Judgment K. B. N. Singh C.J. The petitioner in this writ application prays for quashing the order dt. 1.3.76 passed by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector that of the Collector dated 5.7.76 and the Member, Board of Revenue dated 29.5.58 (Annexure 1, 2 and 3 respectively) by which his application for preemption has been rejected. 2. The relevant facts for disposal of this writ application lie in a narrow compass. On 17.8.74. Lalmohan Pd. (respondent no 5) transferred 25 decimal of plot no. 108, khata no. 626 of village Mirchaibari, in the district of Katihar, for Rs.2000/- In 'favour of Smt Saryug Devi (respondent no 4) and registered a sale deed on the same day. There is nos dispute that the registered sale deed was copied under sections 60 and 61 of the Indian Registration Act, on 16.10.74 In Book no. 4 maintained under the Registration Act. Before this date on 7.10.74 respondent no. 4 purchased from respondent no. 5 some land adjoining east of the disputed land out of the said plot no 108 of Khata no. 626 belonging to respondent no. 5. On 5.11.74 the present petitioner, claiming to be an adjoining raiyat to the east of the disputed land, filed an application for pre-emption under section 16 (3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of surplus land Act. 1961) after complying with all the necessary requirements as laid down under that section and the rules framed under to said Act, of 1961. After this date (5.11.74), that is on 23.11 74 the second sale deed dated 7.10.74 executed by respondent no. 5 was copied in Book no.4 of the Registration office. There is no dispute before us that the husband of respondent no. 4 has purchased a large area of land towards the south of the disputed area by a registered sale deed dated 2.12.72 much earlier than the disputed purchase In question which is towards the south of the disputed land. Respondent no. 4 filed an objection to the pre-emption application before the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, who, after hearing the parties, by order dated 1.3.76 [Annexure-1) rejected the pre-emption application, holding that Ganpat Pd. Das, husband of respondent no.4 Saryug Devi had really purchased the disputed land benami in the name of his wife, out of fear or his brothers. He further held that Ganpat Pd. Das, husband of respondent no.4 Saryug Devi had really purchased the disputed land benami in the name of his wife, out of fear or his brothers. He further held that Ganpat Pd. Das was an adjoining raiyat of the land from southern side since his purchase in the year 1972, and the petitioner had no right of pre-emption. An appeal preferred by the petitioner before the Collector was also dismissed on 5.7.76 [Annexure 2] and his revision application filed before the Member, Board or Revenue, was also rejected by order dt. 29.5.78 [Annexure 3). Thereafter the present writ application has been filed. 3. Though this writ application was admitted by the Division Bench, after the change in the High court Rules It was placed for bearing before a single Judge, who referred the matter to Division Bench, and that is how the matter is again before a Division Bench. 4. Mr. S.B. Sanyal, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has urged that the right of pre-emption of a co-sharer or an adjoining raiyat can only be defeated by acquisition of status of a co-sharer or a raiyat by completed sale which will mean not only execution of the sale deed and acknowledgement of execution before the Registrar but complete registration under sections 60 and 61 of the Registration Act, (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" that is to say, after the document has been copied out in the relevant register maintained by the Registration department. He has submitted that the advantage of section 47 of the Act, accrues only between vendor and vendee and section 47 has no application so far as a third party is concerned in as much as the third party cannot be said to have knowledge as to whether the document Is actually registered as contemplated under sections 60 and 61 of the Act. Reliance in this regard has been placed on a decision of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in the case of Nabir Ganai Versus. Mohd. Ismail Ganai and others (A.I.R.1960 Jammu and Kashmir 112) 5. As already mentioned, the pre-emption application was filed on 5.11.74. In support of his submission Mr. Sanyal has emphasised that respondent no. Reliance in this regard has been placed on a decision of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in the case of Nabir Ganai Versus. Mohd. Ismail Ganai and others (A.I.R.1960 Jammu and Kashmir 112) 5. As already mentioned, the pre-emption application was filed on 5.11.74. In support of his submission Mr. Sanyal has emphasised that respondent no. 4 no doubt purchased a portion or plot no.108, which was contiguous east of the disputed land, by a sale deed dated 7.10.74 but this sale deed was actually registered on 23.11.74 as required under sections 60 and 61 of the Act. Before the registration of the document the petitioner on 7.11.74 filed an application for pre-emption under section 16 (3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus land) Act. Therefore, it is submitted that on the date of the pre-emption application respondent no, 4 had not become the adjoining raiyat or co-sharer of the disputed land so as to defeat the petitioner's claim for pre-emption" and as such, the petitioner could take advantage or section 47 of the Act. In support of his contention reliance has been placed on a Bench decision of this court in the case of Tilakdhari Singh Vs. Gaur Narain and two decisions of the Supreme court in the 'cases of Ram Saran Lall Vs. Most. Domini Kuer & Hirala. Agarwal Vs. Rampadarath Singh, Tilakdhari Singh’s case (Supra) related to a mortgage suit filed on the 7th November 1906 in which the plaintiff obtained a decree which was resisted by a person who purchased the property prior to the institution of the suit by a sale deed, though registered subsequently during the pendency of the suit. In a subsequent suit for possession by the mortgage decree holder, the purchaser was given option to redeem the mortgage as it was held therein that the plaintiff's purchase was complete by the registration of the document after the Institution of the suit. The plaintiff's right which existed at the time of the institution of the suit could not be defeated by the subsequent registration of the document. This case and the other two decisions relied upon by Mr. Sanyal came to be considered by a Bench of the court in the case of Smt. Sudama Devi and others Vs. The plaintiff's right which existed at the time of the institution of the suit could not be defeated by the subsequent registration of the document. This case and the other two decisions relied upon by Mr. Sanyal came to be considered by a Bench of the court in the case of Smt. Sudama Devi and others Vs. Rajendra Singh and others where Tilakdhari Singh's case (Supra) was distinguished and it was observed by Untwalia, J as follows: "It will, however, be noticed that the right of defendant no. 5 (the purchaser) was not obliterated altogether on the doctrine of lis pendens. The well known principle that he should be given an opportunity to redeem the mortgage was applied....” The following observations from the aforesaid decision will show that not only Tilakdhari Singh’s case but the Supreme court decisions relied upon by learned Counsel for the petitioner have also been explained and distinguished and it has been held that the doctrine of lis pendens does not apply to a proceeding under section 16(3) of the Act. “14. Tilakdhari Singh’s case A.I.R. 1921 Patna 150 has not been followed by the Madras High Court in Pingali Venkataramana Reddi Vs. Kotigari Rangiah Cetti, AIR 1922 Madras 249 and Akki Guru Basappa V. Santhappa, AIR 1925 Madras 710. A Bench decision of this court in Sadei Sahu V. Chandramani Del, AIR 1948 Patna 60 has pointed out that a deed of sale executed before the Institution of the suit for specific performance of prior contract for sale of the same property but registered thereafter can not be held to be executed pendentlite. Tilakdhari Singh’s case AIR 1921 Patna 150 is not noticed in this judgment but two Calcutta cases reported in Naresh Chandra V. Girish Chandra A.I.R. 1936 Calcutta 17 and Gobadhan Bar V. Guna Dhar Bar, A.I.R. 1941 Calcutta 78 have been noticed in paragraph 6. I am conscious that the Supreme Court in AIR 1961SC 1447 has quoted with approval in paragraph 8, of the judgment the decision of this court in Tilakdhari Singh’s case A.I.R. 1921 Patna 150 as also the two Calcutta cases which have been noticed and distinguished in Sadel Sahu’s case A.I.R. 1948 Patna 60. But I venture to point out that the ratio in those decisions has been approved by the Supreme court in a different Context. But I venture to point out that the ratio in those decisions has been approved by the Supreme court in a different Context. The question before the Supreme Court was when was the pre-emptor to perform the ceremonies under the Muhammedan law ? The majority decision or the court was that the sale was complete on completion or the registration under section 61 or the Registration Act, and. therefore, the ceremonies had to be performed after completion of the registration. A similar view his been expressed in Hira Lal Agarwal's case A.I.R. 1969 SC 244, In the customary law the question assumed Importance as to the point of time when the ceremony is to be performed and under section 16(3) of the Act, the question arose at to when the preemptor gets right to file an application under section 16(3). In Budhnandan Ram Vs. State of Bihar (C.W.J.C. No. 133 of 1969) decided by a Bench of this court of which I was a member, on 30th January, 1970, I had elaborately considered the point. I had pointed out that there could not be two starting points of limitation under section 16(3) of the Act, starting point must be one either the date of execution of the sale deed or the date when the registration is complete. “I held following Hira Lal Agarwal's case that the latter was the date which was the starting point of the period of three month for the filing of the application under section 16(3). But to apply the doctrine of lis pendens is a different thing Here, cases have consistently taken the view, to which reference has been made earlier by me, that if a sale deed is executed before the filing of the suit but is registered later then such a transfer is not pendente lite, the transferee became the owner of the property, in view of the provision of law contained in Sec. 47 of the Registration Act, prior to the filing of the suit. No case taking a contrary view for the application of the doctrine of lis pendens was brought to our notice by learned counsel for respondent’s 1 to 7". 6. It is thus apparent that a purchaser can improve his status by making subsequent acquisition and take advantage of the provisions of sec. No case taking a contrary view for the application of the doctrine of lis pendens was brought to our notice by learned counsel for respondent’s 1 to 7". 6. It is thus apparent that a purchaser can improve his status by making subsequent acquisition and take advantage of the provisions of sec. 47 of the Registration Act, to defeat the pre-emptor as the principle of lis pendens is not applicable to a proceeding for preemption. It can not be disputed that the purchaser has a right to transfer the property to a person having superior right to that of a pre-emptor and that being done the preemptor's application would have failed vide Ramchandra Yadav. v. Anutha Yadav and others. The scheme of the law engrafted in Sec. 16(3) or the Act, as held in Sudama Devi's case (Supra) is to permit the preemptor to have the property conveyed to him by the transferee. Until possession is delivered to the pre-emptor under clause (ii), he does not get any right in the property and until property is conveyed to him by a sale-deed executed in pursuance of clause (iii), he does not become the owner of the property. In the instant case, there is no question of any transfer being affected by the purchaser In favour of a third party. In such a situation simply because the registration had been done later. the advantage of section 47 of the Act, can not be denied to the purchaser of the second purchase made by him which made him an adjoining raiyat. Sec. 47 does not admit of any limitation as contended by Mr. Sanyal that it applies only between a vendor and vendee. As held in Sudama Devi’s case (Supra) a vendee by improving the status at any time, before the final order is passed against him under section 16(3) can defeat the right of pre-emption. Such a right has been recognised In the case of Madho Singh R. James R.R. Skinner which has been quoted with approval in the case of Nabir Ganal (Supra). There is no embargo on the purchaser from improving his status so as to defeat the pre-emption application either under section 16(3) or any other provisions of the Act. Such a right has been recognised In the case of Madho Singh R. James R.R. Skinner which has been quoted with approval in the case of Nabir Ganal (Supra). There is no embargo on the purchaser from improving his status so as to defeat the pre-emption application either under section 16(3) or any other provisions of the Act. The case of Nabir Ganal [supra] was also distinguished in an earlier Bench decision of this court in the case of Ramchandra Yadav V. Anutha Yadav and others [Supra), the relevant portion of which may usefully be quoted. “The former case of Nabir Ganal was in relation to the exercise of the right of pre-emption, and it is no doubt true that in such a situation it was observed that as between the parties to the transaction or between the transferor and the transferee the registered document takes effect from the date of execution but as regards a third party the point of time at which the deed becomes effective is when it is registered. Such an observation seems to have been made on the principle laid down. In several other decisions of the, various High Court, some of which were noticed in the case of Ram Saran [Supra] decided by the Supreme Court. A question before the Supreme court was, when were the formalities to be performed for the exercise of the right of pre-emption whether on the execution of the sale died or on the completion of the Registration when the sale-deed becomes complete by completion of the registration under section 61 of the Registration Act, and therefore, ceremonies have to be performed after that date. It is to be noticed that such a principal of law is for a different purpose and to a different context. It seems to have been adopted and applied by the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in the case referred to above, but, it we may say so with respect, not very appropriately. The sale under section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, is not complete if it is in respect of a property of more than one hundred rupees unless the sale deed is registered. The third party, therefore, is not obliged to treat the sale complete before it, registration and he can not be asked to perform the ceremony for claiming the right of pre-emption on a back date. The third party, therefore, is not obliged to treat the sale complete before it, registration and he can not be asked to perform the ceremony for claiming the right of pre-emption on a back date. It was impossible to do so”. (The underlining is mine) The case of Nabir Ganal (Supra) relied by Mr. Sanyal has rightly been distinguished by a Bench of this court, with which I am in respectfully agreement and is of no help to the petitioner. It is thus manifest that the provision of section 47 is available to the purchaser in respect of his second purchase so as to defeat the claim of pre-emption of the petitioner. 6. The contention of Mr. T.K. Jha, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no 4, is that the transfer effected before the filing of the application would not be hit by section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, as held by a Bench decision of this court in the case of Partabpore Company V. State. Mr. Jha has also referred to a Bench decision of this court in the case of Fiyazuddin Khan V. Mt. Zahur Bibi. In that case, after the deed of Balmokasa was presented for registration, there was an order of attachment of the property and the document was actually copied out later. The main question which arose was whether the balmokasa would prevail as against attachment as it was registered after attachment and it was held that the document prevailed against the attachment as after registration it took effect from the date of registration. The aforesaid two decisions fully support the contention of Mr. Jha on the point and the view I have taken. 8. In the result, I do not find any merit in this application which is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. I agree Application dismissed.