ORDER Satish Chandra, C.J. -This writ petition has been filed by a tenant. It is directed against an order of release of a building in favour of the landlord. 2. The tenant is a partnership firm Messrs. Gur Narain Jagat Narain & Co. The landlords are Messrs. Motor & General Sales Ltd., a company registered under the Companies Act. 3. The landlords applied under Section 21 Rent Control Act, 1972, for release of the accommodation, in which the tenants were running a cinema business. The Prescribed Authority dismissing the application on the finding that the landlord failed to prove that they bona fide needed the accommodation, and greater hardship will be caused to the tenant if the accommodation is released in favour of the landlords. The landlords went up in appeal. 4. The learned District Judge reversed the findings. He held that the accommodation was bona fide required by the landlords for their own occupation for running cinema business and that greater hardship will be caused to the landlords by refusing the release application than the hardship will be caused to the tenants by allowing it. An objection as to the maintainability of the appeal was repelled. 5. It appears that in 1945, M/s. Gur Narain Jagat Narain & Co. took the building on lease for 25 years, from the then owners. In 1947, the then owners sold the building to the Hindusthan Commercial Bank. On July 23, 1953, the bank executed a lease in favour of Gur Narain Jagat Narain & Co. for 15 years, i. e., till June 30, 1968, (though the original lease was to run till 1970). On April 6, 1965, the bank sold the building to Messrs Motor and General Sales (P) Ltd. This company wanted to run its own cinema business. It passed a resolution on December 30, 1970, for including the running of cinema business as one of the objects in its Memorandum of Association. It applied for amendment of the Memorandum of Association under Section 171 Companies Act. The High Court allowed this application on April 19, 1971. The application for release under Section 21 of the Rent Control Act of 1972, was filed on September 23, 1974. 6. It applied for amendment of the Memorandum of Association under Section 171 Companies Act. The High Court allowed this application on April 19, 1971. The application for release under Section 21 of the Rent Control Act of 1972, was filed on September 23, 1974. 6. During its pendency, all shares of the landlord company were purchased by a public limited company called 'Motor Sales Ltd. The landlord-company became a wholly owned subsidiary of Motor Sales Ltd. The landlord-company applied to the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies for amendment of the certificate of registration by deleting the word 'private therefrom in accordance with Section 43-A of the Companies Act. The Registrar by an order of November 16, 1977, amended the certificate of incorporation of the landlord-company by deleting the word 'private therefrom. On that day, the landlord-companys appeal was pending before the District Judge, the same having been filed on February 4, 1976, in the name of Motor & General Sales (P) Ltd. On November 21, 1977, the landlord-company applied for amendment of the description of the appellant by deleting the word 'Private therefrom. This application was allowed. The learned District Judge went on to hold that by this change the landlord-company did not lose its legal entity. Its existence continued. In Law, the need and requirement of the landlord company was to be seen and not that of its shareholders even though all its shares are held by a single entity, namely, a public limited company, the Motor Sales Ltd. It was also held that a juristic personality like a registered company was entitled to apply for release of building owned by it and in the possession of a tenant. 7. In the present writ petition, Mr. Khare appearing for the petitioner, submitted : (1) the appeal having been filed in the name of the private limited company was incompetent, (2) a juristic personality was not entitled to apply for release under Section 21 of the Rent Control Act; (3) the need of the holding company alone was liable to be considered; (4) the comparison of hardships could be done only with the tenant, namely, the partnership firm the situation of its family members was neither material nor relevant for comparison of hardship. 8. In respect of the first point the factual position is that the landlord company was a private limited company. 8. In respect of the first point the factual position is that the landlord company was a private limited company. The Motor Sales Limited was incorporated as a public limited company in 1972. On November 1, 1974, the Motor Sales Limited purchased all the shares of the landlord private limited company. At that time the proceedings were pending before the Prescribed Authority. It appears that the landlord company informed the Registrar within 3 months of the purchase (vide cross-examination of Mr. H. C. Gupta). The Registrar passed an order effecting a change of name by deleting the name 'private in the certificate of incorporation of the landlord company on November 16, 1977. Meanwhile, the landlord company had filed the appeal on February 4, 1976. The appeal was filed in the name of the private limited company. Five days after the order of the Registrar, namely, on November 21, 1977, the landlord company moved an application in the appellate court for amendment of its name by deleting the word 'private. The learned District Judge held that the change of name of a company takes effect when the Registrar passes the order. Till then the company continued to be a private limited company. The District Judge granted the amendment sought by the landlord company. He held that the appeal was competent and maintainable. 9. Mr. Khare for the petitioner has-questioned this view of the learned District Judge. 10. Section 43-A Companies Act deals with a private limited company becoming a public company. Under sub-section (1) of this Section where not less than 25% of the paid-up share capital of a private company having a share-capital is held by one or more bodies corporate, the private company shall, on and from the date on which the aforesaid percentage is first held by such, body or bodies corporate, become by-virtue of this section a public company. 11. Sub-section (2) of Section 43-A,. requires the private company to inform the Registrar within three months from the date on which it becomes the public company and thereupon the Registrar is to delete the word 'private before the-word 'limited in the name of the company in its register. The Registrar is. also to make the necessary alterations in the certificate of incorporation issued to. the company and in its Memorandum of Association. 12. Sub-section (3) of Section 43-A. makes sub-sec. The Registrar is. also to make the necessary alterations in the certificate of incorporation issued to. the company and in its Memorandum of Association. 12. Sub-section (3) of Section 43-A. makes sub-sec. (3) of Section 23 applicable to a change of name under subsection (2) as it applies under Section 21. Section 23 (3) provides:- "(3) The change of name shall not affect any rights or obligations of the-company, or render defective any legal proceedings by or against it; and any legal proceedings which might have been continued or commenced by or against the company by its former name may be continued by or against the company by its new name." 13. The legal position is quite clear. As soon as 25% of the shares come to be held by a body corporate the private limited company becomes a public company. It has to inform the Registrar thereupon the Registrar has to make the necessary corrections, inter alia, in the certificate of incorporation issued to the company. Sub-section (3) of Section 23 saves pending legal proceedings from becoming defective by reason of change of name. The proceedings can be continued in its new name. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that sub-section (3) of Section 43-A was inapplicable to the present case because it applies to a change of name under sub-section (2). In the present case the change took place under sub-section (1) of Section 43-A. The submission is misconceived. Under sub-section (1), a private limited company, in law, becomes a public company, but the change of name comes into existence under sub-section (2) on the making of the alteration in the certificate of incorporation by the Registrar. In every case covered by sub-section (1), the consequential action u/sub-s. (2) of the Registrar is necessary. Under sub-sec. (5) of Section 43-A, if a company makes default, in complying with subsection (2), it shall be liable to punishment. This makes it amply clear that in every case under sub-section (1) where the private limited company becomes a public company, sub-section (2) has to be complied with. When a change of name takes place under sub-sec. (2) then in virtue of sub-section (3), Section 23 (3) becomes applicable. Under it the change of name neither affects the rights or obligations nor renders defective any legal proceeding by or against it. 15. When a change of name takes place under sub-sec. (2) then in virtue of sub-section (3), Section 23 (3) becomes applicable. Under it the change of name neither affects the rights or obligations nor renders defective any legal proceeding by or against it. 15. Though the landlord company became a public company on November 1, 1974, yet the proceedings launched by it in its former name (namely, private limited company) validly continued (and this is not disputed), before the Prescribed Authority. The appeal filed by the landlord company in its former name was competent. The landlord company could use the changed name only after its certificate of incorporation had been altered by the Registrar. This happened on November 16, 1977. Soon thereafter the amendment application was filed on November 21, 1977 for deleting the word 'private. The same was rightly allowed. 16. For the petitioners, reliance was placed on Messrs. Malhati Tea Syndicate Ltd. v. Revenue Officer, Jalpaiguri ( AIR 1973 Cal 78 ). In that case the appeal was filed in the former name after the Registrar had altered the certificate of incorporation of the company. It was held that the appeal was not competent. The case is distinguishable. There the appeal was filed after the Registrars order. In the present case the appeal was filed long before. This point has no substance. 17. The next point is that a juristic personality like a registered company could not in law apply for release under Section 21 of the Act. I did not hear learned counsel to argue that the Rent Control Act of 1972 is not applicable to juristic persons like a limited company. The submission was that Section 21 of the Act was not available. The application for release was made under clause (a) of Section 21 (1) which provides that the building is bona fide required by the landlord for occupation, by himself or any member of his family, either for residential purposes or for any profession, trade or calling. Learned counsel laid stress on the phrase 'for occupation by himself or any member of his family and submitted that this phrase is inappropriate for a juristic personality like a company, firstly, because the need of a company cannot be described as by 'himself and further a company cannot have a family member. 18. Learned counsel laid stress on the phrase 'for occupation by himself or any member of his family and submitted that this phrase is inappropriate for a juristic personality like a company, firstly, because the need of a company cannot be described as by 'himself and further a company cannot have a family member. 18. There is no difficulty in reading the words 'for himself as meaning 'by itself in relation to a juristic person like a company. Since a company does not have family members the question of bona fide need of the family members will not arise. It does not mean that clause (a) is intrinsically inapplicable to a company. Further, clause (a) says that bona fide requirement is to be either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling or where the landlord is the trustee of a public charitable trust, for the objects of the trust. A public charitable trust is a juristic person. It is never a human being. Yet in such a case the bona fide requirement for the objects of the trust is sufficient. Similarly, the bona fide requirement for the purposes of trade of a company would be material and relevant consideration for judging the release application by a company. 19. For the petitioners, several English decisions were cited. (i) Skimmer v. Geary (1931) All ER Rep. 302. (ii) Reidy v. Walker (1933) All ER Rep 182. (iii) Hiller v. United Dairies (London) Ltd. (1933) All ER Rep 667. (iv) Associated Newspapers Ltd. v. Dingle (1962) 2 All ER 737. (v) Town Investments Ltd. v. Department of the Environment (1977) 1 All ER 813. They are not helpful. In those cases, the involved statutes disclosed a different scheme because of which it was held that they relate to dwelling houses meant for human beings. Our Rent Control Act is very different. In B. M. Lall v. Dunlop Rubber Co. (India) Ltd. ( AIR 1968 SC 175 ), it was held that a company can also have need for personal occupation for purposes of the Rent Control Act. I am hence unable to uphold the submission that the application under Section 21 was not maintainable at the instance of the landlord which was a juristic person as a registered company. 20. The next point submitted by Mr. I am hence unable to uphold the submission that the application under Section 21 was not maintainable at the instance of the landlord which was a juristic person as a registered company. 20. The next point submitted by Mr. Khare was that the need of requirement of a holding company and not of the subsidiary company could alone be considered. Learned counsel did not go so far as to suggest that a private limited company on becoming a subsidiary of a public company ceases to exist as an independent legal entity. The submission was that though in the eye of law the private limited company only becomes a public company but since in the present case the Landlord company was a wholly owned subsidiary of the holding company the corporate veil should be teared and the reality seen. The reality was that the same persons who were the directors of the holding as well as the subsidiary company, managed the affairs of both the companies. They operated from the same office premises. The auditors and the staff was the same. The directors made the policy decisions for both the companies and so the bona fide requirement of the holding company alone was material and relevant. 21. I am unable to appreciate this submission. The two companies have in law, maintained their existence independently of each other. Their affairs are conducted separately. Their rights and obligations are laid down and recognised by the Companies Act differently. Both the companies have separate assets and properties. They have each to render account to their shareholders separately. Each is liable to income-tax independently of the other. 22. The question is whether the landlord company has established bona fide requirement for the accommodation. It is admitted that the landlord company which is now the subsidiary of a public holding company, has as one of its objects the running of cinema business. No such object is to be found in the Memorandum of Association of the holding company. When the need set up in the present case is that the landlord desires the accommodation in question for running its own cinema business, how will it be proper to overlook it and concentrate on the needs and requirements of the holding company. Then, neither in law nor in fact does the holding company own the accommodation in dispute. It is only the subsidiary company which owns it. Then, neither in law nor in fact does the holding company own the accommodation in dispute. It is only the subsidiary company which owns it. 23. As already seen, clause (a) of Section 21 (1) emphasises that the bona fide requirements should, inter alia, be for advancing the objects of the juristic person. The subsidiary which in law is the landlord alone has one of its objects the running of its cinema business. Its need, alone, can be adjudicated. 24. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has been applied to prevent fraud, to prevent trading with the enemy or to prevent tax evasion.(i) Commr. of Income Tax, Madras v. Sri Meenakshi Mills Ltd., Madurai ( AIR 1967 SC 819 ). (ii) Juggilal Kamlapat v. Commr. of Income Tax, U. P. ( AIR 1969 SC 932 ).In Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1965 SC 40 ) it was observed that the courts crack open the I corporate shell only when compelled to do so by clear words of the statute. As the already pointed out clause (a) of Section 21 (1) instead of impelling a court to tear the corporate veil, asks it, inter alia, to look to the purposes and objects of the landlord, where it is a juristic person. The English decisions cited by Mr. Khare on this aspect of the case, in my opinion, deal with dwelling houses and are not helpful and I need not encumber this judgment by discussing them. 25. Looked at from another point of view, if the submission that corporate I veil should be lifted in order to see the reality, then it can also work the other way round. The need or requirement of the subsidiary can be the need and requirement of the holding company, since both are completely managed by the same set of persons. 26. If the directors decide that the holding company will carry on the business of motor finance while the subsidiary will concentrate on cinema business the reality is that the subsidiary company wanted to conduct cinema business and to that end requires the accommodation in dispute which is being used for running cinema business. The bona fide policy decision of the brain-trust of the two companies to expand and canalise the business in this more advantageous way has not been characterised as unwise or reckless. The bona fide policy decision of the brain-trust of the two companies to expand and canalise the business in this more advantageous way has not been characterised as unwise or reckless. The tenant cannot tell them how to run their business. 27. The last submission was that comparison of hardships could be done only with the tenant, namely, the partnership firm, the situation of the family members who were not partners in the firm was neither material nor relevant. It is undeniable that in law a partnership firm is a compendious way of describing the partners collectively. A partnership firm does not become a juristic entity separate from its partners. The only exception is the Income-tax Act which specifically contemplates that a partnership firm is an entity liable to be assessed to income-tax independently of its partners. 28. The Rent Control Act of 1972 frowns upon a partnership firm bringing in a person as a partner who is not a member of the family of the existing partners (vide Section 12 (2)). So the situation of the partners of the firm can be seen and in that connection their factual set up, financial or otherwise, in the background of the members of their family, may also become relevant. 29. In the present case, the tenant was Messrs Gur Narain Jagat Narain & Co. In this firm Gur Narain and his wifes brother Jai Narain were partners till 1958. Then Jai Narain ceased to be a partner and Gur Narains daughter-in-law Smt. Pushpa Devi became a partner. Pushpa Devis son Ravi became the partner in 1958 and continued till 1962. The partnership firm conducted cinema business in the accommodation in dispute at Lucknow and also at Nishat Talkies at Kanpur. In 1965, Nishat Talkies, Kanpur was taken away from the partnership business and put in the joint family set up. If the hardship of only the partners of the firm is to be looked at then we are confined to Gur Narain and his daughter-in-law Pushpa Devi. The question will be how far will they suffer hardship. In that way, looking into their situation, financial position, other business outlets would be material and relevant. The learned District Judge has gone into the matter elaborately and has come to the conclusion that comparatively the hardship would be greater on the landlords if the application is refused than the other way round. In that way, looking into their situation, financial position, other business outlets would be material and relevant. The learned District Judge has gone into the matter elaborately and has come to the conclusion that comparatively the hardship would be greater on the landlords if the application is refused than the other way round. The approach of the learned District Judge and an analysis of the situations of the landlord as well as the tenant do not disclose any error of law. He has held that the requirement put forward by the landlord is neither fanciful, nor wishful. It is a genuine need. He has referred to the fact that the motor finance business which was being conducted by the landlord company has dwindled and for that reason the landlord desires to run a cinema business of his own in the accommodation in dispute. The accommodation is being used for running a cinema business, and so it is suitable. The fact that the same set of persons are the directors in the subsidiary as well as the holding company and they have decided that the holding company will do the motor transport business while the subsidiary will concentrate on the cinema business does not mean that there is any fraud or crime about it. Every person is entitled to manage his business affairs to his better advantage. 30. Even if the comparison of hardship is confined to the partnership firm as such, the resulting position is not better. The partnership firm took the accommodation on a twenty-five year lease in 1945. In 1953, it executed a 15-year lease with the then owner. The fifteen year period expired in June 1968. The partnership firm is since 1953 paying Rs. 1,750/- per month as rent to the landlord company, while it is in evidence that it has let out the entire premises to another firm K. K. Associates on Rs. 4,500/- per week. It is in evidence that neither Gur Narain nor Pushpa Devi personally attend to the business at Lucknow they continuously reside at Delhi. Naturally enough, they have nothing to look after in this cinema I business at Lucknow because they have virtually sublet the accommodation to another firm which does the entire running of the cinema business for its own advantage, paying a princely sum of about Rs. 20,000/- per month to the tenant firm. 31. Naturally enough, they have nothing to look after in this cinema I business at Lucknow because they have virtually sublet the accommodation to another firm which does the entire running of the cinema business for its own advantage, paying a princely sum of about Rs. 20,000/- per month to the tenant firm. 31. The tenant firm has the accommodation on Rs. 1,750/- per month and; it has hired it out for Rs. 20,000/- per month. It is not doing cinema business; of its own. It is using the accommodation for rack-renting, it is virtually a case of unjust enrichment by a rich tenant. 32. The tenant took the accommodation on a fixed term of twenty-five years lease in the first instance; and then for fifteen years which ended in June, 1968. The Rent Control Act frowns upon giving protection to a tenant under a fixed term lease (see the proviso to Section 20 (1)). 33. It was also suggested that the word 'required occurring under cl. (a) of Section 21 (1) in the phrase 'that the building is bona fide required shows that there must be compelling necessity for the accommodation. I am unable to agree. In Mst. Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan ( AIR 1979 SC 272 ), the Supreme Court stressed that the distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire. The connotation of the term 'need or 'requirement should not be artificially extended nor its language so unduly stretched so as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for eviction. The finding of fact recorded by the learned District Judge is that the accommodation was bona fide required by the landlord to achieve one of its objects, The finding is, in my opinion, not vitiated by any manifest error of law. 34. The various points urged in sup-of the writ petition having failed, is dismissed with costs.