ORDER Chandrasekhara Menon, J. 1. This civil revision petition arises out of an order rejecting the defendant's application for impleading an additional party in the suit, O.S. No. 240 of 1976 of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Irinjalakuda. The said suit is one filed by the respondents herein seeking a decree for amounts alleged to be due to them from the petitioner as per their accounts. The case of the plaintiffs is that the revision petitioner and the 1st respondent herein had dealings in copra and the amounts as per the accounts are alleged to be due to them on that account. The defendant petitioner herein averred in the written statement that the suit was brought about in collusion with his son namely, Ravindran who is alleged to have looked after the business on behalf of the petitioner for a few days but who was relieved of his responsibilities because of his wanton acts. Sometime afterwards the defendant petitioner filed I. A. No. 852 of 1980 for bringing on record the said Ravindran, according to the petitioner, for a proper adjudication of the pleas raised in the case and also for proceeding against the said Ravindran under O.8A of the Code of Civil Procedure. That application was opposed by the respondents. The court below has dismissed the application which has given rise to this civil revision petition. 2. The scope and ambit of O.1, R.10(2) come up for consideration in this civil revision petition. It will be useful to quote the provisions of that rule in this case. "10(2) Court may strike out or add parties. - The court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added". 3. The court below stated: "It has not been shown that the person sought to be impleaded is a necessary or even a proper party to the suit". 3. The court below stated: "It has not been shown that the person sought to be impleaded is a necessary or even a proper party to the suit". The court below further pointed out: "It is well settled that the plaintiff is the master of the suit and nobody should except in exceptional cases be added as a defendant without the consent of the plaintiff". The court was of the opinion that the person sought to be impleaded is not a necessary or proper party because there is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and that person who is the defendant's own son. Even if the defendant has been defrauded by his son, the lower court said, it is not a matter which arises for consideration or can properly be considered in this suit. According to the court below, the scope of the suit cannot be enlarged to bring in such matters also into issue. 4. The scope and ambit of O.1, R.10 of the Civil Procedure Code have been clearly brought out in an English decision - Chancery Division in Dollfus Mieg Et Compagnie S.A. v. Bank of England (1950 (2) All ELR 605). The court there was dealing with the English rule in R.S.C., O.16, R.11 which reads: "No cause or matter shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joinder of parties, and the court may in every cause or matter deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interest of the parties actually before it. The court or a judge may, at any stage of the proceedings, either up on or without the application of either part, and on such terms as may appear to the court or a judge to be just, order that the names of any parties improperly joined, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, be struck out, and that the names of any parties, whether plaintiffs or defendants, who ought to have been joined, or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the cause or matter, be added". It is clear that the latter portion of this English rule and of O.1, R.10(2) is more or less identical. It is clear that the latter portion of this English rule and of O.1, R.10(2) is more or less identical. I am referring to the English case because there is a detailed discussion therein of the general principles and of the relevant case law on the matter. It is pointed out that the general rule is accurately stated in The Annual Practice, 1949, P. 253 in these words: "Generally in common law and chancery matters a plaintiff who conceives that he has a cause of action against a defendant is entitled to pursue his remedy against that defendant alone. He cannot be compelled to proceed against other persons whom he has no desire to sue". This general rule is well stated in Norris v. Beazley (46 LJQB 169) by a court which consisted of Lord Coleridge, C. J. Denman and Grove JJ. In that case the defendant, in an action on a bill of exchange against the acceptor, sought to add the name of a company as defendants under R.S.C., 1873, O.16, R.13, on the grounds that: "It was alleged by the defendant that the acceptance was given for the purchase money of a ship which he had agreed to purchase of the plaintiffs; that in entering into the agreement for such purchase he had acted as a trustee for the company, to whom the ship was afterwards conveyed in pursuance of the agreement, and that the plaintiffs made fraudulent representations with regard to the ship, by reason of which the company had been put to useless expense, which they claimed to recover from the plaintiffs". 5. Lord Coleridge, C. J. said there as follows: "It seems to me to be correctly argued that those words plainly imply that the defendant to be added must be a defendant against whom the plaintiff has some cause of complaint, which ought to be determined in the action, and that it was never intended to apply where the person to be added as defendant is a person against whom the plaintiff has no claim, and does not desire to prosecute any. It seems to me that this application is answered, and that it was not intended that persons in the position of the company should be added as defendants, merely for the convenience of another defendant between whom and the company there may be questions which will afterwards have to be settled. It seems to me that this application is answered, and that it was not intended that persons in the position of the company should be added as defendants, merely for the convenience of another defendant between whom and the company there may be questions which will afterwards have to be settled. It seems to me that it is the more important to construe this rule strictly, because it is obvious that, in many cases, if the defendant's contention is right, its provisions might be made use of in a manner exceedingly harassing to plaintiffs, by forcing them to include in their actions persons against whom they do not seek to proceed, and to mix up their rights, as against one person, with questions of a highly complicated nature arising between themselves and others". Justice Denman observed thus: "I am quite clear, however, that the court ought not to bring in any person as defendant against whom the plaintiff does not desire to proceed unless a very strong case is made out, showing that in the particular case justice cannot be done without his being brought in". The same principle was referred to by Justice Buckley in McCheane v. Cyles (1902 (1) Ch. 911) in these words: "Looking at the rule you must, in order to say that a person who is not a party ought to be added, find either that he 'ought to have been joined,' or that his 'presence before the court maybe necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the cause or matter'. I cannot hold that the plaintiff ought to have joined Mrs. Cromyn as a defendant, and her presence is not necessary to enable the court to decide whether Cyles is liable for a breach of trust. Moreover, if Mrs. Cromyn were joined as a defendant and the plaintiff did not make any allegation against her, she might ask to be dismissed from the action". 6. Justice Wynn-parry in (1950) 2 (1) A.E. L.R. 605 after referring to these two cases said that these cases are examples of the general rule and both these cases rested on the ground that, in the circumstances of each of them, the court had no jurisdiction to make the order asked for. 6. Justice Wynn-parry in (1950) 2 (1) A.E. L.R. 605 after referring to these two cases said that these cases are examples of the general rule and both these cases rested on the ground that, in the circumstances of each of them, the court had no jurisdiction to make the order asked for. There are, however, certain exceptions to the general rule, conveniently divided in the Annual Practice, 1949, p. 254, into three classes and prefaced with the words: "Generally speaking, intervention can only be insisted upon in three classes of case". The first of these three classes is a representative action where the person seeking to intervene is one of a class whom the plaintiff claims to represent and the intervener is unwilling that the plaintiff should represent him. In such a case the intervener can insist on being added as a defendant. The second class of case is where the proprietary rights of the intervener are directly affected by the proceedings. The third class of case concern actions for specific performance of contracts where third parties have an interest in the question of the manner in which the contract should be performed. Justice Wynn-Parry states that the applicants, before him, do not come within any of the three classes. The case before him was on the following facts: "A French company was the owner of sixty-four identifiable gold bars which were looted by the Germans during their occupation of France and were later found and seized by the allied armies. Custody of the bars was acquired by a Tripartite Commission, consisting of representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and France, which was set up under treaty arrangements between the United Nations for the purpose of acquiring and eventually distributing, in accordance with the provisions of the treaty, the gold and treasure looted by the Germans. The sixty-four gold bars were conveyed to England and deposited by the commission with the Bank of England, and, on learning this, the French company asserted its claim to them. On 18th October, 1948, the company issued the writ in an action against the bank claiming delivery up of the bars or damages for their detention. The sixty-four gold bars were conveyed to England and deposited by the commission with the Bank of England, and, on learning this, the French company asserted its claim to them. On 18th October, 1948, the company issued the writ in an action against the bank claiming delivery up of the bars or damages for their detention. The bank applied for an order to set aside the writ and all subsequent proceedings on the ground that the bars were in the possession or under the control of the governments of the United States of America, France, and the United Kingdom and the action impleaded two foreign sovereign States, viz., the governments of the United States and France, who declined to submit to the jurisdiction. The case proceeded on the basis that the bars were returnable in specie to the three governments on demand and the judge made the order which was asked for. The company appealed and, at the conclusion of the argument before the Court of Appeal, the bank put fresh evidence before the court, viz., that although it had segregated all the sixty four bars at the request of the Tripartite Commission, it had inadvertently sold thirteen of them while the action was pending. As a result of this fresh evidence, the Court of Appeal allowed the company's appeal, but gave leave to the bank to appeal to the House of Lords. The governments of the United States of America and France now applied under R.S.C., O.16, R.11, to be added as defendants to the action. For the purpose of the application they did not assert a title to the bars, but they contended that, if they could establish that they had possession or control of them through the bank, the company would fail to obtain from the court an order in its favour by reason of the doctrine of immunity which applied to foreign sovereign States, and, therefore, the applicants would retain possession and control over the bars and be able to dispose of them". 7. The learned Judge points out that the first and third classes, clearly, are not applicable. 7. The learned Judge points out that the first and third classes, clearly, are not applicable. As regards the second class of case, the applicants - at any rate, so far as regards the purposes for which they desire to be joined as defendants-do not seek to set up any proprietary rights in the sense in which that phrase was used in Vavasseur v. Krupp (1878 (9) Ch-D. 351). In that case, a foreign sovereign, the Mikado of Japan, bought in Germany shells made there, but said to be infringements of an English patent. The shells were brought to that country to be put on board a ship of war, which had been built for the Mikado in that country, with a view to being used as ammunition for the guns of that ship. The patentee obtained an injunction against the agents of the foreign sovereign, as the persons in whose custody the shells were, restraining him from removing the shells. The Mikado then applied to be made a defendant in the suit. Both Jessel, M.R., and the Court of Appeal held that, notwithstanding the injunction, he ought to be free to remove the shells. In his judgment, Lord James, L.J. had emphasised the point that the decision was being rested on what he described as the undoubted and admitted fact that the property in question was the property of the Mikado, the intervener. Justice Wynn-Parry stated that the authorities furnish instances of when intervention will be allowed and when it will not, and from those authorities the general rule embracing the three classes in question has been evolved, but in no case has the court attempted to lay down in an exhaustive statement all the cases in which the court will allow or refuse applications for the joinder of new defendants. On one side of the line is a case which establishes that an indirect interest on the part of an intervener is not sufficient. On the other side of the line is a case which established that a proprietary right of the proposed defendant in the subject matter of the action is sufficient. On one side of the line is a case which establishes that an indirect interest on the part of an intervener is not sufficient. On the other side of the line is a case which established that a proprietary right of the proposed defendant in the subject matter of the action is sufficient. The learned Judge referred to the fact that was before him that the applicants do not assert a title to the property in question and, therefore, it cannot be asserted that they have a proprietary right, as that phrase is used in Vavasseur v. Krupp (1878 (9) Ch-D. 351). What they assert is that, if they can establish that they have possession or control of the property in question through the defendant bank, then, by virtue of the doctrine of immunity which applies to foreign sovereign States, two results might well follows: (i) the plaintiffs must fail to obtain any order from this court in their favour, and (ii) the applicants will retain the possession and control over the remaining bars of gold, and will be able to dispose of them. In other words, although the applicants do not assert title to the bars of gold, the result of a successful intervention by them would be that, as between the plaintiffs and themselves, they would, for all practical purposes, be the owners. The learned Judge states that the true test lies not so much in an analysis of what are the constituents of the applicants' rights, but rather in what would be the result on the subject matter of the action if those rights could be established. Viewing the matter in this way the application was allowed. 8. Another case on the point is in Amon v. Raphael Tuck and Sons Ltd. (1956 (1) LRQB 357) where also earlier English authorities have been relied on. Defendants applied under R.S.C., O.16, R.11, for an order that one D. be joined as defendant in an action. Viewing the matter in this way the application was allowed. 8. Another case on the point is in Amon v. Raphael Tuck and Sons Ltd. (1956 (1) LRQB 357) where also earlier English authorities have been relied on. Defendants applied under R.S.C., O.16, R.11, for an order that one D. be joined as defendant in an action. In the action the plaintiff alleged that he was the inventor of a certain design known as the "Fastik" design, for a pen, details of which he had imparted in confidence to the defendants under an agreement, and that the defendants, in breach of a duty owed to him, had disclosed the design to other persons and had made use of his information in deriving from it a competing design, the "Stixit" design, for a pen which they had advertised and canvassed to the retail trade, and he claimed damages for breach of contract and an injunction restraining the defendants from making use of the information without his consent. D. alleged that he was the inventor of the "Stixit" pen; that it was that design from which the plaintiff had obtained his invention of the "Fastik" pen; that he had entered the defendants' employment for the purpose of assisting them to market the "Stixit" pen and that there was an agreement between him and the defendants under which he was entitled to a royalty or commission on the sales of the "Stixit" pen and which provided for the payment to him of a minimum annual royalty; D. further alleged that the agreement contained an express clause requiring the defendants to undertake the manufacture and distribution of the "Stixit" pen in certain territories. D. was willing to be made a defendant so that he could counter claim against the plaintiff, but the plaintiff denied the allegations of D. and objected to the joinder. 9. D. was willing to be made a defendant so that he could counter claim against the plaintiff, but the plaintiff denied the allegations of D. and objected to the joinder. 9. Devlin, J., held that the application was, in effect, an application for leave to intervene against the will of the plaintiff; that in such a case the appropriate test to determine whether the intervener was a party "who ought to have been joined", or whose presence "before the court may be necessary'' to enable the court completely and effectually to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the cause or matter within O.16, R.11, was: Would the order for which the plaintiff was asking directly affect the intervener, not in his commercial interests, but in the enjoyment of his legal rights? Applying that test, D. was within the rule, for the injunction sought by the plaintiff in effect would restrain the further manufacture of the "Stixit" pen and therefore, although the fact that D. was entitled to a royalty or commission gave him only a commercial interest in the continued manufacture, if he could show that the defendants were by contract obliged to manufacture a reasonable quantity of "Stixit" pens he would have a right of action against them if they did not do so, and might ask in a subsequent action for specific performance of an agreement which the court had ordered not to be performed. The court accordingly had jurisdiction to make the order sought which, in the circumstances was one which it was proper that the court in its discretion should make. Devlin, J. observed: "I do not agree that the main object of the rule is to prevent multiplicity of sections, though it may incidentally have that effect. The primary object of the R.1 believe to be to replace the plea in abatement. The words of the rule which I have to construe do not represent any addition to the powers of the court initiated by the Judicature Acts, and I do not think that the necessary parties contemplated by it are other than those who would have been considered by a court of equity to be necessary before the passing of the Judicature Acts. The only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is so that he should be bound by the result of the action, and the question to be settled therefore must be a question in the action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party". 10. Many cases on the point have been discussed in detail by Justice Venkatasubba Rao in Secretary of State and another v. M. Murugesa Mudaliar and others ( AIR 1929 Mad. 443 ). His Lordship held therein that against plaintiff's consent a new party may be impleaded as a defendant and that he may be so added though he may thereby be in a position to counterclaim against the plaintiff. His Lordship differed from the decision of Justice Srinivasa Aiyangar in Prayag Dossji Varu v. Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras ( AIR 1926 Mad. 836 ), where Justice Srinivasa Aiyangar said: "The very basic principle of judgment inter partes is that the judgments are not judgments in rem, but declaratory and operative only as between them. The plaintiff being generally dominus litus, I fail to see on what principle of justice he can be compelled to fight against some other litigant not of his own choice unless such a process is required by a positive rule of law". Justice Venkatasubba Rao said that this view seems to ignore the distinction which the statutory provision make between two classes of persons: "(1) Persons who ought to have been joined; (2) persons whose presence is necessary to enable the Court completely and effectively adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit". In the particular case before him the Government sought to intervene in a suit where the plaintiff had prayed as against the District Board and its President for a declaration that he was duly elected member from the Taluk Board to the District Board. Under S.19 of the Madras Local Board's Act the election of a member of a Local Board shall be notified in the prescribed manner, under the rules framed under that Act. It was provided that the election shall be published in the Fort St. George Gazette. 11. The learned Judge said: "The manner has been prescribed by R.8 to which have already referred. It was provided that the election shall be published in the Fort St. George Gazette. 11. The learned Judge said: "The manner has been prescribed by R.8 to which have already referred. S.11 says that every member of a Local Board shall hold office for a term of three years from the date of publication of the notification under S.19. There are several sections in the Act vesting in the Government power of control over the Local Boards. S.45 shows that the power extends over to dissolving the Board for incompetence, for continued default or misconduct. But the Section with which we are most directly concerned is S.38. It empowers the Local Government inter alia, to suspend by order in writing, the execution of any resolution of any Local Board. Presumably it was under this Section that the Government acted, when it issued the notification to which the plaintiff takes exception in his plaint. In that notification, the Government declare that the motion for the adjournment of the Taluk Board was legally carried, that the continuation of the meeting by a Section of the members and the election of the plaintiff as a member of the District Board cannot be recognised and notified in the Fort Saint George Gazette. The notification adds: 'a fresh meeting of the Taluk Board should be convened for the election .............. of a member to the District Board'. Under S.38, I have pointed out, that the Local Government may suspend the execution of any resolution of a Local Board, can it or can it not vote, the election of a member under this section? It is at a meeting that the candidate is to be elected. The name has to be proposed and seconded, the votes of the members are to be taken and the candidate who obtains the largest number of votes is to be deemed to have been elected. The procedure indicated shows that a member is elected by a resolution of the Local Board. The word 'resolution' is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as a 'formal decision, determination or expression of opinion on the part of a deliberative assembly or other meeting'. Now then, if the decision of the meeting, that the plaintiff has been duly elected, amounts to a resolution, the right to suspend it undoubtedly vests in the Government. The word 'resolution' is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as a 'formal decision, determination or expression of opinion on the part of a deliberative assembly or other meeting'. Now then, if the decision of the meeting, that the plaintiff has been duly elected, amounts to a resolution, the right to suspend it undoubtedly vests in the Government. In this case, it has exercised that right and suspended the execution of the resolution. The plaintiff has thus a grievance against the Government. It was their act that has interfered with his alleged right. Is the Government then not a proper party to the suit" . 12. Most of the Madras decisions on the point had again been catalogued and dealt with in G. M. V. Krishnachari v. M. D. Dhanalakshmi Ammal and others ( AIR 1968 Mad. 142 ) where Justice Ramamurti who rendered the decision points out that the language employed in O.1, R.10(2) of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 confers upon the Court a very wide jurisdiction and the Court should not be disposed to a curtailment of the powers more than what is expressly decided by judicial decisions binding on it. The Madras High Court had consistently adopted a wider interpretation of the scope of O.1, R.10 and in the State of authorities the contention that the expression "the questions involved in the suit" in O.1, R.10(2) should receive narrow view, namely, that - only questions as between the parties to the litigation and not questions between any of the parties to the suit and a third party even though touching the property which is the subject matter of the suit - cannot be accepted. In applying O.1, R.10(2) the only question is whether an applicant who applies for being impleaded as a party to the suit has got a direct interest in the subject matter in dispute which would be affected by the result of the litigation. "The interest" that is necessary to make a person party is legal interest including equitable interest, that is an interest which the law would recognise and uphold. 13. "The interest" that is necessary to make a person party is legal interest including equitable interest, that is an interest which the law would recognise and uphold. 13. In Sampatbai w/o Ambaram and another v. Madhusingh Cambhirji ( AIR 1960 MP 84 ) Justice Dixit said: "Under O.1, R.10(2) the test is not whether the joinder of the person proposed to be added as a defendant would be according to or against the wishes of the plaintiff or whether the joinder would involve an investigation into a question not arising on the cause of action averred by the plaintiff. It is whether the relief claimed by the plaintiff will directly affect the intervener in the enjoyment of his rights. It is not enough that the plaintiff's rights, and rights which the person desiring to be made a defendant wishes to assert should be connected with the same subject matter. The intervener must be directly and legally interested in the answers to the questions involved in the case. A person is legally interested in the answer only if he can say that it may lead to a result that will affect him legally - that is by curtailing his legal rights. Again in determining whether or not an applicant has a proprietary right in the subject matter of an action sufficient to entitle him to be joined as a defendant the true test lies not so much in an analysis of what are the constituents of the applicant's rights, but rather in what would be the result on the subject matter of the action if those rights could be established". 14. However the question that arises here for consideration is whether the person sought to be impleaded now could be said to have any sort of right or got direct interest in the subject matter of dispute. No doubt the legal interest would include the equitable interest also. That is an interest which the law would recognise. Here what the defendant says in his written statement about his son is: (Malayalam) 15. No doubt the legal interest would include the equitable interest also. That is an interest which the law would recognise. Here what the defendant says in his written statement about his son is: (Malayalam) 15. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondents on the decision of the Supreme Court in Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum and others ( AIR 1958 SC 886 ) where it has been stated that "each case has to be determined on its own facts and it has to be recognised that no decided cases have been brought to our notice, which can be said to be on all fours with the facts and circumstances of the present case. There cannot be the least doubt that it is firmly established as a result of judicial decisions that in order that a person may be added as a party to a suit he should have a direct interest in the subject matter of the litigation whether it raises questions relating to movable or immovable property" 16. It is extremely difficult in this case to say that the defendant's son has got any right or direct interest in the subject matter of the suit even going by the defendant's case. The adjudication by the court of the questions involved in the suit in his absence will in no way prejudice him or the parties to the suit. It is impossible to say that he is a person whose presence is necessary to completely and effectively adjudicate upon the questions involved. I find no jurisdictional error committed by the court below. 17. As regards the contention raised under O.8A I need only state that no application has been filed by the petitioner under that order, to bring in the third party as a defendant in the proceeding. No such application has been filed by the petitioner to bring in such matters also into issue. This civil revision petition is therefore dismissed. I make no order as to costs.