Elgin Properties v. State of West Bengal — 1980 DIGILAW 229 (CAL)

ORDER In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioners are challenging an order of requisition bearing no.13/80 Reqn. dated 17th April, 1980 issued by the State of West Bengal in exercise of powers conferred by sub-s. (1) of S. 3 of the West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act). The facts of this case, as would appear from the petition, are as follows : – 2. The petitioner no. 1, Elgin Properties, is a partnership firm and the petitioner no. 2 is one of the partners of the said firm. The Official Trustee for West Bengal, the respondent no. 6 herein, is the trustee to the Trust of D.A. David for Davidian Girls’ School by and under a Deed of Trust dated 28th September, 1974 and is the legal owner of the premises no. 1-B, Ashutosh Mukherjee Road, (hereinafter referred to as the said premises). The petitioner carry on business of development of real property. 3. By and under a registered deed of lease dated September 28, 1974 the respondent no. 6 demised the said premises in favour of the petitioner for a term of 21 years commencing from 1st May 1969 with on option on the part of the petitioners to renew the lease for another period of 21 years. The said deed of lease was granted in favour of the petitioners by the Official Trustee with the leave of this Hon’ble Court. It is alleged that the said lease was obtained by the petitioners for the purpose of developing the said property and that the said deed of lease expressly authorised the petitioners to build at their own cost upper storey or storeys on the existing building or to construct a new building. The building at the said premises is a two storeyed building with outhouses. At the time of grant of the said lease a portion of the ground floor of the said premises was occupied by CAXTON & Co., the respondent no. 7 herein. Two rooms on the ground floor of the said premises is partly occupied by Martin & Harris Ltd. The remaining portion of the said premises is comprised of bathrooms, lavatories, urinals, common passages, common lobby which has been in use for all the occupiers of the said premises. 7 herein. Two rooms on the ground floor of the said premises is partly occupied by Martin & Harris Ltd. The remaining portion of the said premises is comprised of bathrooms, lavatories, urinals, common passages, common lobby which has been in use for all the occupiers of the said premises. The staircases leading to the first floor-begin from the ground floor. There is no access to the first floor of the said premises except through the ground floor. After obtaining the said lease, the petitioners, it is alleged got vacant possession of the first floor and also of terrace above the first floor. The Durwan and Security guards engaged by the petitioner for looking after the said premises and they have been provided accommodation on the terrace of the said premises and they have been using the lavatories and urinals on the ground floor of the said premises. It is alleged that the petitioners obtained possession of the leasehold premises in 1972 pursuant to one agreement of lease. 4. The respondent no. 9, Caxton Employees Union, is a registered trade Union. The said Trade Union claims to represent the workers and employees of the said Caxton & Co, the respondent no. 7 herein. It is alleged that the said Caxton Employees Union is affiliated with Centre of Indian Trade Unions which is a Federation of Trade Unions of Communist Party of India (Marxist). 5. It is alleged that the respondent no. 7 did not have any tenancy right in respect of the said premises. After obtaining the lease the petitioners took steps for eviction of the respondent no. 7 from the said premises and thereafter the following proceedings filed a suit being Suit no. 111 of 1972 against the respondent no. 7 for eviction and possession in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Alipore. The said suit was contested by the respondent no. 7 and on March 13, 1976 a decree for eviction of respondent no. 7 was passed by the learned Judge of Alipore on contest. 6. Against the said decree the respondent no. 7 preferred an appeal before this Hon’ble Court. Appellate Side being Appeal no. 367 of 1976. On March 8, 1979 the Appeal no. 367 of 1976 was dismissed on contest. The respondent no. 7 was passed by the learned Judge of Alipore on contest. 6. Against the said decree the respondent no. 7 preferred an appeal before this Hon’ble Court. Appellate Side being Appeal no. 367 of 1976. On March 8, 1979 the Appeal no. 367 of 1976 was dismissed on contest. The respondent no. 7 filed an application for Special Leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India against the said judgment of this Hon’ble Court. On August 10, 1979 the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India was pleased to dismiss the said application for special leave. In the meantime, the petitioners had made an application for execution of the decree of the Trial Court being Execution Case no. 14 of 1976 which had remained stayed. After dismissed of the Special Leave petition of the respondent no. 7, on 28.8.79 the petitioners made an application in the 4th Court of the Subordinate Judge at Alipore for proceeding with the said execution application. On 23.8.79 the respondent no. 7 filed miscellaneous petition under S.47 of the Code of Civil Procedure being Miscellaneous petition under S.47 of 1979. The said miscellaneous petition was allowed on the ground that there was discrepancy in the description of property as given in the execution application with the description as given in the decree for possession and the petitioner was directed to amend the execution petition. On 18.12.79 the petitioners applied for amendment of the execution petition and the amendment as prayed for was allowed by learned Subordinate Judge, Alipore. Thereafter the respondent no. 7 made another application under S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure being Miscellaneous Case no. 7 of 1980 which was rejected by the learned Subordinate Judge on March 27, 1980. Thereafter the respondent no. 7 obtained stay from learned Subordinate Judge at Alipore on the ground that they will apply to the High Court. It is alleged that no such application for revision has been filed to the knowledge of the petitioners. It is alleged that the respondent no. 7 has not paid the occupation charges and mesne profits since August 1969. It is further alleged that the respondent no. 7 has been a trespasser and the learned Subordinate Judge at Alipore and the High Court have held respondent no. 7 to be trespassers. It is also alleged that the respondent no. It is alleged that the respondent no. 7 has not paid the occupation charges and mesne profits since August 1969. It is further alleged that the respondent no. 7 has been a trespasser and the learned Subordinate Judge at Alipore and the High Court have held respondent no. 7 to be trespassers. It is also alleged that the respondent no. 7 has been wrongfully occupying about 16,000 square feet in the said premises. After dismissal of the Special Leave petition the petitioners made an application before the learned Subordinate Judge for determination of the amount of mesne profits payable by the respondent no. 7. In the said petition the petitioners have claimed a sum of Rs. 13 lakhs on account of mesne profits for the aforesaid period. The said petition is now pending. 6. It is alleged that after this Hon’ble Court Appellate Side, upheld the decree for possession, the respondent no. 7 through the respondent no. 8 and the Secretary and Office bearers of the respondent no. 9 approached the Government of West Bengal of which the petitioners have come to learn from the Official Trustee for West Bengal later on. In April 1979 the Official Trustee, West Bengal called a meeting at his office which was attended by the petitioner no. 7, Pravin Popat, the respondent no. 8 and two office bearers of the respondent no. 9. The Official Trustee was also present at the said meeting. The Official Trustee disclosed at the said meeting at the instance of the Government of West Bengal to find out ways and means for settlement. At the said meeting no settlement could be arrived at as the respondent no. 8 and office bearers of respondent no. 9 adamantly insisted that the respondent no. 7 should be allowed to continue in occupation of the said premises and rejected any proposal for shifting the business of the: respondent no. 7 to any alternative place proposed by the petitioners. It is alleged that the petitioners were willing to give reasonable time for shifting. But the respondent no. 8 and office bearers of the respondent no. 9 turned down any such proposal and threatened that unless the petitioners entered into a fresh agreement for tenancy they would get the portion of the said premises in occupation of the respondent no. 7 requisitioned through the Government The said two office bearers of the respondent no. But the respondent no. 8 and office bearers of the respondent no. 9 turned down any such proposal and threatened that unless the petitioners entered into a fresh agreement for tenancy they would get the portion of the said premises in occupation of the respondent no. 7 requisitioned through the Government The said two office bearers of the respondent no. 9, one of whom was Subodh Chakraborty, openly threatened that the respondent no. 9 is a trade union affiliated to Centre of Indian Trade Unions and had considerable influence over the present Government of West Bengal and there will be no difficulty to achieve requisition of the said portion of the said premises. 7. On April 26, 1980 the petitioners received a letter from the Deputy Official trustee for West Bengal under the cover of which a copy of the notice of requisition bearing no. 13/80-Reqn. dated April 17, 1980 was forwarded to your petitioners and it was further intimated that the said notice had been served on the Official Trustee, West Bengal on April 25, 1980 at 4.45 P.M. A copy of the said covering letter dated April 26, 1980 and the copy of the said order of requisition bearing no. 13/80-Reqn. dated April 17, 1980 are annexed to the petition and marked with the letters ‘B’ and ‘C’ respectively. 8. Being aggrieved by the said order of requisition, the petitioners have filed this application and a Rule Nisi was issued therein. 9. In the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the State affirmed by one Jatiswar Dutta on the 9th May, 1980, it has been stated inter alia, as follows :– 10. The respondent no. 9 on 5th February, 1980 made a representation to the Minister-in-charge, Department of Labour Government of West Bengal to save the workmen and the industry apprehending eviction of the employer, respondent no. 7 from the premises in question. On enquiry by the Private Secretary to the Minister-in-charge, Department of Labour, Government of West Bengal the respondent no. 7 by their letter dated 9th February, 1980 confirmed that the contents of letter of the respondent no. 9 were true and requested to help them in the matter and the said letter was received in the department of labour on 19th February, 1980. 7 by their letter dated 9th February, 1980 confirmed that the contents of letter of the respondent no. 9 were true and requested to help them in the matter and the said letter was received in the department of labour on 19th February, 1980. On or about 20th February, 1980, the Minister-in-Charge of the department of Labour forwarded the aforesaid letter dated 9th February, 1980 for the respondent no. 7 to the Minister-in-charge the Land Reforms and Land Utilisation Department of the Government of West Bengal for considering the prayer of the respondent no. 7 and to take such action as might be deemed fit by the Minister-in-charge of the Land Reforms and Land Utilisation Department. On 26th February, 1980 the Minister-in-charge of the Land and Land Reforms Department asked the Joint Secretary of the Land and Land Reforms Department asked the Deputy Secretary, Requisition Branch of that department to examine the question of Public Purpose’ in the light of the representations received. On or about 10th March, 1980 the respondent no. 7 again made representations to the Minister-in-charge of the Land and Land Reforms Department and to the Minister-in-charge of the Commerce and Industries Department of government of West Bengal setting out their nature of work and commitments to the various State Governments, the Government of India and the Government of Bhutan in the matter of printing jobs entrusted to them by these Governments as well as the number of workers involved with the prayer to save their industry from closure and from unemployment of large number of workers by requisitioning the said property and allowing the respondent no. 7 to carry on their services to Government India, different State Governments and private sectors. Both the aforesaid letters were identical. On 11th March, 1980 the Minister-in-charge of the Land and Land Reforms Department asked the Deputy Secretary of the Requisition Branch of that department to put up the file immediately and on 12th March, 1980 the Deputy Secretary of the Requisition Branch asked the Enquiry Officer of the Land and Land Reforms Department to enquire into the matter and report immediately. On 14th March, 1980 the Enquiry Officer of the Land & Land Reforms Department submitted his enquiry report after making enquiry on the spot recommending requisition of 16 rooms in the ground floor of premises no. On 14th March, 1980 the Enquiry Officer of the Land & Land Reforms Department submitted his enquiry report after making enquiry on the spot recommending requisition of 16 rooms in the ground floor of premises no. 1B, Ashutosh Mukherjee Road Calcutta together with a descriptive plan of the rooms recommended for requisition by him. On 18th March, 1980 the matter was examined by the Deputy Secretary, Requisition Branch of the Land & Land Reforms Department of the Government of West Bengal should be obtained and referred the matter to the Special Officer (Law) and Joint Secretary of the Land and Land Reforms Department for his opinion. On 18th March, 1980 the said Joint Secretary of the Land and Land Reforms Department sought the views of the Commerce and Industries Department of the Government of West Bengal with special reference to the questions, namely, (1) whether the press caters to the needs of the government; (2) whether existence of the industry as such including employment of considerable number of employees is at stake due to non-availability of suitable accommodation; (3) whether the concern made serious efforts to find out suitable accommodation before making the prayer for requisitioning and (4) whether the Commerce and Industries Department shall pay compensation that may be assessed under the relevant Act. In the meanwhile, the Commerce and Industries Department of the Government of West Bengal on receipt of the representation of the respondent no. 7 dated 10th March, 1980 to the Minister-in-charge of the Commerce and Industries Department asked for the details and particulars and evidence in support of their claim as referred to in that representation dated 10th March 1980 and the respondent no. 7 on 26th March 1980 submitted the details and particulars and evidence in support of their claim that they were working as printers for various State Governments, Government of India and other authorities and bodies and about their inability to find out suitable accommodation for their work as Printers in spite of efforts being made by them through Estate Agents. 7 on 26th March 1980 submitted the details and particulars and evidence in support of their claim that they were working as printers for various State Governments, Government of India and other authorities and bodies and about their inability to find out suitable accommodation for their work as Printers in spite of efforts being made by them through Estate Agents. On 1st April, 1980 the Deputy Secretary of the Commerce and industries Department of the Government of West Bengal examined the quires made by the Joint Secretary, Land & Land Reforms Department dated 18th March, 1980 as aforesaid and decision was thereafter taken by the Commerce and Industries Department at the higher level to request the land and Land Reforms Department to requisition the portion of the premises in question after observing legal formalities. On receipt of the aforesaid request for requisition from the Commerce & Industries Department, and the Government after being fully satisfied that to prevent the closure of the Industry in question and to prevent the loss of employment, of the workers employed by this Industry and to help the respondent no. 7 who caters to the needs of the governments of West Bengal, Governments of India and various other Governments by rendering their services as printers of various jobs including Security Printing job is a public purpose passed the impugned order of requisition on 17th April, 1980 after due deliberations and consideration of all aspects of the matter bona fide, reasonably and in the public interest and for the aforesaid public purpose. 11. It was further stated that the said order of requisition has been issued after due consideration of the representations of the respondent nos. 7 and 9 herein. The vital interest of the various State Governments, the Government of India and the Royal Government of Bhutan in the matter of keeping the industry of the industry of the respondent no. 7 going on unhampered and uninterrupted, the interests of large body of workmen who were faced with imminent threat of loss of employment consequent upon eviction of the respondent no. 7 from the requisitioned portion of the said premises and after having been fully satisfied as to the public purpose behind it. It was denied and disputed that the said order of requisition has been passed on extraneous considerations and not for any legitimate public purpose. 12. 7 from the requisitioned portion of the said premises and after having been fully satisfied as to the public purpose behind it. It was denied and disputed that the said order of requisition has been passed on extraneous considerations and not for any legitimate public purpose. 12. In the affidavit affirmed by one Sri Arun Ghosh, respondent no. 8 herein, who is a partner of Caxton & Co., it has been denied that respondent has not paid the occupation charges and mesne profits since August 1979 as alleged. It is denied that any threat was made as alleged. It is further stated that he made a representation to the Minister-in-charge, Commerce and industries, Government of West Bengal on the 10th March, 1980 stating inter alia that the respondent no. 7 is engaged in the services of the Government of India (D.A.V.P.) Government of West Bengal, Government of Tripura, Mizoram and Bhutan and the respondent no. 7 is also doing security jobs like printing of Lottery Tickets for Government of Tripura, Royal Government of Bhutan and the Government of West Bengal and state that there are more than 200 employees working under the respondent no. 7. He requested the Minister-in-charge, Commerce and Industries Department, Government of West Bengal that unless the Government could take some steps to provide accommodation for the Press by requisitioning the said premises, those employees may lose their job due to closure of the said company, the respondent no. 7 herein. In reply to the same, the Assistant Secretary, the Ministry of Commerce and Industries asked for such clarification which was furnished. In this context it is further stated that the said respondent no. 7 is carrying on its business since May, 1962 in the said premises and had been doing all sorts of security job for the Government of India, government of West Bengal, Government of Tripura, Royal Government of Bhutan and Government of Mizoram, the respondent no. 7 having Security Wings, the Security job of the aforesaid Governments are entrusted to the respondent no. 7 as such security job cannot be entrusted to other printers for want of security. Furthermore, the respondent, no. 7 carries stock of papers of behalf of various State Governments and are regularly printing lottery ticket for the Government of Tripura, Royal Government of Bhutan, Indian Red Cross Society, Government of Nepal, etc. as the respondent no. 7 as such security job cannot be entrusted to other printers for want of security. Furthermore, the respondent, no. 7 carries stock of papers of behalf of various State Governments and are regularly printing lottery ticket for the Government of Tripura, Royal Government of Bhutan, Indian Red Cross Society, Government of Nepal, etc. as the respondent no. 7 has special security arrangements which are not normally available with any other printers. The respondent no. 7 are also doing work for the leading pharmaceutical companies of India, battery manufacturing companies, Tea Exporting Houses and Milk Food Manufacturers in the country. The respondent no. 7 gets more than 50% of their total business from Government of India and other State Governments. The respondent no. 7 have more than two hundred employees and also have apprentices under the Central Board of Apprentice Training. The said boys after completion of their Diploma course from the Jadavpore School of Printing and Technology are sent to the respondent no. 7 for acquiring practical training pertaining to the course. The respondent no. 7 have also the same facilities for trainees of the Board of Practical Training, Government of West Bengal and have also imparted training facilities to Staff employed with the West Bengal Government Press. The respondent no. 7 has one of the finest units in India who has achieved a rare record by winning various national awards for the excellence in printing and packaging job. 13. Mr. A. Mitra, appearing in support of the Rule, has made five broad submissions. He has firstly submitted that there is no public purpose. In this connection he has drawn my attention to the order of requisition and the respective affidavits by the respondents He has submitted that the purpose is not a public purpose and that in this case the impugned order has been passed not for the benefit of the public but for the benefit of the private persons. The order of requisition has been passed to enable the private person to carry on his business. There is no guarantee from the Caxton & Co., regarding the continuity of the employment of the employees. There is no control by the Government over the management. He has submitted that the alleged public purpose of preventing unemployment cannot be ensured by such order. There is no guarantee from the Caxton & Co., regarding the continuity of the employment of the employees. There is no control by the Government over the management. He has submitted that the alleged public purpose of preventing unemployment cannot be ensured by such order. He has further submitted that in this case the allotment and the requisition is not made in favour of the workers but Caxton & Co., and denied that any money has been paid by the Government. Caxton & Co. is a trespasser and no requisition can be made for a trespasser. The primary object was to provide for accomodation of Caxton & Co., and the primary reason for such requisition is for benefiting Caxton & Co., and not the members of the public. He has further stated that the two reasons have been shown in the affidavit–ensuring execution of Government job and ensuring continuance of employment of the employees. He has stated that if one ground is bad, the whole order is bad. According to him, there is no statement on oath that the premises is needed for a public purpose. He has further submitted that it has not been shown why the respondent no 7 is required to be in that particular area itself and not elsewhere. Necessity or the need of requisition is not there. It has not been shown as to why the press must be situated in that area itself. He has further submitted what attempt the respondent no. 7 had made for alternative accomodation has not been stated. He has submitted that in any event prevention of loss of employment cannot be a public purpose. 14. In this connection, he has referred to the following decisions : Satyanarayan Nathani v. State of West Bengal & anr. AIR 1959 Calcutta 310; Amiya Prova Das Gupta v. First Land Acquisition Collector & Ors. 66 CWN 456; Gobardhan Jayaswal v. First Land Acquisition Collector & anr. 62 CWN 158; Veeraraghavachariar Ors. v. The Secretary of State for India in Council by the Collector of Tanjore 48 MLJ 204, 210; Paresh Nath Nundy v. State of West Bengal & ors. 68 CWN 264. 15. The second submission of Mr. Mitter is that the order of requisition is vague. 62 CWN 158; Veeraraghavachariar Ors. v. The Secretary of State for India in Council by the Collector of Tanjore 48 MLJ 204, 210; Paresh Nath Nundy v. State of West Bengal & ors. 68 CWN 264. 15. The second submission of Mr. Mitter is that the order of requisition is vague. In this context he has drawn my attention to the order of requisition wherein a description of the Schedule of properties requisitioned is given, which is as follows :– SCHEDULE Description of premises; 1-B, Ashutosh Mukherjee Road, Calcutta-20 (entire ground floor of the premises now in occupation of M/s Caxton & Co.) In this connection, he had drawn my attention to paragraph 11 the petition wherein it has been stated that Caxton & Co. is in occupation of 16000 sq.ft. in the said premises. In the affidavit of the Government there is no denial and the Caxton & Co. has not also denied the same. An interim order was passed in this case, when it was stated by Mr. Chatterjee, appearing for the respondent no. 7, that the area in occupation of respondent no, 7 was 8000 sq.ft. So for as the plan prepared by the office of the Land Acquisition Collector is concerned, it was submitted that it was subsequently prepared. In any event, that showed an area of 11449 sq.ft. Accordingly, the area is not definite and cannot be ascertained. 16. In this connection, he has relied on the following decisions : Sri Sri Iswar Sridhar Thakur Jew v. The State & Ors. (1975) 1 CLJ 524. Sm. Subhasini Debi v. State of West Bengal & Ors. (1977) 2 CLJ 476. 17. The third submission of Mr. Mitter is that the petitioner is admittedly a landlord within the meaning of S. 2(c) of the said Act. In any event, the Petitioner is a tenant. Accordingly, he has submitted that in view of the provisions of S. 3(2) of the said Act the order must be served on the petitioners. If the order is not served the Government has no power to take possession. In this connection he relied on the decision in the case of Gobardhan Jayaswal v. First Land Acquisition Collector & anr. Accordingly, he has submitted that in view of the provisions of S. 3(2) of the said Act the order must be served on the petitioners. If the order is not served the Government has no power to take possession. In this connection he relied on the decision in the case of Gobardhan Jayaswal v. First Land Acquisition Collector & anr. The provisions of S. 3(2) of the said Act provide as follows : “3(2) An order under sub-s.(1) shall be served in such manner as may be prescribed on the landlord, and where it relates to premises let out to a tenant also on such tenant” 18. The fourth submission of Mr. Mitter is to the effect that there was non-compliance of the provisions of S. 4(1)(aa) which is set out herein below : “4(1) where any premises are requisitioned under this Act the Collector may by notice in writing – (a) the person in occupation of the premises if any, to vacate the premises within a period of ten days from the service of the notice. (aa) order the landlord or the tenant, as the case may be, to remove the articles belonging to him, if any, and, where the premises are requisitioned without any furniture therein, such furniture within a period of fifteen days from the service of the notice. Provided that the Collector may for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend the said period up to two months”. He has submitted that the said section has not been complied with in the present case and accordingly, the Government is no entitled to take possession of the same. In this connection, he has relied on an unreported judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mrs. Elizabeth Stock v. The Secretary, Land Utilisation and Reforms and Land and Land Revenue Department, Government of West Bengal & ors. delivered on 28th May, 1976 being Matter no. 394 of 1973. 19. The fifth submission of Mr. Mitter is that the order is mala fide. He has submitted that three is malice in law and in fact both. According to him, the order was made to set at nought the decree obtained by the plaintiffs and to circumvent the orders passed by different courts including this court and the Supreme Court. 19. The fifth submission of Mr. Mitter is that the order is mala fide. He has submitted that three is malice in law and in fact both. According to him, the order was made to set at nought the decree obtained by the plaintiffs and to circumvent the orders passed by different courts including this court and the Supreme Court. He has further submitted that there is non-application of mind in the facts and circumstances of this case. In any event, it was made for the purpose of a trespasser and not a tenant. He has further stated that helping a profit making business concern to continue in possession on payment of low rent is mala fide. There is no categorical statement by Caxton & Co. that no closure notice has been issued. He has further stated that originally it was stated that the respondent no. 7 was in occupation of 16 rooms but as would appear from the subsequent report, they are in occupation of 22 rooms. 20. The last submission of Mr. Mitter is that before the order of requisition is made, a notice should be issued to the persons concerned and an opportunity of hearing should be given. However, he did not press this matter before me in view of the decision of this court in the case of Chittaranjan Sen Majumder v. The First Land Acquisition Collector reported in 82 CWN 828. 21. Mr. Advocate General, appearing on behalf of the State, has submitted that in this case the Government has passed such order firstly for preventing loss of employment in respect of a number of employees. It is the interest of the Government to see that there is no loss of employment; unemployment being rempant in this country. Secondly, in view of the nature of work done by the company on behalf of this Government to take steps for allowing continuity of the said business. He has submitted that in this case the purpose is a public purpose. He has further submitted that if the purpose is a public purpose, that is, if it is primarily for public benefit, the entrustment of such function to a private body, even if it means profit to that private body, does not make the purpose any the less a public purpose. He has not contended that the public purpose is nor justiceable. He has not contended that the public purpose is nor justiceable. He has contended that whether a particular premises is needed for a public purpose or not is not justiciable. He has disputed the correctness of each and every contention of Mr. Mitra in particular he has submitted that it is not necessary to show any alternative accommodation. He has denied and disputed that the Government acted mala fide in this matter. In support of his contentions he has relied on the following decisions; 22. State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji & anr. reported in AIR 1955 SC 41 ; Babu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay (now Maharashtra) & ors. reported in AIR 1960 SC 1203 ; SM. Somawanti & Ors. v. The State of Punjab & Ors. reported in AIR 1962 SC 343 : Ratilal Shankarrabhai & ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. reported in AIR 1970 SC 984 ; Government of Haryana & Ors. v. Hakin Sinngh & anr. reported in AIR 1979 Punjab and Haryana 122 ; Jage Ram & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors. reported in (1971) I. SCC 671. Sm. Somawanti and Ors. v. The State of Punjab & Ors. reported in AIR 1963 SC 151 ; Paresh Nath Nundi & anr. v. State of West Bengal & Ors. reported in AIR 1964 Calcutta 175; Chayarani Mukherjee v. Assistant Secretary, land and Land Revenue Department, Requisition Branch, State of West Bengal & Ors. reported in 68 CWN 826, Arnold Rodricks & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported in AIR 1966 SC 1788 l Ambalal Purushotam etc. v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad & Ors. reported in AIR 1968 SC 1223 ; Amulya Chandra Banerjee & Ors. v. The Corporation of Calcutta reported in AIR 1922 PC 333 l Sm. Venkatamma & Ors. v. City Impravement of Trust Board Mysore & Ors. reported in (1973) 1 S.C.C. 189; Ratilal Shankarabhai & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. reported in AIR 1970 SC 984 . 23. Mr. A.P. Chatterjee, learned Advocate appearing for the respondent no. 7 supported the order of requisition and generally adopted the submissions of the learned Advocate General. In this connection he has also drawn my attention to Articles 39(a) and 43 of the Constitution which are set out herein below ; “30. Certain principles of policy to be followed by the State. A.P. Chatterjee, learned Advocate appearing for the respondent no. 7 supported the order of requisition and generally adopted the submissions of the learned Advocate General. In this connection he has also drawn my attention to Articles 39(a) and 43 of the Constitution which are set out herein below ; “30. Certain principles of policy to be followed by the State. – The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing – (a) that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood”. “43. Living wage, etc, for workers. – The State shall endeavour to secure, by suitable legislation or economic organisation or in any other way, to all workers, agricultural, industrial or otherwise work, a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent standard life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities and ill particular, the State shall endeavour to promote cottage industries on an individual or co-operative basis in rural areas”. 24. In support of his contentions, he has relied on the following decisions; State of Karnataka v. Ranagatham Reddy reported in AIR 1978 SC 215 ; M.P. Kuttappa Kurup & Ors. v. Sub-Collector, Chengannnur & Ors. reported in AIR 1962 Kerala 252 Amlya Prova Das Gupta v.1st Land Acquisition Collector reported in 66 CWN 456; Prodosh Kumar Bajpaie v. State of West Bengal & Ors. reported in 74 CWN 696; Jatadhar Mitra & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors. reported in AIR 1970 Calcutta 90; Amarendra Nath & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors. reported in 67 CWN 647. In reply, Mr. Mitra, has submitted that the cases cited under the Land Acquisition Act can be distinguished in as much as the scope of, the public purpose under the said Act is different from the scope of the purpose within the meaning of the Act in question. He has further relied on the following decisions : (1) State of West Bengal & Ors. (2) Ramkrishna Mission Howrah v. P.N. Talukdar & Ors. reported in AIR 1965 SC 646 . He has also relied on an unreported judgment of this court in the case of Sri P. Dutt & Ors. v. Basant Kumar Chokhani delivered by a Division Bench of this Court on the 8th June 1978 in Appeal from Original Order no. 165 of 1972. 25. reported in AIR 1965 SC 646 . He has also relied on an unreported judgment of this court in the case of Sri P. Dutt & Ors. v. Basant Kumar Chokhani delivered by a Division Bench of this Court on the 8th June 1978 in Appeal from Original Order no. 165 of 1972. 25. It is now well settled that it is not necessary to set out the purpose of requisition in the order, The desirability of such a course is obvious because when it is not done, proof of the purpose must be given in other ways In itself an omission to set out the purpose in the order is not fatal so long as the facts are established to the satisfaction of the Court in some other way (State of Bombay v Bhanji Munji (supra), Babu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay (now Maharashtra & Ors.) (supra). 26. The facts and circumstances under which the order of requisition has been passed would appear from the pleadings in this case as quoted above and also the relevant files of the Government, copies of which have been given to petitioners. From that the following facts appear :– 27. The respondent no. 7 herein is a small scale industry. It is a policy of the government to encourage small scale industries in the state. The said company carries on business in printing. It carries on important works of the Government. As a result of the circumstances specified hereinabove the company was going to be evicted from the said premises. In the said circumstances, the government was approached and it was pointed out that if this eviction takes place, there is a threat of closure. About 200 employees are employed therein. At least about 141 of them made a petition also. The Government was faced with an apprehension of loss of employment of such a number of persons. 28. Public purpose is bound to vary with the time and condition in the locality, and therefore it would not be a practical proposition even to attempt comprehensive definition of it (Somawanti v. State of Punjab) (supra). 29. In my opinion, and in the facts of this case, I have no doubt that the purpose of ensuring continuation of employment is definitely a public purpose. These employees are also members of the public. 29. In my opinion, and in the facts of this case, I have no doubt that the purpose of ensuring continuation of employment is definitely a public purpose. These employees are also members of the public. A section of the public can also be members of the public. Pandit Jhandu Lal v. State of Punjab & Ors. (supra) Arnold Rodricks v. State of Maharashtra (supra), Amiya Prova Das Gupta v. 1st L.A. Collector (supra), Ratilal Sankarbhai v. State of Gujarat & Ors., (supra) Government of Haryana v. Huknm Singh (supra). The private benefit of a large number of industrial workers be come public benefit within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act (Pandit Jhandu Lal v. State of Punjab) & Ors. (Supra), Arnold Rodricks & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (supra). 30. Providing employment to people is undoubtedly a public purpose. Somawasti v. State of Punjab (supra) Jage Ram v. State of Haryana & Ors. If that is so, in my opinion prevention of unemployment is also a public purpose. Therefore, if steps are taken by the Government for preventing a threatened unemployment of persons, is my opinion, that cannot be said to be not a public purpose. 31. As it also appears from the affidavit affirmed on behalf of the State and the records produced by them, the respondent no. 7 was engaged in rendering service to the Government as printers of various jobs including security printing job. If one of the reasons for such requisition is prevention of threatened interruption of the same, that, in my opinion, would amount to a public purpose. As would be found from the plan there are security rooms also. 32. In my opinion, the mere fact that the requisition is made for a private institution or a private individual is not the end of the matter. The test is whether it is for the benefit of the public or whether it is for the benefit of any individual. The question is whether the requisition ultimately serve a public purpose or a public interest. In the facts of the present case, it is clear that the premises was requisitioned not for the benefit of Coxton & Co., as such but for preserving the continuity of the work done on behalf of the Government and for ensuring continued employment. Mere fact that respondent no. In the facts of the present case, it is clear that the premises was requisitioned not for the benefit of Coxton & Co., as such but for preserving the continuity of the work done on behalf of the Government and for ensuring continued employment. Mere fact that respondent no. 7 would be benefited as a result of the same is, in my opinion immaterial in the facts and circumstances of the case. If ultimately it is for public interest and if ultimately it is found to be a public purpose, the fact that it is done at the instance of a third party or that it would benefit a private individual does not make it any loss. In the facts and circumstances of this case of object of requisition is within the concept of public purpose as discussed above and merely because it may have incidentally benefited the respondent no. 7 it cannot be said that it was not for public purpose. In my opinion, it is also immaterial that the allottee is the Caxron & Co. and not the workers. It is otherwise for public purpose, whether the private body is a company or a body of workers, that is also unimportant. 33. I am also unable to hold that the primary object was to provide accommodation to the respondent no. 7 I accept the contention of the respondents that the primary object was for maintaining continuity of the employment and the security jobs of the Government. 34. In the ease of Amiya Prova Das Gupta v. First Land Acquisition Collector & Ors. (supra) 66 CWN 455 by an order made under S. 3(1) of the said Act one hall, one room, one privy and a both in occupation of Haranaryan Institute of Culture was requisitioned for a public purpose. In the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondent Land Acquisition Collector the nature of the public purpose was admitted to be accommodation of the said Institute, which is a public institution for training of dancing and music. It was, inter alia, contended on behalf of the petitioner therein that the said Institute was a private profit making institution and requisition for the purpose of such and institution cannot be a public purpose justifying the requisition thereof. The learned Judge repelled the contention of the State Government that the said institute was a public institution. It was, inter alia, contended on behalf of the petitioner therein that the said Institute was a private profit making institution and requisition for the purpose of such and institution cannot be a public purpose justifying the requisition thereof. The learned Judge repelled the contention of the State Government that the said institute was a public institution. Thereafter the learned judge dealt with the contention of the State that although the institution may not be a public institution, yet then it was serving the cause of public education in a particular branch of art and of such requisition for its purpose is a public purpose. The learned judge pointed out that the expression ‘public purpose’ includes purposes for advancement of public prosperity, public welfare and public convenience. It was observed that the word ‘public’ connotes the general public as well as a section of the public and a purpose may be a public purpose even though the purpose does not benefit all the members of the public but only a section of it. It was further observed that in a matter of acquisition or requisition for a private individual or a private body there may be a public purpose involved provided the acquisition or requisition ultimately serves a public purpose. Whatever the public purpose may mean, it must involve a purpose which aims at serving the general interest of the community or a section thereof as opposed to a particular interest of an individual or a private body. A requisition of premises for private dancing and music school may be a public purpose if it subserves a public interest. But because the institution is a dancing and music school, a requisition for its purpose need not necessarily be a public purpose. If the institution is a private profit making institution, a requisition of premises for its private purposes should not be made under the Act for the simple reason that in involves no public purpose. The learned judge observed that “on the materials before me I am also not satisfied that the Haranarayan Institute of Culture is not a private profit making concern, I cannot, therefore hold that the requisition for its purpose was a public purpose”. 35. I have followed the principles laid down in this case. However the facts of this case are different from the facts of the present case. 35. I have followed the principles laid down in this case. However the facts of this case are different from the facts of the present case. On the materials before this case Learned Judge held that it did not serve public interest. For the reasons given, in the facts of the present case, I have held that primarily this is for public purpose and not for the benefit of the respondent no. 7. 36. In the case of the State of Karnataka v. Ranganathan Reddy, (supra) the statutory purpose was to acquire contract carriages in private ownership and transfer them to the State Road Transport Corporation which was to enjoy the exclusive privilege of running contract carriages. The expected shower of benefits was elimination of misuse of contract carriage in private hands and augmentation of public good by plying these vehicles under public ownership and direction. One of the questions raised was whether such taking from a private person and vesting in a pubic body was not a public purpose. In this context it was mentioned that if the purpose is for serving the public as governmental purposes ordinarily are then everything desiderated for sub-serving such public purpose falls under the broad and expanding rubric. The nexus between the taking of property and the public purpose springs necessarily into existence if the former is capable of answering the latter. On the other hand if the purpose is a private or non public one, the mere fact that the hand that acquires or requires is Government or a public Corporation, does not make the purpose automatically a public purpose. 37. In the case of Amarendra Nath v. State of West Bengal & ors. (supra) it was also a case of an acquisition for a private body. There also it was held that if it was otherwise a public purpose, merely because it had been undertaken at the instance of a private body, would not make the order bad. In this context, it was observed as follows: “As the Supreme Court has pointed out, it may well be that proceedings in acquisition are commenced at the instance of a private person, munificence and charity may have supplied the nucleus of an organisation intended to benefit the community at large. In this context, it was observed as follows: “As the Supreme Court has pointed out, it may well be that proceedings in acquisition are commenced at the instance of a private person, munificence and charity may have supplied the nucleus of an organisation intended to benefit the community at large. There is nothing in the Act which prevents an acquisition at the instance of a private agency as the as the purpose of the acquisition is a public purpose. We do not think there is any substance in the argument that the proceedings having been commenced at the instance of a private organisation they are tainted even though they might result in expansion of the in institution which educates hundred, of women students”. 38. In the case of Smt. Venktarama and Ors v. City Improvement of Trust and Board, Mysore & Ors. (supra) the acquisition of land by the Board of Trustees was for construction of shopping sites. In this case it was argued mat the land for shopping sites was not being acquired for a public purpose because the Scheme was that the shopping sites would be let out to private individuals who would erect shops thereon. It was said that if amounted to the acquisition of land of A for the purpose of giving it to B and that is not permissible under the Constitution. In this context the Supreme Court held that any purpose which directly benefits the public or a section of the public is a public purpose. In the present case the shops would cater for the needs of the persons living in the locality. 39. In the case of Amulya Chandra Banerjee & Ors, v. The Corporation of Calcutta (supra), the Supreme Court held that it would not be correct that the Dharamshala is excluded from the term ‘public’ purpose' because the persons interested mainly would have been the worshippers and dignitaries of the temple. 40. In the case of Veeraraghavacharian & Ors. 39. In the case of Amulya Chandra Banerjee & Ors, v. The Corporation of Calcutta (supra), the Supreme Court held that it would not be correct that the Dharamshala is excluded from the term ‘public’ purpose' because the persons interested mainly would have been the worshippers and dignitaries of the temple. 40. In the case of Veeraraghavacharian & Ors. v. The Secretary of State for India in Council, represented by the Collector of Tanjore (supra) it was observed by the Madras High Court as follows: “Where the primary object is personal gain whether that be of a private individual or of a company, the public benefit resulting from the action of such a person or a company is too remote, and the purpose cannot be said to be a public purpose. Every merchant and every dealer can say that he benefits the public because he is catering or providing to the wants of the public. The merchant’s first object is to make a gain for himself. The benefit that he may confer upon his constituents or patrons is very remote. Such purpose are not pubic purposes”. 41. In my opinion there cannot be any doubt about the correctness of the principles laid down in this case. However, in the facts of the present case I am of the opinion that the primary object of the requisition was not the private gain of the respondent no. 7. I am also of the opinion that the public benefit results from such requisition, having regard to the background of the requisition, is not too remote. 42. In the case of Government of Haryana & Ors. v. Hakam Singh & Ors. (supra) a Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court considered the question of public purpose. In that it was held as follows : “The expression ‘public purpose’ has been used in a generic sense. It includes a purpose in which the general interest of the community as opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directly concerned. It also includes the purpose in which a fraction of the community is interested. All that is necessary is that it should serve the general interest of the society. It is well settled that public purpose varies with the times and prevailing conditions in the localities. Therefore, acquisition of land for developing residential and commercial plots is for a public purpose”. 43. All that is necessary is that it should serve the general interest of the society. It is well settled that public purpose varies with the times and prevailing conditions in the localities. Therefore, acquisition of land for developing residential and commercial plots is for a public purpose”. 43. On the question whether the acquisition of land by the State for its development for residential purpose by a Company would also constitute a public purpose, the Court observed that the Act does not provide that if some land is acquired by the State for public purpose, it must be so utilised by the State itself. The requirement of law for acquisition is that land is needed for a public purpose and the compensation be awarded is paid wholly or partly out of the public revenues or some funds controlled or managed by the local authority. It was held that if it was a public purpose entrustment of such function to a private body even for consideration of profit to that body did not make the purpose colourable. 44. In tile case of Prodosh Kumar Bajpaie v. State of West Bengal & ors (supra) the requisition was for an association. It was pointed out that even where the immediate beneficiary of an order for requisition or acquisition be a private person, the order will be upheld if there is ultimate public purpose behind it. It was also pointed out that it is not necessary for the Government to show that attempts for acquiring the land by that body by private treaty had been made and that has failed. It was held that the association for which the disputed premises has been requisitioned is an association for the welfare of the Bhutias and it was engaged in doing social work. Accordingly, that was held to be a public purpose. 45. In the case of Jatadhar v. State of West Bengal (supra) D. Basu J. considered the relevant cases on the question of public purpose. This was another case of acquisition for a private institution. 46. In the case of Jaga Ram & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors. (supra) the land was sought to be acquired for setting up a factory for the manufacture of China-ware and porcelain ware including all glazed tiles etc. The Supreme Court observed that starting of a new industry was in public interest. 46. In the case of Jaga Ram & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors. (supra) the land was sought to be acquired for setting up a factory for the manufacture of China-ware and porcelain ware including all glazed tiles etc. The Supreme Court observed that starting of a new industry was in public interest. The Supreme Court accepted the contention of the State that it was done to tackle the problem of unemployment. It may be pointed out that this was also a case of private ownership. Reference may be made in this connection also to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay (supra). 47. In my opinion, the question of any guarantee being given by the respondent no. 7 regarding continuity of employment of its employees cannot arise in the facts and circumstances of this case. If it is for a public purpose, that is the end of the matter. The object of requisition being maintaining continuity of employment, if the continuity of employment is not maintained in future by the respondent no. 7, that would be a ground for derequisition of the said premises. It is now well settled that if a premises is requisitioned for a public purpose, and subsequently the public purpose ceases to exist, then the premises in question must be derequisitioned at once. Be that as it may, absence of any such guarantee by respondent no. 7 would not affect the requisition. 48. Further, in my opinion, it is not necessary that there should be any control by the Government over the management. The question of enforcing the employment by any government order does not and cannot arise. If it is for a public purpose, it is for the government to see that the premises are continued to be used for such purpose. If there is cesser of such purpose, that Government on its own or at the instance of any interested party, derequisition the said premises. This is the control which the government will have. 49. I am unable to hold that the CAXTON & Co., is a trespasser and accordingly there can be no requisition of the said premises for such a trespasser. This is the control which the government will have. 49. I am unable to hold that the CAXTON & Co., is a trespasser and accordingly there can be no requisition of the said premises for such a trespasser. The fact that Caxton had become a trespasser and liable to be evicted from the said premises by virtue of a decree of the Court, created the necessity for such requisition. As I have already stated the test is whether it is for public purpose the person at whose instance the requisition is made is immaterial. 50. I am also unable to hold that it is necessary to state on behalf of the respondents why such a business is to be carries on only in that particular place and not in other place. In my opinion, once it is for a public purpose the question of this place or other place is for the Government. Moreover, we have to remember that in this particular case the requisition is not for establishment of a new institution but it is for continuation of an institution which has been in existence at this particular place for a number of years. As a matter of fact, very same argument can be made in every case if the Government wants to requisition a particular premises. If any premises is requisitioned at Bagazar as suggested, the persons interested might have taken the point as to why it is necessary to have the same at Bagbazar and not at Ashutosh Mukherjee Road where it is in existence. 51. On the question of alternative accomodation, in my opinion, this question cannot arise in facts and circumstances of this case. We should remember that this is not a case of installation of a Government servant in a house but it is a case of continuity of a particular establishment, which is otherwise for a public purpose, in a place where they bad existed for a number of years past. Further, in my opinion, in the facts of this case, there is some material to show that some attempts were made for finding some other alternative accomodation. I accept the same. 52. For the aforesaid reasons, I hold that the order was made for a public purpose. 53. I shall now deal with certain other cases cited in this connection on behalf of the petitioners. 54. I accept the same. 52. For the aforesaid reasons, I hold that the order was made for a public purpose. 53. I shall now deal with certain other cases cited in this connection on behalf of the petitioners. 54. In the case of Satya Narayan Nathani v. State of West Bengal & Anr. (supra) it was a case of requisition under the said act. It was inter alia contended therein that the purpose for which the requisition was made as not a public purpose. It was inter alia held that the Act under which the requisition was made by the government was governed by Article 31(2) of the Constitution and accordingly the question whether the Act at all purports to authorize the acquisition of requisition for a public purpose or whether the purpose it mentioned or contemplates is a purpose of a public character and the question whether a particular order made under it is actually supported by a public purpose as contemplated by the Act are both justiceable. It was held that the public purpose need not be set out in the order but can be shown otherwise. From the affidavit affirmed in the case it was disclosed that the order was passed for providing accomodation to an officer of the State Government who, it is said, was solely in need of accomodation. It was observed that it was not said that he had made every possible effort on his own account to secure accomodation and that such efforts had failed her that in order to sufficient discharge of the duties of his office it was essential that he should find accomodation in Calcutta and could not come from the suburbs or from any of the neighbouring localities. In this context it was observed as follows :– “A government servant is undoubtedly a public servant in the broad sense of the term, though very remotely a servant of the public, and it may also be said that the public are interested in the proper discharge by government servant of the duties of his office. In this context it was observed as follows :– “A government servant is undoubtedly a public servant in the broad sense of the term, though very remotely a servant of the public, and it may also be said that the public are interested in the proper discharge by government servant of the duties of his office. But where the conditions of a Government servant's service do not require that accomodation is to be provided for him or there is nothing to show that there is some special reason for which it is essential to provide him with residential facilities or to find accomodation for him in a particular locality in order that he may be able to perform efficiently the duties of his office. I find it difficult to hold that the purpose of providing accomodation to a person merely because he is in need of accomodation is a purpose in which the public who pay him by a salary for such services he renders are further interested not to speak of being interested directly or vitally”. The facts of the present case is different from the facts of the Satyanarayan Nathani's case. I may point out that subsequently the said Act has been amended and accomodation for government servants has been made specifically a public purpose. 55. On the question of public purpose, the learned Judge in Gobordhan Jaiswals case (supra) referred to the case of Satya Narayan Nathani v. State of West Bengal (supra) and stated as follows :– “As far as I can see the tests laid down are as follows :– (a) Merely saying that an officer of the State Government was solely in need of accomodation is not sufficient. (2) It must be shown that the Government servant in question had made every possible effort on his own account to secure accomodation and such efforts had failed. (3) It was necessary to establish that in order to ensure the efficient discharge of the duties of his office the particular Government servant in question should find accomodation in Calcutta and could not come from the suburbs or from any of the neighbouring localities. (4) A public purpose is a purpose which must include an object and aim in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of the individual, is directly and vitally concerned. (4) A public purpose is a purpose which must include an object and aim in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of the individual, is directly and vitally concerned. (5) A Government servant is in a sense a servant of the public and the public are interested in the proper discharge by him of his duties of office. But where the conditions of service of a Government servant do not require that accomodation has to be provided for him or there is essential to show that there is some special reason for which it is essential to provide him with residential facilities or to find accommodation for him in a particular locality in order that be may be enabled to perform or performs efficiently the duties of his office, it would not be public purpose to provide him with accommodation merely because he is in need of accomodation”. 56. Applying the tests the learned judge found that (1) the condition of service of Sikha Rani Sen Gupta did not require that the accommodation was to be provided for her by the Government, (2) There was no special reason to show that it was essential to provide her with residential facilities in the particular locality namely, the Bompas Road or even in Calcutta. The learned Judge further found that the Government servant concerned had made efforts and found possible accommodation but the accommodation that was available was not found that it has not been stated nor can it be found that for efficient discharge of her duties, which is merely clerical, it was essential that she should be found accommodation in Calcutta and could not come from suburbs. The learned Judge held in this context as follows:– “There is no condition of service with the lady concerned that she would be provided with accommodation where accommodation is scarce, the Government servant concerned cannot be allowed to pick and choose and it is no part of the duty of the Government to provide accommodation to the liking of the government servant by compulsorily requisitioning the property belonging to others. There exists no special circumstances to compel government to requisition the premises for the Government servant concerned. Accordingly it was held that there was no public purpose and that the order of requisition is bad and not in accordance with law. 57. There exists no special circumstances to compel government to requisition the premises for the Government servant concerned. Accordingly it was held that there was no public purpose and that the order of requisition is bad and not in accordance with law. 57. My comments in respect of this decision is the same as those in respect of Satyanarain Nathani’s case (supra). 58. On the second question. I am unable to hold that the order is vague. The order particularly specifies that it was in respect of premises no. 1B, Ashutosh Mukherjee Road (entire ground flour) which is occupied by Caxton & Co. This company has been occupying a portion of the said premises for a number of years and it is ascertainable a, to what is the area under occupation, As a matter of fact it has been so ascertained subsequently. It is true that before me at some stage some figures were given. But at one point of time the parties were willing that the area in occupation of the respondent no. 7 was to be measured and the question of compensation was to be settled by an independent person to be appointed by Court. Subsequently the petitioners did not agree to the same, Because a particular figure was given at the stage which is different from the figure specified elsewhere, would not make the order, which was passed long before, vague. 59. In the case of Sri Sri Iswar Sridhar Thakur Jew v. The Staate & Ors. (supra) cited on behalf of the petitioner, the respondent no. 2 therein issued a notice of requisition under S. 3(1) of the West Bengal (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948, requisitioning a portion of premises no. 103A, Rakhal Das Addy Road in Holding no. 86 of the Calcutta Municipality for the purpose of maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community namely, for sinking a big diameter tubewell in a bustee area as required by the Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority. In this context, it was observed that thereafter the impugned notice was issued by the respondent no. 2 whereby the schedule of the original notice of requisition was amended by substituting premises no. 101A, Rakhal Das Auddy Road, in place of premises no. 103A, Rakhal Das Addy Road. In this context, it was observed that thereafter the impugned notice was issued by the respondent no. 2 whereby the schedule of the original notice of requisition was amended by substituting premises no. 101A, Rakhal Das Auddy Road, in place of premises no. 103A, Rakhal Das Addy Road. In this context, it was observed that it was found from the amended notice itself that no specification of the portion of premises no. 101A, Rakhal Das Auddy Road, which was intended for requisition, has been made in the purported notice. Replying on three decisions of this Court it was held that a notice of requisition or acquisition of a portion without specifying the particular portion intended to be requisitioned, is per se bad. 60. The facts of this case are distinguishable. In this case a “portion” of the premises was requisitioned. Neither in the original notice nor in the subsequent notice sufficient description was given to specify or identify the ‘portion’. In the present case the portion has been specified and identified by express words to that effect in the order under these circumstances and having regard to the background of this case there is no vagueness. 61. In the case of Smt. Subhasini Devi v. State of West Bengal & Ors. (supra) cited on behalf of the petitioner, an order of requisition being no. 2 dated August 6, 1973 in Requisition Case no. 1/77/72-73 was challenged. By this order the Collector, Hooghly requisitioned 039 acres of land out of the plot No. 40 of Mouza Kulihonds, P.S. Chinsurah. In the column for description of the specific portion of land thereby requisitioned it is mentioned ‘middle’ obviously meaning that the middle portion of the plot was requisitioned. There was no dispute that the plot no. 40 comprised an area of 258 acres of land and out of this land a specified portion thereof measuring, 058 acres was purchased by the petitioner therein by a registered Kobala dated October 3, 1963, for the alleged purpose of building her residence thereon. This was challenged on the ground that it had not been indicated in the notice as to which portion of the plot was sought to be requisitioned. This was challenged on the ground that it had not been indicated in the notice as to which portion of the plot was sought to be requisitioned. This contention was accepted and in this connection it was held that it was no possible to hold that the description was sufficient as the term ‘middle’ in the order by itself without further description did not convey any specific portion which could be deemed to have been requisitioned under the order. The learned Judge referred to certain cases where there is a plan which can be referred to as the description of a particular portion of the plot sought to be requisitioned. The facts of this case are also distinguishable for similar reasons. 62. On the question of service of notice under S.2(2) of the Act, in my opinion, the absence of such service does not make the order bad. The only effect of such non-service does not make the order bad. The only effect of such non-service is that until such service is made the Government will not be entitled to take any step for taking possession or to take possession of the premises in question pursuant to such order. 63. In the case of Gobardhan Jayaswal v. The First Land Acquisition Collector & anr. (supra), it was a case of requisition under the said Act. It is inter alia contended therein that the order of requisition was not served on the petitioner who is the owner of the premises as required by law. Accordingly, it was bad. The learned judge held that there had been no valid service in accordance with law upon the petitioner as required under S. 3 of the Act. Thereafter the question arose that if the notice of requisition has not been served upon the owner as required under the Act, whether it makes the service bad or whether it makes the order of requisition bad. The learned Judge held in this connection as follow : – “In my opinion an order of requisition can be made validity if the provisions laid down in S. 3(1) of the Act are satisfied. In other words, if there is a public purpose, then the requisition order was valid. All that is required is the existence of a public purpose, the opinion of the State Government of its existence and an order in writing requisitioning the premises. In other words, if there is a public purpose, then the requisition order was valid. All that is required is the existence of a public purpose, the opinion of the State Government of its existence and an order in writing requisitioning the premises. Provided that these three conditions exits, the order would be valid. Next comes the question of its service. Before the requisition is valid one of the essential preconditions is that the order must be served inter alia upon the owner. That this is a mandatory provisions there can be no doubt. But if it is not complied with, I do not see how it makes the order of requisition invalid. What it may do is to make the requisition invalid. The requisition consists of the order of requisition together with all the steps followed in order to gain possession. Until the order is properly served, government has no power to take step for taking possession not to speak of taking actual possession. Until the order is properly served, government has no power to take step for taking possession not to speak of taking actual possession or allowing anybody else to take its possession. In the present case the validity of the order of requisition will have to be judged from the point of view of the existence of a public purpose. Assuming for the moment that a public purpose existed, non-service of the notice makes the requisition bad. In other words, the taking over of possession was bad. In my opinion, therefore the service being bad, the taking over of possession by the respondent was bad. This by itself does not effect the order of requisition.” 64. However, in the present case, the possession has all along been with the respondent no. 7, who is also the allottee. It would have been otherwise if the petitioners themselves were in possession. Because they were not in possession they were seeking for possession in Courts of law. Moreover, it is to be pointed out, the petitioners have themselves admitted in the petition that they have received a letter from the Deputy Official Trustee for West Bengal the cover of which a copy of the requisition notice was conveyed to the petitioner. The same is also annexed to the petition. Accordingly, the order has been served on the petitioner, whether directly by the Government or through the Official Trustee. The same is also annexed to the petition. Accordingly, the order has been served on the petitioner, whether directly by the Government or through the Official Trustee. There has been a substantial compliance of the provisions of S. 3(2) of the said Act. 65. In my opinion, the question of non-compliance of section 4(1)(aa) of the Act does not arise because, in the present case the petitioner was admittedly not in occupation of the requisitioned premises. As a matter of fact because they are not in occupation or possession of the premises in question, that they were seeking the assistance of the Court. 66. On the question of mala fide, 1 am unable to accept the Contentions made on behalf of the petitioners. I am unable to accept that there was any non-application of mind. In my opinion, from the facts disclosed in this case there has been a proper application or mind. I have already held that it was not meant primarily for the benefit of Caxton & Co., and accordingly, question of helping a profit making business concern to continue in possession on payment of lower rent cannot and does not arise. It was not necessary that there should have been any categorical statement by the respondent no. 7 that if there would not be any closure in future. The Government will have the control over it by way of de-requisitioning the premises if the public purpose cease to exist Further, in my opinion, it is not relevant that it was not categorically stated that there will be a closure. Unless there is requisition. There was a threat. Admittedly, the petitioners were trying to evict the Caxton & Co. In my opinion, question of Caxton being a trespasser, is immaterial. This is more the reason for such requisition. It was submitted that from the file it appears that respondent no. 7 were occupying 16 rooms, whereas from the report it appears that they were in occupation of 22 rooms. In my opinion, for this reason the order cannot be said to be mala fide. The purpose of acquisition was for continuity and, therefore, whether it is for 16 rooms or 22 rooms irrelevant. The description of the property given inn the schedule to the order was in respect of the premises in occupation of Caxton & Co. 67. In my opinion, for this reason the order cannot be said to be mala fide. The purpose of acquisition was for continuity and, therefore, whether it is for 16 rooms or 22 rooms irrelevant. The description of the property given inn the schedule to the order was in respect of the premises in occupation of Caxton & Co. 67. There is also no merit in the contention that the order was invalid and illegal because it was made to set at nought the decree and to circumvent the order of the Court. As a matter of fact, such a decree and the execution thereof, necessitated such order. If there was no threat to the occupation of the respondent no. 7 the question of requisition would not have arisen. 68. In the case of The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad & anr. v. The New Shrock Spinning and Weaving Co., Ltd., (supra) cited on behalf of the petitioner it was observed by the Supreme Court, relying on a decision in the case of Mahal Chand Sethia v. State of West Bengal, that a Court of law can pronounce upon the validity of any law and declare the same to be null and void if it was beyond the legislative competency of the Legislature or if it infringed the rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution. It can strike down or declare invalid any Act or direction of a State Government which is not authorised by the law. It was observed that the position of a legislature was, however, different. It cannot declare any decision of a Court to be void or inoperative. Reliance was also placed on similar observation made by the Supreme Court in an earlier decision in the case of Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd., and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. 69. In my opinion the law laid down by the Supreme Court has no application in the present. The Legislature far the less the Slate Government, cannot declare any decision of a court to be void or inoperative, but that does not prevent the State Government from exercing its power of requisites, which is otherwise for public purpose, merely because there is a decree for possession in favour of third person or merely because that decree has been put in for execution. I am also unable to hold that merely because these were negotiating at one stage between the petitioners and the respondent no. 7 regarding a tenancy right to the petitioner which ultimately failed, the action of the State Government was illegal or mala fide. 70. In the case of Ambalal Purushottam etc., v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad & ors (supra) it was held that the appropriate Government was not prevented in issuing the notification under S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act merely because the municipality had not attempted to acquire the land by private treaty. 71. So far as the last point is concerned, I have already pointed out that this point was not pressed before me in view of the decision in the case of Ghittaranjan Sen Mazumdar v. First Land Acquisition Collector reported in 82 CWN 628. 72. All the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner fail. Accordingly, this application is dismissed. The Rule is discharged. All interim orders are vacated. There will be no order as to costs. 73. Prayer for stay of operation of the order is made. I asked the learned Advocate for the petitioner as to why such stay was necessary i.e. if the stay is not granted, what prejudice will be suffered by the petitioner, in the facts of this case where respondent no. 7 has been at all material times and still is in possession. The learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that the Government may deal with the property in any other manner. Requisition has been made for the continuation of a particular business and I do not see any prejudice which might be suffered. 74. The learned Advocate for the petitioner then submitted that it is apprehended that the possession might be given to somebody else apart from Caxton & Co. Accordingly, the only stay 1 shall grant is to the effect that the Government shall not hand over possession of the requisition premises to any person or authority other than the respondent no. 7. 75. At the request of the learned Advocate for the petitioner, the State respondents are also directed not to take any step for the assessment of the rent compensation payable in respect of the said premises under the said Act. Rule discharged with direction.