JUDGMENT T. R. Handa, J.—By this petition the petitioner seeks revision of the decision dated It.3.1976 given by the Additional District Judge, Kangra purporting to be in exercise of his appellate jurisdiction under section 39 of the Indian Arbitration Act, (hereinafter called the Act) whereby the learned Additional District Judge affirmed the order of the Senior Subordinate Judge Dharamsala passed under section 17 of the Act directing that the award filed in his Court under section 14 of the Act by the Arbitrator be made a rule of the Court and a decree be passed in terms thereof. 2. The facts giving rise to this petition may in the first instance be stated briefly. The petitioner and the respondent are real brothers. They jointly owned considerable property both movable as also immovable and also were carrying on joint business under different names and styles. As usually happens under such circumstances, differences cropped up between the two brothers concerning their joint property and business. They referred such disputes to the sole arbitration of their uncle Jagat Ram vide their agreement dated 10.8.1965. 3. The arbitrator appears to have entered upon reference promptly and he actually made his award on 17.8.1965. Signed copies of the award were supplied to the parties by the arbitrator on the following day i. e. 18.8.1965. Since the parties had not earlier supplied him with the requisite stamp paper, the arbitrator made his original award dated 17.8.1965 on an unstamped paper and also called upon the parties to provide him with the stamp paper to enable him to re-write the award on such paper. 4. The stamp paper was subsequently furnished to the arbitrator by the respondent only on 10.12.1965 on which date, the arbitrator rewrote the award on that paper. This award written on the stamp paper was got registered by the arbitrator on 27.12.1965 with the Sub-Registrar. Later at the request of the respondent the arbitrator on 8.8.1968 filed that stamped award in Court under section 14 of the Act. It may be mentioned that the arbitrator in his award rewritten on the stamped paper had faithfully recorded that the original award on unstamped paper had been written by him on 17.8.1965 and that the award filed by him was rewritten by him on a stamped paper furnished to him on 10.12.1965 by the respondent. 5. It may be mentioned that the arbitrator in his award rewritten on the stamped paper had faithfully recorded that the original award on unstamped paper had been written by him on 17.8.1965 and that the award filed by him was rewritten by him on a stamped paper furnished to him on 10.12.1965 by the respondent. 5. On such application being filed by the arbitrator the trial Court directed issue of notices to the parties intimating them about the filing of the award and calling upon them to file objections against the same, if any, within the statutory period. The case was directed to be listed on 9-10-1968. The respondent was served of this notice and he put in appearance through his counsel on 9.10.1968 but the petitioner could not be served and hence he failed to appear. Fresh notice was therefore ordered to be issued to the petitioner and the case was adjourned to 12.12.1968. On 12.12.1968 both the parties put in appearance in Court through their respective counsel. The Court on that day passed the following order : "Present Counsel for the parties. Award filed. Objections against the award may be filed within the statutory period. To come up on 26/2 for further proceedings". This order appears to have been passed as the petitioner was served with the notice only on 9.12.1968. 6. Neither party cared to file any objection against the award within the statutory period. In the meanwhile the date fixed in the case was changed from 26.2.1969 to 11.3.1969 as the Courts were to remain closed for winter vacation from 31.1.1969 to 1.3.1969. It was only on 6.MC69 that petitioner filed his objections against the award under section 30/33 of the Act. The objection raised by the petitioner inter alia included the following: (a) The award was in fact executed on 17.8.65 and it was illegally registered on 27 12.65 beyond the prescribed period of limitation by the Sub-Registrar Palampur, The Registration is invalid. The award is invalid for want of proper registration and stamp. The award was executed by the Arbitrator on 17.8.65 and its signed copy, attached herewith, was given to the answering respondent and one to respondent No. 1 on 18.8.65. The Arbitrator had become functous officio after 17.8.65 and the alleged re-writing of the award on a stamp paper and its registration cannot re-validate the award. The award was executed by the Arbitrator on 17.8.65 and its signed copy, attached herewith, was given to the answering respondent and one to respondent No. 1 on 18.8.65. The Arbitrator had become functous officio after 17.8.65 and the alleged re-writing of the award on a stamp paper and its registration cannot re-validate the award. The award was not acted upon and is a scrap of paper. (b) The application purporting to have been filed by the above mentioned arbitrator has been virtually filed by the respondent No.l; it has been filed after more than 3 years at the instance and for the benefit of respondent No. 1 and to the prejudice of respondent No. 2. The application is barred by time." Towards the end of the objection petition, the following words were added: "On 12.12.68 the answering respondent was not present and his counsel did not inform him that objections were to be filed before 26.2.69." 7. The present respondent in reply to the objections raised on behalf of the petitioner in the trial Court appears to have raised some preliminary objections which gave rise to the following preliminary issues in that Court: 1. Are the objections within time? OPO 2. Is the application of the arbitrator for filing the award time barred? OPO 3. If issue No. 1 not proved then whether there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing objections? OPO 8. Out of these issues, issue No. 2 was not pressed before the trial Court as both the parties agreed that the application filed by the arbitrator under section 14 of the Act was not hit by the bar of limitation. On the remaining two issues, the trial Court returned its findings against the petitioner and in consequence of such findings vide its order dated 19.3.1975 directed that the award be made a rule of the Court and a decree be passed in terms thereof. 9. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the District Judge under section 39 of the Act. The respondent raised a preliminary objection against the competency of that appeal under section 39 but this objection did not find favour with the learned Additional District Judge to whom the appeal was entrusted for disposal. 10. 9. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the District Judge under section 39 of the Act. The respondent raised a preliminary objection against the competency of that appeal under section 39 but this objection did not find favour with the learned Additional District Judge to whom the appeal was entrusted for disposal. 10. The petitioner reiterated before the appellate Court that his objections filed under section 30/33 of the Act made in the trial Court were within time and that even if his objections were time barred, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay caused in filing such objections. Realizing the hollowness of this contention, the petitioner for the first time raised a plea before the Court of appeal that even if his objections were time barred and could not be entertained, it was the duty of the trial Court to suo moto set aside the award which was prima facie illegal for want of proper registration and stamp. 11. The learned Additional District Judge concurred with the trial Court that the objections filed by the petitioner were time barred and as such could not be entertained and he further agreed with the trial Court that the delay in filing such objections, could not be condoned. As regards the plea of the petitioner that the trial Court should have suo moto set aside the award on the ground that the same was prima facie illegal for want of proper registration and stamp, the learned Additional District Judge repelled that plea on the short ground that rewriting of the award on a stamp paper was a ministerial act within the competency of the arbitrator and involved no illegality. The learned Additional District Judge; however, did not discuss the point whether it was open to the trial Court to suo moto set aside the award nor did he touch the plea that the award was bad -for want of proper registration. 12. The petitioner now does not question the findings of the Court below that his objections filed under section 30/33 bf the Act were time barred and the delay in filing such objections could not be condoned. 12. The petitioner now does not question the findings of the Court below that his objections filed under section 30/33 bf the Act were time barred and the delay in filing such objections could not be condoned. The only point urged on behalf of the petitioner in this Court is that in view of the apparent and admitted facts of this case, it was the duty of the trial Court to suo moto set aside the award and that an order directing, such an award to be made a rule of the Court could not be sustained. 13. The pertinent and important question that arises for consideration in the first instance, therefore is whether the Act enjoins any duty or confers any power on the Court to suo moto set aside an award if it looks prima facie illegal. The answer to this question shall have naturally to be found from within the provisions of the Act itself. It may be stated that as revealed by the preamble to the Act, this Act was enacted with a view not only to amend the then existing law relating to arbitration but also with a view to consolidate the law relating thereto. The Act is thus not a partial measure but is intended to be exhaustive on the subject. In other words, the Act is a self-contained Code and the only repository of law pealing with arbitration; matters. 1 his being so the powers and duties of the Court pertaining to all matters falling within the scope of the Act, including the power/duty to set aside the award shall have to be traced within one or the other provision of the Act itself. If the Act is silent on such point, the only reasonable inference would be that the Legislature intended to confer no such power or duty on the Court. 14. If the Act is silent on such point, the only reasonable inference would be that the Legislature intended to confer no such power or duty on the Court. 14. Now coming to the scheme and the provisions of the Act which govern proceedings of the present type, i.e., in cases of arbitration without the intervention of the Court, the relevant provisions would be found in Chapter II of the Act which consists of 17 sections from section 3 to section 19, sections 3 to 7 deal with various aspects of arbitration agreements, sections 8, 11 and 12 deal with power of the Court to appoint or remove arbitrators or umpire, while section 9 and 10 deal with the right of a party to appoint a new arbitrator or a sole arbitrator or arid also with the appointment of umpire. Section 13 deals with the powers of the arbitrators. We are not concerned with any of these provisions for the. purposes of the case in hand. Section 14 then provides for the signing of the award and giving notices in writing of the making and signing of the award and also for filing the award in Court. Sub section (2) of section 14 further enjoins upon the Court to give notice to the parties of the filing of the award. Besides section 14 (2), sections 15 to 17 prescribe the powers and duties of the Court and also lay down the procedure to be adopted after the award is filed. Section 15 confers power on the Court to modify or correct an award in the following contingencies: (a) where it appears that a part of the award is upon a matter not referred to arbitration and such part can be separated from the other part and does not affect the decision on the matter referred ; or (b) where the award is imperfect in form, or contains any obvious error which can be amended without affecting such decision, or (c) where the award contains a clerical mistake or an error arising from an accidental slip or omission. Section 16(1) empowers the Court to remit the award to the umpire or the arbitrator, as the case may be, for reconsideration on such terms as it thinks fit but only where: (a) the award has left undetermined any of the matters referred to arbitration, or where it determines any matter not referred to arbitration and such matter cannot be separated without affecting the determination of the matters referred ; or (b) the award is so indefinite as to be incapable of execution ; or (c) an objection to the legality of the award is apparent upon the face of it. Section 16(2) then enjoins that the Court shall, while remitting the award, fix the time within which the arbitrator or the umpire shall submit his decision to the Court and further provides that such time may be subsequently extended by the Court. In case the umpire or the arbitrator fails to reconsider the award and submit to the Court within the time fixed, the award shall become void as per sub-section (3) of section 16. There is then section 17 which is the most important provision relevant for the purposes of the issue in hand. It would be expedient to extract this provision in extenso: "JUDGMENT IN TERMS OF AWARD.—Where the Court sees no cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for consideration or set aside the award, the Court shall, after the time for making application to set aside the award has expired, or such application having beer made after refusing it, proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow ; and no appeal shall lie from such decree except on the ground that it is in excess of, or not otherwise in accordance with the award". 15. The other relevant provisions of the Act which need be looked into are sections 30 and 33. These sections are in the following terms: Section 30: An award shall not be set aside except on one or more of the following grounds, namely:— (a) that an arbitrator or umpire has misconducted himself or the proceedings. (b) that an award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under section 35, that award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid. (b) that an award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under section 35, that award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid. Section 33: Any party to an arbitration agreement or any person claiming under him desiring to challenge the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or an award or to have the effect of either deter-mined shall apply to the Court and the Court shall decide the question on affidavits: Provided that where the Court deems it just and expedient it may set down the application for hearing on other evidence also, and it may pass such orders for discovery and particulars as it may do in a suit. 16. The scheme of the Act obviously is that when the parties mutually and voluntarily decide to have their disputes settled through arbitration rather than having recourse to the ordinary Courts of the land, they are deemed to have agreed to accept the verdict of the arbitrators be the same right or wrong. When the parties so agree to be bound by the decision of the arbitrators, the Court would ordinarily have no jurisdiction to interfere with the award of the arbitrators except when there is a specific provision in the Act empowering the Court to do so. Otherwise also when the parties have chosen the forum of their own choice for the settlement of their disputes, the Courts must lean towards upholding the decision of that forum rather than interfering therewith. Any provision which empowers the Court to interfere with the award of the arbitrator must therefore be strictly construed. 17. Section 17 of the Act, if read in isolation may on the first look seem to contemplate that on an award being made before it, the Court can straight away proceed to consider the question whether the award should be remitted or set aside even through no approach has been made to it by either party for this purpose. 17. Section 17 of the Act, if read in isolation may on the first look seem to contemplate that on an award being made before it, the Court can straight away proceed to consider the question whether the award should be remitted or set aside even through no approach has been made to it by either party for this purpose. At a subsequent thought, however, and especially after reading this provision in conjunction with the other relevant provisions of the Act, it would look difficult to subscribe to this view, A careful analysis of the provisions of section 17 would go to suggest that after an award has been filed, a duty is enjoined upon the Court to give notice of the same to the parties which is of course with the idea of affording an opportunity to the party challenging or disputing the award to file an application to set aside the same and such an application is required to be filed within the period of limitation as prescribed by Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act. If no application is filed, the party in whose favour the award is made should be held entitled to a decree upon the award or if such an application having been filed is dismissed on merits even then a judgment has to be pronounced in terms of the award followed by a decree. It is only when an application to set aside an award is made within the time prescribed by law at such application succeeds that the party in whose favour the award is made is not entitled to a decree in terms thereof. The only proper interpretation, therefore, which can be placed on the language of section 17 is that it contemplates an application to set aside an award which has to be filed under section 33 of the Act. Of course, section 17 doss not speak of the power of the Court to set aside an award but at the same time the unambiguous language of section 30 speaks out that an award shall not be set aside, except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in that section and which have been referred to above. The award thus can be set aside only on one or more of the grounds as mentioned in section 30 and on no other ground. The award thus can be set aside only on one or more of the grounds as mentioned in section 30 and on no other ground. It, therefore, follows that the power of the Court given by section 17 of the Act to set aside an award is subject to the provisions of Sec. 30 and can be exercised only when the existence of one or more of the grounds mentioned in section 30 is proved. It is further clear that challenge to the validity of the award would be inadmissible without an application under Sec. 33 of the Act which need be filed within the aforesaid period of limitation. In this view of the matter and in the absence of any express provision to that effect in the Act, it appears difficult to hold that the Court enjoys any power to suo moto set aside the award. 18, This matter, namely, whether* the Court has power to set aside the award suo moto came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case Madan Lal v.Sunder Lal and another, reported in AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1233. Relying1 upon the authorities reported as AIR 1954 Bombay 243 (Hastimal Dalichand v. Hiralal Motichand) and A1R 1956 Calcutta 321 {Saha and Co. v. Ishar Singh Kipal Singh) it was argued before the Supreme Court that section 17 gives power to the Court to set aside the award and that such power can be exercised even whether an objection in the form of written-statement had been made more than 20 days after the service of the notice of filing of the awar4 as the Court could do so suo moto. The Supreme Court did not go into the question whether the Court had. the power to set aside the award suo moto but had observed that "Assuming that the Court has power to set aside the award suo moto, we are of opinion that that power cannot be exercise to set aside an award on grounds which fall under section 30 of the Act, if taken in an objection petition filed more than 30 days after service of notice of filing of the award, for if that were so the limitation provided under Art. 158 of the Limitation Act would be completely negatived. The two cases on which the appellant relies do not in our opinion support Him". The two cases on which the appellant relies do not in our opinion support Him". (Art. 158 of the Limitation Act of 1908 is now replaced by Art. 119 (b) of the Limitation Act, 1963). Thus according to the view expressed by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case the Court has no power to set aside an award on the grounds which fall under section 3Q of the Apt it. 3uch grounds are taken in an objection petition filed more than 30 days after the service of notice of filing of the award. As already observed section 30 of the Act specifically lays down that an award shall not be set aside on any ground other than those mentioned in that; section. It is, therefore, plain that the Court can set aside an award only on one or more of the grounds mentioned in section 30 of the Act and this power of setting aside the award can be exercised by the Court only when an application to that effect is made before it under section 33 of the Act within the period of limitation prescribed by Art. 119 (b) of the Limitation Act. It would, therefore, follow that the Court has no power to suo moto set an award. Otherwise also the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case Madan Lal v. Sunder Lal and another (supra) squarely apply to the facts of the instant case. The trial Court had, therefore, no power or jurisdiction to set aside the award suo moto and in case it did not do so, no fault can be found for this omission. 19. This revision petition thus deserves to be dismissed on the short ground that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to suo moto set aside the award an