ORDER A.N. Varma, J. - This petition is directed against orders dated 30th October, 1978 and 20th July, 1978 passed respectively by the respondents nos. 1 and 2 releasing a residential accommodation, of which the petitioner was admittedly the tenant, in favour of respondent no. 3, the landlord, under the provisions of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction), Act, 1972. 2. The relevant facts he within a narrow compass and are not in dispute. The petitioner is an Auditor in the office of Controller of Defence Accounts. He was posted in that capacity at Meerut. The house in dispute was let out to him while he was posted at Meerut. The petitioner was residing in the said house with his family. On 9-6-1976, the petitioner was transferred, according to him temporarily, from Meerut to Roorkee. The petitioners family, however, continued to reside in the said house at Meerut. Immediately following the transfer of the petitioner, the landlord made an application for the release of the accommodation under Section 16 (1) (b) of the aforesaid Act alleging that the petitioner had been transferred to Roorkee at which place he had taken up a residence and that consequently the house was liable to be "deemed vacant" under the provisions of Section 12 of the Act. The petitioner contested the said application and asserted that his transfer to Roorkee was wholly temporary, that he would be shortly transferred back to Meerut and that in any case his family was still in occupation of the house in dispute with all his house-hold effects. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer by an order dated 20th July, 1978 overruled the petitioners objection declaring the house vacant with effect from June 1977 relying on the provisions of S. 12 (3-A) of the aforesaid Act and released it in favour of the landlord. The petitioner, thereupon, filed a revision before the learned District Judge, Meerut which has been dismissed by the learned IV Additional District Judge, Meerut by an order dated 30th October, 1978. The learned District Judge placed reliance on sub-section (3-A) of Section 12 and held that in consequence of the transfer of the petitioner, the house was rightly deemed vacant with effect from 30th June, 1977. The revision of the petitioner was, accordingly, dismissed. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders passed by the respondents nos. The learned District Judge placed reliance on sub-section (3-A) of Section 12 and held that in consequence of the transfer of the petitioner, the house was rightly deemed vacant with effect from 30th June, 1977. The revision of the petitioner was, accordingly, dismissed. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders passed by the respondents nos. 1 and 2, the petitioner has filed this petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner relying on several decisions of this court including a Full Bench decision given in Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 750 of 1979 (Reported in 1980 All LJ 233) (Khubi Singh Yadav v. District Judge) urged that Section 12 (3-A) is prospective in its operation and that, inasmuch as, admittedly, the petitioner was transferred prior to the introduction of Section 12 (3-A), the said provision could have no application to the petitioners case. Consequently, both the courts below fell into a patent error of law in declaring vacancy on the mere ground of the transfer of the petitioner. 4. Learned counsel for landlord-respondent on the other hand urged that even though the transfer of the petitioner might have taken place before the introduction of sub-section (3-A) of Section 12, inasmuch as, the building is to be deemed vacant with effect from the 30th of June following the date of transfer which, in the present case, would be 30th June, 1977, the provisions of Section 12 (3-A) would be attracted in any view of the matter, inasmuch as, the date on which the building is to be deemed vacant fell after the introduction of subsection (3-A). 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the view that this petition must succeed. The courts below have fallen into a patent error of law in applying the provisions of subsection (3-A) of Section 12 of the Act. 6. In successive cases a number of Division Benches of this court consistently took the view that sub-section (3-A) of Section 12 was prospective in its operation and that this provision would have no effect on transfers of tenants which had taken place prior to the introduction of sub-section (3-A) i. e. prior to 5th July, 1976. With the Full Bench decision in the Khubi Singh Yadava (supra) the law as regards whether Section 12 (3-A) is prospective or retrospective in its operation has been put beyond the pale of controversy. With the Full Bench decision in the Khubi Singh Yadava (supra) the law as regards whether Section 12 (3-A) is prospective or retrospective in its operation has been put beyond the pale of controversy. In answer to a specific question referred by me whether the words "has been transferred" occurring in subsection (3-A) take within their sweep also the transfers which had taken place before the introduction of sub-section (3-A), the Full Bench in Khubi Singh Yadavas case held that it is only if the event of transfer took place subsequent to 5th July, 1976 that the provisions of sub-section (3-A) would be attracted. After considering the legislative history of the parent Act, particularly the effect of various provisions of Section 12, which were already in existence prior to the introduction of sub-section (3-A), the Full Bench gave the opinion that the provisions of sub-section (3-A) were clearly prospective in their operation. Indeed Sri S. S. Bhatnagar counsel for the landlord did not dispute that sub-sec. (3-A) of Section 12 was prospective in operation. His argument, however, was that the offensive event in sub-section (3-A) was not the order of transfer but the point of time with effect from which the building was to be deemed vacant, that is, the 30th June following the date of transfer or the date of allotment of a house to the tenant at the place to which he is transferred. He submitted that even if the order of transfer took place prior to 5th July, 1976 but if June 30, following the date of transfer or the date of allotment of a house to the tenant at the place of his transfer happens to fall after 5th July, 1976, sub-section (3-A) would apply. I do not agree with this submission. In my view, the offensive even contemplated under sub-section (3-A), which gives rise to vacancy, is the transfer and not the 30th day of June following the date of such transfer or the allotment to the tenant of a residential accommodation in the city to which the tenant is transferred. The provisions as regards the date from which the tenant is deemed to have ceased to occupy the building in consequence of his transfer only fix artificially the date with effect from which the authorities are to treat the accommodation as having fallen vacant. The provisions as regards the date from which the tenant is deemed to have ceased to occupy the building in consequence of his transfer only fix artificially the date with effect from which the authorities are to treat the accommodation as having fallen vacant. The said provisions lay down only the consequence which flows from the fact of transfer. They do not themselves constitute the offensive event for deciding the extent of Section 12 (3-A) prospectively. 7. The above construction which I am inclined to place on sub-section (3-A) also finds support from the following observations made by the Full Bench in Khubi Singh Yadavas case :- "Since sub-section (3-A) of Section 12 creates a liability on the property rights of a tenant, it should normally be construed prospectively. In other words, it would apply where the offensive event, namely, the event of transfer has taken place after the coming into force of this provision on July 5, 1976." "If to such a situation occurring due to transfer prior to 5-7-1976 Section 3-A were to apply, the position will be that on the one hand under Section 14 the wife and the children will be deemed to be authorised tenants while on the other the house will be deemed vacant rendering it liable to allotment to some one else. This will be an anomalous situation. The legislature should not be imputed an intention whereby anomalies complicate matters. We are hence not inclined to hold that sub-section (3-A) has any retrospective operation." 8. With respect, I am in total agreement with the above observations of the learned Judges of the Full Bench. In my judgment sub-section (3-A) of Section 12 will not apply to any transfers which took place prior to 5-7-1976. It will not apply even to the transfer where the 30th June following the date of transfer or the date of allotment of an accommodation to the tenant at the place to which he is transferred falls after 5th July, 1976, the date of introduction of sub-section (3-A). In my view, this conclusion flows logically from the hypothesis that the provisions of Section 12 (3-A) are prospective in its operation. In my view, this conclusion flows logically from the hypothesis that the provisions of Section 12 (3-A) are prospective in its operation. The view which I am taking is in accord with the conclusion of a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Smt. Madhuri Asthana v. S. A. Khan, (1979 (UP) RCC 269), the facts of which are in pari materia with those of the case in hand. I, therefore, hold that the courts: below clearly fell into a patent error of law in applying sub-section (3-A) of Section 12 to the present case. 9. Learned counsel for the landlord then urged that from the averments made in the petition, it is clear that the petitioner has allowed his unmarried sister to occupy the house and that consequently a vacancy must be deemed to have occurred at least under Clause (b) of Section 12 (1) of the Act, inasmuch as an unmarried sister cannot be regarded as a member of the tenants family within the meaning of Section 3 (g). This point was not raised before either of the two courts below, and, being a question of involving investigation of facts, I am not persuaded to sustain the orders of the courts below on this ground. The sole ground upon which the courts below decided the case against the petitioner was that he had been transferred from Meerut. I may also add that by means of a supplementary affidavit, the petitioner has brought to the notice of this court the fact that he has since been transferred back to Meerut. This fact has not been controverted. 10. For the reasons stated above, this petition succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the respondents nos. 1 and 2 dated 30th October, 1978 and 20th July, 1978 respectively are quashed. There will however, be no orders as to costs.