauli sub-division at the material time. No munshi of any other type is shown to have been employed on work-charge basis in the sub-division it at that time. A seniority list of such employees for the whole division has no legal sanction behind it. As already stated, the petitioner was the only work-charged survey munshi in the Karauli sub-division at the material time. No munshi of any other type is shown to have been employed on work-charge basis in the sub-division it at that time. That being so, there was no question of determining the seniority of the petitioner the solitary work-charged survey munshi in the Karauli sub-division, vis-at-vis the work -Charged employees in other sub-divisions for the purpose of promotion and retrenchment under the work-charged Rules. 14. I may now take up the other three points raised by the petitioner's learned counsel and stated as a, b and c in an earlier part of this judgment. To take up (b) first, this contention is based on rule 23 of the Work-charged Rules which reads as under-: 23. Procedure for retrenchment. The surplus staff of one unit may be adjusted against vacancies existing in another unit. While retrenching the staff, it shall he ensured that the person retrenched is the junior most in the particular cadre at his unit level. When retrenchment is necessary, a person who has been promoted from a lower post to a higher post may be reverted to his lower post. Such reversion shall be regulated according to the seniority list maintained in the unit. It has already been held that the petitioner was the only work-charged survey munshi in the Karauli sub-division. In other words, no other work,charged survey munshi, or even munshi, as such was left in the Karauli sub-division, which was the petitioner's unit for the purpose of retrenchment, after the retrenchment of the petitioner. The retrenchment of the petitioner did not therefore involve any contravention of rule 23 reproduced above. By retrenching him, the competent authority was retrenching the only work-charged munshi at his unit level and thus ensuring "that the person retrenched is the junior most in the cadre at his unit level" within the ambit of the rule. 15. Turning now to point (a), this argument can be shortly disposed of on the basis of the finding of fact, mentioned above. to the effect that the petitioner' was the only munshi in the Karauli sub-division, and therefore he could not possibly claim seniority over any other munshi "at his unit level". 15. Turning now to point (a), this argument can be shortly disposed of on the basis of the finding of fact, mentioned above. to the effect that the petitioner' was the only munshi in the Karauli sub-division, and therefore he could not possibly claim seniority over any other munshi "at his unit level". By retrenching the petitioner, the competent authority cannot be said to have acted with arbitrary or hostile discrimination, for there was none-else in the unit to be favoured at the cost of the petitioner. Moreover, the petitioner's service was terminated after notice in accordance wilt rule 26 of the Work-charged Rules. and section 25-F of the Act, specifically mentioning in the impugned order that "survey munshi was no longer required" in the division. As held by the Supreme Court in (I) Satish Chandra V. Union of India, AIR 1953 SC 250 , there is no violation of Article 14 in the termination of service of a Government servant after notice in accordance with the contract of service. The argument, based on Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, also therefore fails. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner addressed Lengthy argument in support of his contention (i. e. point 'c') that the order of entrenchment is invalid on the around that it was passed in contravention of the provisions of section 25-F and section 25-G of the Act. The relevant provisions on which counsel relied may be reproduced here for convenience of reference. They are as under:- 25. F. Conditions precedent to reterchment of workmen.-No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until- (a)... (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and (c) ....... (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and (c) ....... 25, G. Procedure for retrenchment-Where any workman in an industrial establishment who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belong` to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman. 17. The petitioner's learned counsel argued that the petitioner stood retrenched on September 29, 1974. evening, and that the employer did not pay the workman (i. e. the petitioner) or tender for payment to him, the amount of retrenchment compensation on September 29, evening. Counsel laid emphasis on the words "at the time of retrenchment" occurring in clause (b) of section 25-F, reproduced above and contended that offer to pay retrenchment compensation on September 30, 1974, assuming but not admitting that such offer was made, cannot be taken as an offer to pay the amount "at the time of retrenchment", and that, therefore, the retrenchment must be set aside as illegal and invalid. and the petitioner must be reinstated as a survey munshi with full back benefits. 18. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents contended that the retrenchment took effect from September 30, 1974, as clearly stated in the order of retrenchment and that therefore the tender of payment of the retrenchment compensation, as made on September 30, was in full compliance with law requiring payment of retrenchment compensation at the time of retrenchment. Counsel further submitted, even assuming but not admitting, retrenchment compensation was required to be paid or tendered on September 29. instead of Sept. Counsel further submitted, even assuming but not admitting, retrenchment compensation was required to be paid or tendered on September 29. instead of Sept. 30, and the employer thus contravened the provisions of section 25F of the Act, the only consequence of such contravention will be that the workman will be entitled, if he reconciles to such retrenchment, to recover retrenchment compensation under section 33-C of the Act, or if he does not accept the retrenchment, he may raise an industrial dispute and obtain industrial adjudication under section 11-A of the Act setting aside the retrenchment and granting the relief of reinstatement or compensation in lieu of reinstatement in the discretion of the industrial tribunal, as the circumstances of the case may require. In other words, the argument raised is that a workman retrenched without complying with the provisions of section 25-F of the Act does not possess a legal right of reinstatement enforceable as such in a court of law. The Act confers on a workman, aggrieved by such retrenchment, a power to raise an industrial dispute, and thus obtain adjudication from a tribunal, as distinguished from a civil court, as to whether the retrenchment was justified or not, and if not whether he should be granted the relief of reinstatement or money compensation in lieu of reinstatement, depending upon the circumstances of each particular case. It is submitted that the petitioner has no legal right of reinstatement enforceable in a court of law against the respondents and that therefore this Court cannot issue any writ or direction requiring the respondents to reinstate him in service with back wages. It is further pointed out that so far a court of law is concerned, the petitioner may, at best claim damages for wrongful retrenchment and that such a claim had more appropriately been made in a civil suit rather than by a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 19. The law is well settled that the applicant seeking a writ in the nature of mandamus must show that he is possessed of a legal right to the performance of a legal duty by the party against whom mandamus is sought. 19. The law is well settled that the applicant seeking a writ in the nature of mandamus must show that he is possessed of a legal right to the performance of a legal duty by the party against whom mandamus is sought. Soon after the promulgation of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court ruled that the language of Article 226 makes it clear that the existence of a right is the foundation of the exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court under that Article. In (2) State of Orissa V. Madan Gopal (A.I.R. 1952 SC 12) , the Supreme Court held that the words "for any other purpose" in Article 226 must be read in the context of what precedes the some, and that therefore the petitioner who invokes Article 226 must show violation of a fundamental right or some other legal right. It is therefore obvious that this Court will not be able to grant the requisite relief to the petitioner under Article 226, unless he shows that there exists in him a legal right of reinstatement with back wages as a necessary concomitant of retrenchment brought about in violation of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. 20. What is a legal right or the corresponding legal duty which can be enforced under Article 226 is quite often a question of some difficulty, as in the instant case. It is argued on behalf of the petitioner that since his retrenchment was brought about in violation of section 25-F of the Act, it must be treated, on the basis of (3) State of Bombay V. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (A.I.R. 1960 SC 610) , as "invalid or inoperative". It is further argued that since the retrenchment is invalid and inoperative" the petitioner has a right to be reinstated in service with back benefits. Counsel pointed out that this is exactly what was decided in the Hospital Mazdoor Sabha case (ibid) which arose on a writ petition filed under Art cl: 226. 21. A careful study of the cited case would reveal that the employer therein did not raise any argument to the effect that even if a retrenchment is "invalid and inoperative" by reason of failure to comply with the provisions of section 25-F of the Act the employer is under no duty, by that token alone to reinstate the workmen with back benefit. It seems to have been tacitly conceded in that case that once it was held that the workmen concerned had been retrenched-without compliance with the provisions of section 25-F and 25-G of the Act the workmen were entitled to a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the employer to reinstate them in their posts. In other words, the cited case did not decide the question as to whether or not retrenchment made without compliance with the provisions of section 25-F of the Act confers on the retrenched workman an absolute right and imposes on the employer a corresponding duty to reinstate him with back benefits. It will be seen that all that the Supreme Court decided was that failure to comply with the provisions of section 25-F of the Act rendered the order of retrenchment invalid and inoperative. Such invalid retrenchment may be a tortuous act on the part of the employer entitling the workman to damages under law. But the legal relation of master and servant under common law and for that matter, under our own law, does not recognise any rule constraining a master to reinstate a retrenched servant whom the master is not willing to reinstate. 22. Of course, the position under the Act is entirely different. Section 11-A of the Act confers power on an industrial tribunal to set aside discharge or dismissal of a workman and reinstate him or grant other relief like compensation etc. in lieu of reinstatement. 22. Of course, the position under the Act is entirely different. Section 11-A of the Act confers power on an industrial tribunal to set aside discharge or dismissal of a workman and reinstate him or grant other relief like compensation etc. in lieu of reinstatement. Section 1l-A may be reproduced here as under: 11-A. Powers of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals to give appropriate relief in case of discharge or dismissal of workmen-Where an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a workman has been referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication and, in the course of the adjudication proceedings, the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal as the case may he, is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, set-aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require: Provided that in any proceeding under this section the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall not take any fresh evidence in relation to the matter. It is significant to note that the remedy under section 11-A of the Act can only be obtained by raising an industrial dispute and getting it referred by the appropriate Government to an industrial tribunal for adjudication. The employer has, under certain circumstances, a right to adduce evidence before the tribunal in justification of discharge or dismissal. The words "discharge or dismissal" occurring in section 11-A are comprehensive enough to take in retrenchment, for retrenchment, as defined in section 2(oo) of the Act is nothing but discharge or dismissal from service made otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action. As a result of its own enquiry, the tribunal may or may not hold the retrenchment to be justified. Even if it holds that it was not justified, it may not, in the circumstances of the case, find it just and proper to reinstate the workman. Section 11-A vests the tribunal with a power to grant relief by way of compensation in lieu of reinstatement. 23. Even if it holds that it was not justified, it may not, in the circumstances of the case, find it just and proper to reinstate the workman. Section 11-A vests the tribunal with a power to grant relief by way of compensation in lieu of reinstatement. 23. Even before the legislature inserted section 11-A by way of amendment in 1971, the Federal Court and the Supreme Court had already recognised the power of an industrial tribunal to set aside termination of service of a workman by discharge, dismissal or retrenchment and to reinstate him or grant compensation in lieu of reinstatement. A row of judgments starting from the Federal Court judgment in (4) Western India Automobile Association V. Industrial Tribunal (A.I.R. 1949 SC 111) , through the Supreme Court judgments in (5) Bidi, Bidi leaves and Tobacco Merchants Association V. State of Bombay AIR 1962 SC 486 ) , (6) U.B. Dutt and Company V. Its Workmen (A.I.R. 1963 SC 411) and (7) Workmen of Subong Tea Estate V. Subong Tea Estate 'A.I.R. 1967 SC 420) , laid down that the powers of an Industrial Tribunal appointed under the Act are much wider than the powers of a civil court while adjudicating a dispute which may be an industrial dispute, that industrial adjudication does not mean adjudication according to strict law of master and servant, that an award under the Act may create a new contract and impose new obligations on the employer in the interest of social justice and that it is not open to an employer to reduce his labour force without any rhyme or reason. 24. This was the kind of industrial jurisprudence which persuaded the superior courts in the country to recognise a power in the industrial tribunals, even before the enactment of section 11-A of the Act, to direct reinstatement of, or grant compensation in lieu of reinstatement to a retrenched discharged or dismissed workman notwithstanding the terns of the contract of employment to the contrary. In other words, the Legislature, by enacting section 11-A of the Act, has merely codified the power which the industrial tribunals were already exercising on the basis of decisional law. In other words, the Legislature, by enacting section 11-A of the Act, has merely codified the power which the industrial tribunals were already exercising on the basis of decisional law. An industrial tribunal, while adjudicating an industrial dispute referred to it by the Government has, from the very beginning, been known to possess the power to impose on the employer, through the adjudicatory process of the Act, a legal duty to reinstate a retrenched, discharged or dismissed workman if in the circumstances of a particular case, it feels that reinstatement rather, than compensation would be the appropriate relief. Retrenchment brought about in contravention of the provisions of section 25-F of the Act is certainly -invalid and inoperative", but its invalidity and in operativeness do not per se confer on the workman concerned, right to be reinstated and corresponding duty on the employer to reinstate him in his post. The legal right of the workman to reinstatement and the legal duty of the employer to reinstate him can be created only by the Executive and the Industrial Tribunal through the mechanics of the Act. Till the creation of such a right-duty relationship between the workman and the employer, the workman has no legal right of reinstatement which he may enforce in a court of law. 25. To sum up, therefore, the only right which a workman possesses under section 25-F of the Act is a right not to be retrenched without payment of retrenchment compensation. The section imposes a corresponding duty on the employer to refrain from retrenching a workman without paying ment compensation. The employer who retrenches a workman without poying retrenchment compensation is certainly liable in torts to pay darnages aggrieved workman. The workman may also proceed against him under section 33-C of the Act for recovery of retrenchment compensation. If the workman seeks reinstatement with hack wages, he must take recourse to the adjudicatory machinery provided by the Act for the creation and subsequent enforcement of such a right by the authorities appointed under the Act. He does not possess an absolute right of reinstatement capable of being enforced in a court of law. 26. The above approach to the problem finds Support from the dicta of the Supreme Court in two relatively recent cases. He does not possess an absolute right of reinstatement capable of being enforced in a court of law. 26. The above approach to the problem finds Support from the dicta of the Supreme Court in two relatively recent cases. In (8) Premier Automobiles V. K.s Wadke (A.I.R. 1975 SC 2238) , the Supreme Court, speaking through Untwalia J., summed up its four conclusions as under (1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the civil court. (2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. (3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. (4) If the right, which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter VA then the remedy for its enforcement is either under-section, 33C er tthe praising of -an industrial 'dispute, as the case may be. The conclusions at Nos. (2), (3) and (4) above are note worthy for our 'present purpose. Their Lordships pointed out in an earlier part of the judgment that if the right and the remedy are given Uno flatu, i.e., in the same breath, ,the remedy provided by the statute creating the right is an exclusive one. The following dicta may be usefully quoted here : But sorely for the -enforcement of a right or an obligation under he Act the remedy provided uno Rata in it is the exolusive remedy. The legislature iat its wisdom did not think it and proper to provide a very easy and smooth remedy for enforcement of the Tights and obligations created under the Act. Persons wishing the enjoyment of such rights and wanting its enforcement must rest content to secure the remedy provided by the Act. The legislature iat its wisdom did not think it and proper to provide a very easy and smooth remedy for enforcement of the Tights and obligations created under the Act. Persons wishing the enjoyment of such rights and wanting its enforcement must rest content to secure the remedy provided by the Act. The possibility that the Government may not ultimately refer an industrial dispute under Section 10 on the ground of expediency is not a relevant consideration in this regard. This case has brought about a sea change in the law as to the forum competent to resolve a dispute which falls within the purview of industrial dispute under the Act. 26. Similarly, in (9) Rohtas industries V. Its Union (A.l.R, 1976 S.C. 425) , the Supreme Court held that an arbitration award made under section 10-A of the Act awarding compensation to the employer against the workmen for their participation in an alleged strike on the basis of general or common law is had. Their Lordships held : Since the Act which creates rights and remedies has to be considered as one homogenous whole, it has to be regarded uno flatu, one breath, as it were. On this doctrinal basis, the remedy for the strike (a concept which is creature not of the common law but section 24 of the Act) has to be sought exclusively in Section 26 the Act. 27. It may, therefore, be held on the basis of these rulings that the provided under the Act against illegal retrenchment is uno-flatu, exclusive and adequate and that the possibility that the Government may not ultimately refer an industrial dispute under section 10 "is not a relevant consideration in this regard". 28. Two Division Bench rulings of this Court which deal with this subject may now be cited here. In (10) Rajasthan State Electricity Board. Jaipur V. Labour Court, Jaipur and others (1966-I LLJ 381 ) , the Division Bench, speaking through Kan Singh J., held that section 25-F of the Act creates a twos "old right in a workman in case he is retrenched without payment of compensation. One of the said two rights is to challenge the order of retrenchment itself as null and void and seek reinstatement which the workman, as his Lordship pointed out, could do only by approaching the industrial tribunal'". 29. The other ruling is. One of the said two rights is to challenge the order of retrenchment itself as null and void and seek reinstatement which the workman, as his Lordship pointed out, could do only by approaching the industrial tribunal'". 29. The other ruling is. the one reported as (H) Mohanlal Kaul V. Syate of Rajasthan and others (1971-1I LLJ. 291) . The division Bench speaking through Jagat Narain C.J., made the following observations which are relevant for our present purpose:- "It will be seen that the petitioner came to Chis Court on the allegation that the right accrued to him under the industrial law has been infringed. We may say at once that his writ petition should not have been, entertained on this ground. He should have been left to, seek redress under the industrial law which created the right which is said to have been infringed, and which provides for suitable machinery to, deal with such cases. Under the industrial law it is not every case of an industrial dispute that the Government is bound to refer to an authority or Tribune created under the Industrial Disputes Act. They may or may not ref; i a particular dispute. It is a question of expediency of which the Government is the sole judge. If every workman whose industrial right is infringed is allowed to invoke (he extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution the safeguards which the Legislature thought fit to legislate along with the right so created will be rendered nugatory. 30. These two rulings support the respondents, contention that even assuming that the retrenchment is invalid and inoperative for alleged non-comps an with the provisions of section 25-F of the Act, the petitioner ought to have sought appropriate relief under the Act from the industrial tribunals or labour court cornered. 31. Moreover, the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution are of a summary nature and therefore not suitable for agitating complicated question of fact-like those in the instant case, as to whether retrenchment compensation was kept ready for being paid to the petitioner on September 311, 1974, and whether the petitioner deliberately avoided to receive payment that day. Such like complicated questions of fact had been left to be decided by the industrial tribunal appointed under the Act. 32. I may now turn to the rulings cited on behalf of the petitioner. Such like complicated questions of fact had been left to be decided by the industrial tribunal appointed under the Act. 32. I may now turn to the rulings cited on behalf of the petitioner. In (12) Mahesh Chandra V. State of Rajasthan (1974 W.L.N. 564) , the petitioner, a workman as defined in the Act, filed a writ petition the employer with the urination of his services as invalid for non-compliance by as allowed by the Single Bench, setting aside the order of termination and directing appropriate writ to issue for the purpose. None of the aforementioned Division Bench rulings appear to have been cited before the learned Single Judge who decided this case. Moreover, it is not clear from the report of the judgment if the petitioner had claimed the relief of reinstatement or not. If not, the decision was, it is respectfully submitted, correct, for termination could be set aside, as explained in an earlier part of the present judgment merely on the basis of a legal right existing in favour of the workman and a corresponding duty on the employer under section 25-F of the Act. Such setting aside of the order of termination may, per se, be of little practical use to the workman unless he is reinstated or granted some other relief in lieu of reinstatement. The difficulty arises if the workman seeks, as in the instant case, the relief of reinstatement. 33. The Division Bench of the Patna High Court is (13) S.K. Chatterjee V. District Signal Telecommunication Engineer and others (1970 Lab. I.C. 629) is an authority supporting the petitioner's contention that a workman may successfully maintain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and obtain the relief setting aside retrenchment and directing reinstatement without raising an industrial dispute and obtaining adjudication under the Act. The Division Bench came to this conclusion on the basis of the decision in Hospital Mazdoor Sabha case (supra). It is note worthy that the Division Bench expressly noticed that the objection to the effect that a workman could not come under Article 226, without first raising an industrial dispute and obtaining adjudication therein was not raised before the Supreme Court in the Hospital Mazdoor Sabha case. If so, it will not, with respect, be correct to read the said judgment as authority for what it does not decide. If so, it will not, with respect, be correct to read the said judgment as authority for what it does not decide. As pointed out earlier in the present judgment, it appears to have been tacitly conceded in the Supreme Court that if the workmen were found to have been retrenched without compliance with the provisions of section 25-F and 25-W of the Act, they were entitled to a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the employer to reinstate them in their posts. The Patna case is therefore of no avail to the petitioner. 34. Counsel for the petitioner also relied or (14) Nagaur Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. V. Kesa Ram (1979 W.L.N. 408) in which a Division Bench ,of this Court affirmed, in special appeal, an order of a Single Judge allowing the writ petitions of the workmen and setting aside the order of retrenchment passed against them. This ruling, like Mahesh Chandra's case (supra), is distinguishable, because the petitioners in the cited case do not appear to have asked for the relief of reinstatement with back wages. They merely applied for an order setting aside the impugned retrenchments and the same were set aside. Moreover, the earlier Division Bench cases 1966-1 LLJ 381 and 1971-II LLJ 291) and the Supreme Court cases ( AIR 1975 SC 2238 and AIR 1976 SC 425 ) discussed in an earlier part of this judgment do not appear to have been cited before the Division Bench. 35. Another ruling cited by the petitioner's learned counsel is (15) Ananda Ram V. Union of India (1979 W.L.N. 526) . Ananda Ram was employed as a Chowkidar on temporary basis in the Anti Locust Department of Government of India in 1965. On July 8, 1978, the respondent passed an order requiring Ananda Rim to get his name sponsored by the Employment Exchange failing which his services may be terminated and new person may be appointed through the Employment Exchange. Ananda Ram approached the Employment Exchange who refused to sponsor him on the ground that he had become over-age. The respondent then orally told Ananda Ram not to come on work with effect from November 1, 1978. Ananda Ram approached the Employment Exchange who refused to sponsor him on the ground that he had become over-age. The respondent then orally told Ananda Ram not to come on work with effect from November 1, 1978. Ananda Ram filed a writ petition challengins the order dated July 8, 1978, and his challenge succeeded, for the learned Single Judge who decided this case held that the Employment Exchange (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959, under which the impugned order purported to have been issued, did not apply to the vacancy of a watch-man, and therefore the impugned order was quashed. It appears that the oral order of termination of the services of 'Ananda Ram, which was based on the impugned order dated, July 8, 1978, was set aside, because the foundation-order dated, July 8, 1978, was itself set aside. The challenge in the writ petition was. not directed' as such against the oral order of termination, but against the earlier order, dated, July, 8, 1977 &, requiring Ananda Ram to get his name sponsored by the Employment Exchange failing which, his services will be terminated. This ruling is therefore clearly distinguishable. 36. For all these reasons, this writ petition. fail, and. is dismissed leaving; the parties to bear their own costs. *******