G. T. NANAVATI, S. H. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition raises a number of questions of law of wide importance under The Gujarat Rural Debtors Relief Act 1976 which came into force on 15/08/1976. The Act wiped off the debts of certain categories of debtors and scaled those of certain other categories Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 claimed to be marginal farmers or small farmers within the meaning of those expressions assigned to them under the Act and applied to the Debt Settlement Officer for extinguishment of the debt which they owed to the petitioner. It is alleged that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 sold off survey No. 368 on 12/08/1977- that is to say after the Act came into force. On 14/12/1978 the Debt Settlement Officer held that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were small farmers on the appointed day within the meaning of that expression assigned to it under the Act and therefore were debtors within the meaning of the Act. After having considered the merits of the case he declared that the entire debt which respondents Nos. 1 and 2 owed to the petitioner was extinguished. As a consequence of the declaration which he made he ordered the petitioner to deliver possession of the land which was mort- gaged by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to the petitioner. It is not in dispute that the land which was mortgaged by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to the petitioner was under agreement between the parties built upon by the petitioner. The question arose as to what would happen to the building which the petitioner has constructed upon the land in question. The Debt Settlement Officer directed the petitioner to apply to the Civil Court for compensation if it was permissible for him to do so. ( 2 ) THE petitioner appealed to the Appellate Authority against that order. On 19/07/1979 the Appellate Officer dismissed the appeal. It is that order which is challenged in this writ petition. ( 3 ) MR. N. R. Oza who appears on behalf of the petitioner has raised before us several contentions. They are as follows (1) The Act enacted by the President in pursuance of the power conferred upon him under the Gujarat State Legislature (Delega- tion of Powers) Act 1976 was beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature. ( 3 ) MR. N. R. Oza who appears on behalf of the petitioner has raised before us several contentions. They are as follows (1) The Act enacted by the President in pursuance of the power conferred upon him under the Gujarat State Legislature (Delega- tion of Powers) Act 1976 was beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature. (2) At the time when the impugned Act was enacted by the Presi- dent the State of Gujarat was under Presidents Rule and the President could not have enacted the impugned Act without con- sulting the Consultative Committee of Parliament. Inasmuch as the President did not do so the impugned Act was not a valid piece of legislation. (3)Sec. 14 of the impugned Act is violative of Arts. 19 (1) (f) 19 (g) and 31 of the Constitution and is not saved by the Forty Second Amendment. In case it is held that Forty Second Amend- ment saves it Forty Second Amendment itself is ultra vires Art. 368 of the Constitution. (4) Sec. 14 is not protected by Forty-fourth Amendment. If it is held that it is saved by 44th Amendment. Forty-fourth Amendment is ultra vires Art. 368. (5) Sec. 14 in any case violates Art. 300a. (6) Sec. 14 upon its true interpretation is confined to properties which are agricultural lards and does not extend to the other types of immovable properties. (7) Neither on the date when respondents Nos. 1 and 2 made an application for adjustment of their debts nor on date of the decision of the Debt Settlement Officer respondents No. 1 and 2 were marginal farmers or small farmers. Therefore their application was not maintainable. (8) The transaction between the petitioner and respondents No. 1 and 2 by virtue of which respondents No. 1 and 2 became peti- tioners debtors was a transaction of usufructuary mortgage. Therefore respondents No. 1 and 2 had no personal liability to pay the debt. Therefore they were not debtors within the mea- ning of that expression given in the Act. (9) The land in question was not situated in a rural area. There- fore the impugned Act did not apply to it. ( 4 ) WE now turn to the first contention which has been raised by Mr. Oza on behalf of the petitioner. Mr. (9) The land in question was not situated in a rural area. There- fore the impugned Act did not apply to it. ( 4 ) WE now turn to the first contention which has been raised by Mr. Oza on behalf of the petitioner. Mr. Oza has contended that the Legisla- ture of the Gujarat State did not have competence to enact the impugned Act and that therefore the President in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by Parliament under Gujarat State Legislature (Delegation of Powers) Act 1976 also did not have competence to enact the impugned Act. He has invited our attention to two entries in the State List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. They are Entries 30 and 18. Entry 30 reads as follows: money-lending and money-lenders; relief of agricultural indebtedness. Entry 18 reads as follows: land that is to say rights in or over land land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization. Mr. Oza has argued that the impugned Act grants relief not only in respect of agricultural indebtedness but also in respect of indebtedness of persons who have nothing to do with agriculture. So far as Entry 18 is concerned it relates to and. Its amplification shows that rights in and over land land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant the collection of rents transfer and alienation of agricultural land land improvement agricultural loans and colonization are all included within the broad concept of land. It is not necessary for us to examine whether the impugned Act falls either under Entry 18 or under Entry 30 firstly because irrespective of whether it falls either under Entry 18 or Entry 30 it could have been enacted by the State Legislature and therefore by the President when the State was under the Presidents Rule. Secondly relief of agricultural indebtedness is wide enough to extend its arms to secured debts as well as unsecured debts. Merely because a debtor has incurred debt repayment of which is secured by a transaction in an immovable property may be the land it does not necessarily mean that the impugned legislation falls under Entry 18. Thirdly as we shall presently show the Supreme Court has held that legislation relating to relief of indebtedness falls under Entry 30. Merely because a debtor has incurred debt repayment of which is secured by a transaction in an immovable property may be the land it does not necessarily mean that the impugned legislation falls under Entry 18. Thirdly as we shall presently show the Supreme Court has held that legislation relating to relief of indebtedness falls under Entry 30. On account of these reasons it is not necessary for us to deal at length with the connotation and amplitude of Entry 18 in the State List. ( 5 ) IT is however necessary to record the arguments which Mr. Oza has advanced on behalf of the petitioner. According to him the very fact that relief of agricultural indebtedness has been separately specified in Entry 30 in the State List means that relief of indebtedness in general does not fall within the amplitude of the expression money-lending and money-lenders. If it was the intention of the Founding Fathers that the expression money lending and money-lenders should have such a wide and all embracing connotation it was unnecessary for them to specify the relief of agricultural indebtedness as a separate subject in Entry 30 in the State List. According to Mr. Oza since separate specification of relief of agricultural indebtedness in Entry 30 shows that it is not one of the matters falling within the expression money-lending and money-lenders there is no reason to believe that relief of non-agricultural indebtedness forms a part of the expression money-lending and money-lenders. The argu- ment which Mr. Oza has raised has some substance. We are bound by the decision on the Supreme Court in this behalf. However on a plain reading of Entry 30 in the State List it appears to us that separate specification of relief of agricultural indebtedness in that Entry means that relief of agricultural indebtedness does not fall within the ampli- tude of money-lending and money-lenders. Since relief of agricultural indebtedness does not fall within the amplitude of the expression money lending and money-lenders there is no reason to believe that relief of non-agricultural indebtedness falls within the amplitude of money-lending and money-lenders. ( 6 ) LOOKING at it from a different angle it appears to us that the Founding Fathers specified two distinct subjects in Entry 30. ( 6 ) LOOKING at it from a different angle it appears to us that the Founding Fathers specified two distinct subjects in Entry 30. One subject was money-lending and money-lenders and another subject was relief of agricultural indebtedness and conferred upon the State Legislature competence to make a law relating to money-lending and money-len- ders as well as relief of agricultural indebtedness but did not confer upon the competence to make a law in regard to relief of non-agri- cultural indebtedness. If the founding Fathers had thought of conferring upon the State Legislature competence to make a law regarding to relief of indebtedness of all-agricultural as well as non-agriculturists - nothing would have been easier for them than to say relief of indebtedness instead of saying relief of agriculturists indebtedness as they did. Entry 30 therefore produces before us a two-fold picture one of which rela- tes to money-lending and money-lenders and another relates to relief of agriculture indebtedness. The very fact that so far as relief of indeb- tedness is concerned it has been confined to agriculturists suggests that state legislature does not have the legislative competence to enact a law relating to relief of indebtedness of non-agriculturists. ( 7 ) THE learned Advocate-General who appears on behalf of the State of Gujarat has argued that the expression money-lending and mo- ney-lenders is very wide and comprehensive and that they itself embra- ces within its sweep relief of indebtedness. According to him it was unnecessary for the Founding Fathers independently to specify the relief of agricultural indebtedness in Entry 30 in the State List. Proceeding further he has argued that merely because the Founding Fathers have out of the argued caution specified the relief of agricultural indebted- ness as an independent subject in Entry 30 of the State List it does not mean that the expression money-lending and money-leaders will not take within its sweep relief of indebtedness. We are not impressed by the argument which the learned Advocate-General has raised before us. ( 8 ) NEXT argument which the learned Advocate-General has raised is that the word agricultural in the expression relief of agricultural in- debtedness is synonymous with or equivalent to rural. In other words he wants us to read relief of agricultural indebtedness as relief of rural indebtedness. ( 8 ) NEXT argument which the learned Advocate-General has raised is that the word agricultural in the expression relief of agricultural in- debtedness is synonymous with or equivalent to rural. In other words he wants us to read relief of agricultural indebtedness as relief of rural indebtedness. He has tried to fortify this argument of his by sta- ting that rural society in India consists principally of agriculturists and is dominated by agriculture. According to him therefore agriculture indebtedness means rural indebtedness. ( 9 ) THE two arguments raised by the learned Advocate-General do not appeal to us. We say so because we cannot attribute to the Founding Fathers an intention to repeat something which they have already said. A statute never uses superfluous words to which no useful and exclusive meaning can be assigned in the context of that statute. If that is true of a statute it is equally true of the Constitution - the fundamental law of the land. It is difficult to imagine that the Constitution which lays down basic norms of life and enshrines basic moral values will use tau- tological language or will go on repeating what it has said elsewhere That is the reason why the first argument raised by the learned Advocate- General does not appeal to us ( 10 ) THE second argument also does not appeal to us because if the Founding Fathers bad meant to confer upon the State Legislature com- petence to make a law relating to the relief of indebtedness of all it could as well have said relief of indebteenders. If they bad meant to confer competence upon the State Legislature to make a law relating to relief of rural indebtedness they could have as well said so. The very fact that they did not use the word rural in place of agricultural and the fact that they did not remove the word agricultural from the expression relief of agricultural indebtedness in Entry 30 clearly show that what they had in mind was that the State Legislature would be able to make a law relating only to relief of agricultural indebtedness. It cannot be gainsaid that rural society in India is predominantly engaged in agriculture and is dominated by agriculture. However rural society does not consist merely of agricul- turists. It cannot be gainsaid that rural society in India is predominantly engaged in agriculture and is dominated by agriculture. However rural society does not consist merely of agricul- turists. There are different types of non-agriculturists as for example businessmen public-servants private employees self employed persons following other vocations such as barbers carpenters blacksmiths tailors and so on. In our opinion agricultural indebtedness means indebted- ness of those who are engaged in agricultural and for whom agriculture is their principal source of livelihood. Agriculture as we understand it is tillage of soil and all operations connected therewith. Agricultural indebtedness does not in our opinion mean indebtedness arising out of debt incurred in connection with agricultural operations only. Accep- tance of the later concept will mean that an agriculturist may be an agricultural debtor in so far as he has incurred debts for the purpose of his agricultural activities such as tillage of soil purchase of a plough purchase of a pair of bullocks purchase of seeds or sinking of an irrig- ation well and may also be a non-agricultural debtor in so far as he has incurred debts for other absolutely non-agricultural purposes such as marriage of his children construction of a house other than a farm house or purchase of cloth. Therefore irrespective of the purpose for which debt has been incurred a debt is an agricultural debt if it has been incurred by a person who earns his livelihood from agriculture. . ( 11 ) SO far as we are concerned it appears clear to us that Entry 30 brings into bold relief two separate subjects one is money-lending and money-lenders and second is relief of agricultural indebtedness and confers upon the State Legislature competence to make a law relating to money-lending and money-lenders and relief of agricultural indebtedness as distinguished from relief of indebtedness or relief of rural indebtedness. ( 12 ) THE argument which Mr. Oza has raised is therefore notwith- out any substance. It has relevance in the instant case in this way. Sec. 3 of the impugned Act discharges or scales down the debts of marginal farmers rural labourers rural artisans and small farmers. They are also included within the definition of debtor given in sec. 2 (d ). Oza has raised is therefore notwith- out any substance. It has relevance in the instant case in this way. Sec. 3 of the impugned Act discharges or scales down the debts of marginal farmers rural labourers rural artisans and small farmers. They are also included within the definition of debtor given in sec. 2 (d ). It defines debtor in the following terms: debtor means a marginal farmer a small farmer a rural labourer or a rural artisan who on the appointed day is in debt. Marginal farmer has been defined by sec. 2 (g) in the following terms: marginal farmer means a person.- (i) who holds land in any of the villages specified in column 3 of the Schedule not exceeding - (a) the extent of land specified against such village in column 4 of the Sche- dule if such person does not belong to a Scheduled Tribe; (b) twice the extent of land so specified if such person belongs to a Scheduled Tribe and (ii) who earns his livelihood principally by cultivating such land. Land has been defined by sec. 2 (f) in the following terms Land means land which is used or capable of being used for the purpose of agriculture and includes the sites of farm buildings appurtenant to such land. Agriculture has been defined by sec. 2 (a) as follows: Agricu- lture includes horticulture the raising of crops grass or garden produce the use by an agriculturist of the land held by him or part thereof for the grazing of his cattle the use of any land whether or not an appen- dage to rice or paddy land for the purpose of rabmanure dairy farming poultry farming breeding of live stock and the cutting of wood. Paus- ing here for a moment we may observe that a law made by the State Legislature giving the marginal farmer as defined by sec. 2 (g) read with sec. 2 (f) and 2 (a) relief of indebtedness will certainly fall within the meaning of the expression relief of agricultural indebtedness used in Entry 30 in the State List. A small farmer has been defined by sec. 2 (g) read with sec. 2 (f) and 2 (a) relief of indebtedness will certainly fall within the meaning of the expression relief of agricultural indebtedness used in Entry 30 in the State List. A small farmer has been defined by sec. 2 (p) in the following terms: small farmer means a person- who holds land in any of the villages specified in column 3 of the Schedule not exceeding- (a) the extent oat land specified against such village in column 5 of the Schedule if such person does not belong to a Scheduled Tribe; (b) twice the extent of land so specified if such person belongs to a Scheduled Tribe; and (ii) who earns his livelihood principally by cultivating such land no doubt is left in our minds when we read the definition of small famer given in sec. 2 (p) with the definition of (land given in sec. 2 (f) and the definition of agriculture given in sec. 2 (a) that any law which a State Legislature enacts for granting relief of indebtedness to small farmers will be a law which will fall within the compass of the expression relief of agricultural indebtedness. ( 13 ) LET us now turn to the two expressions rural labourer and rural artisan which are also included within the definition of debtor Rural artisan has been defined by sec. 5 (1) in the following terms: rural artisan means a person who being resident in a rural area earns his livelihood principally by practising any craft in such area by his own labour or by the labour of the members of his family. and (i) who either does not hold any land or. (ii) who holds land to the extent specified in paragraph (a) or as the case may be paragraph (b) whichever is applicable of sub-clause (i) of the clause (g) but who does not earn his livelihood principally by cultivating such land. The expression rural area used in sec. 2 (1) has been defined by sec. 2 (k) in the following terms: rural area means an area which for the time being is no within the limits of (i) a city constituted under sec. The expression rural area used in sec. 2 (1) has been defined by sec. 2 (k) in the following terms: rural area means an area which for the time being is no within the limits of (i) a city constituted under sec. 3 of the Bon bay Provincial Municipal Corpo- rations Act 1949 as in force in the State of Gujarat (ii) a municipal borough or a notified area constituted or deemed to be cons- tituted under the Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963 (iii) a contonment declared as such under the Cantonments Act 19 definition of rural artisan clearly discloses that he has hardly anything to do with agriculture. He is a person who does not hold any land and who does not earn his livelihood principally by cultivating land if he holds it to the extent specified in paragraph (a) or (b) of sub-clause (i) of clause (g) of sec. 2. It is difficult to imagine that a person who does not hold any land or a person who does not earn his livelihood principally by cultivating land can be called an agriculturist. ( 14 ) LET us now turn to the definition of rural labourer. It is given in sec. 2 (m ). rural labourer means a person who being resident in a rural area earns his llvelihood principally by manual labour from any of the following occupations but does not hold any land for any such occupations namely :- (i) farming including cultivation or tillage of soil or horticultural operations (ii) cutting of wood (iii) dairy farming (iv) poultry farming (v) breeding of live stock (vi) any operation performed on a farm as incidental to preparation transport delivery or storage for marketing of any of the products of any of the occupations mentioned in sub-clauses (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) and (v ). We have no doubt in our minds that debtors falling under the category specified in sec. 2 (m) (i) sec. 2 (m) (v) and 2 (m) (vi) can be termed as agriculturists and any relief of indebtedness granted to them will fall within the meaning of relief of agricultural indebtedness. We have looked at the meaning of agriculture given in The Oxford English Dictio- nary Vol. I 1970 Edition. The following are the meaning assigned to it. 2 (m) (v) and 2 (m) (vi) can be termed as agriculturists and any relief of indebtedness granted to them will fall within the meaning of relief of agricultural indebtedness. We have looked at the meaning of agriculture given in The Oxford English Dictio- nary Vol. I 1970 Edition. The following are the meaning assigned to it. The science and art of cultivating the soil; including the allied pursuits of gathe- ring in the crops and rearing live stock; tillage husbandry farming (in the widest sense) it is clear therefore that breeding of live stock is a part of agriculture. Therefore in our opinion whereas a marginal farmer a small farmer a rural labourer engaged in farming including cultivation or tillage of soil horticultural operations breeding of live stock and operations desc- ribed in sec. 2 (m) (vi) will be an agriculturists the rest are unlikely to belong to the class of agriculturists. Wood-cutters can hardly be termed as agriculturists. Those who are engaged only in dairy farming poultry farming are not agriculturists. Therefore if we are left to our own in deciding whether the State Legislature was competent to make the impu- gned law under Entry 30 we would have said that whereas it was com- petent to make a law relating to the relief of indebtedness of marginal farmers small farmers and rural labourers engaged in farming including cultivation or tillage of soil or horticultural operations breeding of live stock and operations described in sec. 2 (m) (vi) it was not competent to make the impugned law under Entry 30 in relation to rural artisans defined in sec. 2 (1) and rural labourers who were engaged only in cutting of wood dairy farming and poultry farming. Relief of indebtedness to such persons can be given only by Parliament by making a law under Entry 97 in the Union List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. ( 15 ) HOWEVER the matter is no longer open to debate because a similar law made by Maharashtra Legislature has been upheld by the Supreme Court in M/s. Fatehchand Himmatlal and Others etc. v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1977 S. C. 1825. In that decision the legislative com- petence of the Maharashtra Legislature to enact Maharashtra Debt Relief Act 1975 was challenged. It was contended that it did not fall within the sweep of Entry 30 in the State List. v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1977 S. C. 1825. In that decision the legislative com- petence of the Maharashtra Legislature to enact Maharashtra Debt Relief Act 1975 was challenged. It was contended that it did not fall within the sweep of Entry 30 in the State List. Before we make a detailed refe- rence to the decision of the Supreme Court it is necessary to have a brief look at the Maharashtra Act. Sec. 2 (f) of the Maharashtra Debt Relief Act 1975 defines debtor in the following terms: debtor means a marginal farmer rural artisan or rural labourer whose total income from all sources did not exceed two thousand and four hundred rupees during the year immediately before the 1st day of August 1975 and a worker whose total income from all sources did not exceed if living in an urban area six thou- sand rupees during the year immediately before the said date and if living else- where four thousand and eight hundred rupees during that year. This definition makes it clear that four categories of persons were inclu- ded in the definition of debtor. Marginal farmer who is one of them has been defined by sec. 2 (h) as follows: marginal farmer means an agriculturist who holds land measuring not more than one hectare of unirrigated land and includes an agriculturist who cultivates as a tenant or share cropper land measuring not more than one hectare of unirri- gated land rural artisan has been defined by sec. 2 (k) in the following terms: rural artisan means a person who principally earns his livelihood in a rural area by practising any craft either by his own labour or with the help of labour of the members of his family but does not include an artisan who resides in an urban area. Rural labourer has been defined by sec. 2 (1) in the following terms: rural labourer means a person who- (i) does not held any land in a rural area (ii) may or may not have any homestead therein and (iii) earns his livelihood principally by manual labour but does not include any such labourer residing in an urban area and a rural artisan small farmer has been defined by sec. 2 (m) in the following terms: small farmer means an agriculturist who holds land measuring more than one hectare of unirrigated land but less than two hectares of such land and who culti- vates personally such land and includes an agriculturist who cultivates as a tenant or a share cropper land measuring more than one hectare of unirrigated land but not more than two hectares of such land. These four definitions given clearly show that whereas a marginal farmer and a small farmer as defined by the Maharashtra Act fall within the category of agriculturists a rural artisan and a rural labourer will not fall under that category. Therefore ordinarily any law relating to relief of indebtedness for them will not he a law within the meaning of the expression relief of agricultural indebtedness used in Entry 30 in the State List. Yet the Supreme Court in Fatehchands case (supra) has upheld the validity of that law and held that the Legislature could make it under Entry 30 in the State List. Paragraph 54 of the report is the only material paragraph for this purpose. In the subsequent paragraphs the Supreme Court has dealt with the question of repugnancy between the Gold Con- trol Act a parliamentary statute and the Maharashtra Debt Relief Act 1975 We are not concerned with that question in this case. The Supreme Court has made the following observations with reference to Entry 30. Entry 30 in List II is money-lending and money-lenders relief of agricultural indebtedness. If commonsense and common English are components of constitutional construction relief against loans by scaling down discharging reducing interest and principal and staying the realisation of debts will among other things fall squarely within the topic. And that in a country of hereditary indebtedness on a colossal scale. It is commonplace to state that legislative heads must receive large and liberal meanings and the sweep of the sense of the rubrics must embrace the widest range Even incidental and cognate matters come within their purview. The whole gamut of money-lending and debtliquidation is thus within the States legislative competence. The reference to the Rajahmundry Electricity case 1954 SCR 779 ( AIR 1954 SC 251 ) is of no relevance. Nor is the absence of the expression relief in Entry 30 List II of any moment when relief from money-lenders is eloquently implicit in the topic. Sometimes. The reference to the Rajahmundry Electricity case 1954 SCR 779 ( AIR 1954 SC 251 ) is of no relevance. Nor is the absence of the expression relief in Entry 30 List II of any moment when relief from money-lenders is eloquently implicit in the topic. Sometimes. arguments have only stated to be rejected. It is clear that the Supreme Court has upheld the legislative competence of the Maharashtra law under Entry 30. It is true that the distinction made by Mr. Oza in the instant case was not made in the case before the Supreme Court. However we are bound by the decision of the Supreme Court. In paragraph 56 of the report this is what has been stated: Without fear of contradiction we may assert that Act. 246 (3) read with Entry 30 in List II empowers the State to make the impugned law. Since the Supreme Court has upheld the validity of the Maharashtra Act under Entry 30 in the State List even though it inter alia gives relief of indebtedness to-non-agriculturists we must hold that the impugned Act was within the legislative competence of Gujarat State Legislature and therefore within the legislative competence of the President during the Presidents Rule by virtue of the Gujarat State Legislature (Delegation of Powers) Act 1976 ( 16 ) THE next decision to which our attention has been invited by Mr. Oza is in Pathumma and Others v. State of Kerala and Others AIR 1978 S. C. 771. In that case Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act 1970 was challenged inter alia on the ground that it was not within the legislative competence of Kerala State Legislature to make that law. Paragraph 4 of the report shows that the Supreme Court has relied upon its earlier decision in Fateh- chands (supra) in which the constitutionality of the Maharashtra Debt Relief Act 1975 has been upheld even though it contains similar provisions. In paragraph 38 of the report the Supreme Court has referred to the object of that Act. Its object is to remove property by eradicating rural indebted- ness. In paragraph 57 of the report it has been observed that the Kerala Act provides for the relief of indebted agriculturists in the State of Kerala. It was therefore within the legislative competence of the Kerala State Legislature. Its object is to remove property by eradicating rural indebted- ness. In paragraph 57 of the report it has been observed that the Kerala Act provides for the relief of indebted agriculturists in the State of Kerala. It was therefore within the legislative competence of the Kerala State Legislature. From the discussion in paragraph 57 it appears to us that the Kerala law relates to relief of indebtedness of the agriculturists. The- refore the Supreme Court held that it fell within the purview of Entry 30 in the State List. In this connection we may refer to the pertinent obser- vation made in paragraph 58 of the report in which it is stated that the subject-matter of Entry 30 is not confined only to subsisting indebtedness but covers the necessity of providing relief to those agriculturists who have lost their immovable properties by Court sales in execution of the decrees against them and have been rendered destitute. Referring to such agricul- turists it has been observed that it makes no difference to an agricultu- rist merely because he has lost his immovable property. Proceeding fur- ther the Supreme Court has observed that there is nothing in Entry 30 in the State List to show that the relief contemplated by it must nece- ssarily relate to any subsisting indebtedness and cannot cover the question of relief to those who have lost the means of their livelihood because of the delay in providing them legislative relief. This decision does not clinch the issue which has been raised by Mr. Oza before us because it appears to us from the report that Kerala. Act was enacted to grant relief to the agriculturists from indebtedness. ( 17 ) THE learned Advocate-General has invited our attention to the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Krishna Murthy and Others v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1979 A. P. 85. In that case. the consti- tutionality of Andhra Pradesh Agricultural Indebtedness (Relief) Act 1977 was challenged. It appears from that decision that the legislative competence of the Andhra Pradesh State Legislature to enact that law was challenged under Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution Since there was no constitutional challenge under Entry 30 in the State List it is not necessary to refer to that decision in details at this stage. ( 18 ) MR. It appears from that decision that the legislative competence of the Andhra Pradesh State Legislature to enact that law was challenged under Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution Since there was no constitutional challenge under Entry 30 in the State List it is not necessary to refer to that decision in details at this stage. ( 18 ) MR. G. A. Pandit who appears on behalf of debtors in some cases has invited our attention to the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ramkrishan Agarwal and Another v. The Collector Jabalpur and Others AIR 1977 Madhya Pradesh 21. In that case the constitutionality of Madhya Pradesh Gramin Rin Vimukti Tatha Rin Sthagan Adhiniyam 1975 was challenged under Entry 30 in the State List. In the context of Entry 30 the argument which was raised in that case was that the expression agricultural indebtedness refers to debts incurred in connec- tion with agriculture only so that in every case it will be a matter for trial whether the debt in incurred in connection with agriculture exclusi- vely. That argument was negatived by Madhya Pradesh High Court. While doing so the High Court observed that Entry 30 must be read as a whole so that the word agricultural must be interpreted to harmonise it with money lending and money-lenders. In their opinion the framers of the Constitution have by Entry 30 empowered the State Legislative to relieve agriculturists of their indebtedness. It means according to them that relief to agriculturists must be the true import of the expression. Irre- spective of whether the indebtedness is agricultural or non-agricultural all debts will fall within the scope of this Entry if they are incurred by an agriculturist whether in connection with agriculture or otherwise. The view expressed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court is consistent with what we have stated in this decision. However the question which has been raised by Mr. Oza before us remains unanswered by the decision. Does a debt incurred by a non-agriculturist fall within the scope and ambit of Entry 30 in the State List ? In light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Fatehchands case (supra) with which we must respectfully agree we turn down the first contention which has been raised by Mr. Oza on behalf of the petitioner. ( 19 ) THE second contention which Mr. In light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Fatehchands case (supra) with which we must respectfully agree we turn down the first contention which has been raised by Mr. Oza on behalf of the petitioner. ( 19 ) THE second contention which Mr. Oza has raised relates to the omission on the part of the President during the Presidents Rule to consult the Consultative Committee before enacting the impugned Act. So far as the factual situation is concerned our attention has been in- vited by Mr. Oza to reasons for the enactment of the impugned Act. In regard to non-consultation this is what has been stated in the reasons In view of the urgency of the matter it is rot practicable to consult the Consultative Committee of Parliament on Gujarat Legislation. The me- asure is accordingly being enacted without reference to the Consultative Committee. This paragraph clearly shows that the President had not consulted the Consultative Committee before enacting the impugned law. In the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the State of Gujarat it has been stated on this subject as follows: with regard to the comments made by the petitioner in this regard that there was no urgency worth the name and it was practicable and possible to consult the Consultative Committee of Parliament on Gujarat Legislation 1 submit that it is the prerogative of the President under the powers conferred on him under Art. 35 (1) (a) to decide whether it is expedient and proper to enact a law at a particular time and the opinion formed by the President is immune from challenge. This reply to the contention raised by the petitioner is no reply at all. We shall presently show that the President was under a statutory obliga- tion to consult the Consultative Committee before making any law for the State which was under Presidents Rule. Whether to comply with such a statutory obligation cannot be a matter of his prerogative and cannot be beyond challenge. Two absolute propositions stated on behalf of the State of Gujarat are therefore without any substance. In a democratic society which our Constitution brings into existence it is the will of the people matters. If the Parliament therefore requires that President before making a law for a State which is under Presidents Rule shall consult the Consultative Committee he must do so. In a democratic society which our Constitution brings into existence it is the will of the people matters. If the Parliament therefore requires that President before making a law for a State which is under Presidents Rule shall consult the Consultative Committee he must do so. It cannot be said that even though the Parliament casts upon him a statutory obligation to consult the Consultative Committee he may or may not consult the Committee because it is a matter of his prerogative. No provision in the Constitution conferring such a prerogative upon the President has been pointed out to us. All legislative bodies including the President must act within the four corners of the Constitution. ( 20 ) ART. 357 (1) (a) provides in this behalf as under: where by a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of Article 356 it has been decla- red that the powers of the Legislature of the state shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament it shall be competent. (a) for Parliament to confer on the President the power of the Legislature of the state to make laws and to authorise the President to delegate subject to such con- ditions as he may think fit to impose the power so conferred to any other authority to be specified by him in that behalf. Sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Art. 357 provides for conferment of two kinds of power by Parliament upon the President: (1) power of the Legi- slature of the State to make laws (ii) to delegate subject to such condi- tions as he may think fit to impose the power so conferred to any other authority to be specified by him in that behalf. It cannot be gainsaid that Parliament can confer upon the President unconditionally the power of the Legislature of the State to make laws when a Proclamation of Emergency has been issued under clause (1) of Art. 356. If the Parliament can unconditionally confer power upon the President to make a law for the State under Presidents Rule Parliament can also confer conditional power upon the President to do so or can qualify it. . ( 21 ) BEARING this proposition in mind let us now turn to the Gujarat State Legislature (Delegation of Powers) Act 1976 Sub-sec. (1) of sec. . ( 21 ) BEARING this proposition in mind let us now turn to the Gujarat State Legislature (Delegation of Powers) Act 1976 Sub-sec. (1) of sec. 3 provided as follows: the power of the Legislature of the State of Gujarat to make laws which has been declared by the proclamation to be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament is hereby conferred on the President sub-sec. (2) of sec. 3 provided as under: in the exercise of the said power the President may from time to time whe- ther Parliament is or is not in session enact as a Presidents Act a Bill contain- ing such provisions as he considers necessary: provided that before enacting any such Act the President shall whenever he considers it practicable to do so consult a committee constituted for the purpose consisting of thirty-four members of the House of the People nominated by the Speaker and seventeen members of the Council of States nominated by the Chairman. It is clear therefore that if the President considers it practicable to con- sult the Consultative Committee it is his obligation to do so before he makes a law for the State under Presidents Rule. The power to make law under Presidents Rule which was conferred by Parliament upon the President under sec. 3 is therefore a qualified power. The condition pre- cedent to the exercise of the Legislative power was ordinarily required to be satisfied before the President could make any law for the State during the Presidents Rule. ( 22 ) MR. Oza has argued that the express on whenever he considers it practicable to do so used in sub-sec (2) of sec. 3 required the Presi- dent to state reasons why he thought? it was not practicable to consult the Consultative Committee whenever he did not consult the Consultative Committee. In the instant case no reasons have been shown Mr. Oza has argued that the use of the word consider lays down the test of objecti- vity. It does not lay down the test of subjective satisfaction. If accor- ding to him the word consider lays down the test of subjective satisfa- ction it will be rendered infructuous. Secondly it has been argued by Mr. Oza that it is a safeguard which cannot be done away with except for valid reasons. It does not lay down the test of subjective satisfaction. If accor- ding to him the word consider lays down the test of subjective satisfa- ction it will be rendered infructuous. Secondly it has been argued by Mr. Oza that it is a safeguard which cannot be done away with except for valid reasons. He has invited our attention to two decisions to which it is not necessary to refer. It cannot be gainsaid that the word consider means scrutinise. In our opinion it was necessary for the State Gove- rnment to show why the President did not think it necessary to consult the Consultative Committee before he enacted the impugned law ( 23 ) HOWEVER what is the effect of non-consultation in a case of the type ? We do not think omission on the part of the President to consult the Consultative Committee as required by sec. 3 was an illigality which required the impugned law void ab initio. The requirement of consulting the Consulative Committee was nothing more than the requirement to be in touch with the democratic opinion obtaining in the State because in a democratic society no law which does not express the will of the people can be enacted. When the State is under Presidents Rule it is reflected by the Member of the Consultative Committee. However it is also reflected by the Parliament. Therefore if the President fails to consult the Consu- ltative Committee and enacts a law which is ultimately placed before the Parliament then the requirement of enacting a law in consonance with public will is satisfied. Sub-sec. (3) of sec. 3 of the Gujarat State Legisla- ture (Delegation of Powers) Act 1976 required that Every Act enacted by the President under sub-sec. (2) shall as soon as may be after enact- ment be laid before each House of Parliament. In the instant case the impugned law was placed before the Parliament and the Parliament approved it. Thereafter the impugned law was amended by Gujarat State Legislature by Act 29 of 1977. It is clear therefore that the democratic requirement of consulting the peoples representatives laid down by sec. 3 (2) was satisfied when Parliament consisting of the elected representatives of the people of the country approved it under sub-sec. Thereafter the impugned law was amended by Gujarat State Legislature by Act 29 of 1977. It is clear therefore that the democratic requirement of consulting the peoples representatives laid down by sec. 3 (2) was satisfied when Parliament consisting of the elected representatives of the people of the country approved it under sub-sec. (3) of sec 3 In our opinion therefore omission on the part of the President to con- sult the Consultative Committee as required by sub-sec. (2) of sec. 3 was only an irregularity which was cured when the Parliament approved it under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 3 of the Gujarat State Legislature (Delegation of Powers) Act 1376 The second contention which Mr. Oza has raised therefore is without any substance and is rejected. ( 24 ) THE third contention which Mr. Oza has raised is that sec. 14 of the Act violates Arts. 191 (i) (f) 19 (1) (g) and 31 of the Constitution and is not saved by Forty-second Amendment to the Constitution. Accord- ing to him if Forty-second Constitutional Amendment saves it that amendment is ultra vires Art. 368 of the Constitution. It is not necessary to examine the latter part of this contention because we are examining the constitutional validity of sec. 14 in light of Arts. 19 (1) (f) 19 (1) (g) and 31. When the impugned Act was enacted Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 31 were on the statute book. In first Appeal No. 1072 of 1978 and others decided by a Division Bench of this Court on the 1/10/1979 (Rajiv Ramanlal and Ors. v. Ashok Mills Ltd. 1979 (2)-XX (2) G. L. R. 461) it has been held that the constitutional validity of an impugned provision can be tested on the anvil of Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 3t if the impugned v provision was enacted at the time when those Articles were on the sta- tute book. There is no doubt or dispute about the fact that Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 31 were on the statute book on 15/08/1976 when sec. 14 was enacted. Art. 19 (1) (f) conferred the following fundamental right upon the citizens: to acquire hold and dispose of property. Art. 19 (1) (g) confers the following fundamental right upon the citizens of the country: to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation trade or business. 14 was enacted. Art. 19 (1) (f) conferred the following fundamental right upon the citizens: to acquire hold and dispose of property. Art. 19 (1) (g) confers the following fundamental right upon the citizens of the country: to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation trade or business. Upon these fundamental rights under clauses (5) and 6 of Art. 19 reasonable restrictions could be imposed in the interests of the general public. Art. 31 (1) provided as under: No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. ( 25 ) WE first proceed to examine the contention raised by Mr. Oza under Art. 31. The impugned Act indeed deprives the creditors of their property. It is also not in dispute before us that moneys advanced by the creditors to the debtors are the property. The impugned law is the autho- rity for depriving the creditors of their moneys. Mr. Oza has however relied upon clause (2) of Art. 31 which inter alia provided as under: no property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by authority of a law which provides for acquisition or requisiti- oning of the property for an amount which may be fixed by such law or which may be determined in accordance with such principles and given in such manner as may be specified in such law; and no such law shall be called in question in any court on the ground that the amount so fixed or determined is not adequate or that the whole or any part of such amount is to be given otherwise than in cash. Clause (2) of Art. 31 applied to cases of compulsory acquisition or requi- sition of property. Clause (2) has to be read with clause (2a) of Art. 31. Clause (2a) circumscribed the scope of Clause (2) by showing what was compulsory acquisition or requisition of property within the meaning of Clause (2 ). It provided as follows: where a law does not provide for the transfer of the ownership or right to poss- ession of any property to the State or to a corporation owned or controlled by the State it shall not be deemed to provide for the compulsory acquisition or requisi- tioning of property notwithstanding that it deprives any person of his property. In the instant case the impugned law deprives the creditors of their pro- perty by extinguishing the debts owed by the debtors to them. It does not provide for compulsory acquisition or requisition of the property of the creditors because it does not transfer the ownership or right to possession of any property to the State or to a Corporation owned or controlled by the State. Therefore what the impugned law does is to provide for extinguishment of the right of the creditors to their moneys by discharging debtors from the obligation to repay them to the creditors and not to compulsorily acquire or requisition any property. Therefore clause (2) of Art. 31 did not have any application to the instant case. ( 26 ) MR. Oza has however tried to vehemently argue that clause (2) of Art. 31 had a necessary link with clause (1) of Art. 31. The argu- ment which Mr. Oza has expressed is not a correct argument. We may in this behalf refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Madan Mohan Pathak and Another v. Union If India and Others AIR 1978 S C. 803. It was a case under the Life Insurance Corporation (Modification of Sett- lement) Act 1976 In the context of the contention which was raised un- der that Act the first question which arose was whether annual cash bonus payable by Life Insurance Corporation to its employees was property within the meaning of Art. 31 (1 ). The second question which arose rela- ted to the relationship between clause (1) of Art. 31 and clause (2) of Art. 31. On the first question the Supreme Court has held that the property cannot have one meaning in Art. 19 (1) (f) another in Art. 31 clause (1) and a third in Art. 31 (2 ). Property must have the same connotation. In all the three Articles and since these are constitutional provisions intended to secure a fundamental right they must receive the widest interpretation and must be held to refer to property of every kind. Elucidating the concept of property as expressed in Art. 19 (1) (f) and clause (2) of Art. 31 the Supreme Court has observed that it comprises every form of property tangible or intangible including debts and choses in action such as unpaid accumulation of wages pension cash grant and constitutionally protected Privy Purse. Elucidating the concept of property as expressed in Art. 19 (1) (f) and clause (2) of Art. 31 the Supreme Court has observed that it comprises every form of property tangible or intangible including debts and choses in action such as unpaid accumulation of wages pension cash grant and constitutionally protected Privy Purse. Adverting to the second question which arose in that case it has been observed by the Supreme Court in paragraph 35 as follows: the majority view in The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose 1954 SCR 587 ( AIR 1954 SC 92 ) and Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. The Sholapur Spi- nning and Weaving Co. Ltd. 1954 SCR 674 : (A. I. R. 1954 SC 119) was that clauses (1) and (2) of Article 31 were not mutually exclusive but they dealt with same topic and the deprivation contemplated in clause (1) was no other than the comp- ulsory acquisition or taking possession of property referred to in clause (2) and hence where the deprivation was so substantial as to amount to compulsory acqui- sition or taking possession Article 31 was attracted. The introduction of clause (2a) in Article 31 snapped the link between clauses (1) and (2) and brought about a dichotomy between these two clauses. Thereafter clause (2) alone dealt with comp ulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property by the State and clause (1) dealt with deprivation of property in other ways and what should be regarded as comp- ulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property for the purpose of clause (2) was defined in clause (2a ). It was as if clause (2a) supplied the dictionary for the meaning of compulsory acquisition and requisitioning of property in clause (2 ). Clause (2a) declared that a law shall not be deemed to provide for the compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property if it does not provide for the transfer of the ownership or right to possession of the property to the State or to a corporation owned or controlled by the State. It is only where a law provides for the transfer of ownership or right to possession of any property to the State or to a corporation owned or controlled by the State that it would have to meet the challenge of clause (2) of Article 31 as a law providing for compulsory acquisition or requisiti- oning of property. It is only where a law provides for the transfer of ownership or right to possession of any property to the State or to a corporation owned or controlled by the State that it would have to meet the challenge of clause (2) of Article 31 as a law providing for compulsory acquisition or requisiti- oning of property. Whenever therefore the constitutional validity of a law is challenged on the ground of infraction of Article 31 clause (2) the question has to be asked whether the law provides for the transfer of ownership or right to possession of any property to the State or to a corporation owned or controlled by the State. In paragraph 36 of the report the Supreme Court has observed as follows: now whilst interpreting Article 31 clause (2a) it must be remembered that the interpretation we place upon it will determine the scope and ambit of the constitutional guarantee under clause (2) of Article 31. We must not therefore construe clause (2a) in a narrow pedantic manner nor adopt a doctrinaire or legalistic approach. Our interpretation must be guided by the substance of the matter and not by lex scripta. When clause (2a) says that in order to attract the applicability of clause (2) the law must provide for the transfer of ownership of properly to the State or to a corporation owned or controlled by the State it is not necessary that the law should in so many words provide for such transfer. No particular verbal formula need be adopted. It is not a ritualistic mantra which is required to be repeated in the law. What has to be considered is the substance of the law and not its form. The question that is to be asked is: does the law in substance provide for transfer of ownership of property whatever be the linguistic formula employed ? What is the effect of the law: does it bring about transfer of ownership of property ? Now transfer of ownership is also a term of wide import and it comprises every mode by which ownership may be transferred from one person to another. The mode of transfer may vary from one kind of property to another; it would depend on the nature of the property to be transferred. Now transfer of ownership is also a term of wide import and it comprises every mode by which ownership may be transferred from one person to another. The mode of transfer may vary from one kind of property to another; it would depend on the nature of the property to be transferred. And moreover the court would have to look to the substance of the transaction in order to deter- mine whether there is transfer of ownership involved in what has been brought about by the law. ( 27 ) IN State of Gujarat v. Shantilal Mangaldas and Others AIR 1969 SC 634 X G. L. R. 879 the following observations have been made in paragraph 22 of the report. They have a vital bearing on this subject. The following principles emerge from an analysis of clauses (2) and (2a): compul- sory acquisition or requisition may be made for a public purpose alone and must be made by authority of law. Law which deprives a person of property but does not transfer ownership of the properly or tight to possession of the property to the State or corporation owned or controlled by the State is not a law for compulsory acquisition or requisition. The law under the authority of which property is comp- ulsorily acquired ar requisitioned must either fix the amount of compensation or specify the principles on which and the manner in which the compensation is to be determined and given. If these conditions ate fulfilled the validity of the law cannot be questioned an the plea that it does not provide adequate compensation to the owner. In that case the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the Cousti- tution (Fourth Amendment) Act 1955 in the Context of the dispute which arose under the Bombay Town Planning Act 1955 ( 28 ) THESE two decisions make it clear beyond any doubt that the question of fixing the compensation under clause (2) of Art. 31 arises only if the property is acquired being the State within the meaning of clause (2a) of Art. 31. In the instant case the debts which were due to the creditors from the debtors have not been transferred to the State or to any corpo- ration owned or controlled by the State. They have been merely extingu- ished. In the instant case the debts which were due to the creditors from the debtors have not been transferred to the State or to any corpo- ration owned or controlled by the State. They have been merely extingu- ished. Therefore clause 2) read with clause (2a) of Art. 31 does not come into picture at all. ( 29 ) AN attempt was made by Mr. Oza to refer to Art. 31a. Art. 31 carves out an exception to Arts. 14 19 and 31. It saves laws which may be otherwise invalid under Arts. 14 19 and 31. Art. 31a does not come into picture in the present case because the impugned Act is not invalid under Art. 31. A part of the third contention raised by Mr. Oza therefore fails and is rejected. ( 30 ) WE now turn to the constitutional challenge which is directed against sec. 14 under Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 19 (1) (g ). In fact the challenge is directed not only against sec. 14 but against secs. 3 and 14. The learned Advocates appearing for the creditors in other petitions have intervened in this case. Arguments were raised from amongst the interveners by Mr. P. N. Dave and Mr. A. K. Mankad. They directed the challenge under Arts. 19 (1) (f) and 19 (1) (g) against secs. 3 and 14 and also directed it under Art. 14. We shall also answer in this judg- ment what was contended by the interveners. Art. 19 (1) (f) conferred upon every citizen the sight to acquire hold 3nd dispose of properly. Art. 19 (1) (g) confers upon every citizen the right inter alia to carry on business. Art. 19 (1) (f) as held by the Supreme Court in Madan Mohan Pathaks case (supra) applied to moneys. Money it has been held in that case is property. It also cannot be gainsaid that to lend moneys to earn interest and to recover principal and interest is business. It is true that non-institutional money-lending business is heavily looked down upon. Money-lending by itself is not a nefarious business activity merely because we have got not only in this country but in the world at large the system of institutional credit. It is only when money-lending is used as an instrument to squeeze a poor man and to exploit him that it becomes an undesirable activity. Money-lending by itself is not a nefarious business activity merely because we have got not only in this country but in the world at large the system of institutional credit. It is only when money-lending is used as an instrument to squeeze a poor man and to exploit him that it becomes an undesirable activity. It is difficult to say that every non- institutional credit in the shape of money-lending amounts to a nefarious business activity. We have no doubt in our minds that barring the und- esirable threads which have entered into the system of non-institutional credit money-lending must be regarded as a business. It has been rega- rded as business by the Supreme Court in Fatehchands care (supra ). Bearing in mind therefore that money was property within the meaning of Art. 19 (1) (f) and money-lending is business within the meaning of Art. 19 (1) (g) let us now try to find out what has been done by the impugned Act. It is necessary to analyse the scheme of the Act in that behalf. Sec. 3 provides as follows: save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act and on and from the appointed day - (a) every debt outstanding against a debtor who is marginal farmer or rural labourer or who is a rural artisan whose income does not exceed rupees 2 400 per year shall be deemed to be wholly discharged; (b) every debt outstanding against a debtor who is a small framer or who is a rural artisan whose income exceeds rupees 2 400 per year but does not exceed rupees 4 800 per year shall (i) in a case where any amount equal to or exceeding twice the amount of the principal has already been paid by or recovered from such debtor before the appointed day be deemed to be wholly discharged; (ii) in any other case be deemed to be reduced to one-half of the recognised debt; provided that the amount which remains to be paid by the debtor shall not exceed twice the amounts of the principal. Explanation 1.-For the purpose of this sub-section as well as sub-sec. (3) of sec. 8 income per year in relation to a rural artisan shall mean the average annual income of such artisan for the three years immediately preceding the appointed day. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Explanation 1.-For the purpose of this sub-section as well as sub-sec. (3) of sec. 8 income per year in relation to a rural artisan shall mean the average annual income of such artisan for the three years immediately preceding the appointed day. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . It is not necessary to reproduce Explanation 2 to sub-sec. (1) of sec. 3. It is not material for the purpose of the present case. Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 3 provides as follows: notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions in no case shall a debtor be liable to pay to his creditor or creditors under sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) an amount exceeding rupees 1 400 in the aggregate: provided that where the amount payable by the debtor to more than one cre- ditor is so reduced to rupees 1 400 the amount payable to each one of the creditors shall be determined on a pro rata basis having regard to the amounts or amounts of debts payable to each one of them subject to the overall limit of rupees 1 400 clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 3 clearly shows that the debt owned by every marginal farmer and every rural labourer has been wholly dis- charged. So far as rural artisan is concerned income test has been laid down for him. It appears to us that the income test which has been laid down for a rural artisan by clause (a) has not been applied to marginal farmer or rural labourer. This position becomes clear when we read clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) and sub-sec. (2) of sec. 3. If the income test was applied to a marginal farmer and a rural labourer those two cate- gories of debtors would have been mentioned again in clause (b) in order to give them a different dispensation in these cases in which their income exceeded Rs. 2 400 Similarly the expression income per year has been defined in Explanation 1 to sub-sec. (1) only in relation to a rural artisan. It has not been defined in relation to a marginal farmer or a rural labourer. 2 400 Similarly the expression income per year has been defined in Explanation 1 to sub-sec. (1) only in relation to a rural artisan. It has not been defined in relation to a marginal farmer or a rural labourer. If the intention of the Legislature was to apply the income test also to marginal farmers and rural labourers what has been provided by Explanation 1 in respect of a rural artisan would have been provided in respect of a marginal farmer and a rural labourer also. We therefore feel that a marginal farmer and a rural labourer irrespective of their annual income have been wholly discharged from the debts out- standing against them. In the very nature of things a marginal farmer or a rural labourer economically down-cast as he is would not have heavy debts. On account of his poor economic condition his credit- worthiness must be much less We have reproduced the definitions of marginal farmer and rural labourer and bearing them in mind we make these observations. A marginal farmer hardly owns two hectares of lands at the maximum. That is what the definition of marginal farmer read with the Schedule to the impugned Act shows. When we turn to clause (b) we find that a rural artisan whose income exceeds Rs. 2. 400. 00 per year but does not exceed Rs. 4 800 per year has been given a partial relief in the shape of scaling down of his debt. He is wholly discharged from the obligation to pay his debt if he has already paid his creditor the principle amount and interest equivalent to the principal amount. Similarly a small farmer is also wholly discharged if he has paid to his creditor the principal amount and interest which is equal in sum to the principal amount. Those small farmers and those rural artisans whose income exceeds Rs. 2 400 per year but does not exceed Rs. 4 800 and who do not stand wholly discharged under sec. 3 (1) (b) (i) get the benefit of the reduction of the recognized debt to half. Recognised debt is not what is shown in the creditors book of accounts against his debtor. 2 400 per year but does not exceed Rs. 4 800 and who do not stand wholly discharged under sec. 3 (1) (b) (i) get the benefit of the reduction of the recognized debt to half. Recognised debt is not what is shown in the creditors book of accounts against his debtor. It has been defined by Explanation 2 in the following terms: for the purpose of clause (b) recognised debt in relation to any debtor means the amount of the principal together with the amount of simple interest thereon at the rate of six per cent per annum or the rate stipulated between the parties whi- chever is less calculated as outstanding on the appointed day after allowing dedu- ctions of all sums paid from time to time towards the repayment of the principal or interest as the case may be. In simple terms recognised debt means the principal amount left by a creditor to his debtor and simple interest thereon at the rate of six per cent per annum the interest not exceeding the amount of principal. Such a recognised debt of every small farmer is reduced to half and such a recognised debt of a rural artisan whose income exceeds Rs. 2 400 per year but does not exceed Rs. 4 860 ear is reduced to half. We therefore find that whereas marginal farmers and rural labourers have been wholly discharged from the obligation to pay their debts irrespective of their annual incomes small farmers who are bigger than the marginal farmers and rural artisans and rural artisans have been partial relief. That a small farmer is bigger than a marginal farmer is made clear by the definition of small farmer when it is read with the Schedule to the Act. It is quite clear therefore that very few debtors will retain some liability to pay their debts to their creditors adjudicated upon by Debt Settlement Officer. In such cases also the Legislature has set the upper limit. Sub-sec. (3) of sec. 3 provides that in no case the liability of such debtor shall exceed Rs. 1 400 Therefore though small farmers and rural artisans whose debts do not stand fully discharged under the scheme of sec. 3 will not have an outstanding debt liability exceeding Rs. 1 400 ( 31 ) IT was argued by Mr. Dave that Legislature has fixed the ceiling of Rs. 1 400 Therefore though small farmers and rural artisans whose debts do not stand fully discharged under the scheme of sec. 3 will not have an outstanding debt liability exceeding Rs. 1 400 ( 31 ) IT was argued by Mr. Dave that Legislature has fixed the ceiling of Rs. 1 400 arbitrarily. Nothing has been pointed out on behalf of the State of Gujarat how the ceiling of Rs. 1 400 was fixed. However if it is necessary to fix the ceiling it is open to the Legislature to take any figure. An extreme argument was raised on behalf of the petitioner was that a recent debt incurred by a small farmer or a rural artisan amo- unting to a lac of rupees will also stand reduced to the sum of Rs. 1 400 The logic of the argument cannot be controverted. However we have to bear in mind the social conditions prevailing in the country. It is di- fficult to imagine that a small farmer who does not owe even 4 hect- ares of land as the definition of small farmer read with the Schedule shows and a rural artisan who practices a craft and lives in a rural area on his own manual labour or on the Manual labour of the mem bers of his family will have creditworthiness to incur such huge debts. We do not think any money-lender has lend to them more than Rs. 5 0 or Rs. 6 0 at the most. If some money-lender has lent to them a bigger am- ount it must be treated as an exception. It is such a debt of Rs. 5 0 or Rs. 6 0 is scaled down to the maximum amount of Rs. 1 400 it being the ceiling. In case of a recent debt incurred by a small farmer or a small artisan belonging to the higher income his group money leader is found to suffer more than a money-lender who has a more re mote or old debt to recover. An old debt ordinarily presupposes that the money-lender has earned quite a good deal of interest thereon with the passage of time ( 32 ) LET us now have a look at some other sections which have bea- ring on this aspect. We shall rifer to sec. 4 later. An old debt ordinarily presupposes that the money-lender has earned quite a good deal of interest thereon with the passage of time ( 32 ) LET us now have a look at some other sections which have bea- ring on this aspect. We shall rifer to sec. 4 later. Sec. 9 which provides for payment of the debt determined by the Debt Settlement Officer lays down that a debt found due by the Debt Settlement Officer shall be paid by the debtor to the creditor in ten equal annual instalments without any interest. therefore where the debt of a small farmer or a rural ar- tisan is scaled down Rs. 1 400 it is not going to bear interest for the next ten years. Secondly its recovery has been spread over a period of ten years. It has been made payable in very easy instalments. Added to it is the provision made by sec. 10. The liability to pay the scaled down debt in ten annual instalments is also not absolute. Sec. 10 provides that whenever the State Government suspends or remits the payment of one- half or more of the land revenue the payable of whole of the instalment due for that year and the full amount of instalment due for each sub- sequent year under sec. 9 shall be postponed for one year. In other words if during a period of ten years there is a suspension or remission of one- half or more of the land-revenue payable to the State the annual insta- lments otherwise payable over a period of ten years under sec. 9 become payable over a period of eleven years. If the payment of one-half or more of the land-revenue is suspended or remitted more than once during the period of ten years contemplated by sec. 9 then as many years are added for payment of annual instalments under sec. 9. Sec. 10 further provides that in case the State Government suspends or remits less than one-half of the land-revenue during any particular year one-half of the amount of instalment for that year and full amount during subsequent year under sec. 9 shall be postponed for a period of one year. 9. Sec. 10 further provides that in case the State Government suspends or remits less than one-half of the land-revenue during any particular year one-half of the amount of instalment for that year and full amount during subsequent year under sec. 9 shall be postponed for a period of one year. ( 33 ) THE analysis of the scheme of debt reduction and its payment which we have made clearly she was that whilst a large number of debtors are wholly discharged others are required to pay only a small amount in a very easy manner. Its payability has been spread over a period of time and may be interrupted by the circumstances contemplated by sec. 10 This scheme in our opinion takes little difference between these money-lenders whose debts have been fully wiped off and those whose debts have been partially wiped off The latter class is unlikely to recover substantial amount of capital advanced by them to their debtors. ( 34 ) WE now turn to sec 14 which provides as under: (1) No creditor shall after the appointed day damage destroy or tamper with any property pledged or mortgaged with him by a debtor or any document connec- ted therewith or part with or deal with the same except as provided in sub-sec. (2 ). (2) Where a certificate of discharge of any debt is granted to a debtor or an order reducing his debt is made under sec. 8 every property pledged of mortgaged by such debtor as a security for such debt shall stand released in favour of such debtor and the creditor shall forthwith return such property to the debtor. So far as sub-sec. (1) of sec. 14 is concerned we do not think it is open to any challenge for the simple reason that a money-lender who holds security from his debtor in the shape of movable or immovable property must be prevented from damaging destroying or tampering with it because upon the discharge of the debt under the Act he is bound to return the security to his debtor in the same form in which he had received it when he advanced the money to him. Sub-sec. (2) has been assailed very stro- ngly on behalf of the money-lenders. Sub-sec. Sub-sec. (2) has been assailed very stro- ngly on behalf of the money-lenders. Sub-sec. (2) deals with two situa- tions: (i) where a certificate of discharge of any debts has been granted to a debtor or (ii) where an order reducing his debt has been made under sec. 8. In both these cases the movable or immovable property pledged or mortgaged by a debtor as security for the debt must be returned by the creditor forthwith to the debtor. It stands released in favour of such debtor. If the statutory discharge of debt suffers from no constitutional vice release of the security and its return to the debtor which has been fully discharged can hardly suffer from any constitutional infirmity. It is a mere consequence flowing from the statutory discharge of his debt. ( 35 ) SO far as the second aspect is concerned serious arguments have been raised. What has been argued is as follows. In a case where order reducing a debt has been made under sec. 8 is it reasonable that the security given by the debtor should be forthwith released in his favour and returned to him even before the scaled down debt has been paid up ? We have already seen on the analysis of the scheme of the relevant provi- sions of the impugned Act that payment of the scaled down debt is spread over a period of ten years which period may become longer if the circu- mstances specified in sec. 10 occur. It has been argued on behalf of the money-lenders that once the security is released and goes back to the debtor there is no certainty that the debtor shall pay his scaled down debt. Secondly if he does not pay his scaled down debt the creditor shall have nothing to fall back upon to realise his dues which have been found payable as a result of adjudication under the impugned Act. It has also been argued on behalf of the money-lenders that there is no guarantee that a debtor whose debts have been scaled down and to whom the security has been returned shall not idcur fresh debts against that very security. He may encumber the same security by charging it in one form or another with fresh debts. It has also been argued on behalf of the money-lenders that there is no guarantee that a debtor whose debts have been scaled down and to whom the security has been returned shall not idcur fresh debts against that very security. He may encumber the same security by charging it in one form or another with fresh debts. ( 36 ) IT has been argued that our social experience shows that such debtors even after they are statutorily discharged from their debts go on incurring fresh debts and the Legislature goes on passing new laws to discharge them again and again from their indebtedness. ( 37 ) IN order to relieve the agriculturists of their debts it has been pointed out to us that Bombay Provincial Legislature first enacted Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act 1939 Thereafter it enacted Bombay Agri- cultural Debtors Relief Act 1947 and has now enacted the impugned Act. We are not referring to the Deccan Agricultural Relief Act 1879 which was enacted during the last century. The argument which has been advanced on behalf of the money-lenders is not without any substance. In the first instance what a money-lender gets in a case in which there is an order to pay him the scaled down debt is a very small amount of his debt and the repayability of that small amount has been spread over at least a period of ten years. Thirdly sub-sec. (2) of sec. 14 renders the repayability of such a sealed down amount spread over such a long period of time very uncertain and insecure. If the Legislature has thought fit that at least in some cases a part of the debt should be repaid by the debtor to his creditor that part at least must remain secured until it is repaid. To deprive a small money-lender of his cover of protection after telling him that he is entitled to recover some amount from his debtor is in our opinion no reasonable restriction within the meaning of Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. If the security remains with the money-lender he cannot do anything with it because sub-sec. (1) of sec. 14 requires him not to damage dest- roy or tamper with it. If the security remains with the money-lender he cannot do anything with it because sub-sec. (1) of sec. 14 requires him not to damage dest- roy or tamper with it. therefore in our opnion it is more reasonable to think that the security given by a debtor to his creditor should remain intact in the hands of his creditor until the debtor pays up his scaled down debt. To hold otherwise is to render the adjudicated debt of the creditor insecure and to expose him for all intents and purposes to the danger of losing it over a period of time during which it has been made repayable in instalments. ( 38 ) THE learned Advocate-General who appears on behalf of the State of Gujarat has argued that the maximum sum of Rs. 1 400 which a creditor may get in a given case is too small an amount to warrant the retention of security in the hands of the creditor. The argument which the learned Advocate-General has raised is not a sound argument. The question is not whether the amount which a debtor who is required to pay his creditor after the amount of his debt has been scaled down is small or big. The question is whether to release and return the security forthwith to the creditor in such a case is reasonable when the Legisla- ture has thought that the creditor at least should get some amount from his debtor (indeed in a case where the debt has been scaled down and not discharged ). Whether an amount is small or big is a relative question. What small amount is to a petty and helpless money-lender may not be so to an affluent or rich money-lender. To a petty or helpless money-len- der who has a few thousands of rupees upon the usufruct of which he lives it is the only sustaining force of his life. We shall revert to this aspect later when we deal with the challenge against the impugned provi- sions under sec. 14. ( 39 ) THE learned Advocate-General has advanced two more arguments in support of the validity of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 14. We shall revert to this aspect later when we deal with the challenge against the impugned provi- sions under sec. 14. ( 39 ) THE learned Advocate-General has advanced two more arguments in support of the validity of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 14. The first argument raised by him is that a security which is given for a larger amount can- not be retained with the creditor for a smaller amount to which the ori- ginal debt on being scaled down is reduced. This is not a very sound argument. If the Legislature had provided that the creditor shall return security to the debtor forthwith but that that security shall remain sta- tutorily charged with the payment of the scaled down debt very probably no objection could have been raised to that provision. In the instant case what the Legislature has done is to release the security from the cre- ditor and to return it forthwith to the debtor. Indeed for a smaller amo- unt a smaller or less valuable security will serve the purpose. However in the instant case no provision has been made for a smaller security or even for charging the original security after it is returned to the debtor with a scaled down debt. We are therefore unable to uphold the argument raised by the learned Advocate-General that sub-sec. (2) of sec. 14 imposes a reasonable restriction on the right to hold property and to carry on business. ( 40 ) THE next argument which he has raised is that a small farmer and a rural artisan who belongs to the higher income-group are more affluent than others. According to him it is an account of this reason that they are required in certain cases to pay the scaled down debt. It cannot be gainsaid that a small farmer or a rural artisan belonging to a higher income-group is far better off than a marginal farmer or rural artisan belonging to the lower income-group. But that is not the test for deciding whether sub-sec. (2) of sec. 14 is constitutionally valid. The test lies in the creditworthiness of a small farmer or a rural artisan belo- nging to the higher income group. If he was a creditworthy person he could have borrowed the amount as an unsecured loan. But that is not the test for deciding whether sub-sec. (2) of sec. 14 is constitutionally valid. The test lies in the creditworthiness of a small farmer or a rural artisan belo- nging to the higher income group. If he was a creditworthy person he could have borrowed the amount as an unsecured loan. The very fact that he was required to give security for borrowing the amount clearly shows that he did not have personal creditworthiness. This uncreditwo- rthiness coupled with the uncertainty of repayment spread over a period of ten years or more requires reasonably that the security which he gave for borrowing a loan from his creditor should be retained with the cre- ditor until he has repaid the scaled down debt. As an off-shoot of this argument the learned Advocate-General has tried to reason that no debt who has been adjudged to pay its scaled down debt is required to pay more than Rs. 140. 00 a year. According to him therefore it cannot be imagi- ned that a small farmer and a rural artisan belonging to the higher income group will not be worth the amount of Rs. 140. 00 a year. The argument which the learned Advocate-General has raised is more eloq- uent in an air conditioned Court-room than in the social life of this country. Once a debtor knows that law has been made discharging him from debt partially or fully and returning the security to him without any charge thereon in respect of the loan which he borrowed he is likely to deal with the security in any manner he likes. Is there any guaran- tee that he will not borrow fresh loans on that security ? If he borrows fresh loans and creates fresh indebtedness again recovery of scaled down debt will again step into serious jeopardy. We have not been shown any provision either in the impugned Act or in any other law which prevents a debtor from incurring fresh debts and falling into indebtedness again. . ( 41 ) THE two arguments which the learned Advocate-General has rai- sed are therefore in our opinion unsound and cannot be upheld. ( 42 ) SO far as the full or partial discharge of the debt without com- pensation is concerned it is necessary to bear in mind sec. 24 of the impugned Act. It reads. . ( 41 ) THE two arguments which the learned Advocate-General has rai- sed are therefore in our opinion unsound and cannot be upheld. ( 42 ) SO far as the full or partial discharge of the debt without com- pensation is concerned it is necessary to bear in mind sec. 24 of the impugned Act. It reads. It is hereby declared that the provisions of this Act are for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in Article 46 of the Constitution. Art. 46 which finds place amongst the Directive Principles of State Policy provides are follows : the State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people and in particular of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. It is well settled that norms of reasonable restraint upon a fundamental right can be directly inferred or declared from the directive principle of the State policy. The impugned Act has been enacted in order to implement directive principle of State policy enshrined in Art. 46. Secon- dly the recent statistics show that 48. 13% of people in this country are living below poverty line. Thirdly it has been held by the Supreme Court to Fatehchands case (supra) that such a law is a regulatory measure of relief of indebtedness. Amelioratory measures taken by the Legislature in order to make social-economic scene more contentive just and orderly is reasonable. The policy which the Legislature lays down in such a law cannot be struck down as perverse by the Court. Realism in the Legis- lature is a component of reasonableness. It has also been stated that it is not valid to attack such a law on the ground that it deprives the money-lender of the very capital of his business. Existing debts of some classes of indigents alone have been liquidated. If impossible burdens on the debtors are not lifted social orderliness may be threatened. Disorder may break out if the law does not step in to grant some relief. Even trade will not flourish where social orderliness is not secured. The Supreme Court has therefore held that for the purpose of Art. 301 restrictions placed by the Maharashtra Debt Relief Act 1975 are reasonable. Disorder may break out if the law does not step in to grant some relief. Even trade will not flourish where social orderliness is not secured. The Supreme Court has therefore held that for the purpose of Art. 301 restrictions placed by the Maharashtra Debt Relief Act 1975 are reasonable. The standards of reasonableness for the purpose of Art. 301 are not different from the standards of reasonableness under Arts. 19 (1) (f) and (g ). Therefore except a part of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 14 of the impugned Act which we are striking down we must hold that the impugned law imposes reasonable restriction within the meaning of Arts. 19 (1) (f) and 19 (1) (g) upon a citizens right to bold property and to carry on his business. ( 43 ) WE may usefully refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Pathummas crse (supra ). A slightly similar provision in Kerala Agricultu- rists Debt Relief Act 1970 has been held by the Supreme Court to be valid. A perusal of the report of the decision shows that sec. 20 of the Kerala Act inter alia provides that the property of an agriculturist which was sold to the creditor to satisfy the decretal debt shall be ordered to be returned to him (debtor) on his depositing in Court half the amount and the costs of execution and that the balance of the decretal debt shall be payable in ten equal half yearly instalments. So far as the directive principle laid down in Art. 46 is concerned if the land which the debtor has given to the creditor as security is statutorily charged with the pay- ment of the scaled down debt after it is returned to the debtor by the creditor and if the debtor is statutorily prevented from alienating it or encumbering it with fresh debts it shall not be defeated. On the contr- ary while ensuring the repayment of the scaled down debt it will make the peasantry more prosperous and free from debts. We find no such provision in the impugned Act. ( 44 ) SOME of the interveners in particular Mr. P. N. Dave and Mr. A. K. Mankad have challenged the material provisions of the impugned Act under Art. 14 of the Constitution. Mr. Mankad has raised three contentions in none of which we find any substance. We find no such provision in the impugned Act. ( 44 ) SOME of the interveners in particular Mr. P. N. Dave and Mr. A. K. Mankad have challenged the material provisions of the impugned Act under Art. 14 of the Constitution. Mr. Mankad has raised three contentions in none of which we find any substance. The first contention which he has raised is that the provisions of the impugned Act are discriminating between the mortgagees of the debtors under the impugned Act and the mortgagees of those who are not the debtors under the impugned Act. This is a very unsound argument. The debtors under the provisions of the impugned Act comprising four categories are constituted into a class by itself and it is that class which is sought to be relieved of its indebtedness. They are poor rural agriculturists or poor persons living in the rural areas of the State. A person who is not a debtor under the Act cannot be compared with a person who is a debtor under the Act. Therefore the classification which the inpung- ned Act makes is rational and does not suffer from any element of hostility. ( 45 ) THE second contention which has been raised by Mr. Mankad is that sec. 27 saves the debts due to the Government local authorities and other corporate bodies. To the extent to which sec. 27 exempts certain institutional debts from the operation of the impugned Act introduces in the opinion of Mr. Mankad an element of hostile discrimination bet- ween non-institutional creditors and institutional creditors. The argument which Mr. Mankad has raised is not well-founded. It has been observed by the Supreme Court in Pathummas case (supra) that the institutional credit ordinarily does not carry with it the element of exploitation or any other undesirable element. In that view of the matter institutional credi- tors can be classified in one category and can be distinguished from non-institutional creditors who are grouped by the impugned Act into another category with respect to which the impugned Act has been made. ( 46 ) THE last argument which Mr. Mankad has raised is that sec. 13 confers upon the Appellate Authority only limited power in regard to appeals. According to him it confers upon the Appellate Officer jurisdi- ction only to confirm or modify the award and not to annul or reverse it. ( 46 ) THE last argument which Mr. Mankad has raised is that sec. 13 confers upon the Appellate Authority only limited power in regard to appeals. According to him it confers upon the Appellate Officer jurisdi- ction only to confirm or modify the award and not to annul or reverse it. This argument raised by Mr. Mankad is unsound. Power to modify an order includes the power to set aside or annul the order if it is not in accordance with law We therefore find that whereas the third argument raised by Mr. Mankad is not sustainable the first two arguments raised by him suffer from inherent fallacy. The Legislature wants to protect weaker sections of our society against exploitation by non-institutional creditors who behave in such manner as they think fit. The impugned provisions of the Act have therefore reasonable nexus with the object of relieving weaker sections of our society from the clutches of non- institutional creditors which the impugned Act seeks to achieve. ( 47 ) MR. Dave has argued that the impugned Act does not satisfy the test of rationality under Art. 14. He has argued that it is wrong to club all money-lenders together and to treat them with one yard-stick. He did not have any sympathy for big money-lenders or unscrupulous money-lenders but he indeed shed tears for three types of money-lenders which he illustrated before us: (i) Widows who are otherwise helpless in life and who have none to maintain living upon the usufruct of a small capital of a few thousand rupees which they advance to petty debtors. (ii) Small money-lenders who are otherwise helpless in life and who can live only upon the usufruct of a small capital which they have. We are assuming in both these cases that such money-lenders have no other source of income and are unable to do anything else in life situated as they may be in life. (iii) Small money-lenders who borrow capital from others at a lower rate of interest and who advance at a slightly higher rate they live upon the difference between the interest which they pay to their lenders and the interest which they recover from their debtors. We are assuming for the purpose of the illustration that these three classes of money-lenders do not have an element of exploitation in their money- lending activities. Mr. We are assuming for the purpose of the illustration that these three classes of money-lenders do not have an element of exploitation in their money- lending activities. Mr. Dave has argued that the effect of the impugned Act is to discharge the debts of the debtors of such money-lenders with the resultant deprivation of small capital which such money-lenders have. According to him it ruins such money-lenders. Before we proceed to examine the argument raised by Mr. Dave it is necessary to note that such an argument was advanced before the Supreme Court in Fatehchands case (supra ). It appears that the argument relating to money-lenders who borrow moneys from others and lend to the debtors has been negatived by the Supreme Court. ( 48 ) IT is necessary to rote that in a society in which we are living such elements are not a few only are not rare or exceptional. We have amidst us widows who live on the usufruct of small capital which they advance to others and who have no other source of income and who have none else to maintain them Similarly we have amidst us a large number of small money-lenders who advance their small capital to others and live on the usufruct of that capital. The effect of the impug- ned Act is that the advances made by them to the debtors are wiped off with the result that they lose all their capital and means of subsis- tence. They are reduced to starvation. We say so because we deal with a class of money-lenders who are not able to do anything else in life and who are otherwise helpless. The fate of a small money-lender who borrows moneys from one and advances to a debtor is not different. The advances made by him are wiped off while he smarts under an irrevoca- ble obligation to pay to his creditors the moneys which he has borrowed. Can it be said that a law which does not deal with and discriminate in favour of such money-lenders is a rational piece of legislation ? ( 49 ) THE history of our society shows that those who are relieved of their debts statutorily go on incurring fresh debts. We have stated in an earlier part of this judgment that three such enactments have come to be enacted within a period of forty years. ( 49 ) THE history of our society shows that those who are relieved of their debts statutorily go on incurring fresh debts. We have stated in an earlier part of this judgment that three such enactments have come to be enacted within a period of forty years. It appears that therefore so far as debtors are concerned the statutory discharge of his debts furnishes him a fresh opportunity to incur fresh debts. So far as such money-lenders are concerned total ruin or destruction is spelt for their life-time. They are helpless to do anything else. Once they are deprived of their capital they live only to die. The result of enacting a law which does not take care of such money-lenders is that whereas on one hand it does not confer upon the debtors an ever-lasting immunity from indebtedness or open for them a perpetual source of prosperity it redu- ces to penury and starvation such money-lenders for their life-time. In other words they are starved to death. Left to ourselves it is difficult for us to say that a piece of legislation which does not make a distinc- tion between such money-lenders and other money-lenders is a rational piece of legislation. If our hearts bleed for one poor they must bleed for another poor as well. As between two poor persons cause of poverty is not at all material. No Saw has ever tried to trace the cause of poverty while granting relief from indebtedness. In a society it is the poverty which pinches and not its cause. To reduce or to remove the impact of indebtedness on one until he starts reeling under fresh indebtedness and to create life-long penury and destitution for another is distribution of poverty and not relief against exploitation or a measure for social and economic amelioration. Social welfare means creation of new sources of income opening new avenues for useful economic activity and transfor- mation of the face of the country while allowing those who are prospe- rous and well-off to retain their moderate prosperity. Social welfare requires persons to be levelled up and not down. Our people want that two unequal lines should not be made equal by cutting down the exce- ssive length of one but that they should be made equal by extending to the full length the line which has short length. Social welfare requires persons to be levelled up and not down. Our people want that two unequal lines should not be made equal by cutting down the exce- ssive length of one but that they should be made equal by extending to the full length the line which has short length. We scan different legisla- tions and find in dispair that we have no solution for Indias grinding poverty. We have only a latch-key to unlock poverty for all. This is nei- ther equity justice or fair play which underlie our Constitution nor imple- mentation of the directive principle of State policy laid down in Art. 46. A law relating to relief of indebtedness can stand the test of rationality if it discharges the debts of debtors and compensates at least such money- lenders out of public funds or State Treasury. To deprive a widow of his only source of livelihood in life without creating a corresponding source of income for her is not a social welfare measure. To grant a momentary or temporary relief to a debtor while creating a State of starvation or a state of perpetual penury for a widow money-lender can hardly be said to be the implementation of the directive principle of State policy enshrined in Art. 46. While legislating upon relief of indebtedness the legislature should not create fresh pockets of poverty and misery. In our opinion therefore a rational law on relief of indebtedness must on one hand dis- charge the debtors of their debts create fresh or new sources of adequate income for them so that they do not incur fresh debts and on the other hand compensate or create sources of income for helpless small money- lenders who have been denuded of their life savings. We have not the slightest hesitation in saying that whereas the impugned law grants relief to debtors of their indebtedness until they incur fresh debts it opens an eternal channel of misery and poverty for small money-lenders. Unequal money-lenders have been steamrolled into equality producing poverty and penury amongst the petty and helpless out of them. We have not the slightest hesitation in saying that whereas the impugned law grants relief to debtors of their indebtedness until they incur fresh debts it opens an eternal channel of misery and poverty for small money-lenders. Unequal money-lenders have been steamrolled into equality producing poverty and penury amongst the petty and helpless out of them. ( 50 ) HOWEVER we do not propose to strike down the impugned law on this ground because we are aware of the fact that norms of reasonableness under Art. 19 (1) (f) as well as under Art. 301 are not qualitatively diff- erent from the norms of rationality which Art. 14 requires to be satisfied. Since the Supreme Court has in Fatehchands case (supra) held the Maha- rashtra Debt Relief Act 1976 reasonable we not only hold that it is reasonable but also hold that it is rational. We therefore turn down the constitutional challenge raised by the interveners under Art. 14 of the Constitution. ( 51 ) SINCE we have examined the constitutional validity of the impugned Act under Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 31 the question whether Forty-second Amendment is ultra vires Art. 368 or not does not arise. ( 52 ) SINCE we have examined the constitutional challenge under Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 31 to sec. 14 of the Act the fourth contention raised by Mr. Oza also does not survive. The fourth contention raised by him is that sec. 14 is not protected by Forty-fourth constitutional Amendment by which Art. 19 (1) (f) has been deleted. If it is held that it is saved by Forty-fourth constitutional amendment Forty-fourth Amendment is ultra vires Art. 368. This contention in view of what we have stated above does not survive and is therefore rejected. ( 53 ) THE fifth contention which Mr. Oza has raised is that sec. 14 violates Art. 300a. It is difficult to imagine how constitutional challenge under Art. 300a can be raised. It is a very simple Article which can hardly be pressed into service for challenging any statute. It provides as under : No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. It affords constitutional protection to a light to property which a statute recognizes. If a statute does not recognize a right to property Art. 300a cannot be invoked. It provides as under : No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. It affords constitutional protection to a light to property which a statute recognizes. If a statute does not recognize a right to property Art. 300a cannot be invoked. Much less therefore any provision of the impugned Act can be challenged under Art. 300a. The fifth contention raised by Mr. Oza therefore is without any substance and is rejected. ( 54 ) THE next contention which Mr. Oza has raised is that sec. 14 upon its true interpretation is confined to properties which are agricultural lands and does not extend to other types of immovable property. The relevance of this argument lies in the discharge of secured debts-debts secured by mortgaging immovable properties or by charging them with it. In that context it has also been argued that sec. 14 (2) does not come into play where a land which has been given by a debtor in security to his creditor has as for example been built upon by the creditor with the consent of the debtor. ( 55 ) LET us now turn to sec. 14. We have reproduced it in the for- egoing parts of this judgment. Sub-sec. (1) which uses the expression any property certainly refers to movable as well as immovable property because that expression is used in juxtaposition with the expression pledged or mortgaged. If it covers an immovable property which is pledged by a debtor with his creditor there is no reason to believe why an immovable property which has been mortgaged by a debtor to his creditor should encompass only agricultural land and no other property. To say that sub- sec. (1) deals with movable property and only agricultural immovable property is to read it in a truncated manner. The expression property in the context in which it has been used is wide enough to bring within its sweep all sorts of properties movable and immovable agricultural and non-agricultural. It is that very property which is referred to in sub-sec. (2) and has been described as security. We may refer to the definition of the debt given in sec. 2 (c ). It is defined as any liability due from a debtor in cash or in kind whether secured or unsecured. It is that very property which is referred to in sub-sec. (2) and has been described as security. We may refer to the definition of the debt given in sec. 2 (c ). It is defined as any liability due from a debtor in cash or in kind whether secured or unsecured. There is little justification for holding that a secured debt which is referred to in sec. 2 (c) means debt secured only by an encumbrance upon agric- ultural lands. We are therefore not impressed by the contention raised by Mr. Oza that sec. 14 has no application to cases where debts have been secured by mortgaging non-agricultural immovable properties or charging them with it. In our opinion it embraces within its sweep all properties movable or immovable agricultural or non-agricultural which have been charged by the debtors with repayment of moneys which they borrowed from their creditors. ( 56 ) SO far as the second part of the argument is concerned it is again divisible in two parts. The learned Advocate-General who appears on behalf of the State has also drawn that distinction. Immovable pro- perties whose character has been transformed by the creditor with the con- sent of his debtor recorded in the transaction of secured loan itself. The second class consists of immovable properties whose character has been transformed by the creditor with the consent of the debtor recorded in a transaction subsequent to the transaction of secured loan. ( 57 ) WHAT happens to such properties when the debt of a debtor is statutorily discharged or scaled down? In our opinion the use of the expression security for such debt used in sub-sec. (2) refers to security which the debtor gave to his creditor and not to the secutity which has been transformed by the creditor with tale consent of his debtor. ( 58 ) WE may state that such a question is not likely to arise in case of movable properties unless the creditor has sold them away or done away with them before the appointed day. In such a case remedy is provided by sec. 16 of the impugned Act. In case of immovable proper- ties such a situation is likely to arise more often than not. In such a case remedy is provided by sec. 16 of the impugned Act. In case of immovable proper- ties such a situation is likely to arise more often than not. If a creditor has transformed the character of immovable property given to him as sec- urity with the consent of his debtor given at any time before the appointed day it is not returnable within the meaning of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 14 to the debtor unless such return causes no loss to the creditor. We now illustrate the proposition which we have stated. If a creditor has built with the consent of the debtor a building upon the land which a debtor has mortgaged to him that property is not returnable to the debtor under sec. 14 (2) upon the statutory discharge of the debtors debt. The only remedy which the debtor has is to ask the Debt Settlement Officer to fix the value of the property under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 16 and to direct the creditor to pay it to him. Return of such a property to the debtor is likely to cause heavy loss to the creditor without any fault on his part However if the creditor has dealt with the immovable pro- perty and constructed a building thereon without the consent of his debtor he cannot take advantage of his own fault and subject the debtor to a disability without any fault on the part of the debtor. In such a case the creditor is bound to return the property to his debtor. In such a case so far as the building is concerned the creditors rights to it shall be gove- ned the ordinary law of the land. He may either remove it and take it away or allow it to go to his debtor. The learned Advocate-General very rightly submitted to us in this context that what the impugned Act exti- nguishes is a debt and does not extinguish any other contract between the parties. An agreement between the parties simultaneously arrived at under which the creditor deals with the properly and builds upon it is an agreement which is not affected by the provisions of the impugned Act. Therefore though the debt for which the security was given by a debtor to his creditor is extinguished the other terms of the transaction must operate and can be enforced. Therefore though the debt for which the security was given by a debtor to his creditor is extinguished the other terms of the transaction must operate and can be enforced. In other words where a creditor has dealt with the property given to him in security with the consent of his debtor that property must be dealt with in terms of the agreement arrived at between the parties in that behalf except in respect of debt which has been statutorily extinguished by the impugned Act. Sec. 16 (1) provides for one of the remedies in such a situation. It is open to the parties to work out any other arrangement in respect of such a property which they may think fit or arrive at a fresh agreement in that behalf. ( 59 ) MISS V. P. Shah who appears on behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2 has argued that with the extinguishment of debt the other terms of the transaction in relation to a secured debt are also extinguished. In other words if a debtor borrowed the debt upon the security of an im- movable property and parted possession with that property to his creditor and permitted his creditor to build upon it then all those terms of tran- sactions are also extinguished. We are unable to uphold the contention which Miss Shah has raised in that behalf. The submission made by the learned Advocate-General in this behalf is eminently justified and is upheld. ( 60 ) WE therefore reject the first part of the sixth contention raised by Mr. Oza and uphold the latter part of it. . ( 61 ) THE next contention which Mr. Oza has raised is that neither on the date when respondents Nos. 1 and 2 made an application for adjust- ment of their debt nor on the date of the decision of the Debt Settlement Officer respondents No. 1 and 2 were marginal farmers or small farmers. According to him therefore their application was not maintainable. This contention is ex facie unsustainable. Whether a person is a small farmer or a marginal farmer has to be decided with reference to the appointed day as laid down in sec. 3 (1 ). The expression appointed day has been defined in sec. 2 (b) so as to mean the date on which the impugned Act come into force. It is 15th of August 1976. Whether a person is a small farmer or a marginal farmer has to be decided with reference to the appointed day as laid down in sec. 3 (1 ). The expression appointed day has been defined in sec. 2 (b) so as to mean the date on which the impugned Act come into force. It is 15th of August 1976. There is no doubt or dispute about the fact that on 15/08/1976 respondents No. 1 and 2 were either small or marginal farmers. Therefore they were entitled to make the present application. We therefore reject the conten- tion raised by Mr. Oza in this behalf. ( 62 ) THE next contention which he has raised is that the transaction between the petitioner on one hand and respondents No. 1 and 2 on the other hand by virtue of which respondents No. 1 and 2 became the peti- tioners debtors was a transaction of usufructuary mortgage. According to him therefore respondent No. 1 and 2 had no personal liability to pay the debt. Proceeding further he has argued that they were therefore not debtors within the meaning of the expression debtor given in the impugned Act. It is true that under Transfer of Property Act in case of a usufructuary mortgage the debt attaches to the security and not to the debtor personally. However we cannot decide this contention with refere- nce to the provisions of Transfer of Property Act. We have got to decide this contention with reference to the provisions of the impugned Act. The definition of debt given in sec. 2 (c) and the definition of debtor given in sec. 2 (d) read with the definitions of marginal farmer in sec. 2 rural artisan in sec. 2 (1) rural labourer in sec. 2 (m) and small farmer in sec. 2 (p) as well as sec. 14 leave no doubt in our minds that even a usufructuary mortgage is affected by the impugned pro- visions of law. If we take a different view then provisions of sec. 14 would be rendered partially nugatory. If a usufructuary mortgagor is not in a position to make an application for discharge of his debts and for return of his property then he will be denied the benefit of sec. 14 which expressly requires a creditor to return the property to the debtor upon the discharge of his debts. 14 would be rendered partially nugatory. If a usufructuary mortgagor is not in a position to make an application for discharge of his debts and for return of his property then he will be denied the benefit of sec. 14 which expressly requires a creditor to return the property to the debtor upon the discharge of his debts. We therefore find no substance in the conte- ntion which Mr. Oza has raised. It is necessary to remember that Acts such as Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 and the im- pugned Act are innovations upon the Transfer of Property Act which was enacted during the last century and supplant and supplement many of its provisions. The contention raised by Mr. Oza in that behalf therefore is rejected. ( 63 ) THE last contention which Mr. Oza has raised is that the land in question is not situate in a rural area. According to him therefore the impugned Act did not apply to it. Rural area has been defined by sec. 2 (k) in the following terms : rural area means an area which for the time being is not within the limits of- (i) a city constituted under sec. 3 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Cor- porations Act 1949 as in force in the State of Gujarat; (ii) a municipal borough or a notified area constituted or deemed to be cons- tituted under the Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963 (iii) a cantonment declared as such under the Cantonments Act 1924 Vijapur within the limits of which the land in question is situated has not been shown to be governed by the Gujarat Municipalities Act. It is governed by Gujarat Panchayats Act. Therefore it is a rural area. ( 64 ) THE concept of rural area applies to a rural artisan and a rural labourer. It does Dot apply to a marginal farmer of a small farmer. Definitions of marginal farmer given in sec. 2 (g) and small farmer given in sec. 2 (p) make it abundantly clear and there is no doubt or dispute about the fact that respondents No. 1 and 2 were either small farmers or marginal farmers. Therefore whether the land in question is situate in a rural area or not is not material. 2 (g) and small farmer given in sec. 2 (p) make it abundantly clear and there is no doubt or dispute about the fact that respondents No. 1 and 2 were either small farmers or marginal farmers. Therefore whether the land in question is situate in a rural area or not is not material. It may be stated that the impugned Act applies to marginal farmers and small farmers holding land in any of the villages specified in Column 3 of the Schedule and not exceeding the area specified against them. The Schedule to the Act shows that Vijapur is a Taluka. In the first part 22 villages of Vijapur Taluka have been specified. It does not specify Vijapur itself as a village. In the second part all other villages have been stated. If Vijapur is a village it falls under the residuary category described by the expression all other villages. The question therefore is whether Vijapur is a village. Village has been defined by sec. 2 (r) in the following terms : village shall have the meaning assigned to it in the Bombay Land Revenue Code 1879 as in force in the state of Gujarat. Sec. 3 (21) of the Bombay Land Revenue Code 1879 defines village in the following terms : village includes a town or city and all the land belonging to a village tow or city. The definition of the expression village is so wide that surprisingly it will include with its ambit even the city of Ahmedabad as well with lands situated within the revenue limits of Ahmedabad city. The last contention raised by Mr. Oza is therefore without any substance and is rejected. ( 65 ) IN view of the findings which we have recorded upon the third contention raised by Mr. Oza and the interveners we declare that the expression or an order reducing his debt is made used in sec. 14 (2) is ultra vires Art. 19 (1) (f) and sec. 19 (1) (g) and is struck down. We declare accordingly. This expression is ex-facie severable from the rest of the section. We therefore do not see any need to state the reasons in support of its severability. We issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents from enforcing the offending part of sec. 14 (2) which we have struck down. 19 (1) (g) and is struck down. We declare accordingly. This expression is ex-facie severable from the rest of the section. We therefore do not see any need to state the reasons in support of its severability. We issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents from enforcing the offending part of sec. 14 (2) which we have struck down. In the instant case respondents No. 1 and 2 have been fully discharged from their debt. It is not in dispute that the peti- tioner has built a building upon the land in question with the consent of respondents No. 1 and 2. It is therefore not returnable to respondents No. 1 and 2 under sec. 14 (2 ). We therefore issue a writ of certiorari and quash that part of the impugned award which directs the petitioner to return to respondents No. 1 and 2 the land in question and remand the case to the Debt Settlement Officer Vijapur for granting relief to respo- ndents No. 1 and 2 under sec. 16 (1) of the impugned Act. We may state that sec. 16 (1) expressly requires the Debt Settlement Officer to fix the value of the property-in this case land as it was when it was mortgaged to the petitioner. After having determined the value of the land in question the Debt Settlement Officer shall direct the petitioner to pay the amount to respondents No. 1 and 2. It is needless for us to say that the parties shall be at liberty to arrive at any other arrangement in respect of the land in question. If they do so the Debt Settlement Officer shall not fix the value of the land in question and close the case. Rule is made partly absolute with no order as to costs. ( 66 ) MR. J. R. Nanavaty who appears on behalf of the State of Gujarat-respondent No. 4-applies for certificate of fitness under Art. 133 (1) of the Constitution in order to enable the State of Gujarat to appeal against this decision to the Supreme Court. Mr. N. R. Oza who appears on behalf of the petitioner applies for certificate of fitness under Art. 133 (1) to enable the petitioner to appeal against this decision to the Supreme Court. We have not recorded the final decision in this case. We have remanded the case to the Debt Settlement Officer. Mr. N. R. Oza who appears on behalf of the petitioner applies for certificate of fitness under Art. 133 (1) to enable the petitioner to appeal against this decision to the Supreme Court. We have not recorded the final decision in this case. We have remanded the case to the Debt Settlement Officer. Therefore there is no final order in this case. The terms of Art. 133 (1) are there- fore not satisfied. Therefore though we have decided substantial questions of law in this case we have no jurisdiction to grant certificate of fitness under Art. 133 (1 ). Oral applications made on behalf of both the parties are therefore rejected. ( 67 ) ON behalf of the State of Gujarat the learned Advocate-General markes an oral application for issuing certificate of fitness under Art. 132 in order to enable the State of Gujarat to appeal against this decision to the Supreme Court. Firstly we have not recorded any final order in this judgment. Secondly we have not effectively interpreted any provision of the Constitution. We have applied the principle laid down by the Supreme Court to the provisions of the impugned Act. Since we have not recorded any final order and since no constitutional provision has been affectively interpreted by us. We reject the oral application made by the learned Advocate-General. ( 68 ) ON behalf of the State of Gujarat the learned Advocate-General applies for stay for some time of the implementation and operation of our order. In our opinion there is nothing which requires to be stayed. The only material conclusions which we have recorded against the State of Gujarat are that a part of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 14 of the impugned Act is ultra vires Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art 19 (i) (g) and that we have inte- rpreted sec. 14 (2 ). So far as the interpretation of sec 14 (2) is concerned we have upheld the arguments which the learned Advocate-General has advanced before us. It is therefore not a conclusion recorded really against the State of Gujarat. So far as the declaration made by us that sub-sec. (2) of sec. 14 (2 ). So far as the interpretation of sec 14 (2) is concerned we have upheld the arguments which the learned Advocate-General has advanced before us. It is therefore not a conclusion recorded really against the State of Gujarat. So far as the declaration made by us that sub-sec. (2) of sec. 14 in so far as it requires a creditor to return forth- with the property to the debtor even though the debtor has been found under the Act to be liable to pay some amount to the creditor is conce- rned balance of convenience requires that we should not stay that part of our judgment. If we do so in spite of the fact that we have declared that part of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 14 ultra vires Debt-Settlement Officers will go on directing the creditors to return the securities to the debtors. Now pending the decision of the Supreme Court it is in public interest that the security should remain with the creditor because if the security is returned to the debtor he may transfer alienate or otherwise deal with it or may encumber or charge it with fresh debts. In such a case even if the Supreme Court upholds our decision and a creditor is found entitled to retain the security until the scaled down debt is discharged he will lose the security and in all probability the scaled down debt also. If on the other hand the security remains with the creditor it will be safe for being returned ultimately to the debtor when the debt is discharged because under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 14 he cannot damage it tamper with it or deal with it. Therefore purely on balance of convenience we reject the oral request made by the learned Advocate-General in that behalf. .