Judgment :- In November, 1969 the manager of Sree Karikad Devaswom granted two leases, one in favour of Krishnan Natnboodiri, and another in favour of Balakrishnan Nair. The first, registered as document No. 2454, was in respect of 16 acres and 4 cents of land belonging to the Devaswom, and the second, registered as document No. 2455, was in respect of one acre. The period specified was one year and the rent, Rs. 5/-per acre. After the death of . Krishnan Namboodiri his heirs assigned the leasehold right to the Wandoor Jupiter Chits (P) Ltd. Balakrishnan Nair also transferred his rights to the company. This company was ordered to be wound up in 1973. Pending the framing of a scheme under the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 for the proper administration of the Devaswom, the Deputy Commissioner functioning under the Act appointed a 'fit person' to be in charge of the Devaswom, in July, 1976. This person considered the leases to be unauthorised, improvident and prejudicial to the Devaswom. and after obtaining sanction from the Department for instituting legal proceedings, approached this Court with Application Nos. 640 and 656 of 1977 for leave under Sec. 446 of the Companies Act to file suits for cancelling the two documents and for recovery of possession. Leave was granted on 27-1-78 and C.S. Nos I and 2 were then filed by him in June, 1978. 2. In August, 1977 one Fr. Cuthbert filed Application No. 673/77 for an order that the lands in question be sold to him at the rate of Rs. 800/-per acre. On 22-9-77 the Official Liquidator filed a report in the above matter, pointing out that the fit person of the Devaswom had already moved this Court for leave to institute legal proceedings for cancelling the leases. Thereafter the application was dismissed on 14-7-78 as not pressed On 23-11-78 another application (No. 664/78) was filed on behalf of the Islamic Association;, Wandoor for purchase of the lands at the rate of Rs I000/-per acre. As already noticed, C S. Nos. 1 and 2 of 1978 had been tiled by that time; and on 7-12-78, this Court passed an order allowing the Liquidator to sell the lands to the Association if it was willing to pay at the rate of Rs.1300/- per acre and to "take the property without any recourse". As already noticed, C S. Nos. 1 and 2 of 1978 had been tiled by that time; and on 7-12-78, this Court passed an order allowing the Liquidator to sell the lands to the Association if it was willing to pay at the rate of Rs.1300/- per acre and to "take the property without any recourse". The Association purchased the properties on the above terms on 12 -1-79. 3. Soon after the above, the Association got itself impleaded in both the suits and filed written statements. Issues were framed on 2-7-79 In January, 198U the Association applied for receiving two documents in evidence viz. an order of the Land Tribunal. Malappuram allowing purchase of the lands covered by document No. 2454, and the purchase certificate. The platintiff sought for and obtained leave to amend the plaint, seeking a declaration that the purchase certificate was issued in proceedings which were null and void. The Association was also allowed to file an additional written statement claiming the benefit of S.6C of the Land Reforms Act, introduced by Amending Act 27/ 79. Additional issues were also framed, with the result that the issues now arising for consideration in C. S. No. 1/78 are the following: 1. Whether the plaintiff has no legal right to sue on behalf of the Devaswom? 2. Whether the lease granted by the Devaswom was void for want of sanction under S.29 of the H. R.& C. E. Act? 3. Was the lease improvident and prejudicial to the interests of the Devaswom? 4. Was it invalid under S.74 of Act I of 1964? 5. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from questioning the lease? 6. Whether the plaintiff can claim mesne profits and if seat what rate? 7. Is the suit barred by limitation? 8. Whether the suit has to be returned to the proper court in view of the assignment dated 12- 1-79? 9 Whether the assignment dated 12-1-79 is vitiated by Us pendens 10. Reliefs and costs? addl.11. Whether the lease in question is protected by S.6C of the Kerala Land Reforms Act 1 of [964 and whether the 7th defendant can claim such protection? 12. Whether the purchase certificate issued in S. M. No. 487/ 79 or the proceedings relating to the issue are void and inoperative by reason of fraud and collusion? 13. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration sought for in prayer (aa)? 12. Whether the purchase certificate issued in S. M. No. 487/ 79 or the proceedings relating to the issue are void and inoperative by reason of fraud and collusion? 13. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration sought for in prayer (aa)? There are only twelve issues- in C. S. No 2/78, and they are the same as issues (1) to (10), and (12) and (13) in C. S. No. 1. 4. The suits were jointly tried. The Executive Officer of the Palaver Devaswom holding charge of the Karikad Devaswom as 'fit person' was examined as Pw, 1 and Exts. AI to A 14 were marked on the plaintiff's sides. One Hydrose Kurickal, who was engaged by the late Krishnan Namboodiri in 1970 or so for cutting laterite stones from the properties and putting up a compound wall, was examined as Dw. 1 Exts. Dl to D3 were also marked on the side of the defendants. 5. In view of Exts. Al to A5 whether prove that Pw. 1 was duly appointed as fit person and that he had obtained the permission of the Commissioner and this Court for filing the two suits, counsel for the Islamic Association did not press the first issue in both the suits I therefore hold that the plaintiff is entitled to sue on behalf of the Karikad Devaswom. 6. Common issue No. 5 is whether the plaintiff is estopped from questioning the validity of the two leases The argument seems to be that the Devaswom which granted the lease could not itself impeach its validity. I do not know why. If some person purporting to act on behalf of the Devaswom had bartered away its rights in a manner not authorised by law, if the purported transfer was beyond the powers of the then manager, I think the Devaswom is entitled to challenge his act. This issue is found in favour of the plaintiff. 7. Regarding mesne profits covered by the common issue No. (6), no evidence has been adduced to show that the lands have been yielding any income. Pw. ! does not say anything about it in chief examination. In cross examination, he states that to his knowledge, the lands are agricultural and are yielding some income; but no accounts of the Devaswom have been produced to show what the true position was, before November, 1969. Pw. ! does not say anything about it in chief examination. In cross examination, he states that to his knowledge, the lands are agricultural and are yielding some income; but no accounts of the Devaswom have been produced to show what the true position was, before November, 1969. Pw 1 concedes that no separate accounts relating to these properties were being maintained Admittedly, part of the land is being used only for quarrying; and there is nothing to evidence to show that even now it is being put to agricultural use. The issue is found against the plaintiff. 8. On the question of limitation (common issue No 7) the defendants' case that the suits should have been filed within three years of the execution of the lease deeds in 1969, has only to be stated to be rejected The plaintiff has averred that he came to know of the leases only in January, 1977 and this is not even disputed. The suits are not barred. 9. Exts. A8 to A10 are documents produced to show that 1 acre and 76 cents of land ( "a compound and a house") in R S. No. 525/5 and belonging to the Devaswom was sold, towards the end of 1975, for Rs. Ii.230/-. Pw 1 says that this property is situated very near the lands in question; but there is no reliable evidence as to the nature of the land. Ext. A9 describes the house as Pw 1 does not deny that there were 25-year old coconut trees in this property. That apart, the price obtained for an out-right sale in 1975 is no index for deciding whether the 1969 leases were improvident or prejudicial to the interests of the Devaswom, I have already indicated, while discussing issue No. (6), that the lands in question were more or less barren, and fit only for quarrying at the time the leases were granted. There is thus no acceptable evidence to establish that the grant of the leases was improvident or prejudicial to the interest of the Devaswom. Common issue No. (3) is accordingly found against the plaintiff. 10. The next question, arising under issue No. (8) in both the suits, is whether the suits have to be returned for presentation to the proper court in view of the assignment made in favour of the Islamic Association in January, 1979. Common issue No. (3) is accordingly found against the plaintiff. 10. The next question, arising under issue No. (8) in both the suits, is whether the suits have to be returned for presentation to the proper court in view of the assignment made in favour of the Islamic Association in January, 1979. The defendants' contention is that the liquidator and the company ceased to have any right in the properties after the said assignments; the contest which scurvies, it is said, is between the Devaswom and the Association the outcome of which will in no way affect the company. There is no dispute that when the suits were originally filed, they were instituted before the proper court Order 7 Rule 10 which speaks of returning the plaint for being presented to the court' in which "the suit should have been instituted", does not strictly apply, on the facts Assuming that it does, this is not a case where lack of initial or inherent jurisdiction is complained of, and there is enough authority to hold that the rule does not compel a court of higher grade to return the plaint for presentation before a court of lower grade, regardless of all the facts and circumstances. The plaintiff had instituted the suit in the proper court, and I do not think that the circumstance that the company has subsequently parted with its rights is sufficient to drive the plaintiff now to a subordinate court. The terms of Ext. AH where under the Association had agreed to get itself impleaded in the two suits and prosecute the same, and the averments in the impleading applications (Application No. 59/79, for instance) also estop it, in my opinion from raising this contention. The issue is therefore found against the Association. 11. Common issue No. (9) can easily be answered in the affirmative. The Association took the assignments with open eyes, during the pendency of the suits, and it cannot get a better title than what its transferor had. As transferee pendente lite it cannot be in a better position than the liquidator or the company; and if the plaintiff was entitled to the reliefs prayed for and recover the lands from the company, the assignment in favour of the Association "without recourse" cannot defeat that right 12. Turning to issue Nos. As transferee pendente lite it cannot be in a better position than the liquidator or the company; and if the plaintiff was entitled to the reliefs prayed for and recover the lands from the company, the assignment in favour of the Association "without recourse" cannot defeat that right 12. Turning to issue Nos. (2) and (4), there seems to be little escape from holding that the leases were hit by S.74 of Act 1/64 and S.29 of the H.R.& C.E. Act, Sub-section (1) of S.74 of Act I of 1964, which came into force on 1-4-64, provided that no tenancy shall be created after its commencement, and sub-section (2) provided that tenancies so created "shall be invalid". The lease deeds were executed in November, 1969 and they were invalid under S 74. S.29 of the H.R.& C.E. Act, as it originally stood provided that lease of lands belonging to a religious institution for a period exceeding 5 years without the sanction of the Commissioner would be null and void; but after amendment by Act 13/67, the position was that a lease for any term without such sanction would also suffer from the same infirmity. There is no case that the two documents (Exts. A6 and A7', were executed in 1969 after obtaining such sanction. The leases were therefore invalid, null and void at the time they were granted. The two issues are answered accordingly. 13. Issues (M) to (13) in CS. No. 1 and issues (11) and (12) in CS. No.2 can now be dealt with. On 4th July, 1979 the Governor of Kerala promulgated Ordinance No. 8/79 inserting S.6C in Act 1 of 1964, reading as follows: "6C. The two issues are answered accordingly. 13. Issues (M) to (13) in CS. No. 1 and issues (11) and (12) in CS. No.2 can now be dealt with. On 4th July, 1979 the Governor of Kerala promulgated Ordinance No. 8/79 inserting S.6C in Act 1 of 1964, reading as follows: "6C. Certain lessees who have made substantial improvements, etc., to be deemed tenants:-Notwithstanding anything contained in S.74, or in any contract, or in any judgment, decree or order of any court or other authority, any person in occupation at the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969, of the land of another person on the basis of a lease deed executed after the 1st day of April, 1964, shall be deemed to be a tenant if (a) he (including any member of his family) did not own or hold land in excess of four acres in extent on the date of execution of the lease deed; and (b) he or any member of his family has made substantial improvements on the land Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, improvements shall be deemed to be substantial improvements if the value of such improvements is more than fifty per cent of the value of the land on the date of execution of the lease deed." Act 27/ 79 which came into force in November, 1979 replacing Ordinance 8/ 79, also provided for inserting the identical provisions in Act I of 1964 with the result that S.6C as extracted above is now part of Act I of 1964 The purpose of the amendment was obviously to save tenancies created between 1-4-64 and 1-1-70 from the operation of S.74; and the contention of the Association is that Krishnan Namboodiri, the lessee under document No. 2454, was not holding lands in excess of four acres and had made substantial improvements in the land after the lease. Dw. 1 says that Namboodiri was having only about 1.50 acres of land. Assuming that this is enough to establish the requirement of clause (af of S.6C, it must further be shown that Namboodiri had made "substantial improvements" by 1-1-70, in order to satisfy clause (b)also. Dw. 1 says that Namboodiri was having only about 1.50 acres of land. Assuming that this is enough to establish the requirement of clause (af of S.6C, it must further be shown that Namboodiri had made "substantial improvements" by 1-1-70, in order to satisfy clause (b)also. On a plain reading of the Section it appears tome that the making of improvements by the person in occupation must also be by that date, since the object of the Section is to protect those who had entered on land belonging to another and had spent labour and money for its improvement. The evidence of Dw I on this aspect is that Namboodiri had engaged him "in 1970" for cutting laterite stones and for putting up a compound wall. About a lakh of stones were cut and used. He had engaged four or five masons a day, besides labourers, for cutting the stones, and the work was done in four or five months If the wall was the 'substantial improvement' made, work thereon was obviously completed months after 1-1-70. Even the work of cutting stones had started only in 1970 On this evidence it is impossible to hold that the requirement of clause (b) is satisfied. In my view, Krishnan Namboodiri and his assignees are not entitled to claim the protection of S.6C. 14. That apart, S.6C of Act I of 1964 is insufficient to save the two leases from the operation of S.29 of the B R.& C. E Act Unlike Ss.4,4A,5,6.6A,6B,7,7A,7B,7C,7D,8,9 and 10 (of Act I of 1964) all of which create deemed tenancies "notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law", the operation of S.6C is confined to "notwithstanding anything contained in S.74". In other words, S.6C saves a lease if it was invalid under S.74 of Act 1 of 1964. and not if it was null and void under S.29 of the H. R.& C. E. Act. S.13 of the Land Reforms Act is also of no avail, as counsel for the Association would like to have it; it confers fixity on a tenant notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law, only if there is a valid tenancy It must therefore be held that the lease created under Ext. A6 is not protected by S.6C of Act I of 64. 15. The purchase certificate in S. M. 487/79 is Ext. D3 dated 10-9-79. A6 is not protected by S.6C of Act I of 64. 15. The purchase certificate in S. M. 487/79 is Ext. D3 dated 10-9-79. The Tribunal's order allowing purchase is dated 22-5-79. (Though this too was produced along with Application 207/80, it was not marked in evidence; I am marking it as Ext. Cl for the purpose of completeness). The plaintiff's case, as set out in paragraph 4A of the plaint, is that no notice was issued to the fit person in the aforesaid proceedings. The Association was aware that the validity of the lease was under challenge in the Company Suit and that the plaintiff-fit person alone was competent to represent the Devaswom in any legal proceedings. Still it managed to get an order from the Tribunal, and that too in spite of the circumstance that the lease was of 1969, and no Tribunal could have, unless fraud was involved, recognised it as a valid one. Ordinance 8/79 was promulgated only in July, 1979 while Ext. Cl order was in May, 1979. The averment that no notice at all was given to the Devaswom or the fit person remains uncontradicted. Pw. 1 says that no notice was issued to him; soon after he came to know of the order, he applied in October, 1979 for a certified copy of the same for the purpose of filing an appeal. The copy has not been furnished so far. Counsel for the Association contends that. The above seems to be a mere reproduction of some form used by the tribunals; one does not know whether what was sent was a notice or an. No intermediary was involved, if one goes by Exts. CI and D3; but still there is a recital that some intermediary was present. It is also not clear whether the parties had appeared in person or through authorised agents; nor is it possible to find out who had failed to appear, in the face of the specific averment in the plaint and the clear assertion of Pw. 1, it is difficult to accept the above as a statement that the Devaswom was duly served and was represented before the Tribunal. Ext. Cl shows that the fair rent fixed for purposes of determining the purchase price was Rs 4/-per acre, under item 3 (1) (b) of Schedule III to the Act. The contract rent was Rs. 1, it is difficult to accept the above as a statement that the Devaswom was duly served and was represented before the Tribunal. Ext. Cl shows that the fair rent fixed for purposes of determining the purchase price was Rs 4/-per acre, under item 3 (1) (b) of Schedule III to the Act. The contract rent was Rs. 5/ per acre, and under S.27 (2) (b), the fair rent had to be fixed at Rs 3. 75, unless the tenant had opted by notice to the landlord sent by registered post to have it fixed at Rs. 4/-. Ext. CI order does not show, and even the Association has no case, that such a notice had been issued. In other words, the Tribunal's order contains intrinsic evidence as to how it cams to be passed. As Khalid J. has observed in Velappan. Peter Thomas (1979 KLT. 412= AIR. 1979 Kerala 194), a purchase certificate issued in proceedings where individual notice is not issued to the landowner cannot operate against him in spite of S.72K (2), even if a public notice has been issued under Sub-section (1) of S.72F. The Supreme Court has also held, in C. Veettil Ammed v. Taluk Land Board 1979 KLT. 601; (AIR. 1979 SC. 1573) that a purchase certificate would not conclude matters if the same is "inaccurate on its face, or has been obtained by fraud or collusion". When a Land Tribunal issues a purchase certificate on the strength of a tenancy admittedly created in 1969, and at a time when S.6C was not even on the legislative anvil, it has to be inferred that its proceedings consisted of an empty formality and a make-believe, with inaccuracy writ large on the face of the certificate issued by it. Coupled with the circumstance that no notice was issued to the Devaswom. inference of fraud is irresistible, And Velappan's case (1979 KLT. 412s AIR. 1979 Kerala 194) is also authority for the proposition that a court could declare invalid the order of a Tribunal or the purchase certificate issued by it under circumstances similar to those here established. On the issues under consideration, therefore, my finding is in favour of the plaintiff, and against the Association. 16. 412s AIR. 1979 Kerala 194) is also authority for the proposition that a court could declare invalid the order of a Tribunal or the purchase certificate issued by it under circumstances similar to those here established. On the issues under consideration, therefore, my finding is in favour of the plaintiff, and against the Association. 16. Though not raised in the pleadings, it was suggested at the fag end of the hearing that the validity of the leases and the availability of protection under S.6C are questions which should be referred to the Land Tribunal under S.125 of Act 1 of 1964. An interesting point as to how far the Section would affect the Company Court's jurisdiction under S.446 of the Companies Act thus emerges for consideration 17. S.125 (1) of Act 1/64 provides that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to determine matters which are, under the Act, to be determined by Land Tribunals; and Sub-section (3) provides that when such questions or matters arise for decision in a suit or other proceedings, the civil court shall refer them to the tribunal. What is the meaning to be given to the .term "civil court" in the context? Does it include the High Court, or more particularly the Company Court? 'Court' has been defined in S.2 (6) as the court having jurisdiction under the CPC. to entertain a suit for the possession of the holding to which any legal proceeding under the Act relates. If "civil court" means the same thing, what is affected by S.125 is only the jurisdiction of the subordinate court of first instance as understood in the CPC., and not of the High Court. The decision of the Land Tribunal under Sub-section (4) is binding only on the trial court; the appellate civil court can disturb it, in view of Sub-sections (5) and (6). That is another reason to think that 'civil court' means only the court as defined under Section 2 (6). But it is said that there are decisions which at least assume that the term may comprehend the High Court also. 1 therefore propose to make a different approach to the question. 18. That is another reason to think that 'civil court' means only the court as defined under Section 2 (6). But it is said that there are decisions which at least assume that the term may comprehend the High Court also. 1 therefore propose to make a different approach to the question. 18. Dealing with the distribution of legislative powers, Article 246 (1) of the Constitution confers exclusive power on Parliament to make laws with respect to any matter in List 1 of the Vllth Schedule; and this power is "notwithstanding anything in clauses (2) and (3)" of the Article. Clause (3) similarly confers exclusive power on the legislature of a State to make laws with respect to matters enumerated in List II, but this is "subject to clause (1)." The Companies Act is an Act passed by Parliament with respect to matters specified in Entries 43 and 44 of List! Entry 95 of List I enables Parliament to make laws delimiting the. jurisdiction and powers of all courts (except the Supreme Court) with respect to any of the matters in that List. Thus, the exclusive power to legislate on companies (within the purview of Entries 43 and 44) and to confer jurisdiction on courts including the High Court, in relation to the incorporation and winding up of companies, is vested in Parliament; and it is in exercise of that power that the Companies Act designates the High Court as the winding up court. The power of the Company Court under S.446 of the Companies Act is also traceable to the same source The Land Reforms Act is a law made by the State legislature in exercise of its powers under Art.246(3), read with Entry 18 in List H. Entry 65 of List H is similar to Entry 95 of List T; the former enables the State legislature to confer jurisdiction and powers on all courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to matters in List II. "Jurisdiction and powers" can be conferred both affirmatively and negatively. Thus Parliament can confer jurisdiction on the High Court or take away the jurisdiction vested in it while legislating with respect to a matter in the Union List. The State legislature can also do likewise while making laws with respect to matters in the State List. "Jurisdiction and powers" can be conferred both affirmatively and negatively. Thus Parliament can confer jurisdiction on the High Court or take away the jurisdiction vested in it while legislating with respect to a matter in the Union List. The State legislature can also do likewise while making laws with respect to matters in the State List. But can the legislature of a State making laws with respect to a matter in the State List, take advantage of Entry 65 thereof, to take away or abridge the jurisdiction conferred on a court by Parliament, by a law it has made with respect to a matter in the Union List, read with Entry 951 I think the answer can only be in the negative, because the exclusive power of Parliament under clause (1) of Article 246 is "notwithstanding" the exclusive power of the State legislature under clause (3), and the latter itself is subject to clause (1). Putting it more specifically, the Kerala legislature could make provision for land reforms and exclude or abridge the powers of the High Court in doing so, but only without touching upon the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court by Parliament under the Companies Act. The State legislature has thus no competence to curtail the powers conferred on the Company Court by S 446 of the Companies Act. In this view, the term "civil court" in S.125 of Act 1/64 should necessarily exclude the Company Court, because it cannot be presumed that the State legislature has done what it is not competent to do under the Constitution. 19. In a case arising under the Government of India Act, it was argued before the Federal Court (in Subramanyan Chettiar v. Muthuswamy Gounden AIR 1941 FC. 47) that where a State legislation was in pith and substance with respect to a matter contained in the State List, an incidental encroachment into the Union field, even if it be occupied by a Union law, could be tolerated; but Sulaiman J. found no difficulty in repelling the argument. It was observed: "...The principles laid down by their lordships have gone only so far as to permit an incidental encroachment, provided the Dominion field is unoccupied. In no case so far decided have their lordships tolerated a trespass as well as a clash. It was observed: "...The principles laid down by their lordships have gone only so far as to permit an incidental encroachment, provided the Dominion field is unoccupied. In no case so far decided have their lordships tolerated a trespass as well as a clash. If a clash with the dominion legislature were also allowed, then a Provincial legislature will also be in position, though indirectly, to nullify the Dominion legislation, even inside field exclusively open to the Dominion, which would make the position intolerable" "...To allow the Provincial legislatures to encroach upon the exclusive Federal field, even though in an indirect way, when there is a Central legislation already occupying the field, would be to give to the former a free hand in nullifying Central Acts relating to matters in the Federal field. Such a carteblanche he could hardly have been contemplated". The principle to be deduced is that if Parliament had not conferred jurisdiction on the Company Court under S.446 of the Companies Act, to entertain and dispose of any suit, proceeding or claim against a company in liquidation, the State legislature could probably have denied jurisdiction to the High Court in relation to any question springing there from; but once the field is occupied by Parliament by providing that the Company Court would be competent to deal with any suit, proceeding or claim against a company in liquidation, the legislature cannot thereafter invade that field. The word "any" in S.446 has also to be given its full meaning. A trespass into an unoccpied filed can be tolerated; but a trespass into an occupied field leading to a clash will be beyond the competence of the State legislature. To tolerate such a situation would be to permit the State to indirectly nullify Central legislation in an area where it is supreme under the scheme of Article 246 20. In Devassia v. Catholic Bank of India (1971 KLT. 932) the question arose whether a debtor of a banking company in liquidation could claim the benefits of the Kerala Agriculturists' Debt Relief Act. 1970; and a Division Bench of this Court held that he could not, in view of S.458 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 Applying the doctrine of occupied field referred to above, the Court held that the provisions of the Banking Regulation Act would exclusively govern the determination of the amount due from the debtor. 1970; and a Division Bench of this Court held that he could not, in view of S.458 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 Applying the doctrine of occupied field referred to above, the Court held that the provisions of the Banking Regulation Act would exclusively govern the determination of the amount due from the debtor. And in Official Liquidator v. Land Tribunal (1973 KLT 529) Isaac J. held that the Company Court alone would have jurisdiction to deal with a kudikidappu claim raised against a banking company liquidation, notwithstanding S.125 of Act 1 of 1964. Emphasis was of course placed on the word "exclusive" in S.458 of the Banking Regulation Act. 21. The decisions of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. India Fisheries (P) Ltd. AIR 1966 SC. 35 and in Damjiv. L.I.C. of India AIR. 1966 SC. 135 do not affect the position. It was held, in the former, that the special provisions of the Companies Act would prevail over the general provisions of S.49E of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922; and in the latter, it was held that the general provisions of the Companies Act could not prevail over the special provisions of S.41 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act The Income tax Act and the Life Insurance Corporation Act were both Central legislations, and the question was one of interpreting the extent of powers conferred by Parliament on the adjudicating authorities created thereunder, in the context of another Central Act The principle of the special excluding the general could be applied to cases where all the laws in question are by one and the same legislature; but that cannot be extended to cases where the competence of one legislature to trespass into a field occupied by another is in question. 22. S. V. Kondaskar v. M. M Deshpande AIR 1972 SC. 878 cannot also be of much assistance in reconciling the Company Court's jurisdiction under S.446 with the jurisdiction vouchsafed to the Land Tribunals by S.123 of Act 1/64. The question in Kondaskar's case was whether assessment and reassessment proceedings under the Income tax Act were to be considered as "other legal proceeding" within the meaning of S.446 (1), in which case the Income tax Officer had to obtain leave of the Company Court to initiate or proceed with such proceedings. The question in Kondaskar's case was whether assessment and reassessment proceedings under the Income tax Act were to be considered as "other legal proceeding" within the meaning of S.446 (1), in which case the Income tax Officer had to obtain leave of the Company Court to initiate or proceed with such proceedings. Answering the question in the negative, their Lordships held that "legal proceeding" in S.446 denoted a proceeding that could "appropriately be dealt with by the winding up court". The liquidation court could not perform the functions of an Income tax Officer in the matter of assessing the tax payable even by companies in liquidation. Assessment orders passed by Income tax Officers were subject to appeals to the higher heirarchy under the Income tax Act; and if the Company Court were to convert itself into an assessing authority, the consequences would be "anomalous" and "startling". The above principle could not apply to determination of questions arising under S.125 of Act I of 1964 because they are questions which the ordinary courts of the land (and the High Court) could easily deal with, and could have dealt with, but for its provisions. That apart, it S.125 of Act 1/64 could not deprive the Company Court of its jurisdiction under S.446 of the Companies Act, as f have already held, no question like the one dealt with in Kondaskar can arise at all. 23. It was also argued that the decision of the Land Tribunal in SM No. 487/79 would operate as res judicata in the suit I have already held that the decision is a nullity Even otherwise, the Tribunal's order has not become final because the Devaswom is yet to get a copy of it for filing an appeal. This contention has also therefore to be rejected. 24. In the result, the plaintiff is granted a declaration that the leases created by document Nos. 2454 and 2455 are null and void, and are not binding on it. The proceedings in SM. 487/ 79 and the purchase certificate Ext D3 are inoperative and are of no effect, so far as the plaintiff's rights in the two properties are concerned. The plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of the plaint schedule properties. 2454 and 2455 are null and void, and are not binding on it. The proceedings in SM. 487/ 79 and the purchase certificate Ext D3 are inoperative and are of no effect, so far as the plaintiff's rights in the two properties are concerned. The plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of the plaint schedule properties. As for costs, I think the parties should be left to suffer their own, particularly in view of the circumstance that the Association had already parted with substantial sums for purchasing the leasehold rights 'without recourse'.