JUDGMENT - A.N. MODY, J.:---This petition is filed by an unfortunate police constable who, though acquitted by the Magistrates Court on a charge of robbery, found innocent of the charges framed on the basis of the same facts, by the enquiry officer, because of his misfortune, was found guilty of the same charges by the Commissioner of police, the 2nd respondent by an order which can only be described as irrational and perverse. 2. The petitioner was employed as a police constable in the Bombay Police Force with effect from 1-4-1958 and suspended from 28-2-1970. The main charge against him was of robbery and the evidence against him before the enquiry officer was of the witnesses, one of whom was the complainant in the criminal prosecution and a self-confessed lier and the other one S.I. Deshmukh of the police force who had recorded the statements of witnesses and all of whom, denied the correctness of the statements as recorded by him. The self-confessed lier had deposed before the Magistrate that his statement was not properly recorded but before the enquiry officer he resiled from the previous statement and stated that his statement was correctly recorded. 3. One Suleman Ahmed Mohiddin a person with doubtful means of subsistence, on 16-3-1970, lodged a complaint with the Ghatkopar Police Station, alleging that on 28-2-1970 at about 7 OClock in the morning while he was standing near Ghatkopar Railway Station for catching a State Transport bus for Aurangabad he was accosted by four persons posing as C.I.D. personnel and who accused him of carrying gold. According to Suleman three of these persons put him in a taxi and relieved him of Rs. 50,000/- which Suleman was carrying in a bag and Rs. 20/- out of Rs. 220/- which Suleman was carrying in his purse. S.I. Deshmukh investigated the complaint and caught hold of three persons as accused one of whom was the petitioner. All these persons were acquitted on the charge of robbery in the Magistrate Court. 4. In the departmental proceedings all these three persons were charged (1) that they left the jurisdiction of the headquarters to which they pertained without permission of the Superintendent, and (2) that posing themselves as C.I.D. Officers on 20-2-1970 they robbed the said Suleman of Rs. 50,000/-. 4. In the departmental proceedings all these three persons were charged (1) that they left the jurisdiction of the headquarters to which they pertained without permission of the Superintendent, and (2) that posing themselves as C.I.D. Officers on 20-2-1970 they robbed the said Suleman of Rs. 50,000/-. This was investigated at length by the enquiry officer, who examined several witnesses on behalf of the prosecution as also one witness produced on behalf of the petitioner and ultimately submitted a well reasoned report. After the receipt of this report by an order dated 9-8-1972 the 2nd respondent did not accept the report of the enquiry officer and came to the conclusion that all the three persons including the petitioner were guilty of both the charges and after issuing a show cause notice as to why his service should not be terminated, by an order dated 21-11-1972 terminated the service of the petitioner. 5. As contended by Mr. C.J. Shah, it is well settled that this Court in exercising jurisdiction under Article 226, cannot sit in appeal over findings of fact of disciplinary authorities. However, this Court will be justified in setting aside the finding in case the decision is perverse and irrational and such that no reasonable person or a body of person can arrive at. 6. The said Suleman in his F.I.R. had given, inter alia, the facts stated above and had later given a further statement stating at an identification parade held later on he had identified the petitioner as one of the persons in the taxi and sitting in the front by the side of the driver. In his evidence before the Magistrate he stated that the statement recorded by S.I. Deshmukh in F.I.R. was not correct and gave an entire different version. At the disciplinary enquiry he again went back on his evidence before the Magistrate and he reiterated that the statement recorded by Deshmukh was correct. He further alleged that he had not deposed before the Magistrate to the effect that the statement recorded by Deshmukh was not correct. This is obviously a false statement as is apparent from the judgment of the Magistrate. It is stated in the judgment, "He (Suleman) denied that the officer who had recorded the statements had read it over to him in Hindi. The F.I.R. was readover and explained and he stated that he had not made those statements. This is obviously a false statement as is apparent from the judgment of the Magistrate. It is stated in the judgment, "He (Suleman) denied that the officer who had recorded the statements had read it over to him in Hindi. The F.I.R. was readover and explained and he stated that he had not made those statements. His further statement was also read out to him and he admitted having identified the accused Nos. 1 and 3 as the police constables and told him about them,". It is this Suleman who is considered as a reliable person by the Commissioner of Police had whose evidence is relied on to find the petitioner guilty. The next witness is the taxi driver. According to the statement as recorded by S.I. Deshmukh, this taxi drive is also supposed to have identified the petitioner. This taxi driver has consistently maintained in his evidence before the Magistrate as well as the enquiry officer that he had never identified the petitioner. 7. The Commissioner has strongly relied on the statement of various persons as recorded by Deshmukh, wherein the petitioner is alleged to have confessed to his committing the alleged crime. However, whether the statements as recorded by Deshmukh are reliable requires serious consideration : (a) As aforesaid each and every witness has denied the correctness of statements recorded by Deshmukh in one respect or other. Some of the witnesses who have denied correctness are police employees and another witness is a taxi driver whose evidence according to Commissioner and according to the statement of Mr. Shah in Court is reliable. (b) The taxi driver has clearly denied that he had at any time identified any of the accused though his statement to the effect has been recorded by Deshmukh. (c) Deshmukh has recorded the statement of one police constable, Sutar, who is now Head Constable. According to Sutar he received telephone call on 27-12-1970 at about 1.35 p.m. at the Head Quarters to which the accused No. 1 was attached saying that his nephew had expired. The accused No. 1 was on duty at Raj Bhavan. A message was conveyed to the Guard Commander at Raj Bhavan for being passed on to the accused No. 1 and also informing the Guard Commander that a relief was being arranged to relieve the accused No. 1 early to enable him to go to funeral. The accused No. 1 was on duty at Raj Bhavan. A message was conveyed to the Guard Commander at Raj Bhavan for being passed on to the accused No. 1 and also informing the Guard Commander that a relief was being arranged to relieve the accused No. 1 early to enable him to go to funeral. This Sutar was on duty between 8 a.m. and 2 p.m. and this is supported by the contemporaneous documentary record. The receipt of the message is also recorded in the register kept for the purpose with the time of the receipt of the message. As to what was conveyed was also recorded in the said register but in the handwriting of another constable who came at about 2 p.m. and relieved Sutar. Effect of this entry is that the message was given to the Guard Commander by this constable who relieved Sutar. According to Sutar he had not conveyed the message at all. The statement recorded by Deshmukh says that this message was conveyed by Sutar. Sutar has further stated in his evidence that he had given his statement in his own handwriting in Marathi to Deshmukh under his signature while the statement which is produced in English and which was explained to him by the enquiry officer was not correctly recorded. There is no reason to disbelieve Sutar specially when his evidence is supported by documentary evidence and also by other police personnel who have all denied the correctness of their statements as recorded by Deshmukh and have said that the message was conveyed to the Guard Commander by the person who relieved Sutar. 8. The aforesaid factors clearly show unreliability of the statements as recorded by Deshmukh. In these circumstances the Commissioner was thoroughly unjustified in blindly relying on the alleged confession as recorded by Deshmukh. 9. There is an inherent impossibility of arriving at the conclusion that the Commissioner arrived at. According to the Commissioner he completely believed the taxi driver when he stated that he was engaged at Ghatkopar Railway Station by four persons at 7 a.m. and discharged at Agar Bazar by the passengers at 8 a.m. on 28-2-1970. 9. There is an inherent impossibility of arriving at the conclusion that the Commissioner arrived at. According to the Commissioner he completely believed the taxi driver when he stated that he was engaged at Ghatkopar Railway Station by four persons at 7 a.m. and discharged at Agar Bazar by the passengers at 8 a.m. on 28-2-1970. While completely believing the taxi driver he had ignored the statement of the complainant in his evidence that he was put down near Mahim at about 8.45 or 9 a.m. However, assuming that what the taxi driver has stated is correct, the Commissioner completely ignored the fact that the petitioner was found present at the regular roll call taken at the Head Quarters on that day at 8 a.m. If he believed the evidence of the taxi driver that the passengers left the taxi somewhere near Mahim at 8 a.m., it is obvious that the petitioner who was present at the roll call on 28-2-1970 at 8 a.m. at Worli, could not be one of the passengers. 10. The Commissioner has again totally ignored the fact which has come out in the evidence that it is doubtful whether the complainant had any money with him as claimed. According to the complainant, he had brought Rs. 25,000/- from his native place in Madras, being the life savings of himself and his mother when he came to Bombay. According to him another sum of Rs. 25,000/- was obtained by his grand-father from one Dr. (Mrs.) Vidyagaur Shah. Though these two persons allegedly gave statements to Deshmukh, the grand-father did not even dare to appear before the Magistrate. Vidyagaur, however, did appear before the Magistrate but not before inquiry officer. The only evidence produced was a letter addressed by her to Suleman stating that she had given the amount of Rs. 25,000/- to Suleman for a period of six months. No receipt or promissory note has at any time been produced. Another surprising fact is that as per this letter this amount is supposed to have been borrowed by Suleman and not by the grand father as alleged by him. It cannot be said to have been established that Suleman had at an time possessed Rs. 50,000/- . This fact also is completely ignored by the Commissioner. 11. Another surprising fact is that as per this letter this amount is supposed to have been borrowed by Suleman and not by the grand father as alleged by him. It cannot be said to have been established that Suleman had at an time possessed Rs. 50,000/- . This fact also is completely ignored by the Commissioner. 11. The Commissioner has by some strange logic of his own come to the conclusion that it appeared that while defaulters were being prosecuted in the Court they persuaded the complainant Suleman to give different version in Court. This conclusion of the Commissioner is also thoroughly unjustified. Except the evidence of the self-confessed lier, Suleman, there was no other evidence before him to come to this conclusion. It is very serious allegation to make against any person of tampering with witness and such a conclusion cannot be arrived at without any cogent evidence. In my view there was no reliable evidence at all before the Commissioner to enable him to come to such a conclusion. It is only the perverseness of the thought process of the Commissioner that led him to believe the evidence of Suleman, who was obviously an unreliable person. Similarly is the case with regard to his accepting the evidence of Deshmukh. Says Commissioner that as per the statements recorded by Deshmukh, the defaulters had clearly admitted the guilt. As it is pointed out above, Deshmukh cannot be believed at all when he says that he had correctly recorded the statements. It is difficult to fathom the thought process by which the Commissioner came to the conclusion that there was no reason why Deshmukh should have recorded false statements. In view of the clear and unimpeachable evidence before him of at least portions of some of the statements as recorded by him having been obviously not correctly recorded by him, he cannot rely on the alleged confessions as recorded by Deshmukh merely on the ground that there was no reason why Deshmukh should have recorded false statement. The reasons for recording incorrect statements may be many. One of them could be over enthusiasm of an officer. The officer may have come to the conclusion that certain persons were guilty for reasons of his own and thereafter shaped the statement recorded to support this conclusion. Another reason could be that he wanted to get credit for quick solution of a case. One of them could be over enthusiasm of an officer. The officer may have come to the conclusion that certain persons were guilty for reasons of his own and thereafter shaped the statement recorded to support this conclusion. Another reason could be that he wanted to get credit for quick solution of a case. There can be other reasons also of graver nature. 12. In my view the order of the Commissioner, finding the petitioner guilty, to say the least, discloses total non-application of mind and total absence of rational thought process and is arrived at by totally and deliberate ignoring the evidence favourable to the petitioner and also disregarding the evidence which would prove the innocence of the petitioner the evidence relied on by the Commissioner is totally unworthy of any credence. There is no other possible conclusion. 13. It was urged on behalf of the respondent that the petitioner is guilty of gross delay and latches. In support of the contention Mr. Shah has cited (State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai)1, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1006 and (State of Kerala v. K.P. Gonvindan)2, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 152. Mr. Rana has cited (R.S. Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra)3, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 259. (Hirday Narain v. I.T. Officer, Bareily)4, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 33, 1979 Chancery Division (Kochefaucauld v. Boustead)5, 196, (Moon Mills v. Industrial Court, Bombay)6, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1450. I need not discuss in detail any of the judgment. It is well settled that delay when it amount to laches is one of the grounds justifying refusal to grant discretionary relief under Article 226. It is also well settled that whether there are such laches as it would deprive an aggrieved party of his remedy under Article 226 depends upon facts of each case. The Court must consider the reasons for delay if any given by the petitioner, the condition of the petitioner, mental as well as financial, the possible state of the mind of the petitioner when he received a shock because of a perverse order as also the effect of granting of relief on the rights and position of 3rd parties after a great lapse of time are some of the factors which must all be weighed together to consider the cause and effect of delay and if necessary relief can be moulded so that injustice likely to result because of delay can be compensated. If on the facts of a case it is found that the impugned order was throughly perverse and manifestly unjust, the Court should not hesitate to grant relief merely because of delay. The ultimate object of the Court always is to do justice. In the present case one must imagine what petitioner must have gone through when after having been elevated to a very happy state of mind because of a clear acquittal by the Court and a clear finding of the enquiry officer in his favour is, he like a bolt from the blue, suddenly faced with a perverse order of dismissal. Here is a person with a low salary and hence possibly no savings. It is difficult to imagine how he must have maintained his family in these circumstances and what difficulties he must have gone through to make the two ends meet during four years for which he is guilty of delay. If these circumstances and the utter perverseness of the impugned order are taken into consideration, I do not think that the delay is such as calls for dismissal of the petition. Apart from this it is also pointed out by Mr. Rana that the point of delay was advanced and considered at the time of admission of the petition and it was after considering this point that the petition was admitted irrespective of delay on the basis of the statement recorded by the Court that the petitioner will not claim any back wages even if he succeeds in the petition. In view of this position, asserted by Mr. Rana and not denied, and rightly so, on behalf of the respondents, it is not now open to the respondents to even raise this contention at this stage. 14. It was contended by Mr. Rana that though the departmental proceedings if already instituted can be completed even though criminal proceedings are pending in respect of the same subject and it is possible that the conclusion in the departmental proceedings and the criminal proceedings may be different, once a person was acquitted the departmental tribunal cannot institute, proceed with or give a finding contrary to that of the criminal Court. He cited various judgments of High Court in India to support this contention. He cited various judgments of High Court in India to support this contention. However, in view of the judgment in (Motisingh v. S.D. Mehta)7, A.I.R. 1966 Gujarat 233 which was approved by Kantawala, J. (as he then was) in a judgment dated 21-1-1971 in Misc. Petition No. 711 of 1968 (Appa K. Gori v. B.P.T.)8, the contention of Mr. Rana cannot be accepted. The view of the Gujarat High Court and Bombay High Court which is binding on me is that the nature of proceedings and the burden of proof the proceedings in the cases are different and so a departmental inquiry can be proceeded with and the different conclusion arrived at in spite of acquittal by a Magistrates Court. 15. In the circumstances I make the rule absolute in terms of prayer (a) and set aside the order of dismissal dated 21-11-1972 and the order in appeal dated 8-4-1974 and directed that the petitioner should be reinstated in the police force. The petitioner, however, will not be entitled to back wages but his salary for the future will be fixed on the basis that he had earned all the increments in the interagnum. Rule accordingly. The respondents shall pay the costs of the petition to the petitioner fixed at Rs. 1000/-. -----