B. K. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner who was an exofficio member of Bardoli Taluka Panchayat by virtue of his office as Sarpanch of village Ten Gram Panchayat has challenged by this petition the order of suspension of January 13 1977 passed by respondent No. 1 and confirmed in appeal by respondent No. 2 under sec. 51 (1)of the Gujarat Panchayats Act 1961 ( 2 ) NO affidavit in reply has been filed on behalf of the respondents. ( 3 ) THE impugned order is challenged on the following grounds:-1 The order is void and ineffective since it is made by respondent No. 1 without giving any opportunity to the petitioner to make his submissions in that behalf and therefore it is against the principles of natural justice and fair play. 2 The condition precedent for passing the order of suspension namely institution of criminal proceedings in respect of the offence involving moral turpitude or detention in prison during the trial for the offence under the provisions of any law for the time being in force is not satisfied and therefore the Competent Authority namely respondent No. 1 herein has no jurisdiction power or authority to make the impugned order. 3 In any case of the impugned order was not justified at all since in the complaint filed by Yaqub Saleh Hafiz which is the basis for the impugned order the name of the petitioner is not disclosed and therefore there was no evidence whatsoever on the basis of which the impugned order could have been made. ( 4 ) I am of the opinion that this petition should be allowed on the second and third contentions and it is therefore not necessary for me to go into the larger question whether any prior notice is required to be given before making the order of suspension since it involves some consequences to the persons suspended. ( 5 ) SEC. 51 (1) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act 1961 (hereinafter called the said Act) empowers District Development Officer to suspend from the office of Sarpanch of a Gram Panchayat or Chairman or Vice chairman of a Nagar Panchayat against whom any criminal proceedings in respect of an offence involving moral turpitude have been instituted. ( 5 ) SEC. 51 (1) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act 1961 (hereinafter called the said Act) empowers District Development Officer to suspend from the office of Sarpanch of a Gram Panchayat or Chairman or Vice chairman of a Nagar Panchayat against whom any criminal proceedings in respect of an offence involving moral turpitude have been instituted. It is common ground that the impugned order has not been made on the ground of detention of the petitioner in prison during his trial since it is not clear whether the trial has taken place till today. What is an offence involving moral turpitude has been considered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Mr. P an Advocate AIR 1963 SC 1313 where a question arose as to when an Advocate can be said to be guilty of gross misconduct or negligence involving moral turpitude or delinquency. In that context Gajendagadakar J. speaking for the Court held as under:-"it may be that before condemning an Advocate for misconduct courts are inclined to examine the question as to whether such gross negligence involves moral turpitude or delinquency. In dealing with this aspect of the matter however it is of utmost importance to remember that the expression moral turpitude or delinquency is not to receive a narrow construction. Wherever conduct proved against an Advocate is contrary to honesty or opposed to good morals or is unethical it may be safely held that it involves moral turpitude. A wilful and callous disregard for the interests of the client may in a proper case be characterised as conduct unbefitting an Advocate Any conduct which makes a person unworthy to belong to the noble fraternity of lawyers or makes an advocate unfit to be entrusted with the responsible task of looking after the interests of the litigant must be regarded as conduct involving moral turpitude. . . " ( 6 ) IN Patel Bhogilal Mamordas v. The Development Commissioner of Gujarat State and Anr. (1976) 17 Guj. L. R. 724 an application was made to the District Development Officer against the Sarpanch of Zillavasha village in Chanasma taluka of Mehsana district to take action against him under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 51 of the said Act since criminal proceedings were instituted against the said Sarpanch and other members of the panchayat for offences alleged to have been committed by them under secs. (1) of sec. 51 of the said Act since criminal proceedings were instituted against the said Sarpanch and other members of the panchayat for offences alleged to have been committed by them under secs. 447 504 506 114 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code and under sec. 161 of the Gujarat Panchayat Act 1961 In that context S. H. Sheth J. held that it is the duty of a Sarpanch to cater to the welfare of the village people and to the establishment of peace amongst them and having regard to the offences charged against the aforesaid Sarpanch it must be said that he was behaving in a manner which is contrary to his duties or functions under the said Act and by straying away his cattle into the fields of others he not only committed criminal trespass but directly violated sec. 161 of the said Act the provisions of which he is supposed or required to implement in order to cater to the welfare of the people and which behaviour would therefore shock the general conscience of the society and rendered him unfit to become the Sarpanch an office which involves responsibility of looking after the interest of the village people. The learned Judge therefore concluded that such a conduct is opposed to good morals and to all canons of honesty which he is supposed to observe as Sarpanch and therefore the condition precedent for exercise of the power under sec. 51 of the said Act was satisfied. ( 7 ) I do not think that the decision of S. H. Sheth J; in Patel Bhogilals case (supra) can be pressed into service on the facts and in the circumstances of this case before me. In order to invoke the power granted under sec. 51 (1) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act 1961 criminal proceedings must have been initiated against the concerned office bearer of Panchayat for offences involving moral turpitude. In other words before such an office bearer can be removed he must be charged with the offence arising out of act which is dishonest immoral or unethical. It is no doubt true that the words involving moral turpitude should not be given restrictive meaning. In other words before such an office bearer can be removed he must be charged with the offence arising out of act which is dishonest immoral or unethical. It is no doubt true that the words involving moral turpitude should not be given restrictive meaning. None the less in the ultimate analysis an office bearer sought to be removed under the aforesaid provision must be imputed with the act constituting offence which is dishonest or immoral or conduct which is so unethical as to render him unfit to held the office. It should be borne in mind that the complaint filed on 25-10-1976 by Yaqub Saleh Hafiz which prompted respondent No. 1 to pass the impugned order did not disclose the name of the petitioner. It should be further emphasised that in the first statement recorded on 26th December 1976 of Yaqub Saleh no reference is made to the name of the petitioner. It was only in the second statement recorded on the same day that the name of the petitioner was disclosed. The offences which the petitioner was alleged to have committed were under secs. 323 324 149 and 147 of the Indian Penal Code read with sec. 135 of the Bombay Police Act. Proceedings under sec. 107 were also initiated against the petitioner. I do not think that it can be said that the alleged offences were offences involving moral turpitude in the sense that the alleged acts can be said to be a conduct which is contrary to honesty or good morals or is unethical since at the most it was an incident of some scuffle between the petitioner and other persons alleged to be involved in the incident with Yaqub. By no stretch of imagination without violence to the language it can be said that this act imputed to the petitioner assuming it to be true would constitute a conduct which may be labelled as dishonest or immoral or unethical. In no case it can be said that the alleged conduct of the petitioner was not behaving to the duties which he was to perform as a Sarpanch. In the circumstances therefore the condition precedent for the exercise of the power is absent and the impugned order of suspension as confirmed in appeal should be quashed and set aside. In no case it can be said that the alleged conduct of the petitioner was not behaving to the duties which he was to perform as a Sarpanch. In the circumstances therefore the condition precedent for the exercise of the power is absent and the impugned order of suspension as confirmed in appeal should be quashed and set aside. ( 8 ) THE result is that this petition is allowed and the order of suspension passed against the petitioner is quashed and set aside and the rule is made absolute with no order as to costs having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case. Petition allowed. .