Judgment Sia Saran Sinha, J. 1. This is an appeal by the defendant against the judgment of reversal. 2. The respondent instituted Title suit No. 52 of 1972 on the 5th September, 1972 against the defendant appellant for a decree for eviction in respect of the premises described therein on the ground of there being arrears of rent as also on the ground of personal necessity. A decree for Rs. 600.00 by way of arrears of rent for the months from March 1972 to August 1972 was also prayed for with the allegation that the monthly rental payable by the defendent to the plaintiff in respect of the demised premises was 100.00 per month. 3. The defendant contested the claim of the plaintiff. The parties adduced evidence, both oral and documentary. 4. The plaintiff did not succeed in establishing the question of personal necessity and his question was not agitated even before this Court. The trial Court found that the defendant has succeeded in proving that he was not a defaulter so as to attract the mischief of Sec.11(1)(d) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the act), and he therefore dismissed the suit with costs. 5. The plaintiff took up the matter in appeal. The lower appellate Court found that the defendant had defaulted in payment of rent for the months from March, 1972 to May, 1972. The defendant claimed to have sent the rent for the period from June, 1972 to August, 1972 to the plaintiff by money order. The lower appellate Court held in the circumstances stated in the judgment that this tender was not legal and valid. On these findings, it decreed the plaintiffs suit for eviction after setting aside the judgment of the trial Court. There was a dispute between the parties as to the amount of rental. According to the defendant, the monthly rental was Rs. 16/-. The defendant had however, executed a Kirayanama (Ext. 1). On the 18th March, 1972 in which he has stated the rental to be Rs. 100.00 par month. Both the two Courts below concurrently found that although the Kirayanama (Ext. 1) was a genuine document, the initial rental was Rs. 16/- per month and the claim of the plaintiff for recovery of rent at the rate of Rs. 100.00 per month was not maintainable in law. 100.00 par month. Both the two Courts below concurrently found that although the Kirayanama (Ext. 1) was a genuine document, the initial rental was Rs. 16/- per month and the claim of the plaintiff for recovery of rent at the rate of Rs. 100.00 per month was not maintainable in law. The lower appellate Court further passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff in respect of Rs. 100.00 on the ground that this amount was stated to be in arrears in the Kirayanama (Ext. 1) The defendant has come up in second appeal. 6. Two points were formulated by the learned single judge for decision of this appeal. They are mentioned in order No. 6 dated the 23rd August, 1979. The submission of learned Counsel for the appellant was that the issue stands settled by the admission of the plaintiff himself (P. W. 18). He having admitted in his cross examination that no rent was due, the defendant would cease to be a defaulter and, as such, the judgment of the lower appellate Court needs to be set aside. This contention was refuted by Shri Ghose, learned Counsel for the respondent. 7. The defendant appellant is in occupation of the tenanted premises since the last five to seven years as concurrently found by the two Courts below. The rental as initially fixed was Rs. 16/- per month. On the 18th March, 1972, the defendant executed the Kirayanama (Ext. 1) undertaking to pay the monthly rental of the demised premises at the rate of Rs. 100.00 per month. The genuineness of Ext. 1 was challenged before the two Courts below, but the concurrent finding is that Ext. 1 is a genuine document. The plaintiff alleged default in payment of rent from March,, 1972 till August, 1972 and prayed for eviction of the defendant on the ground of default. In his examination in chief, the plaintiff (P. W. 18) stated that the monthly rent is due from the defendant since March 1972. The admission on which the learned Counsel for the appellant sought to rely is contained in paragraph No. 6 of the deposition of P. W. 18 made in the cross examination which has been quoted in paragraph No. 11 of the judgment of the trial Court. The admission on which the learned Counsel for the appellant sought to rely is contained in paragraph No. 6 of the deposition of P. W. 18 made in the cross examination which has been quoted in paragraph No. 11 of the judgment of the trial Court. It is, inter alia, to the effect that before the suit "nalsi ke pahle" the defendant used to pay rent per month at the rate of Rs. 100.00 and that before the filing of the suit there was no difference between them regarding the rental. This dismissal has been differently interpreted by the two Courts below. According to the trial Court, this statement shows that nothing was due as rent to the plaintiff from the defendant prior to the institution of the suit in September, 1972. According to the lower appellate Court, the term "nalsi ke pahle" refers to the period prior to the suit. The submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant was that even if this term was susceptible to two interpretations, the interpretation put by the trial Court should be accepted in preference to the interpretation put by the lower appellate Court, as the former had the occasion to mark the deneamour of P.W. 18. The matter does not concern directly the trustworthiness otherwise of P.W. 18 and the point involved is the interpretation of the admission made by him. 8. The first important rule with regard to the admission is that the whole statement containing the admission must be taken together, for though some part of it may be favourable to the party and the object is only to ascertain what he has conceded against himself and what may, therefore, be presumed to be true, yet unless whole is received, the true meaning of part which is evidence against him cannot be ascertained. Admissions might be substantive evidence, but its weight is a matter of consideration of the Court. Admission by a party, no doubt, should be presumed to be true unless contrary is shown, but before this rule is invoked, it must be shown that there is a clear and unambiguous statement as will be conclusive unless explained. Secondly, the value of admissions must depend upon the circumstances in which they are made and possible motives for incorrect statement by interested persons should not be ignored. Secondly, the value of admissions must depend upon the circumstances in which they are made and possible motives for incorrect statement by interested persons should not be ignored. In face of the initiation rental of the demised premises being; 16/- the fixation of rental at Rs. 100.00 by the Kirayanama (Ext. 1) was not supportable in law. The plaintiff claimed arrears since March, 1972 when the Kirayanama (Ext. 1) came into being. The plaintiff was" therefore desirous of establishing a case that even before the institution of the suit in September, 1972 he used to receive rental of Rs. 100.00 This is what led the plaintiff as was submitted on his behalf to make the statements referred to above in paragraph No. 6 which has been found by the lower appellate Court to be an incorrect statement. It is not the case of the defendant that he ever paid rent to the plaintiff at the rate of Rs. 100.00 per month. The above statement of the plaintiff in paragraph No. 6 of his cross examination cannot, therefore, be taken to mean his admission about the receipt of rental by him at the rate of Rs. 16/- for the period prior to the institution of the suit. 9. The rent for the months of June, July and August of the year 1972 was sent by the defendant to the plaintiff by money order. The defendant did not claim to have sent the rental from March, 1972 to May 1972 by money order. It is somewhat difficult to believe that the greedy plaintiff who compelled the defendant to execute the Kirayanama (Ext. 1) mentioning the rental at Rs. 100.00 per month would have agreed to accept the rental for these three months at the rate of Rs. 16/- per month. It was in these circumstances that the lower appellate Court found that the admission made by the plaintiff in paragraph No. 6 of his cross examination was not correct and there was no question of accepting these statements as correct. The lower appellate Court being the final Court of fact found that the defendant had not paid the rent for the months of March, 1972 to May 1972 and he is a defaulter in the eye of law. 10. Onus shifts in appropriate circumstances. The lower appellate Court being the final Court of fact found that the defendant had not paid the rent for the months of March, 1972 to May 1972 and he is a defaulter in the eye of law. 10. Onus shifts in appropriate circumstances. If the plaintiff wants eviction of the defendant for reasons of default, initially he shall have to lead evidence that the defendant is defaulter. Once he prima facie shows that the defendant is a defaulter, the onus to prove the payment would be on the defendant for the simple reasons that when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact could be upon him. The plaintiff satisfactorily stated in his evidence that the defendant is a defaulter. The defendant alleged payment. In such a situation, the onus of proving the payment should be on the defendant. Be that as it may, the question of onus shifts to the background when parties lead evidence. Evidence has been lead in this case and the lower appellate Court has constructed the same. The case of the plaintiff cannot be thrown out in the wind merely for the reason that no rent receipt is to be granted as was contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant. The lower appellate Court examined and scrutinised the evidence and came to the conclusion reached above which conclusion cannot be said to be either wrong or perverse and this being the position, that finding of fact will be binding on this Court. The two points formulated while admitting the appeal are answered accordingly. 11. The finding of the fact recorded by the lower appellate Court regarding the defendant being defaulter in respect of the rent for the months of March, 1972 to May 1972 having been correctly and legally recorded, the mischief of Section 11 (1)(d) of the Act will be attracted, and, the suit for eviction has, therefore, to be decreed as has been done by the lower appellate Court. 12. Mr. 12. Mr. S.C. Ghose, learned Counsel for the respondent, relying on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Raj Kumar Prasad V/s. Uchit Narain Singh, 1980 0 BBCJ 391 , submitted that even the rental for the months of June to August, 1972 cannot be said to have been validly tendered for the reason that the fental for June said to have been refused was not tendered, while sending rental for the month of July, 1972. Be that as it may it has been found as a matter of fact, which finding is legal and valid, that the defendant defaulted in payment of rent from March, 1972 to May 1972. This being the position, the suit for eviction was rightly decreed by the lower appellate Court. 13. In addition to the decree for eviction, the lower appellate Court also granted a decree for Rs. 100.00 in favour of the plaintiff basing it on the kirayanama (Ext. 1) By doing so the lower appellate Court has made out a third case which is unacceptable, and the learned Counsel for the respondent in usual frankness rightly conceded that this part of the lower appellate Courts judgment cannot be supported in law and should be set aside. Thus, while the decree for eviction as awarded by the lower appellate Court is confirmed, the judgment and decree so far as it directs payment of Rs. 100.00 by the defendant to the plaintiff is set aside. 14. With the modification as stated above, the appeal is dismissed, and the judgment and decree of the lower appellate, modified to the extent indicated above, are confirmed. There will be no order as to costs of this appeal and the parties shall bear their own costs.