Judgment 1. This second appeal by the defendant arises out of a judgment of reversal passed in a suit for eviction on ground of default in payment of rent. 2. The plaintiff-respondent prayed for eviction of the defendant, undisputedly a tenant under him on the ground that he had defaulted in payment of rent for a period of more than two months from 1.11.1961 onwards. The defendant-appellant contested the suit. He raised two points, namely, that he was not a defaulter inasmuch as the amount of rent stood adjusted on account of supply of material to the Mutwalli of the plaintiff, a Deity, from the grocery shop of the appellant. The second ground taken was defect in the service of notice under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 3. The trial Court did not accept the case of the defendant regarding plea of payment and held him to be a defaulter. However, it held that the notice under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not properly served. The trial Court, therefore, dismissed the suit without costs. 4. The plaintiff carried the matter in appeal. The appellate Court agreed with the finding of the trial Court rejecting the defence plea of payment. The lower appellate Court, however in disagreement with the trial Court held that the notice under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act was validly served. The result was that the judgment of the trial Court was set aside and the suit for eviction was decreed. The defendant has now carried the matter in second appeal before this Court. 5. The Supreme Court, as contended by Shri B.N. Agrawal, has held that a notice u/s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is not necessary to be served in a suit for eviction under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act. In such a situation Shri Agrawal did not press the question of service of notice for which point No. 2 in order No. 7 dated 3.05.1979 was formulated by the Hon ble Judge while admitting this second appeal. The sole contention of Shri Agrawal before this Court was that the finding of the lower appellate Court disbelieving the defendants version about the plea of payment of rent was not a finding in the eye of law, the lower appellate Court having given no reason worth the name in support of that finding. The sole contention of Shri Agrawal before this Court was that the finding of the lower appellate Court disbelieving the defendants version about the plea of payment of rent was not a finding in the eye of law, the lower appellate Court having given no reason worth the name in support of that finding. He, therefore, submitted that this introduced serious infirmity in the judgment of the lower appellate Court and as the whole decision of the suit hinges on this issue, the judgment of lower appellate Court should be set aside and the matter remended to it for fresh consideration in accordance with law and for deciding the appeal after giving a finding regarding the plea of payment with reasons therefor. 6. In paragraph 5 of judgment the lower appellate Court while discussing the point of plea of payment has observed as follows : "In this connection, I would like to mention here that the learned Addl. Munsif has elaborately discussed the evidence and I find no reason to disagree with his opinion. No cross objection has been filed against this finding of the learned Addl. Munsif. So the contention raised by Mr. Sahay has got no merit at all and I do not agree with his submissions that the finding of the learned Addl. Munsif is wrong as regards the rejection of the plea of payment made by the defendant." Certain evidence both oral and documentary were adduced by the parties regarding the plea of payment. They were discussed by the trial Court and it came to a finding disbelieving the plea of payment. The lower appellate Court did not scrutinise the evidence at all and simply observed that the learned Additional Munsif elaborately discussed the evidence and he found no reason to disagree with his finding. It is in this context that Shri Agrawal made a serious grievance and submitted that in absence of scrutiny of the evidence, either for or against, this bald finding by the lower appellate Court cannot be regarded as a finding recorded in accordance with law and as such the judgment of the lower appellate Court needed to be set aside. 7. Sec.107 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with the powers of appellate Court. 7. Sec.107 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with the powers of appellate Court. Sub-section (2) thereof states, inter alia, that the appellate Court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by this Code in Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein. Order 20, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure states that in suits in which issues have been framed, the Court shall state its finding or decision, with the reasons therefor, upon each separate issue, unless the finding upon any one or more of the issues is sufficient for the decision of the suit. The essence of a judgment is that it must be supported by reasons. Importance of reasonings in judgment is all the more necessary before a lower appellate Court whose decision or finding of facts is binding on the High Court. If, therefore, a judgment of a lower appellate Court is based on no reason, as submitted by Shri Agrawal, it cannot be regarded as a judgment recorded in accordance with law. In support of his contention Shri Agrawal relied on a single Bench decision of this Court reported in 1979 BBCJ 584 (585) : ( AIR 1980 Pat 89 ), (Bibi Tahzibunissa V/s. Dr. Syd. Azizur Rahman) wherein his Lordship observed that a mechanical reference of the oral evidence on which reliance has been placed on behalf of the respondent cannot be held to be a consideration of the evidence in the eye of law. The submission of Shri Agrawal was that here in the instant case there was absolutely no consideration of the evidence by the lower appellate Court as the lower appellate Court has simply agreed with the finding of the trial Court after observing that the learned Additional Munsif had elaborately discussed the evidence. The observation of the lower appellate Court regarding no cross-objection having been filed against the finding on the plea of payment was also assailed by Shri Agrawal on the ground that as the law stood prior to the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976 there was no provision for appeal against a finding in a suit of this nature when a suit had been dismissed. There is force in the contention of Shri Agrawal. There is force in the contention of Shri Agrawal. Learned counsel for the respondent urged that no such specific plea had been taken in the memo of second appeal. The submission of Shri Agrawal was that the point is covered by point No. 1 formulated at the time of admission of this appeal in Order No. 7 dated 3-5-1979. The point involved is pure and simple question of law and in the circumstances must be regarded as of a substantial nature. Pointing out to the provision of Order 41, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure the submission of Shri Agrawal was that even assuming that no such ground of objection was taken in the memo of second appeal, it being a substantial question of law of considerable importance, the Court should grant leave to him to urge this point and it should then decide the point. Order 41 deals with appeals from original decree but O.42, R.1 states that the rules of Order 41 shall apply, so far as may be to appeals from appellate decrees. It was in such a situation that leave was allowed to Shri Agrawal to urge this point, after notice to the learned counsel for the respondent, whose submission in this context too was heard. 8 On account of the infirmity occurring in the judgment of the lower appellate Court as pointed out above it cannot be regarded as supportable in law. Since the decision of the suit hinges on the question of plea of payment it would be necessary to set aside the judgment as a whole and remand the case to the lower appellate Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law on the materials available on the record. 9. In the result the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court is set aside and the case is remanded to the lower appellate Court for fresh decision in accordance with law keeping in view the observations made above on the materials already available on the record. There shall be no order for costs of this appeal and the parties shall bear their own costs.