JUDGMENT : S.D. Agarwala, J. This is Plaintiff's second appeal arising out of a suit filed for dissolution of his marriage with the Respondent Smt. Savitri Devi or in the alternative for a relief of judicial separation u/s 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act. 2. The case of the Appellant was that be was married with the Respondent in 1958 and lived at Farrukhabad together till 15th August, 1958. After that date Smt. Savitri went back to her father's house with her brother and returned to Farrukhabad only on 25-11-1958. 3. In December, 1958 the Respondent was suffering from constant vomiting and thereafter she was got examined at the Memorial Hospital, Burhpur, Farrukhabad by Dr. Vischer on 7-1-1959. According to whom the Respondent was about nine weeks pregnant. This raised suspicion of the Appellant and he ceased to co-habit with the Respondent. 4. The Respondent contested the suit on the ground that after 15th August, 1958 the Appellant met the Respondent at Pilibhit, Bareilly and co-habited with each other. It was further alleged that after 25th November, 1958 the Petitioner and the Respondent continuously lived together and co-habited with each other at Farrukhabad and that the pregnancy of the Respondent was from the Petitioner. 5. In view of the above, the Appellant filed the suit on the ground that the Respondent was living in adultery and as such be was entitled to a decree for divorce. The suit was initially dismissed on 17th January, 1966, by the Civil Judge, Farrukhabad. Against the said judgment an appeal was filed which was also dismissed by the District Judge, Farrukhabad on 15-10-66. Against the said judgment dated 15-10-1966 Second Appeal No. 229 of 1966 was filed in this Court. Hon'ble S. N. Singh, J. (as he then was) by his judgment dated 10th March, 1969 allowed the appeal and remanded the matter to the Civil Judge with a direction to decide the appeal afresh in the light of the observations made above. The High Court was of the view that the courts below bad ignored to consider the statement of the Respondent under Order X Rule 2 CPC and as such the case was remanded for a decision after consideration of the statement made by the Respondent under Order X Rule 2 CPC. 6. The High Court was of the view that the courts below bad ignored to consider the statement of the Respondent under Order X Rule 2 CPC and as such the case was remanded for a decision after consideration of the statement made by the Respondent under Order X Rule 2 CPC. 6. After remand, the matter came up again for hearing before the District Judge Farrukhabad who by his judgment dated 7th October, 1971 again dismissed the appeal. Against the judgment dated 10th October 1971 the present appeal has been filed in this Court. 7. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has raised three contentions before me. His first contention is that u/s 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act as amended by the Marriage LAWS (Amendment) Act, 1976 he is entitled to a decree for divorce as now it is not necessary for the Appellant to establish that the Respondent was living in adultery but it was enough for the Appellant to prove a single instance that after the solemnization of the marriage the Respondent had voluntary sexual inter-course with a person other than the Appellant.. The second contention is that the Respondent was bound by her statement under Order X Rule 2 CPC and the courts below erred, in not decreeing the suit after having found that her statement was incorrect. The third contention of the learned Counsel is that in view of the report of Dr. Vischer it is clearly established that the pregnancy was resulted not because of the sexual inter-course of the Appellant with the Respondent but because of the sexual inter-course with some other person. 8. I have beard learned Counsel for the Respondent who has contested all the three submissions made by the learned Counsel for the Appellant. He has further urged that the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 is not retrospective and as such the petition for divorce is not maintainable because the Appellant had failed to prove that the Respondent was living in adultery. 9. Section 13(1)(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act as it originally stood was as follows: (1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party-- (i) is living in adultery; or (ii).... 10. 10. Sub-clause (i) to Sub-section (1) was substituted by Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976, Act No. 68 of 1976. The substituted Clause (i) is as follows: (i) has after the solemnization of the marriage had voluntary sexual inter-course with the person other than his or her spouse; or (ia) has after the solemnization of the marriage, treated the Petitioner with cruelty; or (ib) has, deserted the Petitioner for a continous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition; or 11. Section 39 of Act No. 68 of 1976 clearly provides that all petition and proceedings in causes and matters matrimonial which are pending in any court at the commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 shall be dealt with and decided by such court: (i) if it is a petition or proceeding under the Hindu Marriage Act, then so far as may be, as if it had been originally instituted therein under the Hindu Marriage Act, as amended by this Act. 12. Sub-clause (2) to Section 39 further provides as follows: (2) In every petition or proceeding to which Sub-section (1) applies, the court in which the petition or proceeding is pending shall give an opportunity to the parties to amend the pleadings, in so far as such amendment is necessary to give effect to the provisions of Sub-section (1), within such time as it may allow in this behalf and any such amendment may include an amendment for conversion of a petition or proceeding for judicial separation into a petition or proceeding, as the case may be, for divorce. 13. From the above Sub-sections (1) and (2) to Section 39 of the Act, it is clear that all petitions pending on the date of coming into force of the Act No. 68 of 1976 have to be dealt with and decided by a court in accordance with the Act as amended by Act No. 68 of 1976. In view of this provision, therefore, it is clear that Act No. 68 of 1976 is retrospective and, therefore, the Petitioner is entitled to a relief for divorce only if be establishes that after the solemnization of marriage the Respondent had voluntary sexual intercourse with any person other than the Appellant. The first contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant, therefore, is well founded. 14. The first contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant, therefore, is well founded. 14. In regard to the second contention, it is necessary to quote the statement of the Respondent Under Order X Rule 2 CPC. The statement was as follows: The Respondent Smt. Savitri states that she had conception from the Petitioner in the period from 2-11- 58 to 7-11-58 at Bareilly; that in the period from August to November, 1958 the Petitioner also met her some times in Bareilly, but she cannot tell the dates of those meetings; that after 7th November, 1958 she met the Petitioner only after 25th November, 1958, that she is living at her father's house from October, 1959 as she did not find comfort or pleasure at the Petitioner's house (SAB TAKLEEF THIN KISI KISM KA SUKH NAHIN THA). 15. The lower appellate court has recorded a finding that from the evidence on record it is established that there was no meeting between 2-11-58 to 7-11-51 between the Appellant and the Respondent. In view of this finding it is urged that after this finding the decree should have been granted by the lower appellate court. 16. I do not agree with this submission made by the learned Counsel for the Appellant, It is no doubt established that the Respondent did not meet the Appellant between 2-11-58 to 7-11-58 but the Respondent's further case was that the Respondent had met the Appellant After 25th November, 1958 and she lived with the Appellant upto October, 1959. This is also a part of her statement under Order X Rule 2 CPC. The court had to, therefore further examine as to whether after 25th November, 1958 when admittedly the Respondent cohabited with the Appellant, was pregnancy possible so as to be in conformity with the report of the doctor, which is the entire basis of the Appellant. In this view of the matter the court was justified in examining the further fact as to whether the pregnancy was because of the sexual intercourse with the Appellant. 17. In regard to the third contention raised by the learned Counsel for the Appellant, the lower appellate court has recorded a finding that the Respondent Savitri Devi had menstruation on 12-11-58. It is. admitted that the Respondent had lived with the Appellant from 25th November, 1958. Dr. Vischer had examined the Respondent on 7th January, 1959 as alleged. 17. In regard to the third contention raised by the learned Counsel for the Appellant, the lower appellate court has recorded a finding that the Respondent Savitri Devi had menstruation on 12-11-58. It is. admitted that the Respondent had lived with the Appellant from 25th November, 1958. Dr. Vischer had examined the Respondent on 7th January, 1959 as alleged. The report of the Doctor which does not bear any date is as follows: Savitri seems to have been about 9 weeks pregnant, though of course, it is too early to be 100% sure. I have advised her about diet, and given her pills for vomiting, Once the vomiting is improved, she can have other medicines, If vomiting is not improved in 3 days, she should have further treatment. 18. The lower appellate court has found that this report was not proved on record. It is not necessary for the purposes of this appeal to go into this question as the case of the Appellant is not established even if it is taken, that the report was proved. 19. On 7th January, 1959, Dr. Visoher was of the opinion that the pregnancy was about 9 weeks old. If the period is counted from 12th November, 1958, the date of last menstruation to 7th January, 1959, 8 weeks expire on 7th January, 1959. The 9th week will start from 8th January, 1959. The words used by Dr. Vischer are 'about 9 weeks'. Therefore, it is clearly possible that the pregnancy was due to sexual inter-course with the Appellant after 25th November, 1958. No Doctor can give the exact period of pregnancy. It is only a presumptive diagnosis. In the instant case the use of the word 'about' is very significant as the Doctor herself clearly stated that it is only approximately that she could say that the pregnancy was 9 weeks old and that is why the Doctor further added the expression 'that it is too early to be 100% sure.' In view of the statement coupled with the fact that the Appellant co-habited with the Respondent after 25th November, 1958, it is clearly established that the Respondent was pregnant because of the sexual inter-course with the Appellant and the Appellant has failed to establish that after the marriage the Respondent had voluntary sexual inter-course with any other person. 20. 20. In Eden & Holland's Mannual of Obstetrics 10th Edition at page 89, it has been clearly laid down that until the tenth week has been reached the changes in the uterus itself are not sufficiently definite to allow of a physical diagnosis. The relevant passage reads as follows: 1. Diagnosis of Pregnancy during (be First Half symptoms: Those met with during this period are amenorrhea, morning sickness, irritability of the bladder, discomfort and swelling of the breasts, enlargement of the abdomen and "quickning." It must be understood that not one of these symptoms occurring alone, for even all of them occurring together, can be regarded as conclusive evidence of pregnancy. They allow of the "presumptive diagnosis" of pregnancy, but a definite opinion should never be expressed in any case until a physical examination has been made. And further, until the tenth week has been reached, the changes in the uterus itself are not sufficiently definite to allow of a physical diagnosis being made unless the conditions are specially favourable. 21. Learned Counsel for the Appellant in support of his submission has cited various passages of the book "A short Practice of Midwifery for Nurses" by Henry Jellett for the proposition that it is always possible for a Doctor to find out the duration of pregnancy. This position is well settled. No passage has been cited which establishes that the estimate of the Doctor is exact. It is always possible for the Doctor to find out the age of pregnancy but it is only an approximate period that can be found out and not an exact period. In the circumstances, the estimate by Dr. Vischer that pregnancy is about 9 weeks is in consonance with the fact that the Appellant cohabited with the Respondent after 25th November, 1958. These passages do not go contrary to the view which I have taken above. 22. In the result, the view taken by the lower appellate court is in accordance with law and I do not find any ground for interference. The appeal has, therefore, no force. It is accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs.