ORDER In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioners are challenging an order of reference made by the Government of West Bengal by its order dated 2nd November, 1977 and the Award made by the Tribunal on the 12th September, 1979. 2. The facts of this case, which are relevant for the purpose of the present application, are as follows: - 3. Sri Sudhir Kumar Das and Sri Ram Raj Gupta were the employees of the respondent No. 1 herein. Sudhir Kumar Das was appointed as a Daftry. A contention was raised before the Tribunal subsequently that though Sri Sudhir Kumar Das continued to be designated as a Duftry, his principal Duty was that of a bearer i. e. peon since 1970. This contention was rejected by the Tribunal Be that as it may, his services were terminated by a letter dated 2nd November, 1976 by the respondent No.1, which is set out herein-below: - "Mcleod & Company Ltd. Registered Officer 'Mcleod House', 3, Netaji Subhas Road Calcutta- 700001 (India) 2nd November, 1976 Sri Sudhir Kumar Das, Calcutta. Dear Sir, Due to reorganisation of office necessitated by heavy losses in business your services will not be required with effect from 9th November, 1976 as there is no work of a Daftry for which post you were appointed. You will be paid one month's salary in lieu of notice and retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to 15 days' average pay for every completed year of service or any part thereof in excess of six months apart from your other legal dues, if any. Please collect your dues from the Accounts Department on or before the 8th November, 1976. Yours faithfully, Mcleod Co, Ltd., Sd/- Director, 4. Ram Raj Gupta was appointed as a Motor Car Driver. His services were terminated by a letter dated 28th October, 1976 which is set out herein-below:- "Mcleod & Co. Ltd. Registered Office, 'Mcleod House', 3, Netaji Subhas Road, Calcutta-700001. (INDIA) 28th October, 1976 Sri Ram Raj Gupta, Driver. Dear Sir, You have been driving the car belonging to Mr. R. L. Khanna, Accountant of the Company, who will cease from the employment of the company from 1st November, 1976. There is no other car for which your services can be utilised Hence, your services are no more required with effect from 1st November, 1976. Dear Sir, You have been driving the car belonging to Mr. R. L. Khanna, Accountant of the Company, who will cease from the employment of the company from 1st November, 1976. There is no other car for which your services can be utilised Hence, your services are no more required with effect from 1st November, 1976. You will be paid one month's salary in lieu of notice and retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to 15 days' average pay for every completed year of service or any part thereof in excess of six .months apart from your other legal dues, if any. Please collect your dues from the Accounts Department on or before 30th October, 1976. Yours faithfully, Mcleod & Co. Ltd Sd/- C. Hockley Director.” 5. Disputes and differences arose therefrom and an order of reference was passed by the Government of West Bengal on the 2nd November. 1977 for adjudication of the following issue: "Whether retrenchment of Sri Sudhir Kumar Das. Daftry, from 9th November, 1976 Ram Raj Gupta. Driver, from 1st November, 1976 is justified? To what relief, if any, are they entitled ?" 6. Various contentions were raised before the Tribunal and after consideration of the evidence and materials, the Tribunal came to the cl1nclusion that their retrenchment of Sudhir Kumar Das and RamRaj Gupta was justified. The Tribunal held that the workmen concerned were not entitled to any retrenchment compensation. 7. Bing aggrieved by the same, this application has been made in this Court. The only contention raised in support of the Rule is in the effect that there was non compliance of the provisions of S. 25- F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) which is set out herein-below :- 25F. "(a) that the workman proposed to be retrenched should be given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and that the workman should be paid one month's wages if his services are to be terminated without notice in lieu of such notice; (b) no workman shall retrenched unlees the workman has been paid at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to 15 days' average pay; (c) no workman shall be retrenched until notice in the prescribed manner is served on the a Government." 8. It has been submitted that the section provides that the payment must be made to the workman at the time of retrenchment as provided in the Act. In this case that was not done. Merely asking the employees concerned to collect their dues from the Accounts Department according to the learned Advocate appearing in support of the Rule, was not sufficient compliance with the mandatory provisions of the said Act. 9. In this connection reliance has been placed on a decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Pepsu Transport Co, Ltd. v. State of Punjab & ors., reported in AIR 1958 Punjab and Haryana p. 90. 10. In answer to the same on behalf of the respondent No. 1 it has been contended that there has been due compliance with the provisions of the said Act in the facts and circumstances of the case, It was submitted that asking the petitioners to collect their dues before the retrenchment came into effect is sufficient compliance. Reliance is placed in this connection on the following decisions: Indian Oxygen Ltd. v. Narayana Bhoumik reported in (1968)17 FLR 214; Chandra Kumar Dutta v. Secretary, M/s, Frank Ross & Co. Ltd. & ors. reported in (1971) 1 Lahour and Industrial Cases 790. 11. In my opinion, there has been due compliance with the provisions of the Act in this case. The provisions though mandatory must be given a reasonable interpretation. A reluctant employee cannot be forced to accept payment if he refuses' to accept payment. That in my opinion, would not amount to non-compliance with the provisions of the Act. Apart from the actual payment, if there is a tender or offer of payment, then that is also a valid compliance with the provisions of the Act. What has happened in this case is that in the case of Sudhir Kumar Das a letter was given on the 2nd November, 1976 stating therein that he was being retrenched with effect from the 9th November, 1976 and he was asked to collect his dues from the Accounts Department on or before 8th November. 1976. It is to be noticed that the retrenchment came into effect from 9th November, 1976. He was requested to collect his dues by 8th November, 1976. Accordingly before the retrenchment came into effect, he was asked to collect his dues. 1976. It is to be noticed that the retrenchment came into effect from 9th November, 1976. He was requested to collect his dues by 8th November, 1976. Accordingly before the retrenchment came into effect, he was asked to collect his dues. This, in my opinion amounts to tender, at least an offer. The mere fact that the money itself was not brought before the person concerned, in my opinion, does not make any difference. Producing the money before the person and asking the person to collect the money, in my opinion, has the same effect. 12. In the case of Ram Raj Gupta a letter was written on 28th October, 1976 to the effect that he was being retrenched with effect from 1st November, 1976 and he was asked to collect his dues from the Accounts Department on or before 30th October, 1976, that is, before the retrenchment came into effect. In my opinion, for similar reasons, there was sufficient compliance with the provisions of the Act. 13. In the case of Indian Oxygen Ltd. (supra) the Supreme Court had to deal with the similar point in connection with the interpretation of proviso to S. 33(2)(b) of the said Act which is similar to the provisions of S. 25F. The 'Supreme Court held that though the word used in the' proviso to S. 33(2)(b) is 'paid', the proviso does not mean that the employer must actually hand over or pay to the workman dismissed or discharged, his one month's wage. There the Supreme Court referred to the decision in the case of Strawboard Manufacturing Co. v. Govind reported in (1962) 4 FLR 403 wherein it was pointed out that the employer was required to carry out the condition to tender or pay the wages to the 'employee. It was pointed out that if the employee chooses not to accept, them, he cannot come forward and say that there has been no payment of wages made of wages made by the employer The Supreme Court held that though S. 33 speaks of payment of one month's wages, it can only mean that the employer has tendered the wages and that would amount to payment, for, otherwise a workman could always make the section unworkable by refusing to take the wages. The Supreme Court also referred to a decision in the case of P. H. Kalyani v. M/s. Air France reported in (1964) 2 SCR 104 , 109 where the employer had offered one month's wages to the workman before the order of dismissal against him came into force. The offer was held to be sufficient compliance of the said condition laid down in the proviso to S. 33(2)(b), The Supreme Court accordingly came to the following conclusion:- "It is thus clear that the condition as to payment in the proviso does not mean that the wages have actually been paid but if wages are tendered or offered, such tender or offer would be sufficient compliance for the purposes of S. 33(2)(b) proviso. 14. In case of Chandra Kumar Dutta v. Frank Ross & Co. Ltd, (supra) it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that an offer of payment was sufficient, so far as S. 25F is concerned. 15. I respectfully follow the aforesaid decisions. In my opinion, apart from the actual payment, unconditional tender or offer of payment is sufficient and in the facts and circumstances of this case, there was such offer, which was in due compliance with the provisions of S. 25F. 16. In this context I should point out that Banerjee, J. in his judgment in the case of National Iron & Steel Co Ltd. v The Third Industrial Tribunal. West Bengal & ars reported in AIR 1964 Calcutta 194 pointed out that so far as S. 25F is concerned, it may be difficult to make the workman accept payment if he with not himself do that. Therefore, unconditional offer for payment, proceeding retrenchment may be equivalent to payment. 17. In the case of Pepsu Transport Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Punjab & ors reported in AIR 1968 Punjab and Haryana p. 90, the Tribunal came to a different finding on different facts and on different points However, the Punjab High Court held that the employer must actually tender the amount of wages to the employee, and if the latter then does not accept the same, he cannot later on be heard to say that no wages had been paid to him by the employer. There it was observed that tender does not mean calling the workman to receive payment on a particular date. There it was observed that tender does not mean calling the workman to receive payment on a particular date. In view of the decisions of Supreme Court and the Division Bench of his Court referred to above, I am unable to follow this decision. I am also of the opinion that to that extent this decision is-nut correct. 18. Reliance was also placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of The K.C.P. Employees Association, Madras v. The Management of K.C.P Ltd., Madras & ors, reported in (1978) 36 FIR 217. In the above case it was observed as follows:- "In industrial law, interpreted and applied in the perspective of Part IV of the Constitution, the benefit of reasonable doubt on law and facts, if there be such doubt, must go to the weaker section, labour. If there is any doubt regarding interpretation of the section, which should re applied, the benefit of doubt on law and facts must go to the weaker" 19. There is no question of the applicability of the same in the facts and circumstances of this case. 20. In the view I have taken and having regard to the decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court, I hold that the unconditional offer in the preset case to the employees concerned to collect the amount due before the termination came into effect amounts to due compliance of the provisions of the said Act. 21. In that view of the matter, I reject the contention of the petitioner. Accordingly, the application is dismissed. The Rule is discharged. Interim order, if any, is vacated. There will be no order as to costs. Rule discharged.