N. H. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a petition filed by Dhahubai widow of Hirabhai Dhulabhai and other heirs and legal representatives of said Hirabhai Dhulabhai who are the children of Dhanuben and deceased Hirabhai. The dispute concerns itself with agricultural lands situated at a village near Surat. Deceased Hirabhai had mortgaged the land with one Nagindas Govandas and the land was being cultivated by one tenant Gopal Parbhu inducted by said mortgagee Nagindas. In the case no. 2629 of 1947 initiated under the provisions of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act an award had come to be passed scaling down the debt of deceased Hirabhai. The award was passed on 12-4-50. On or before 15-5-60 the Mamlatdar concerned had initiated the case No. 32 of 1960 suo motu under sec. 32-G of the Bombay Tenancy Act hereinafter referred to as `the Act for brevitys sake. The mortgagee was shown as landlord and said Gopal Parbhu was shown as the tenant in those proceedings and the Mamlatdar declared Gopal Parbhu as having statutorily purchased the land under sec. 32 of the Act. Said Gopal Parbhu is the respondent in this petition. Deceased Hirabhai having come to know of such an ex-parte prejudicial order preferred the appeal no. 193 of 1960 which was allowed on 26-10-60 by the Prant Officer. In the meantime deceased Hirabhai as the landlord of the land had applied for exemption certificate under sec. 88 of the Act. The said application was made by him on 26-8-59 and those proceedings had come to be registered as 88/c case no. 12 of 1959. The Mamlatdar on 22-8-60 had granted the certificate to deceased Hirabhai but in that certificate the land S. No. 81/2 which is the subject matter of this litigation was excluded. Deceased Hirabhai therefore had preferred the appeal no. 22/60 and the appellate authority had remanded the 88c proceedings to the A. L. T. and Mamlatdar by its order dated 21 with a direction to decide the question of the disputed land S. No. 81/2 situated at village Takarma in Olpad taluka. On fresh enquiry the Mamlatdar by his order dated 30-8-61 granted the exemption certificate under sec. 88c of the Act for all lands including the disputed S. No 81/2. Actually an exemption certificate produced at p. 42 of the petition was issued by the Mamlatdar on 11-9-61. The tenancy appeal no. On fresh enquiry the Mamlatdar by his order dated 30-8-61 granted the exemption certificate under sec. 88c of the Act for all lands including the disputed S. No 81/2. Actually an exemption certificate produced at p. 42 of the petition was issued by the Mamlatdar on 11-9-61. The tenancy appeal no. 109 of 1962 was preferred by the respondent and Parbhu Nathu that is the father of the respondent but the appellate authority confirmed the certificate except in respect of the disputed Survey No. 81/2. Deceased Hirabhai therefore filed a revision application no. 194/62 before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal on 5-4-62. During the pendency of that petition the respondent-tenant had filed an application under sec. 88d of the Act to the Government for revocation of the certificate. On 2-8-63 Gujarat Revenue Tribunal allowed the deceased Hirabhais revision application and directed the lower authority to consider the income of deceased Hirabhai as on 1-4-57 after giving both sides opportunity to lead evidence. The competent authority again took the matter on hand and by an order dated 7-11-63 granted the certificate in respect of all the lands including the disputed land. Soon thereafter deceased Hirabhai (gave the notice to the tenant under sec. 32 T (i) of the Act terminating his tenancy in respect of two disputed land which was with the respondent as the excluded tenant on the ground that he bona fide required the land for cultivating it personally. The said notice was given on 30-12-63 and on 4-2-64 deceased Hirabhai filed an application under sec. 32-T (1) of the Act read with sec. 29 of the Act for getting possession of the disputed land. The said application was registered as the case No. 3 of 1964. On 31-7-64 the Mamlatdar granted the application and passed the order for delivery of possession. The respondent preferred the tenancy appeal no. 69/64 and in the appeal the appellate authority confirmed the order substantially on merits but directed that instead of the whole S. No. 81/2 only half of that land should be delivered to deceased Hirabhai. Against this order two revision applications had come to be filed 293 by deceased Hirabhai and 313/66 by the respondent. It the meantime by their order dated 9-1-67 the Government rejected the respondents application under sec. 88-D which was filed by the respondent on 6-1-63 already referred to above. Against this order two revision applications had come to be filed 293 by deceased Hirabhai and 313/66 by the respondent. It the meantime by their order dated 9-1-67 the Government rejected the respondents application under sec. 88-D which was filed by the respondent on 6-1-63 already referred to above. The Revenue Tribunal allowed the tenants revision application no. 313/66 and dismissed the revision application no. 293/66 filed by deceased Hirabhai. Against that judgment of the Revenue Tribunal the special civil application no. 552 of 1967 had come to be filed in this High Court by deceased Hirabhai which had come to be allowed by this court on 11-8-70. The High Court remanded the proceedings to the Revenue Tribunal. In the meantime the respondent-tenant had filed second application to the Government on 25-6-71 by resort to sec. 88d of the Act with a prayer to revoke sec. 88 C certificate. ( 2 ) AFTER remand of the two revision applications as per the orders of this High Court the Revenue Tribunal re-numbered the respondents revision application as 129/71 and the deceased Hirabhais revision application as 130/71. The tenants revision application came to be rejected whereas deceased Hirabhais revision application came to be allowed. This means that the Revenue Tribunal ordered delivery of the entire disputed survey number to deceased Hirabhai as was initially done by the Mamlatdar. Thus the Mamlatdars order came to be restored by the Tribunal as per its judgment dated 30-8-71. ( 3 ) THEN the respondent Gopal Parbhu the tenant filed a Review Application no. 28/71 requesting the Tribunal that as his application under sec. 88d was pending for revocation of the certificate the possession could not be delivered. The Tribunal by passing the order dated 17-12-71 modified its order to the effect that possession not to be handed over till S. 88d application was rejected. That order was not challenged by deceased Hirabhai. He had then started knocking the doors of the Government seized of the proceedings under sec. 88d of the Act that the said 88 application should be expeditiously dealt with because he was suffering from cancer and was on his death bed and wanted to have the fruits of his litigation before he departed from the world. His requests made to the Govt. on 2-5-72 24 7 and 2-8-76 however fell on deaf ears and he then died on 16-9-76. His requests made to the Govt. on 2-5-72 24 7 and 2-8-76 however fell on deaf ears and he then died on 16-9-76. Thereafter the Government passed on 21 the order the operative part of which is reproduced as follow:"the revocation of the certificate shall not affect the lands in respect of which proceedings under sec. 32-T of the said Act have been finalized. "on 31-12-76 the heirs of deceased Hirabhai got an order from the Mamlatdar directing delivery of possession to them in execution of the order on the Revenue Tribunal directing delivery of the entire disputed land. The mamlatdar got made the panchnama in taken of the delivery of possession. Against that action of the Mamlatdar the respondent Gopal Parbhu preferred the appeal no. 16/77 to the Plant Officer which appeal had come to be allowed by the Plant Officer on 30-7-77. The present petitioner no. 1 Dhanuben the widow of deceased Hirabhai than filed the revision application no. 322/77 before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal against one order of the Collector and procured ex-parte stay of the order of the Prant Officer. Ultimately on 14-10-77 the Revenue Tribunal dismissed Dhanubens revision application no. 322 of 1977 and the matter was brought to this High Court by be by filing the Special Civil Application No. 1804/77 in which again ex-parte stay order of re situation was made. The High Court ultimately varied the stay order and directed that status quo as 22-2-78 should be maintained. In my view this should mean that the possession which was delivered to the heirs of Hirabhai was to remain with them. Finding that the High Courts order was not to his taste and agreement the respondent Gopal Parbhu filed a regular Civil Suit No. 34/78 in the Civil Court all 29-4-78 and sought to secure exparte injection against these petitioners but the injunction was ultimately vacated on 5-5-78 and the appeal preferred by this Gopal Parbhu against vacating of the injunction? being the Civil Appeal no. 55/78 also was dismissed by the appellate Court. Gopal Parbhu therefore again knocked the doors of this High Court by filing the Special Civil Application no. 2150 of 1978 Due it was also rejected by the very Judge (A. D. Desai J.) who had dealt with Special Civil Application no. 1804/77. being the Civil Appeal no. 55/78 also was dismissed by the appellate Court. Gopal Parbhu therefore again knocked the doors of this High Court by filing the Special Civil Application no. 2150 of 1978 Due it was also rejected by the very Judge (A. D. Desai J.) who had dealt with Special Civil Application no. 1804/77. The present special civil application then came to be filed by the heirs of late Hirabhai challenging the order of the Revenue Tribunal in the execution proceedings upholding the appellate officers order that possession could not be handed over. In this position the prayers that are sought for are reproduced from paragraph 43: (A) That a wait of certiorari or any other writ order or direction be please issued to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad calling for the records of case TEN/b-B 322/77 and on receipt of the same to quash the illegal orders of the said Tribunal and he Prant Officer in Appeal no. 16/77 and to restore the just order of the Mamlatdar dated 31-12-76 handing over possession which is lawful implementation of the order of the said Honble Tribunal dated 30-8-71 passed in revision applications nos. 129 130 of 1971. (B) to quash the order dt. 21-10-76 of the opponent no. 2 by issue of an appropriate writ order and direction as it is illegal on the face of it and is entirely without jurisdiction because the State Government having already earlier in 1967 decided the matter under sec. 88d the powers vested in law were exhausted and it had no jurisdiction to entertain a fresh sec. 88-D application on 25-6-71 or pass the impugned order dated 21-10-76 and the order is perverse in law and is entirely without jurisdiction. (C) that the purported order dated 21-10-76 passed by the opponent no. 2 under sec. 88-D purporting to cancel the 88. C certificate dated 11-9-61 is without authority of law and is without jurisdiction as such powers can be exercised only within a reasonable time and not at any time at the pleasure of Government. (D) that the order dt. 21-10-76 passed after the death of the landlord on 16-9-75 was a nullity and ineffective in law and did not affect the lawful order passed by the Tribunal on 30-8-71 and duly implemented by the Mamlatdar. (E) that the opponent no. (D) that the order dt. 21-10-76 passed after the death of the landlord on 16-9-75 was a nullity and ineffective in law and did not affect the lawful order passed by the Tribunal on 30-8-71 and duly implemented by the Mamlatdar. (E) that the opponent no. 1 be restrained by a permanent injunction of this Honble Court to refrain from adopting any steps to disturb the lawful possession of the petitioners and that the status quo be directed to be maintained by all concerned till this writ petition is heard and finally decided including pending admission of this writ petition: (F) that ad interim ex-parte orders in terms of prayer (e) may please be granted. (G) that all other and further orders as may be deemed just and necessary under all the facts and circumstances of the case may be please passed as may be just and necessary. (H) that the costs of this writ petition may be please provided for. " ( 4 ) FROM what has been stated above this court in this writ petition is required to interpret the Tribunals order and the order passed by the State Govt. under sec. 88-D of the Act. The Tribunal seems to be of the view that as the certificate under sec. 88c was revoked by the Govt. by its order dated 21-10-76 the earlier order of the Tribunal upholding late Hirabhais prayer for possession did not survive for execution. In cidentally therefore this court will be required to examine the effect of the order under sec. 88 D of the Act which had come to be passed by the Government. ( 5 ) THE Scheme of the Bombay Tenancy Act requires to be referred to in a nutshell. On the tillers day namely 1-4-57 as a matter of legislative mandate all tenants on the land were declared to have statutorily purchased the tenanted land having free from all encumbrances. Certain exceptions however were envisaged by the Legislature in order to strike a just balance between the avowed policy of agrarian reforms on one hand and legitimate claims of the land owners on the other. Provisions of sec. 31 on one hand and the provisions in the form of sec. 88c and 32 T on the other are the examples expressing the Legislatures desire to strike a just balance. It was provided in sec. 32t read with sec. Provisions of sec. 31 on one hand and the provisions in the form of sec. 88c and 32 T on the other are the examples expressing the Legislatures desire to strike a just balance. It was provided in sec. 32t read with sec. 88c of the Act that a landlord could apply for an exemption certificate under sec. 88c and after availing himself of that certificate he could terminate the tenancy of a tenant by giving him a notice and filing an application as per sec. 32 T (1) of the Act. It is not in controversy before me and could not be also in controversy that deceased Hirabhai had procured such a certificate had given the notice of termination of the tenancy and had filed an application under sec. 32t (1) as back as on 4-2-64. The certificate under sec. 88c was finally given to him on 7-11-63. Within the period of three months thereafter he gave the notice terminating the tenancy and filed the application on 4-2-64 as already said above. The tenant in the meantime had already filed an application to the Govt. under sec. 88d of the Act on 6-1-63. That application was pending on the day the application under sec. 32t had come to be filed by late Hirabhai. That application however admittedly stood rejected by the Govt. on 9-1-67. This means and in my view must mean that the termination of tenancy under sec. 32t (1) was complete and effective as I shall elaborately show a little later. The matter ultimately came to the Revenue Tribunal which held on 30-8-71 that the landlord Hirabhai was entitled to possession of the whole land namely S. No 81/2. ( 6 ) UNDAUNTED by the rejection of his application dated 6-1-63 under sec. 88 D of the Act at the hands of the Govt. on 9-1-67 this respondent-tenant had filed a second application on 25-6-71 under the very sec. 88 D for the similar prayer of revocation of the exemption certificate under sec. 88 D. The Tribunal thought while passing the order in the review application no. 28/71 that because of the tendency of that second application under sec. 88 D the possession could not be delivered and so kept the matter pending in so far as it related to the delivery of possession under the ex-facie erroneous and untenable view that an application under sec. 28/71 that because of the tendency of that second application under sec. 88 D the possession could not be delivered and so kept the matter pending in so far as it related to the delivery of possession under the ex-facie erroneous and untenable view that an application under sec. 88d could be filed successively by the tenant at any stage till he is actually dispossessed pursuant to the termination of tenancy under sec. 32 T (1) of the Act. The moot question that arises before me in this petition is whether a successive applications under sec. 88d of the Act could be filed by a tenant so as to thwart ad infinitem the landlords right to terminate the tenancy under sec. 32 T (1) of the Act. ( 7 ) MRS. Mehta the learned advocate appearing for the respondent Gopal Parbhu urged with considerable vehemence that sec. 88d is intended to benefit the comparatively downtrodden class namely the tenants and therefore it should be interpreted broadly. She urged that in the text of sec. 88d there was nothing to suggest that the Governments power to revoke the certificate is limited to any particular period. This argument does not appeal to me for two reasons. it is not correct to say that sec. 88 D does not contain any reference which would be suggestive of the time-limit within such the powers under sec. 88d could be exercised by the Government. In sub-sec. (1) itself it has been stated that the State Govt. can direct that with effect from such date as may he specified in the order such land or area as the case may be shall cease to be exempted from all or any of the provisions of the Act from which it was exempted under any of the sections aforesaid and any certificate granted under sec. 88b or 88c as the case Outlay be shall stand revoked. The idea underlying this text is that the certificate cannot be revoked so as to operate retrospectively. Revocation can be therefore prospective only. Implicit in this provision is the direction that if the certificate under sec. 88c has achieved its purpose the order under sec. 88d can not be passed. Secondly sec. 88d is to be read with sec. R2t of the Act. Revocation can be therefore prospective only. Implicit in this provision is the direction that if the certificate under sec. 88c has achieved its purpose the order under sec. 88d can not be passed. Secondly sec. 88d is to be read with sec. R2t of the Act. A landlord who has procured an exemption certificate and has become an exempted landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy of any land leased by him to the excluded tenant after giving notice and making an application for possession as provided in sub-section (3 ). It would therefore mean that the tenancy stands terminated by the two steps to be taken by the landlord. The landlord has to give first a notice and then file an application and by undertaking these two steps he terminates the tenancy. ( 8 ) SEC. 32 T (5) also lends to the same conclusion. The right of a certified landlord to terminate a tenancy under this sectional is made subject to certain conditions which are set out in clauses (a) to (d ). Termination of tenancy as already observed by me is effected by giving a notice and by filing an application. However such aa application cannot be filed if clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c) or clause (d) is operative and if such an application is filed and if any of these four clauses is said to be attracted the application will he deemed to be nst worthy to be carried to its logical culmination. If conditions of clauses (a) to (c) are not fulfilled the application would be untenable. Clause (d) however mentions that landlords right to terminate the tenancy is subject to the condition set out in clause (d ). The said clause (d) mentions that the landlord shall nst be entitled to possession of the land if an application under clause (iv) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 88d has been made and has not been rejected. Prima facie therefore it appears that if an application under sec. 32-T (1) is made and on that day the application under sec. 88d is pending the application shall not be carried to its logical conclusion namely passing the order of delivery of possession. This however does not and cannot mean that during the paladins of the petition an application under sec. 32-T (1) is made and on that day the application under sec. 88d is pending the application shall not be carried to its logical conclusion namely passing the order of delivery of possession. This however does not and cannot mean that during the paladins of the petition an application under sec. 88d can be made at any time and even in succession after rejection of earlier matters. If such wide interpretation sought to be placed on sec. 88d is accepted it would mean that sec. 88d at the hands of a crafty tenant can be a weapon to frustrate the very object of sec. 32-T. Say for example an exempted landlord has filed an application for possession. The tenant gets the proceedings stayed on the ground that his application before the Govt. under sec 88d is pending. The said application is rejected by the Govt. He then files the second application and wants the stay of the proceedings under sec. 32p and this can go on ad infinitum. This cannot be the idea of the legislature which as said by me above was strive to strike a just balance between the jealous guarding of the tenants rights and possible safeguarding the claims for personal cultivation of the bona fide landlords. It is therefore reasonable to hold that successive applications cannot be filed and that the application under sec. 88d could be filed on or before the tenancy is terminated under sec 32t (1) read with sec. 32 T (5 ). In this view take by me I am not alone. The Bombay High Court speaking through its Division Bench in the Special Civil Application no. 868 of 1970 (with special civil application no. 2085/73. decided on 6-9-74 also holds the same view I would like to quote certain observations of the Bombay High Court itself in support of in conclusion :it is undoubtedly true that there are no express words of limitation contained in sec. 88d which place any restriction on the power of the States Government or the Commissioner to cancel or revoke the certificate of exemption granted under sec. 88c. 88d which place any restriction on the power of the States Government or the Commissioner to cancel or revoke the certificate of exemption granted under sec. 88c. But it is not as if that there should be express words in the enactment placing restriction or limitation on the power of the State Government or the Commissioner in entertaining the application for cancellation or revocation of the exemption certificate and such restriction or limitation can be read into it if the same is necessarily implied. In our view reading sections 88c and 88d along with the provisions of new Part II-A comprising sections 33a to 33c a reasonable time limit on the power of State Govt. or the Commissioner is clearly indicated by necessary application. Ordinarily it would be unreasonable to place the view that sec. 88d could be availed of by a tenant after lapse of any Number of years especially in cases where proceedings under sec. 88c and sec. 33b has been completed titles had been settled and even transfers had been effected. It would be unthinkable that subs unlimited power of was intended to be conferred upon the State Govt. for the commissioner for such unlimited power would disrupt settled titles if the tenant could avail himself of sec 88 after lapse of several years. That some reasonable limitation on the power will have to be read into the section would become apparent it an extreme illustration is taken into consideration. For instance assume that a small land holder has only the source of income namely the leased land let out by him to a tenant assume further that the leased land does not exceed the economic holding and his rental income therefor is less than Rs. 1500. 00. in such a case he would undoubtedly be entitled to apply and obtain a certificate on exemption under sec. 81c and if on the strength of the certificate so obtained he terminates the tenancy and applies for possession of the land for personal cultivation under sec. 32b read with sec. 29 of the Act and succeeds in obtaining possession of the laud under the Mamlatdars under he would be entitled to cultivate the land for himself as an owner. 81c and if on the strength of the certificate so obtained he terminates the tenancy and applies for possession of the land for personal cultivation under sec. 32b read with sec. 29 of the Act and succeeds in obtaining possession of the laud under the Mamlatdars under he would be entitled to cultivate the land for himself as an owner. In such a situation by making improvements in the land by digging a well or by putting manures or by using improved methods of agriculture if he enhances the income from such land exceeding Rs. 1500/then on that ground if unlimited power is presumed the tenant would be entitled to apply to the State Govt. or the Commissioner for cancellation or revocation of the exemption certificate. Surely such a situation could not have been intended by the Legislature for we do not think that legislature desired that such a landlord who has obtained under sec. 88c must for the purpose of retaining possession see to it that his income therefrom never exceeds Rs. 1500/annually. Therefore it would be unreasonable to hold that even after proceedings under section 33b have been completed and the titles have been settled the tenant should be enabled to apply for cancellation of the exemption certificate under section 88 On the introduction of new Part II-A in the Act by Maharashtra Act 9 of 1961 the right of tenant under section 88d (1) (iv) to apply for cancellation or revocation of the exemption certificate obtained by a small landholder under sec. 88c will have to be read in conjunction with the provisions contained in that part for that part deals with termination of tenancy by landlords and purchase by tenants of lands to which sec. 88c applies and so read a limitation on the power of the State Government or the Commissioner as regards the point of time before which these authorities could entertain an application for cancellation or revocation under section 88d (1) (iv) gets clearly indicated. The manner in which a certificated landlord (meaning a landlord who has obtained the certificate under section 88c) has to take various steps for obtaining possession of the land for personal cultivation have been clearly set out in section 33 Sub-section (1) of section 33c provides that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) of section 88c every excluded tenant (meaning a tenant of land to which secs. 22 to 32r do not apply by virtue of sec. 88c) holding land from a certificated landlord shall except as otherwise provided in sub-sec. (3) be deemed to have purchased from the landlord on the day specified therein ( 1/04/1962 from all encumbrances subsisting thereon on the said day the land held by him as tenant if such land is cultivated by him personally unless the landlord has taken the steps contemplated in sec. 33b. In other words merely obtaining an exemption certificate under sec. 88c does not carry the matter any further so far as the certificated landlord is concerned. He must issue a notice terminating the tenancy within the period mentioned and must also make an application for possession if the land is required bona fide for his personal cultivation under sec. 33b read with sec. 29 of the Act and in case none of these steps are taken the tenant notwithstanding the obtaining of the exemption certificate by the landlord under sec. 18c is declared to have become the purchaser of the land on 1/04/1962 i. e. of the land held by him as a tenant if such land is cultivated by him personal. What happens if the landlord makes the application after terminating the tenancy under sec. 32b is indicated in the proviso to sec. 33c (1) and the proviso runs as follows: "provided that where the landlord has made such application for possession the tenant shall on the date on which the application is finally decided be deemed to have purchased the land which he is entitled to retain in possession after such decision. "sec. 88d which is applicable to Gujarat and which is applicable to Maharashtra is the same. Instead of sec. 32t (5) there is sec. 33 (C) which appears to be in pari materia with sec. 32t of this Act. ( 9 ) ON above grounds I therefore hold that powers under sec. 88d which were exercised by the Government on the second occasion in the respondent-tenants application dated 25-6-71 made by him after dismissal of his earlier application and made by him during the tendency of the revision applications in the Revenue Tribunal were the powers exercised ex-facie without authority of law and therefore said order is a nullity Mrs. 88d which were exercised by the Government on the second occasion in the respondent-tenants application dated 25-6-71 made by him after dismissal of his earlier application and made by him during the tendency of the revision applications in the Revenue Tribunal were the powers exercised ex-facie without authority of law and therefore said order is a nullity Mrs. Mehta rightly brought it to my notice that an order could be said to be a nullity only when the authority has no jurisdiction or where the principles of natural justice are flagrantly violated. I however have found that on the admitted facts the State government had no authority to permit the second round of application under sec. 88d during the pendency of the proceedings under sec. 32 which as held by the Tribunal ultimately were rightly initiated for the purpose of terminating the tenancy of the responent-tenant. ( 10 ) MRS. Mehta however in this connection urged that the Tribunals order passed in Review Application no. 28/71 suspending the order of execution of decree of delivery of possession till the Government disposed of the application under sec. 88d had become final between the parties. When I hold that the Government had no power to initiate the proceedings under sec. 88d second time this condition put forward by the Revenue Tribunal also is a condition without any authority or law. It therefore cannot do to say that the State Governments order under sec. 88d and the Tribunals order in Review application had become final between the parties for want of any challenge at the relevant time. ( 11 ) MRS. Mehta had then raised one more contention placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of MENGALBHAI FULABHAI V. PARSHOTTAM GARBADBHAI 14 G. L. R. 292. In that case it was held by the Division Bench that personal requirement being personal would die with the death of the person concerned. The said authority in my view does not advance the case put forward by Mrs. Mehta. In that case it was held by referring to sec. 32t (1) that termination of the tenancy within the special meaning of the word termination which can be attributed in the scheme of sec. 32 is to be done by the certified landlord and therefore it is obvious even in the context of sec. Mehta. In that case it was held by referring to sec. 32t (1) that termination of the tenancy within the special meaning of the word termination which can be attributed in the scheme of sec. 32 is to be done by the certified landlord and therefore it is obvious even in the context of sec. 32t (4) that if the termination is to be done by the widows successor-in-title even the successor-in-title must be a certified landlord. In the case on hand termination of the tenancy had been effected by Deceased Hirabhai. The Tribunal finally held in his lifetime that he bonafide and reasonably required the land for his personal cultivation. All that the Tribunal did by passing the order on review application was that the order should not be executed till the tenants application obviously the second one filed in June 1971 without any authority of law as I have already held came to be rejected by the Government. So there was an operative order in favour of deceased but before he could successfully execute that order the execution of which was unduly delayed he died. There had come to be vested in him before his death the right to get possession of the land and such vested right cannot be divested by his death. ( 12 ) IN above view of the matter the petition is required to be allowed. I therefore set aside the order of the Tribunal by holding that the Tribunal had wrongly interpreted its order and the Governments order under sec. 88d and I restore the order passed by the Mamlatdar on 31 handing over possession in lawful implementation of the order of the Tribunal being dated 30-8-71 passed in revision applications nos. 129 and 130 of 1971. I also declare that the State Governments order dated 21-10-76 under sec 88d is also without jurisdiction and that the Govt. had no jurisdiction to entertain a fresh 88d application dated 25 during the pendency of the application under sec. 32t (1) and after rejection of the earlier similar application under the said provisions. Rule is accordingly made absolute with costs. ( 13 ) AT the request of Mrs. Mehta operation of this order is stayed for a period of a fortnight from to-day in order to enable the respondent no. 1 to have further recourse in accordance with law. Petition allowed. .