Judgment :- 1. This Criminal Miscellaneous Petition is filed by the complainant in C. C. No. 1 of 1978 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of 1 Class, Wadakkancherry invoking the powers of this Court under S.482 Cr. P. C. to quash the order of the magistrate dismissing the said complaint under S.245 (2) Cr. P. C. on the ground that the complaint is not maintainable in view of absence of a proper complaint in writing by the Land Tribunal as required under S.195 Cr. P. C. 2. The short facts necessary for the disposal of this petition can be stated as follows: The petitioner and the respondent are direct brothers. The respondent is said to be a lawyer practising in the local courts at Wadakkancherry and the petitioner was away in connection with his employment in different parts of the country. Under a partition of the family properties, certain items were set apart to the share of the petitioner and certain other items to the share of the respondent. According to the petitioner, as he was away in connection with his employment, his properties were being managed by the respondent on bis behalf. While the respondent contended that he is a lessee of these properties by virtue of a registered lease deed executed by him in the year 1958 in favour of the petitioner. Claiming tenancy on the strength of the above lease deed, the respondent filed O.A. No. 329 of 1973 before the Land Tribunal, Wadakkancherry for the purchase of landlord's right. This was resisted by the petitioner who contended that he did not execute any lease deed as alleged and that it is a fabricated document. After taking evidence on either side, the Land Tribunal dismissed the application filed by the respondent holding that the lease deed produced and relied on by the respondent was not a valid document. Thereafter the petitioner filed a criminal complaint against the respondent alleging commission of offences punishable under Ss."193, 409 and 423" of the Indian Penal Code before the Magistrate's Court Wadakkanchery who took the case on the file and numbered it as CC. No 1 of 1978. Thereafter the petitioner filed a criminal complaint against the respondent alleging commission of offences punishable under Ss."193, 409 and 423" of the Indian Penal Code before the Magistrate's Court Wadakkanchery who took the case on the file and numbered it as CC. No 1 of 1978. The respondent entered appearance and raised a preliminary objection that the complainant has no locus standi to file the complaint and that the finding of the Land Tribunal was being challenged by him before the Appellate Authority in A. A. No. 3040 of 1977. The learned magistrate holding that "except the court in which the matter was pending, no other person was competent to file a complaint which will come under the mischief of S.195 Cr. P. C " dismissed the complaint. 3. Being aggrieved by this order, the petitioner filed Crl. R. P. No. 41 of 1978 before the Court of Session, Trichur, and the learned Sessions Judge holding that a complaint by the Land Tribunal was necessary for initiating action against the respondent in respect of the offences alleged, dismissed the Revision Petition. It is this order that is being challenged before this Court. 4. The only question that arises for determination in this petition is whether the complaint filed by the petitioner is maintainable in view of the provisions in S.195(l)(b) Cr. P.C. An answer to this depends upon the question whether a Land Tribunal constituted under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (Act 1 of 1964), hereinafter called the Act, is a "court" within the meaning of S.195 Cr. P. C. 5. It was vehemently argued by the counsel for the respondent relying on the Full Bench decisions of this Court reported in Koran v. Kamala (1977 KLT. 358) and in Govindan Gopalan v. Raman Gopalan (1978 K.L.T. 315), and and the decision of a single Bench in C S Co-opetative Society v. Co-operative Tribunal (1979 KLT 629), that the Land Tribunal constituted under the Act is a court for all purposes. 358) and in Govindan Gopalan v. Raman Gopalan (1978 K.L.T. 315), and and the decision of a single Bench in C S Co-opetative Society v. Co-operative Tribunal (1979 KLT 629), that the Land Tribunal constituted under the Act is a court for all purposes. The counsel contended that the proceeding before the Land Tribunal is a judicial proceeding; that by virtue of S.101 of the Act, the Land Tribunals have been conferred with the powers of a civil court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of matters mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) of the section and that by virtue of S.108 of the Act, S.5 of the Indian Limitation Act has has been made applicable to all proceedings under the Act. Relying on the Full Bench decisions of this Court, the counsel submitted that it has been held in these decisions that the principle of res judicata enunciated under S.11 Code of Civil Procedure applies to Land Tribunal also. The argument was that S.11 Code of Civil Procedure speaks of a court and therefore when the principle under that section has been made applicable to the Land Tribunal, it automatically follows that the Land Tribunal is also a court. The decision of the Single Judge was relied on to show that the dictionary meaning of the word 'court' also was relied on by the court. What the learned Single Judge decided in this case was that in matters of construction of statutes, courts should not be prisoners of dictionary, though sometimes support may be had from dictionaries also. 6. None of these decisions has any application to the facts of this case. The simple and straight point for decision in this case is whether a Land Tribunal constituted under the Act is a court coming within the meaning of 'court' under S.195 Cr. P. C. No doubt 'court' has not been generally defined under the Code of Criminal Procedure. But it is significant to note that both Court and Land Tribunal have been defined respectively under S.2 (6) and 2 (32) of the Act. Both are distinct and different in constitution and functions. R.20 of the Rules framed under the Act, as it stood originally, related only to Land Tribunal and the Appellate Authority; but the word 'court' was inserted in the rule by Notification SRO. Both are distinct and different in constitution and functions. R.20 of the Rules framed under the Act, as it stood originally, related only to Land Tribunal and the Appellate Authority; but the word 'court' was inserted in the rule by Notification SRO. No 497 of 1975 published in the Kerala Gazette (Extraordinary) No. 307 dated 16 6 1975. These are clear indications to show that under the Act there is a clear distinction between a court and Land Tribunal and a Land Tribunal under the Act is different from a court as understood in S.195 Cr. P C. The argument of the counsel for the respondent that the Land Tribunal was adjudicating rights of parties and acting in a judicial manner and therefore it should be treated as a court coming within the meaning of S.195 Cr. P.C. also cannot be sustained. Even if an officer or a Tribunal has to act in a judicial manner or to perform quasi-judicial function while adjudicating upon matters coming before him or it, it cannot be said that regardless of all circumstances, such an officer or Tribunal is a court. (See Indo China Steam Navigation v Jasjit Singh) AIR. 1964 S. C. 1140 and also 1154. There is no necessity to refer to any decision on the point coming under similar Acts or to rely on the dictionary meaning of the word 'court', particularly when the meaning of the word 'court' referred to in sub-section I (b) has been made clear in sub-section (3) of the same section. Sub-section (3) of S.195 reads: "(3) in clause (b) of sub-section (1), the term "Court" means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this Section." It is crystal clear from the above, that what is meant by court in sub-section (1) (b) of S.195 has been defined in the above sub-section. This is a new provision introduced in the Code of 1973. This is a new provision introduced in the Code of 1973. The corresponding provision in the Old Code was sub-section (2) of S.195 which read as follows: "(2) In clauses (h) and (c) of sub-section (1), the term "court" includes a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, but does not include a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian Registration Act, 1877." In view of sub-section (3) of S.195, in order to decide whether a complaint in writing as contemplated under sub-section (I) of S.195 is necessary in respect of offences mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of S.195, what we have to consider is whether the forum or the Tribunal before which the proceedings were pending in relation to which offences are alleged to have been committed is a court coming within the meaning of sub-section (3) of S 195 Cr. P C. and not whether it is court as defined under the Act or generally understood or whether the forum or the Tribunal can be treated as a court by virtue of the judicial functions which it exercises. Admittedly the Land Tribunal is neither a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court referred to in S.195 (2) Cr. P. C. 7. The next question for consideration is whether it is a Tribunal constituted under any Central, Provincial or State Act. No doubt, the Land Tribunal is a Tribunal constituted under a State Act. But the further question which is the most important one as far as this case is concerned, is whether the Land Tribunal constituted under the Act has been declared by that Act to be a court for the purpose of S.195 Cr. P.C. Admittedly there is no such declaration or notification under the Act. It follows that the Land Tribunal under the Act is not a court within the meaning of sub-section (3) of S 195 and therefore, no complaint as contemplated under sub-section (1) of that section is necessary in respect of offences referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of that section. The complaint filed by the petitioner was therefore competent and was maintainable The order of the trial court, upheld by the Court of Session, cannot be sustained and has therefore to be interfered with. The complaint filed by the petitioner was therefore competent and was maintainable The order of the trial court, upheld by the Court of Session, cannot be sustained and has therefore to be interfered with. But the counsel appearing for both parties submitted that an appeal has been filed by the respondent challenging the order of the Land Tribunal and the same is pending consideration before the Appellate Authority and no decision has yet been reached in the case and therefore it is not necessary to restore the complaint on file but it is enough if the right of the petitioner to file his complaint at the appropriate time is left open. In the result, the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the complainant has no locus standi and is not maintainable.